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This thesis argues that "ethnicity" can be seen as the 
interplay between culture and politizs in a specific social 
context. It compares the ethnic identity and organization of 
two migrant groups, Eritreans and Egyptians, in Milan and 
their contrasting relationship with the "host society". It 
also assesses the theoretical significance of "cultural 
strategy", "social closure" and the "social construction of 
race", evaluating their significance for the concept of 
"ethnicity". The main method adopted is that of qualitative 
participant research. 
After a description of the social and cultural background of 
emigration and of the context of arrival, the thesis analyzes 
the main differences between the two groups in terms of 
patterns of employment, legal situation and housing. While 
these differences may partly be explained by the two groups' 
different demographic structures, social networks and ethnic 
identity, the crucial difference is in their different 
patterns of leadership, organization and political contacts 
with the "host society". The Eritreans have a high attendance 
at their "ethnic institutions" because their leaders have 
been able to draw support from and to establish contacts 
with, sections of the "host society" in order to find 
employment, to obtain sojourn permits and to gain access to 
public housing. By contrast, the Egyptians have a low 
attendance at the religious institution that they share with 
other Muslims, not only for ideological reasons, but also 
because of the institution's relative lack of resources. Instead, intermarriage is one of the main avenues of social 
advancement. 
The thesis concludes that "ethnicity' can be seen as a 
"usurpatory cultural strategy" in relation to the racist 
ideologies and "exclusionary" practices of the "host 
society". For the Eritreans it involves the stressing of 
cultural distinctiveness and social enhancement at a group 
level. For the Egyptians it involves concealment of cultural 
difference and social enhancement pursued at an individual 
level. 
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This thesis falls within the broad field defined as "ethnic 
relations" and in particular within that of "urban 
ethnicity". These topics have been tackled, from different 
angles, by a multitude of scholars within the social sciences 
-sociologists, anthropologists, geographers, political 
scientists and others- producing an enormous amount of 
material. Although this thesis addresses some of the major 
theoretical questions that emerge from the literature and 
tries to challenge the conventional usage of certain concepts 
(including, "ethnicity" itself), it raises as many questions 
as it attempts to answer. What may be novel is the 
interdisciplinary approach adopted in the treatment of these 
questions. This reflects in part my undergraduate background, 
having read for a B. A. in Anthropology and Geography at 
University College London, and - in part a theoretical concern 
that, without such an approach, important issues will be 
missed out. As a result, contributions that have emerged from 
the fields of geography, anthropology and sociology will be 
adopted. 
My interest in this topic arose from reading Abner Cohen's 
Customs and Politics in Urban Africa (1969). I was fascinated 
by the idea that the "cultural-symbolic" dimension (including 
"ethnicity"), rather than being just an "archaic" survival of 
the past, was also an important factor of the 
politico-economic process. His concepts will be discussed 
and their relevance tested in the context of my own study. 
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The "ethnic groups" (Eritrean and Egyptian) and the "urban 
context" (Milan) 'selected for this research probably does 
constitute an absolute novelty, at least for the Anglo-Saxon 
tradition in this field of study. The novelty lies not so 
much in the study of two "ethnic migrant minorities" like the 
Eritreans and the Egyptians, but that the context is a 
country like Italy. Within the field of anthropology, Italy 
has generally been studied as an "underdeveloped" country, 
either by looking at Italian migrants abroad, or by studying 
small rural communities in Southern and Central Italy, within 
the field of "Mediterranean studies" (1). As Kerzer (1983) 
points out, from the literature it often seems that Italy is 
a nation of peasants living in remote and desolate villages. 
On the other hand, this study looks at Italy in terms of 
features it has in common with other "western industrial" 
countries, including the presence of migrant labour from the 
"Third World". For in 1986 Italy was the fifth western 
industrial nation in terms of G. N. P. per capita, according to 
The Economist (2). However it is true that this "new" type 
of migration (as opposed to internal 'migration from South 
to North) is a relatively recent phenomenon. Another 
distinctive aspect of this migration that posed particular 
problems for research was that, at least during the time of 
fieldwork (September 1984- March 1986), most of the migrants 
were "illegal". They therefore greeted a researcher with 
particular diffidence and suspicion. 
Finally, another relative peculiarity of the thesis is the 
attempt to engage in a systematic comparison between two 
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migrant groups, the Eritreans and the Egyptians, in the same 
context, Milan. Although differences outweighed similarities, 
the comparative aspect is useful from a theoretical point of 
view. However a totally "impartial", "objective" comparison 
has not been possible, not only because of my own subjective 
feelings towards the two groups, but also because the 
different nature of the two groups poses different problems 
in each case. 
Acknowledgments 
I should like to thank many individuals and institutions who 
have contributed to, the completion of this reasearch. From 
an academic point of view, my gratitude is especially due to 
my two supervisors, Dr. Peter Jackson (Department of 
Geography U. C. L. ) and Dr. Paul Richards (Department of 
Anthropology U. C. L. ) for painstaking theoretical and 
editorial guidance. Also at University College London, I 
would like to thank Professor Sandra Waliman and her "City 
Workshop" for valuable suggestions and criticisms about my 
research and in particular Dr. Italo Pardo. The Royal 
Anthropological Institute granted me an award (the 
Radcliffe-Brown Memorial Award) which helped me to complete 
the thesis. In Italy, I would like to thank Professor Enzo 
Mingione (Department of Sociology, University of Messina), 
Professor Danilo Giori (Department of Sociology, University 
of Cagliari), Professor. Umberto Melotti (Department of 
Sociology, University of Pavia) and Professor Pierluigi 
Crosta (Department of Planning, University of Milan) for 
theoretical contributions and for practical suggestions on 
11 
fieldwork strategies. In this respect many thanks are also 
due to Dr. Antonio Aimi, who was kind enough to provide me 
with some contacts among "Third World" immigrants in Milan 
and with whom I also had some valuable theoretical 
discussions. Many individuals working in groups and 
institutions dealing with these issues from a non-academic 
point of view should also be thanked for having kindly 
provided me with data and contacts. Among them, I should 
mention Miss bruna Sironi, Dr. Graziella Favaro, Mrs. Rosanna 
Turri Riccardi, Mr. Damiano Bonini, Mr. Stefano Allievi, Dr. 
Giampiero Bartolucci, Father Augusto and Faher Nunzio. My 
warmest thanks also to members and leaders of the Eritrean, 
Egyptian and Muslim groups, for having shown kindness and 
hospitality to a "nosy intruder". I would like to think that 
my research may improve their situation, but would be more 
than happy if it helps to understand it a little better. 
Pseudonyms have been used in the thesis to safeguard their 
privacy. Finally my warmest gratitude to my parents, without 
whose support this project would never have been possible. 
12 
NOTES TO PREFACE 
R 
1 
(1) See for example Boissevain (1979), Boissevain and Friedl 
(1975) and S. E. F. G. (1981) for a more critical approach. 
(2) The Economist 24-ZO January 1987: "Italy's vita gets 
more dolce" 
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CHAPTER 1: THEORETICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL INTRODUCTION: 
ETHNICITY, MIGRATION AND THE CITY. 
This study examines the interplay of socioeconomic, 
demographic, political and cultural aspects of two migrant 
groups, Eritreans and Egyptians, in Milan and compares their 
different relationships with the "host society". The main 
focus is on how the two groups, in a common context and 
similar economic position, developed contrasting cultural 
strategies and styles of ethnic politics. This chapter 
outlines the main theoretical assumptions and propositions 
beheind the research. It reviews the literature most 
relevant to the study, introduces the theoretical and 
methodological framework and defines the object of study.. 
1.1 Theoretical assumptions and propositions 
Eritreans and Egyptians in Milan can initially be 
characterized as two migrant groups with specific 
"non-Italian" ethnic backgrounds. This involves both 
socioeconomic issues such as migration, class and employment, 
and sociocultural ones such as identity, ethnicity and 
culture. Although these two sets of issues cannot be reduced 
to one another they influence each other in specific 
situations as mediated by human practice. This thesis thus 
entails an examination of a range of theories that encompass 
different aspects of social life and adopts an 
interdisciplinary approach, which is recently becoming more 
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popular also among geographers (cf. Gregory 1978, Jackson 
and Smith 1984). 
Some of the main theoretical concepts employed in the thesis 
can now be introduced. 
Structuration and the habitus 
Giddens' (1976) notion of "structuration", has sought to go 
beyond the analytical dualism that characterized much of the 
sociological literature (1). He argues that the production 
and reproduction of social life must be treated as a skilled 
performance on the part of social actors and not as an 
epiphenomenon of social structure. The realm of human agency 
is bounded. Human beings produce society as historically 
located actors. Structures are produced and reproduced 
through practice, which in turn is constituted structurally. 
Furthermore structures only exist as the reproduced conduct 
of situated actors with definite intentions and interests. 
This approach, recently also employed in geographical works 
(e. g. Gregory 1978, Jackson and Smith 1984, Pred 1986), is 
close to Bourdieu's (1977) argument that human action should 
not be seen just in terms of rules, epiphenomenal to the 
structure, but in terms of "practice" and "strategies", 
i. e. 
as "practical social mastery" that enables the individual 
to 
cope with the social world. Bourdieu synthetizes 
this 
relationship between practices and structures through his 
concept of "habitus". These concepts help to understand 
that 
the behaviour of Eritreans and Egytpians in Milan is partly 
the result of their different social and cutural 
backgrounds 
and demographic charactersistics, partly conditioned by the 
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context of arrival, and partly the result of the practical 
strategies of the individuals of the two group and of the 
wider society. In particular it helps to understand the 
relationship between the "ethnic institutions" described in 
chapter 5, the "host society's organizations described in 
chapter 6 and the ethnic politics analyzed in chapter 7. 
Social classes `" 
Whereas Marx defined social classes by the unequal 
relationship of human collectivities to the means of 
production of material life (cf. Marx 1963), the 
relationships between social classes- or between "social 
formations" are not simply functional to the "needs" of 
capital or simply reducible to the "structure" (2). Instead 
the maintenance and reproduction of capitalist relations 
should be analyzed as the result of historically specific 
conflicts, negotiations and alliances between classes (as 
well as "social formations" and various kinds of social 
groups), that is in terms of practice. Thus, as Gramsci 
(1975, pp. 119-120) pointed out: "a given political act may 
be a mistake on the part of the leaders of the dominant 
classes... (and is not necessarily) determined by the 
structure" (3). This thesis also draws on the distinction 
between a "class in itself", defined only by relations of 
production, and a "class for itself", defined also by class 
consciousness, as a class becomes a social subject only when 
these two preconditions are present (cf. Mar); 1963 pp. 
164-165). This affects the relationship between the migrants 
and the Milanese working class, discussed in chapters 3,4, 
and B. Moreover, the division between capital and labour is 
i 
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not the only significant social division in western 
societies. In fact the growing importance of the service 
sector at the expense of the industrial sector as well as' the 
segmentation of the labour market, have meant an increasing 
fragmentation of the two main social classes and the rise of 
new sQ=ial divisions and patterns of social conflict (cf. 
Mingione 1981; Castells 1983). While this thesis aims to 
situate the migrant groups in their economic (class) context, 
it will argue that some of the crucial differences between 
the two groups (cf. chapter 7) and areas of conflict with the 
wider society (cf. chapter 8) lie in the shere. of social 
reproduction or "collective consumption". 
Interest groups and social closure 
In capitalist societies major social divisions and social 
conflicts arise from opposing interests, that do not 
necessarily coincide with the capital/labour dichotomy. As 
Parkin (1979) has argued,, interest groups seek to maximize 
their . gains by restricting access to resources and 
opportunities to "outsiders". He defines this process as 
"social closure", which can be of an "exclusionary" kind, 
where a social group seeks to prevent others from having 
access to its gains, or of a "usurpatory" kind, where a 
social group tries to displace another from its social gains. 
Crucially, social closure does not-entail only a conflict in 
the economic sphere, but also in that of politics, status or 
culture. Chapter 7 will ' analyze to what extent it is 
possible to speak of Eritreans and Egyptians in Milan as 
interest groups employing "usurpatory strategies" and 
chapter 8 will analyze the "exclusionary" practices of the 
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"host society" (4). Social conflict is therefore of a 
mutidimensional, rather than unidemensional, kind and 
relationships between social classes and interest groups may 
be not only of conflict but also of alliance and negotiation 
(e. g. Gramsci's (1975) notion of "historical bloc"). These 
patterns will be analyzed in chapter 6,7 and B. 
Culture and identity 
The basis of social conflict or alliance, that is of 
collective action between different social groups, is not 
dictated by socioeconomic motives alone. The fact that one 
can identify categories of people in terms of common 
relations of production or socioeconomic interests does not 
mean that all human beings belonging to these categories will 
act togther with common goals. The problem is therefore to 
delimit the boundaries of these horizontal sets of categories 
(social classes, interest groups) which would identify them 
as active social groups. For besides the ontological 
importance of labour, i. e. the production and reproduction of 
material life by human beings, there is also the need to 
identify the self in the social universe (cf. Cohen, S. A., 
1984, Levi-Strauss 1964a, b). Belonging to a particular 
group, with all the rituals, symbols and affectivity 
attached, provides a group identity which is a very powerful 
psychological factor affecting social behaviour (Epstein, 
1978). Thus the analytical importance of the existence of an 
"us"/"them" boundary (Waliman 1979), can be said to be an 
ontological condition of human life. Culture can be seen as 
"historically transmitted patterns of meanings embodied in 
symbolic forms... by means of which men (sic) communicate, 
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perpetuate and develop their knowledge about and their 
attitude towards life" (Geertz 1973, p. 89). When the 
boundaries of culture enable the individual to identify 
him/herself as part of an "us" vs. a "them" (usually with 
the presence of rites of passage at the crucial stages of the 
life-cycle), they also delimit identity, although it can 
shift with the us/them boundary (cf. Waliman 1979). The 
identity of Eritreans and Egyptians in, their countries of 
origin will be analyzed in chapter 2 an-J their realization in 
Milan in chapter 5. Interest groups and social classes 
therefore carry out collective action also when there is the 
perception of a common identity. Although a social class can 
provide a "culture" with strong sybolic patterns, in order 
for a "class in itself" to become a "class for itself", class 
consciousness must also be coupled with a common identity. As 
chapter 7 will argue, this process has gone further in Milan 
for the Eritreans than for the Egyptians. 
Culture and heoemon 
But culture does not only provide a system of meanings and an 
identity, nor can it be reduced to an ephimenomenon of the 
structure and therefore treated as "ideological false 
consciousness". As Gramsci recognized, there are also: 
"historically organic ideologies that have a validity that 
is psychological; they organize human masses, form the 
terrain on which men acquire consciousness of their 
position, struggle... (and these analyses therfore) 
strengthen the conception'of historical bloc,. in which 
material forces are not historically conceivable without 
form and form would be just individual whims without 





Although he still used the concept of "ideology" as opposed 
to that of "culture", Gramsci recognized that all 
"ideologies" contain an element of distortion of social 
reality (what may be defined as "ideology" proper) as well as 
a "world-view" (which may be defined as "culture"). This can 
be summarized by the notion of "hegemony", by which he meant 
that the dominant classes exert their power on the 
subordinate one not only through legal force, (, but also 
through consensus obtained at the level of culture to which 
the subordinate classes oppose their own world view (cf. 
Gramsci 1975,1977). These ideas have been further elaborated 
members of , the C. C. C. S. in Birmingham (e. g. Hall and 
Jefferson '1976, C. C. C. S. 1982). They provide a key to 
understand the different relationship between the two, groups 
and the "host society" analyzed in chapters 6 and 7. 
Culture and politics 
This thesis is also centrally concerned with the relationship 
between culture and politics, a field that has been one of 
the main concerns of the anthropologist Abner Cohen (1969, 
1974a, 1974 b). He has examined the dialectical relationship 
of the symbolic-cultural level with politico-economic 
processes. He argued that symbolic formations have important 
functions of organization, distinctiveness and "closure" to 
outsiders especially for interest groups (including "ethnic" 
groups) and that the symbolic-cultural dimension can be 
manipulated and transformed to achieve particular aims, even 
if he is careful to argue that there is an "irreducible" 
dimension to culture (1980, p. 81). He sees these processes 
as inherent to all social groups, including West Indian 
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minorities in London (1980,1982). Other authors have 
recognized the importance of studying the relationship 
between symbolic-cultural and politico-economic processes. 
For example Pierre Bourdieu (1977) employs concepts of 
"symbolic capital" and "symbolic power" as an integral 
component of social "practices" and "strategies" while Sandra 
Waliman (1984) employs the notion of non-material 
resources". Culture is not only a medium through which 
social relationships of conflict, alliance and negotiation 
are expressed. It also constitutes an active component of 
these processes. With this general framework, some of the 
more specific literature on "urban ethnicity" can now be 
examined., ' 
1.2 Debates on the nature of ethnicity 
A comprehensive review of the literature is not possible 
here. Instead, only works considered theoretically useful 
for the construction of the argument and for the 
specification of the obect of study, will be selected. 
The adjective "ethnic" is usually employed in two different 
contexts: where two or more culturally distinct groups 
contest power within the framework of a nation-state 
(usually giving rise to the concept of "nationalism") and 
where culturally distinct minority groups, usually (but not 
always) migrants, interact with other(s) to enhance their 
socioeconomic conditions, but without nationalistic aims. 
This analysis will be mainly confined to the second context. 
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While the Chicago school's pioneering work on ethnic 
minorities in cities was carried out within an J 
assimilationist perspective (cf. Park 1967, chapters 6 and 
8), Glazer and Moynihan (1975) have noted that, from a 
theoretical point of view, analyses of ethnicity have tended 
to fall between two poles: "primordialist" and 
"circumstantialist". While the second of these approaches 
will be analyzed later on in this section, the 
"Primordial ist" thesis assumes that ethnic loyalties are a 
survival from a "primitive" past (characteristic of 
non-western "primitive" groups) that would disappear in the 
process of modernization (cf. Shils 1957). However, Glazer 
and Moynihan (1970) found no evidence of assimilation Among 
the various ethnic groups in New York in the 1960s. In 
Britain other authors have argued that ethnic groups are 
neither assimilating in the process of modernization (Peach, 
1981) nor that they 'should be seen as a "survival" of 
"primordial loyalties" (Watson, 1977). Instead, the modern 
world is witnessing a massive occurrence of "ethnic revivals" 
(Smith, A. 1981). But, as Epstein (1978) argues, the 
cognitive-affective dimension of belonging to an "ethnic" 
group, is still a powerful element to be recognized. The 
notion of identity and the existence of an "us"/"them" 
boundary is an ontological condition of human life. The first 
problem that this poses, however, is how to distinguish 
"ethnic" identity, ` from other forms of cultural identity. 
While this will be discussed in more detail later, for it 
affects all the contexts in which the adjective "ethnic" is 
used, "ethnic" identity (as opposed to other kinds) can 
provisionally be characterized as one that defines a 
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particular group of people sharing the perception of a common 
history and origins, maintained by rituals at crucial stages 
of the individual's life-cycle (especially birth and 
marriage). In a sense, therefore, all human beings belong to 
an "ethnic group", but the term "ethnic" is socially 
significant only when applied to a situation of interaction 
between two (or more) groups, in this case between a 
(migrant) minority and a "host society" (4). 
The second problem is, as Epstein (1978) and Wailman (1979) 
recognize, that the "us"/"them" boundary is not fixed, but 
can be maintained or tranfarmed according to different 
circumstances that also affect the number of identity options 
available to the individual. This leads to an examination of 
some of the "circumstantial ist" approaches to ethnicity, such 
as the interactionist approach, that can be traced to Park's 
work (Jackson and Smith, 1981). Most appropriate to the 
concerns of this study, even if not focussing directly on the 
topic of ethnicity, is Hannerz's (1980) attempt to develop an 
"anthropology of the city". Hannerz looks at interactions (or 
what he terms "purposive situational involvements") between 
individuals in the city in different domains of "role 
repertoires" (household-kinship, provisioning, recreation, 
neighbouring, traffic). He argues that the analyst should 
look at both interactions within the same domain and at 
relationship between the various domains and that roles are 
not static but can be negotiated in different interactional 
settings, using Goffman's (1959) theatrical approach to the 
"presentation of self" in -society. However this approach is 
highly voluntarisitic and based on the individual rather than 
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social groups. Moreover, there is very little discussion of 
relationships of power and conflict among social groups, let 
alone among social classes. Hanner: therefore comes to the 
disappointing and traditional conclusion about ethnicity, 
that it is a "role discriminatory attribute" in "purposive 
situational involvements", i. e. a burden, a form of "cultural 
baggage" in the rational conduct of human beings. 
A more interesting framework, theoretically related to the 
above one and concentrating more on ethnicity than on the 
urban setting, is Barth's (1969) transactionalist approach to 
the study of ethnic groups and boundaries. He argues that 
instead of- looking at ethnic groups in terms of their content 
or "cultural stuff" (the "cultural baggage" notion of the 
"survivalist" approach), we should see them as categories of 
ascription and identification by the actors themselves, 
organizing interaction particularly in the process of 
boundary formation and maintenance between different ethnic 
groups. In other words, an ethnic group is not defined by its 
internal cultural characteristics but in relation to another 
group. The task of the analyst is to examine the cultural 
differentiae, rather than the whole culture, that allow for 
the maintenance of such boundaries. He recognizes, moreover, 
that individuals might cross over and change their identity 
according to their interests, as their ethnic identity might 
be relevant to behaviour or not. In spite of these useful 
theoretical suggestions, " Barth's approach also suffers from 
some shortcomings. In the first place, as Abner Cohen argues 
(1974a, pp. xii-xiii), ethnicity is still viewed as an 
essentially innate and fixed characteristic, being an 
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"organizational vessel", in Earth's words. If the primary 
process is only that of self-identification (even if in 
relationship to other groups) one risks stating the obvious, 
i. e. that ethnic groups exist because the actors say so. In 
this respect there. is no suggestion that ethnicity can be 
transformed and manipulated, not only maintained, or that 
ethnicity operates at a group level and not only at that of 
the individual, Secondly, and more importantly, there is 
little discussion of how the process of ethnic boundary 
maintenance is interlinked with other types of social 
relationships, such as those involving political and economic 
conflict, as Miles (19B2) argues. 
A fruitful development from this perspective is that 
expounded by Sandra Wallaman (1979). She recognizes the 
significance of the "us"/"them" boundary in terms of identity 
and boundary maintenance and argues that ethnicity is the 
recognition of a significant difference beteen "them" and 
"us" that can be couched in a variety of terms, like 
culture, race, religion or nation (ibid., p. 3). Moreover, and 
crucially for the perspective of this study, she also 
recognizes that the boundary, might shift according to the 
circumstances set by the context or situation, which in turn 
depends on the interplay between structural constraints and 
opportunities (cf. also Mitchell 1974). As changes occur on 
one side of the boundary they also produce changes on the 
other side. The boundary process as well as ethnicity itself 
are "reactive". Finally, depending on the context, ethnicity 
can provide access to and organization of (through "ethnic 
gatekeepers") work and "non-material" resources like time, 
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information and identity (to which one might add political 
connections) as opposed to material resources, like capital 
and labour (Wallman 1982). In other words ethnicity itself 
can become a resource or, in Bourdieu's (1977) words, a kind 
of "symbolic capital". But what is crucial, is that, 
depending on the context, this may or may not happen. It is 
important therefore to define the nature of the context 
itself. While a. more precise definition will be found in the 
next section, it can be anticipated that the context will 
include socioeconomic (interest groups and social classes), 
political (power groups, parties, etc. ) and cultural 
(hegemonic ideologies and cultural discourses) factors. 
Finally, sharing some elements of the above perspective, but 
placing more emphasis on the political dimension of ethnicity 
at the expense of the cultural-identity one, there is Abner 
Cohen's wort: itself. The previous section has already 
reviewed Cohen's "two-dimensional" approach to the study of 
human society with his notion of the "dialectics of 
politico-symbolic interdependence" (1974b) and his 
dramaturgical approach to the study of the "chain of 
sociocultural causation" (1980,1981). In his earlier works 
he applied these concepts, from a slightly different 
perspective, to the study of ethnicity. In his seminal work 
(Cohen 1969) he distinguished between "ethnic groups" and 
"ethnicity", stating that (p. 4): 
i 
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an ethnic group is an informal interest group whose members 
are distinct from members of other groups within the same 
society in that they share ... compulsory institutions like 
kinship and religion ... make use of extensive moral and 
ritual obligations that bind its members in order to 
organize its political functions ... Ethnicity refers to the 
strife between such groups, in the course of which people 
stress their identity and exclusiveness". 
This is because symbolic formations are seen by Cohen as very 
powerful elements structuring relationships, largely 
unconsciously, through the psyches of the actors, referring 
ambiguously to different, meanings (1974a, 1974b). More 
importantly, they can be manipulated according to political 
functions. 
This often involves stressing distinctiveness from other 
groups making up the society in which they are interacting. 
This can be done in a variety of ways: by stressing common 
descent, by developing kinship relations, by forming 
religious or voluntary associations that would exclude 
"outsiders", and for a variety of purposes, like economic 
entrepreneurship, by the development of moral solidarity and 
trust and structures of decision-making and authority (Cohen 
1969,1974a, 1974b). Ethnic groups are seen as interest 
groups making use of "cultural strategies". (or what might be 
called "ethnicity") in their struggle for economic and 
political power. The advantage of these strategies is that 
they often lead to the development of "informal 
organizations" that allow the group to articulate its 
interests even if in a minority situation when formal 
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political strategies are insufficient because of their lack 
of (formal) power. Cohen has applied this method to a variety 
of cases and in particular to the Hausa settlers in Ibadan 
who, through a kinship network and membership of an Islamic 
sect, monopolize a trading network of cattle and kola nuts 
(Cohen 1969) and to the Creoles of Freetown who, through 
membership of a Masonic lodge, manage to retain control of 
the professions and of the civil service, even if in a 
situation of (formal) political weakness following 
decolonization (Cohen 1971,1981). In both cases Cohen argues 
that in a situation of relative weakness of (formal) power, 
political and economic interests can be articulated through 
"cultural 'strategies" that involve the manipulation of 
cultural distinctiveness. He applied this framework also to 
Western case studies, like the City of London businessmen 
(1974a, 1974b) and, dropping the emphasis on the 
political-interest oriented aspects of these processes for a 
notion of culture in terms of resistance to subordination, to 
Afro-Carribean minorities in London (1980,1982). 
Cohen is not the only scholar to see ethnicity in situational 
and political terms and ethnic groups as interests groups. 
For example, Glazer and Moynihan (1975) also see ethnic 
groups primarily as interest groups, Bell (1975) analyzes 
them in terms of a combination of affective ties and 
interests, and Lloyd (1974) sees power and wealth as the main 
sources of ethnic competition. However Cohen seems to be the 
most consistent and imaginative exponent of the 
"pal itical-circumstantialist" approach to ethnicty and he is 
careful to avoid economic reductionism also taking into 
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account the cognitive dimension of ethnicity. His notion of 
cultural strategy may be criticized for sounding too 
deliberate and voluntaristic, but Cohen argues that symbols 
operate in their poltical functions largely unconsciously 
through the psyches of the actors. When the Muslim Hausa of 
Ibadan 
... gather in a congregation to pray on Friday, they do not 
say: Let us pray in order to consolidate the '-weakening 
position of the cheif, or to enhance the moral 
distinctiveness of the community. They are mostly unaware 
of these functions, their motives in performing the prayer 
being mixed and varied, often having nothing to do directly 
with politicking (Cohen, A. 1974b, p. 53). 
His argument that the cutural-symbolic forms are an inherent 
parts of politico-economic processes and of struggles of 
resistance is appealing and is part of the theoretical 
framework of this thesis. But the argument that ethnic groups 
can be seen as interest groups adopting cultural strategies 
that always involve the stressing and dramatization of 
cultural difference, seems difficult to generalize, as 
ethnicity can also be a liability, depending on the context 
(cf. Wallman 1979, Epstein 1978). This does not deny the 
symbolic-cultural dimension of social subordination and 
politico-economic processes or, to use Cohen's terminology, 
that a "cultural strategy" will not be adopted. But this 
might involve concealing, rather than stressing, cultural 
difference. This calls again for a closer look at the context 
of "ethnicity", in terms of class structure (cf. Miles 1982), 
and of the relationship between the "ethnic" group and other 
interest groups and with the dominant political forces and 
cultural discourses of the "host society". 
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1.3 Ethnicity in context 
J 
Any group defining itself in opposition to others and making 
use of cultural distictiveness, following the above approach, 
may be defined as an "ethnic" group. In this sense, punks, 
mods and skinheads, among others, may qualify as an ethnic 
group. Indeed, on many counts they are. Cohen's City of 
London businessmen come from a distinctive social 
background, have been to the same schools, dress in the same 
way and speak with the same accent, allowing them to develop 
relationships of trust through which informal transactions 
are carried out (Cohen, A. 1974a, 1974 b). In this sense they 
are very similar to the Hausa of Ibadan and are therefore as 
"ethnic" as any ethnic group can be. However, what 
characterizes "ethnic" as opposed to other kinds of groups, 
is not only cultural distictiveness, which can be couched in 
a variety of terms (e. g. religious, linguistic, etc. ), but 
also a separate sense of descent from the other groups with 
whom they are interacting (given the caveat that boundaries 
may shift overtime). Usually this pattern is reinforced by 
rites of passage at crucial stages of the life-cycle of an 
individual, like birth and marriage, which define in-group 
membership. However Miles (1982, pp. 61-67) argues that what 
characterizes "ethnic" groups is the position of their 
members as subordinated labour migrants. Even though his call 
to look at the structural context is commendable, it must be 
recognized that one can speak of "ethnic" groups and 
"ethnicity" not only in this situation, as e. g. the Sierra 
Leone Creoles case shows, for they have a perception of 
separate descent and cutural, distinctiveness, maintained 
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through elaborate! rituals and yet occupy mainly middle-upper 
class positions (Cohen 1981). This pattern applies to a 
certain extent also to Jews in Britain and in the USA who, in 
present times, are mainly concentrated in the commercial and 
financial sector and 'in the professions (cf. k: osmin 1979, 
Glaser and Moynihan 1970, Steinberg 1981). The overlap 
between class and ethnic boundaries maintains and reinforces 
ethnic differences as the class struggle 'largely coincides 
with ethnic interest. In the two situations mentioned above, 
this overlap occurs at an upper class level and the ethnic 
groups employ "exclusionary" strategies (Parkin 1979) to 
preserve their position. This situation also leads to a 
potentially high degree of ethnic conflict. 
But in looking at the context of ethnicity, the main focus 
will be on "ethnic" groups at the bottom of the social 
ladder. In the first place many minority "ethnic" groups, 
including Eritreans and Egyptians in Milan, can be 
characterized from a socio-economic point of view as labour 
migrants (Miles 19B2). Labour migration theory will therefore 
be briefly examined. 
Labour mioration theor 
In examining migration, the literature classically 
distinguishes between "push" and "pull" factors of migration. 
However this conception is rather empiricist, for processes 
leading to emigration in the zones of exodus are affected by 
processes leading to immigration in the zones of arrival, 
like the penetration of capitalist relations in the 
countryside and international division of labour (cf. Roberts 
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1978, Miles 1982, Reyneri 1979, Gilbert and Bugler 1983) (5). 
For example it is not by chance that many immigrants to 
European countries come from ex-colonies (cf. Re>: and 
Tomlinson 1979 and Miles 1982). Moreover it is now well 
established that migration is not a random process affecting 
mainly people at the very bottom social strata of the zones 
of exodus, but that it is a selective process (age, sex, 
financial resources), structured by networks of kinship, 
friendship, etc. (cf. Reyneri 1979, Roberts 1978). This has 
led the above authors to characterize the migration process 
as a "migration chain". Although this approach is 
analytically useful, it also has the danger of 
overemphasizing the direct connections between "push" and 
"pull" factors all functional to the "needs" of capital and 
to treat the migrants as mere "rings" of a chain, rather 
than also as subjects who make decisions. Finally, especially 
in the early phases of settlement, it is important to 
identify the pattern of migration since it determines 
important "structural" aspects of the group, like size, 
age-structure and sex-ratio. This applies particularly to the 
situation of Eritreans and Egyptians in Milan. 
Looking more into the labour side of the labour migration 
theory, many authors agree that labour migration was very 
advantageous economically to the countries of arrival since 
it met a shortage of labour in the unskilled-semiskilled 
industrial manufacturing sector at very low costs of social 
reproduction (education, housing, social security) (cf. 
Reyneri 1979, diner and Salcedo 1978). This has led some 
authors to claim that immigrants can be considered as part of 
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the working class, even if a "divided" one (cf. Castles and 
Kosack 1973) or as constituting a "fraction" of the working 
class (Miles 1982). This might have been true of a particular 
historical period, i. e. the industrial boom of the 1950s and 
1960s in Europe and in the USA in an earlier period (cf. 
Gordon 1964). This situation may potentially lead to 
assimilation, as belonging to the working class, with all the 
political and symbolic meanings attached to it, can provide a 
strong identity option for the migrants. This pattern partly 
applied to the "ethnic" European migrants in the USA 
(Steinberg 1981) and to most West Indians who came to Britain 
with no specific sense of a separate identity (Cashmore 
1979), entered the working class and supported the trade 
unions (Rex and Tomlinson 1979). Subjectively at least, they 
would have felt assimilated as their struggles and goals 
would have largely coincided with those of the class they 
belonged to. This could be the classical scenario for a 
"succession/assimilation" ecological model. However, even in 
this case the "rank sequence" can be violated (cf. Light 
1981), as the case of Puerto Ricans in New York demonstrates 
(Jackson 1981). 
This pattern does not apply equally well to later periods. 
With the economic crisis and industrial restructuring of the 
1970s and 1980s, migrant workers,, more than native ones, were 
made redundant or forced into the lower service sector (cf. 
Rex and Tomlinson 1979, ' Reyneri 1979). Moreover, many 
migrants entered directly into the lower service economy or 
carried out economic activities associated with the "petty 
bourgeoisie". With sojourn permits tied to job contracts 
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and with the lack of support from the trade unions (cf. Giner 
and Salcedo 1978, Portes 1977, Reynerl 1979), they were 
likely to be a more "flexible" pool of labour, rather than a 
militant one claiming wage increases. These processes have 
been connected with a transformation in the structure of the 
labour market where from a situation of competition among 
workers for employment (the "reserve army of labour") a 
situation of separate labour markets developed1(cf. Fiore 
1979). This is because, 'on the one hand, the industrial 
sector has experienced a transformation with the introduction 
of labour saving technologies which required relatively more 
skills such that unionized workers who retained their Jobs 
became more difficult to fire. On the other hand, there has 
been a persistence and growth of small-scale non-unionized 
economic activities (cf. Paci 1981) and of the many sectors 
of the service economy that could not be reached by 
technological innovation (eg. catering, cleaning), which have 
been mostly filled by migrants (cf. Mingione 1984, pp. 
238-240). A "central" "protected" working class has emerged 
as opposed to a "marginal" "unprotected" one. Finally there 
has also been a growth of a relatively skilled and 
"protected" service economy either in the private sector, 
paralleling economic innovation, or in the public one due to 
the greater amount of state intervention in the economic 
field. A "segmented" labour market has developed (cf. 
Mingione 1981 pp. 55-63) or, in relation to migrants, an 
"ethnic division of labour". 
These concepts have profound implications for a 
characterization of the migrants in terms of class, as well 
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as for patterns of social consciousness and conflict. 
Discounting those migrants who enter the petty bourgeoisie 
(small business, etc. ) and cannot be regarded as part of the 
working class, it seems pointless to consider the host of 
"coloured" migrants that work as cleaners, waiters, caterers 
in fast-food shops, etc., as part of the working class (even 
if a "fraction" of it) as Miles (1982) does, simply on the 
grounds that they sell their labour power. This does not meet 
the second condition for a marxist characterization of the 
working class, namely that besides selling wage labour (the 
precondition for a "class in itself"), workers must also have 
a degree of class consciousness, through unionization, etc. 
(the precondition for a "class for itself"). It is in this 
situation of exclusion from the class structure of the "host 
society" (6) that ethnicity can become a resource for upward 
mobility, mainly through self-employment and ethnic 
enterprise. This has been true of the earlier phases of 
Jewish migration to Britain and The USA (cf. Kosmin 1979, 
Steinberg 1981) and of Pakistanis in Britain who, to a large 
extent, concentrated in small-scale business (cf. Dahya 1974, 
Aldrich et al. 1981). These groups can be analyzed as 
interest groups employing "cultural strategies" (cf. Cohen 
1969,1974a, b) of a "usurpatory" kind (cf. Parkin 1979). 
However "ethnicity" might not work only in relation to 
employment but also in relation to " urban goods" such as 
housing, health and education, as the case of Eritreans in 
Milan will show. 
Not all groups excluded from the class system (that is not to 
say from the productive system) manage to articulate as 
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interest groups employing apt "cultural strategies", as they 
may lack adequate "ethnic resources". This is not to argue 
that these migrants do not have any political consciousness, 
culture or oases of collective action, nor to slip into 
racist notions of "pathological cultures" (cf. Lawrence 
1982a). On the contrary, the specific character of their 
consciousness, in the absence of a class one, constitutes an 
important tonic of enquiry. For example, the exclusion of 
West Indians from British society helped to bring about a 
transformation of their identity into a Rastafarian one (cf. 
Cashmore 1979). This had the function of creating an identity 
alternative to that of the society which discriminated 
against them, but also that of a specific "ritual of 
resistance" to the hegemony of white British society (cf. 
Hall and Jefferson 1976, C. C. C. S. 1982). This development can 
be seen in the evolution of the Notting Hill Carnival from a 
"polyethnic" feast of peace and amity, to one dominated by 
Rtastaf ari ani sm and reggae music (cf. Cohen 1980,1982). 
The case of Egyptians-in Milan falls between this situation 
and that described in the above paragraph. On the one hand 
they lack the "ethnic resources" enjoyed by Eritreans. On the 
other, although there is a specific pattern of discrimination 
against them, even if as Muslims rather than as Egyptians, 
they have a higher rate of intermarriage with the local 
population. But it is also possible that their "ethnicity" 
will transform towards that of an interest group employing 
"cultural strategies" in the economic sector as well as 
"rituals of resistance", also as Muslims rather than as 
Egyptians. 
37 
Urban managers and urban conflict 
Another aspect of the definition of the structural conte>: t, 
after migration and the labour market and class relations, 
concerns the specifically "urban" aspects of the problems. 
Without reviewing the whole debate on the specificity of "the 
urban" (cf. Saunders 1981), the focus shall be on those 
aspects, most pertinent to the argument and to the topic of. 
enquiry mainly either from weberian or from neo-mar): ist 
approaches, between which a common ground can be found at an 
epistemological level (cf. Jackson 1983b, Elliott and 
McCrone 1982). One can agree with Pahl (1975) that there are 
some key individuals in the. city with some degree of 
discretionary power over the distribution of vital resources 
such as housing. These he calls "urban mangers" or 
"gatekeepers". They are to be found especially in the public 
sector (local state) but also in the private one (e. g. 
building societies). This is important for the topic of study 
because, as Rex and Moore showed (1967), institutional 
constraints in the public sector exclude recent immigrants 
from access to public housing, forcing them into low status 
and overcrowded tenancies. The main discriminatory factor is 
therefore related to the weberian notion of bureaucracy, 
rather than to the marxist one of relations of production. 
Secondly, a body of neomarxist work, largely stemming from 
Castells' work (1976,1977,1983), has focussed on the growth 
of social conflict in the area of "collective consumption" or 
"social reproduction" of labour power (Mingione 1981), that 
is mainly (public) housing, education, transport, health, 
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etc., as opposed to struggles in the area of "production" 
(tne "classical" class struggle). This was linked to the 
growth of state ir(tervention in this area (the welfare state) 
at the local level and to its subsequent crisis, therefore 
(also) to the complex relationship between the central and 
local state. This focus of analysis has been retained even by 
authors who have distanced themselves from the Althusserian 
overtones of Castells' work (7) adopting a generally 
"left-weberian" approach (cf. Saunders 1981, Dunleavy 1980). 
From a similar perspective, but with a different emphasis, 
Elliott and McCrone (1982) have looked at the city as an 
arena of conflict between social groups, involving political 
as well as, economic inequalities and employing the concept of 
"social closure" referred to above. These notions will be 
employed in chapters 7 and 8 when analyzing the "usurpatory 
strategies" of the migrants groups vs. the "exclusionary" 
ones of the "host society". 
Heoemonic cultural discourses 
Finally, the hegemonic cultural discourses (cf. Gramsci 1975, 
Foucault 1972) of the "host society" must be examined for two 
reasons. In the first place because, as Miles (1982) argues, 
it is important to characterize the ideological legacy 
affecting the "host society"'s attitude towards the 
immigrants, i. e. the extent and character of an ideological 
tradition of racism. Among these it is important to mention 
the existence and type of a colonial past (Lawrence 1982a) 
and of a tradition of antisemitism, but also historical 
attitudes towards other minorities as well as other 
religions. It is also important to characterize the context 
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from a cultural point of view since conflicts and alliances 
between social groups are also established at the cultural 
level, affecting also the migrant groups. For example, the 
political connections that a group establishes with the 
"host society", will in part be conditioned by the extent to 
which it can fit with the-dominant cultural discourses of 
the "host society". The extent to which the cultural identity 
of an (ethnic) group can be manipulated to suit its needs and 
aims, is limited to the point at which its members will 
continue to ioentify themselves as members of that group. 
Again, there are important differences between Eritreans and 
Egyptians in these respects. 
The meaning of and difference between "ethnic" group, 
identity, and "ethnicity" can now be defined more precisely. 
An "ethnic group" can be defined as a group of people 
interacting with other collectivities in a common social 
system, identifying itself as different from them, sharing 
some pattern of normative behaviour through some compulsory 
institutions, leading to a greater rate of in-group 
interaction and to some degree of collective action. In this 
respect it is important to distinguish, according to McKay 
and Lewins (1978), between "ethnic category", which is 
ascribed from the outside, and "ethnic group", as the two 
might not coincide. "Ethnic identity" may be defined as those 
aspects of a group's culture (sense of common history, 
religion, language, etc. ) that allow for the affective 
identification of the group's members in a section of the 
social universe and at the same time help to establish an 
"us"/"them" boundary, maintained through some rites of 
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passage. This is not to deny that even within an "ethnic" 
group itself, there might not be some "ideological" aspects 
(in the marxist 'sense of a distortion of reality by a 
particular interest group or social class) (cf. Larrain 
1979), but that it would be practically difficult to 
distinguish it from the positive aspect of the term. Finally, 
"ethnicity" can be understood as the dynamic expression in 
social action of cultural difference for particular social, 
economic and political goals (often not explicitly conscious) 
or, to use Cohen's term, a "cultural strategy". However, 
"ethnicity" or the usage of "cultural strategies" might 
involve the stressing of cultural difference in order to 
manipulate an internal trading network or control 
sought-after professions (8), but also, depending on the 
context, to resist sociocultural hegemony or to establish 
political links with sections of the "host society" or to 
conceal it altogether. 
The above discussion constitutes only a sketch of an analysis 
of "ethnicity in context". It might help to avoid the twin 
mistakes of engaging in "economistic" explanations, 
attempting simply to "read off" these patterns from the class 
structure, or in "culturalist" ones, looking only at cultural 
values and identity. It also highlights how, as different 
groups dramatize, maintain or conceal their ethnic identity, 
both "assimilationist" and "pluralist" perspectives, 
holding that the "host 
.. society" can accommodate 
different 
ethnic groups and preserve ethnic differences (cf. Clarice et 
al. 1984), must be qualified (cf. Steinberg 1981). However no 
account can be produced without engaging in specific 
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analyses, as the outcome of "ethnicity" will also be 
determined by the practical strategies of the individuals, 
power holders and collectivities involved in these processes. 
The pragmatic strategies in the pursuit of the resources 
available within the structure of opportunities of the "host 
society", involving "cultural strategies" and ethnic 
organization, is what may be termed as the "political" 
dimension of ethnicity. 
1.4 Seareoation and racism 
Two further concepts that define the context of ethnicity, 
namely-segregation and racism can now be reviewed. 
Seareoation 
As a starting point segregation can be defined as the rate of 
deviation of a selected population as compared to another 
population and/or the normal or random distribution (Boat 
1978). One can agree with Harvey (1973) that in contemporary 
western societies segregation and ghetto formation are 
inevitably linked to the workings of the capitalist mode of 
production as a whole, but the specific significance of 
segregation must be determined for particular (ethnic) groups 
in historically and socially specific situations. For 
example, segregation, of which the ghetto was the 
ideal-typical form, changed from being a normative and 
compulsory institution as in the case of Jews in Europe up to 
the 19th century (Wirth 1928), to a situation determined more 
by socio-economic factors and discrimination, as in the case 
of many ethnic minorities in contemporary western cities (9). 
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On the other hand, Rex and Moore (1967) analyzed the 
residential segregation of black immigrants in Sparkbrook, 
Birmingham, in terms of the institutional discrimination they 
faced from building societies and the local authority that 
forced them into the lodging houses of the "twilight --one" in 
a situation of overcrowding. Despite the fact that their 
concept of "housing class" has encountered theoretical 
criticism (e. g. Saunders 1981), their approach is of some 
interest for the specific concerns of this thesis, both 
because they identify a relationship between ethnic groups as 
interest groups defined in terms of housing (which is, to a 
certain extent, the case of Eritreans in Milan) and because 
it allows to look at segregation not only in spatial terms 
but also in terms of types of housing. 
However, as Dahya (1974) argues in the case of Bradford, the 
residential segregation of Pakistanis is not so much the 
result of institutional discrimination but of "choice", since 
it is more suited to develop the kind of "ethnic enterprise" 
related to their particular articulation of "ethnicity". This 
argument is also forcefully applied by Cohen (1969) in 
relation to the Hausa in Ibadan, who are spatially segregated 
from the rest of the Yoruba population, as part of their 
"cultural strategy" to articulate their trading network. 
However, as Brown (1981) argues, this choice/constraint 
dualism can be overcome by looking at both structural 
subordination (on the part of the "host society") and 
forms 
of cultural negotiation and strategies of resistance (on the 
part of the "ethnic" groups). Thus while 
Boat (1978) argues 
that the ghetto can have "positive" functions for the ethnic 
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group, ward (19B3) warns that when there is no possibility of 
upward mobility, the ethnic ghetto becomes a cul de sac 
rather than an elevator. 
Rac i sm 
Racism should also be analyzed within specific historical and 
social circumstances as it might change form accordingly (cf. 
Hall 1980, C. C. C. S. 1982, Sinvanandan 1983). Secondly, as 
Miles (1982, pp. 76-77) argues, we should distinguish between 
racism at the ideological level and at the level of social 
practice as in both cases the socioeconomic context is 
crucial. For example, with respect to the Jews in the Middle 
Ages, racism was couched mainly in religious terms and at the 
level of social practice compulsory segregation was the main 
form of discrimination. From the mid-19th century to the end 
of the Second World War it was constructed in biological 
terms with notions of "racial inferiority". This meant that 
conversion to Christianity was no longer, as in the Middle 
Ages, sufficient to escape persecution. At the level of 
social practice genocide as opposed to forced conversions, 
for example) was a- consequential outcome. This emergence of 
biological racism can be related not only to developments in 
the physical sciences but also to the rise of capitalism and 
the nation-state in Western and Eastern Europe (cf. Mosse 
1980). 
This "classical", ideal-typical form of racist ideology, 
based on the supposed determination of behaviour by 
genotypical characteristics, which would be reflected by 
"phenotypical" traits, has been amply criticized as having 
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no proven scientific validity (cf. Miles 1982). At the level 
of popular discourse in contemporary western cities, such a 
deterministic conception of race in terms of "biological 
inferiority" is no longer the dominant form of conceiving 
"the other", with the notable exception of South Africa where 
"race" is still the ideological basis for institutionalized 
discrimination. But while the "classical" form of racism is 
less relevant nowadays, discrimination against "the other" 
acquires new forms both ideologically and at the level of 
social practice. These changes have to be related to 
socioeconomic dvelopments from the introduction of a money 
economy in Middle ages Europe, to the introduction of slavery 
and the expansion of colonialism and finally to labour 
migration in contemporary capitalist countries. In post-war 
Britain, for example, Commonwealth migrants were and are 
discriminated against through ideological notions of 
"alienness", "criminality" and "disreputable lifestyles". 
They are blamed for their "social failures" through the 
pathologization of black families and through the concept of 
"deprived cultures", reproduced in the media (cf. Solomos et 
al. 1982, Lawrence 1982a, 1984b). The fact that the 
(ex)migrants were physically distinct from the "native" 
population, has led some acaoemics to maintain the validity 
of a field of study defined as "race relations". 
In this case "race" is conceived of in "phenotypical" terms, 
of which colour is usually. the most important (cf. Smith, 
M. G. 1986). However one must agree with Miles (1982) that 
"race" is a socially. constructed ideology, historically 
specific, deterministically ascribing negatively-valued 
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characteristics to an out-group, used to justify the denial 
of access to material resources and political rights. In 
order to analyze it, one should therefore trace both the 
ideological legacy to understand the current set of symbols 
and stereotypes that contemporary racism builds upon and the 
structural position of the peoples who are the "objects"' of 
racist ideologies and discriminatory practices, even if the 
two might not be deterministically related. With regard to 
the ideological legacy, both Miles (1982) and Lawrence 
(1982a) point out the importance of the colonial past. To 
this must be added the attitude to the so-called "Jewish 
question", around' which much continental racist discourse 
was constructed. With regard to the structural position, it 
is important to determine'the inclusion/exclusion of the 
migrants within the "native" class system, as opposed to a 
simplistic identification of migrants within the working 
class at all costs. For example, in the case of inclusion of 
the migrants within the working class and in the context of 
economic recession, competition for jobs and the ideological 
stereotypes mentioned above, could lead to discriminatory 
practices in the field of employment, i. e. to the-sacking of 
migrants. This is, to an extent, what happened in countries 
like Britain, France and Germany in the 1970s. In other 
contexts, such as the case of Eritreans and Egyptians in 
Milan, discriminatory practices in a segmented labour market 
are justified by racist ideologies in the field of "social 
reproduction". In both case this leads to a "heating up" of 
"ethnicity" and to "social closure" on both sides of the 
boundary (migrants/"host society"), as argued before. 
Therefore "racism" can be seen as the "ethncity"of the "host 
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society" in a specific context, even though the different 
balance of power gives it different implications. 
1.5 Object of study and thesis outline 
The object of study can be specified by different degrees of 
generalization. At a very general level this thesis is an 
analysis of the significance of "ethnicity" for two migrant 
groups, Eritreans and Egyptians, in an urban context, Milan 
in Italy. This involves looking at both sides of the "ethnic" 
boundary, that of the migrant group and of the "host 
society", i. e. the context. The characterization of 
"ethnicity" for the two groups, in terms both of cultural 
resources and strategies and of political, practice, for the 
two groups, will be the main focus of the thesis. This 
becomes relevant in a context where ethnic resources are 
crucial in the absence of class ones. The second main focus 
will be to see how these processes affect the groups' 
relationship with the "host society", both in terms of the 
resources they manage to draw from it and the kind of social 
relation it entails, e. g. of assimilation, integration or 
conflict. For "ethnicity" does not work in the same way for 
every group in every context. Its dynamics can be seen at 
the boundary between the "ethnic group" and the "host 
society", while the various factors accounting 
for the 
specific character of "ethnicity" can be 
found in the 
analysis of the various constituting components of 
both the 
ethnic group and the "context". These theoretical 
issues have 
been examined in the present chapter. 
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The character of "ethnicity' the patterns of ethnic 
identity, the causes of migration and the social composition 
of the migrants will be analy_ed in chapter 2. They have 
specific implications both internal to the groups and for 
their relationship with the "host society". Thus, for 
example, the nationalist-radical and Christian identity of 
the Eritreans will have a different effect on the internal 
cohesion of the group as well as on patterns of alliance with 
sections of the. "host society", than the Muslim identity of 
the Egyptians. 
The socioeconomic context and the legal framework controlling 
foreign immigration broadly determine which economic and 
housing sectors the migrant groups will occupy and the 
inclusion/exclusion from the native class structure. The 
hegemonic cultural discourses of the "host society" will also 
affect the pattern of possible social relations between its 
various sections and the two immigrant groups. - Thus, for 
example, the fact that Catholicism and radicalism have played 
a major role in Milanese society will be of great 
significance for the possible patterns of relationship 
between it and the two ethnic groups concerned. This applies 
also to the pattern of political groups (parties, voluntary 
organizations, pressure groups, etc. ) that dominate the "host 
society". These issues will be analyzed in chapter 
3. 
As far as the "ethnic groups" are concerned, the nature of 
the two migrant groups, in. terms of size, age and sex-ratio, 
will also be assessed. The first hypothesis 
is that a 
relatively small population, with a differentiated age and 
sex-ratio, will have a higher degree of ethnic cohesion and 
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interaction, due to the greater amount of face-to-face 
contact, intra-ethnic family groups and endogamous marriage. 
On the other hand, patterns of employment and housing will be 
only to a certain extent determined by the "structural 
context": different groups can find different niches because 
of the nature of the migration process, and because of their 
different cultural strategies and political practices. 
Different patterns of employment, housing and various 
aspects of "social reproduction" (education, health, places 
of soci, alization, and worship) between Eritreans and Egyptians 
constitute one of the main points of interest in analyzing 
the dynamics of their "ethnicity". These patterns will be 
analyzed in chapter 4. 
These factors also affect the different strength of the 
solidarity network, organization and leadership between the 
two groups and the different attendance at their respective 
"ethnic institutions". Although the character of these 
institutions is influenced by the hegemonic cultural 
discourses in the countries of origins, certain 
transformations in their cultural forms and in the 
composition of followers suggest that they are not mere 
carry-overs but also respond to the new context. The 
different character of, the attendance at Eritrean and 
Egyptian "ethnic institutions" also influences the 
possibility of group-wide collective action. These issues 
will be examined in chapter 5. 
Finally, the main argument will be presented concerning the 
characterization of the specific patterns of "ethnicity" or 
"ethnic politics" of the two groups. This will involve 
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looking, at both the internal patterns of organization and 
leaaership of the two groups and external ones of alliance 
and/or conflict with sections of the "host society". The 
latter aspect can also be seen in the different attendance of 
Eritreans and Egyptians at the various voluntary 
organizations dealing with Third World immigrants in Milan. 
This is conditioned not only by the different character of 
the two migrant groups vis a vis the services these 
organizations can offer, but also by the political contacts 
they can offer, at least in the Eritrean case, as argued in 
chapter 6. 
The main hypothesis is that while the group with a higher 
degree of organization and political links with certain 
sections of the "host society", i. e. the Eritreans, will be 
able to make use of their "ethnicity" to gain some benefits 
from the "host society", the group that lacks both of them,, 
i. e. the Egyptians, will not be able to use their "ethnicity" 
and instead will conceal it, or at least downplay it. Both 
cases involve "cultural strategies", but whereas in one case 
this happens in a "positive" way (i. e. by stressing 
difference), in the other it happens in a "negative" sense 
(i. e. by concealing it) leading to intermarriage and 
eventually assimilation. In the first case the ethnic group 
can be characterized as an interest group (even if defined 
more in terms of items of social reproduction and political 
links, rather than employment). In the other case much less 
so. However there may be a redefinition of the Egyptian 
identity, in terms of a Muslim fundamentalist revival, that 
might provide an internal articulation as an informal 
interest group, but with Islam, rather than with Egypt, as 
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the common denominator of identity. All this will be argued 
in chapter 7. 
In both cases, organization, leadership and alliances with 
sections of the "host society", as well as collective action 
and mobilization, will be crucial. These can only to a 
certain extent be related to the factors identified above 
(the nature of the migration, the character of identity, the 
presence of "ethnic institutions"). They will also be the 
outcome of practical strategies of individuals achieving 
positions of power. This, and the assessment and pursuit of 
options and resources available from the host society, is 
what may be termed the political dimension of ethnicity, in 
a situation where "formal" politics are not available because 
of exclusion. "Ethnicity" cannot be "read-off" from 
pre-existing "structural" or "cultural" features, but can be 
examined only by engaging in concrete analysis. Following the 
theory of structuration 'it can be said that ethnicity as a 
cultural strategy and form of political practice is a skilled 
performance that is mediated by features such as identity, 
institutions and alliances, which in turn are also\the 
outcome of these practices. 
Finally, the relationship between the ethnic groups and the 
"host society" will be analyzed from the other side of the 
boundary. From this point of view "ethnicity" can be seen 
as a usurpatory "cultural strategy" on the part of the 
ethnic groups, while "racism" can be seen as an exclusionary 
"cultural strategy" on the part of the "host society". In 
this respect two things will be shown. First, that racism as 
an ideology justifying discriminatory practices need not be 
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couched only in biological terms, but also in sociocultural 
ones (the context in which it occurs being crucial, 
especially in the -presence or absence of conflict over 
employment and/or services). Secondly, that while the ethnic 
politics of the two groups are different, as well as their 
respective "phenotypical traits", the "reaction" of the "host 
society" towards them is relatively undifferentiated, not 
least because of the recent character of the migration. These 
processes will be analyzed in chapter B. 
In summary, this study is about the analysis of the different 
character of "ethnicity" ("cultural resources and strategies" 
and "political practice"), with different "usurpatory" 
outcomes in the absence of class resources, for two migrant 
("ethnic") groups. It attempts to explain these differences 
using the concept of structuration whereby they can be 
understood in terms of the different cultural and political 
practices of social actors, mediated by the different social, 
political and cultural aspects of both the ethnic groups and 
the "host society", which in turn are the outcome of the 
situated practices of the actors. A characterization of 
Eritreans and Egyptians in these terms and a theoretical 
framewok for the analysis of "urban ethnicity" will be found 
in chapter 9. The different nature of the processes outlined 
above for the two groups leads to an examination of the 
comparative aspect of the thesis and raises certain 
methodological questions. 
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1.6 The comparative method and fieldwo-k techniques 
The scope for comparison and methodology 
It will be apparent from the thesis tnat differences between 
the Eritrean and Egyptian groups greatly outweigh 
similarities. However, while this is true of factors internal 
to the groups and of their relationship with the "host 
society", what they have in common is the "context" in which 
they are interacting. The main point of comparison is 
therefore that of analyzing how =wo groups in a similar 
structural context, in terms of legal and socioeconomic 
position, but with a different interplay of demographic, 
social, political and cultural characteristics, differ in 
their relationship with the "host society". From a 
theoretical point of view this means assessing the 
proposition that while "ethnicity' always involves a 
"cultural strategy", it may not always work in the same way, 
sometimes being stressed (as in the case of the Eritreans) 
and sometimes being "downplayed", not being a relevant asset 
(as in the case of the Egyptians). 
Participant observation as immersion in the social life of 
the actors and sympathetic understanding and interpretation 
of their viewpoint, has been a classical technique of social 
anthropology in "traditional" settings. Recently, geographers 
have also called for its usage in urban contexts (e. g. 
Jackson 19B3a). Of course, participant observation does not 
exclude other techniques of enquiry, such as surveys, and a 
combination of qualitative and quantitative data is 
desirable. Transposing this method from the "traditional" 
53 
small-scale settings that allowed the reseracher to have a 
"holistic" grasp of the society under study to a complex 
urban setting poses certain problems (cf. Waliman 1984, 
Burgess, 1984). These are due to the quantity, complexity and 
fragmentation of social relationships in the urban context. 
In a city the "participant observer" cannot claim to 
"observe" the daily life of all the members of a particular 
group. Problems of statistical representativeness may also be 
raised. However, as Mitchell points out in his discussion of 
case and situation analysis, "the validity of extrapolation 
depends not on the typicality or representativeness of the 
case, but on the cogency of theoretical reasoning" (1983, p. 
207). Case studies therefore represent a useful methodology 
when they can illuminate the context in which they occur in a 
logically coherent theoretical framework. 
Fieldwork techniques 
In the present context,. significant quantitative, data on the 
two immigrant groups (e. g. from a census) were unavailable, 
given the fact that a great proportion of the migrants were 
illegal and therefore undocumented. Legislative documents of 
the Italian state and of the Milanese municipality have been 
examined to determine their attitude towards Third World 
immigration. Data from the few available statistical sources 
were supplemented by interviews with "ethnic leaders" and 
social workers and with data available from certain voluntary 
organizations dealing with Third World immigrants. The latter 
also gave important suggestions in terms of the differential 
attendance at them by the various migrant groups, both about 
the nature and requirements of the various types of 
migrations and about the network of political contacts 
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between, the two groups and certain sections of the "host 
society". Access to these organizations has been facilitated 
by raving carried out ten months part-time community work in 
one of them (EMASI-ACLI, see chapter 7) as part of my 
national voluntary service. This also allowed me to establish 
useful contact with members of the two ethnic groups that 
were involved with the association. 
Secondly, and more importantly, participant observation at 
events organized by the various "ethnic institutions" was 
carried out, trying to analyze the attendance at them by 
members of the respective ethnic groups. The different rate 
of rites of passage (i. e. births and marriages) performed in 
the relevant "ethnic institutions" of the two groups was also 
analyzed. This was important in order to establish not only 
patterns of identity and solidarity, but also potential bases 
for collective action and political processes, both in terms 
of internal organization and leadership structure, as well as 
in terms of political connections with the "host society". 
Thirdly, out of the relatively large number of short-lived 
"encounters" in these settings ("ethnic institutions" and 
voluntary organizations), a few "cases" were selected, using 
criteria that included theoretical relevance and availability 
for interviews. In this respect the Egyptian group, more 
fragmented and less organized than the Eritrean one, 
presented more problems for reserach. While in the Eritrean 
case acquaintance with ethnic leaders and the existence of a 
tight network gave access to many people, in the Egyptian 
case an atomized network meant that acquaintance with one 
person did not give access to many more. This has led to a 
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greater empahsis on the Eritreans in the thesis because of 
the greater availability of data. 
Semi-structured in-depth interviews with field-notes, but 
without the use of a tape-recoroer (because of the 
suspiciousness of the "clandestines"), were carried out with 
about 30 Eritreans and 20 Egyptians. Questions relating to 
age, origin, identity and, more importantly, attitude and 
relationship to, "ethnic institutions" and the "host, society", 
were put forward. Silences, especially on the second two 
questions, were considered as eloquent as answers. In many 
cases, cross-validation through participation in the "ethnic 
institutions" and longitudinal studies (sometimes involving 
socializing) was possible as well as examining the rates of 
intermarriage with the local population from the municipal 
statistics. For the theoretical reasons mentioned above and 
because of the fact that respondents did not always answer 
"sensitive" questions, a questionnaire-based survey was not 
carried out. Finally the attitude and reaction of the "host 
society" to the presence of these two migrant groups has been 
evaluated through recording statements made by ordinary 
people, participation in places of common interaction (e. g. 
bars) and through an informal survey of various newspapers. 
Fieldwork lasted from September 1984 to March 1986. 
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NOTES TO CHAPTER 1 
(1) Cf. Perlman (1976) for a critique of the tradition of 
theoretical dualism in sociological analysis. 
(2) As in the "structural-marxism" of Althusser and Balibar 
(1979). 
(3) Translations from Italian qoutations are my own. 
(4) Despite the paternalistic and potentially racist 
implications of the "host society" concept (cf. Castles and 
Kosack 1983), it is employed here for its descriptive value. 
(5) The terms "push" and "pull" will, however, still 
sometimes be used for their descriptive value. 
(6) In a contemporary capitalist urban context, three major 
social classes can be tentatively identified: 1) the 
capitalist upper class (owners of capital, professional 
bourgeoisie, financial and commercial bourgeoisie)j 2) the 
middle-class (intellectuals, civil servants, white collar 
workers); 3) the working class (industrial workers and 
unionized workers in the public service sector, e. g. 
transport). 
(7) But cf. his "Afterword", in Castells (1976), for 
theoretical revisions. 
(8) As for, respectively, the Ibadan Hausa (Cohen 1969) and 
the Freetown Creoles (Cohen 1981). 
(9) South Africa is, of course, a notable exception. 
(10) Cf. Miles (1982) and Mosse (1980), for a more detailed 
account of the racialization of the Jews. 
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CHAPTER 'd-: THE BACKGROUND TO EMIGRATION 
This chanter compares the socioeconomic, political and 
cultural cackground of the respective areas of emigration of 
the Eritreans and the Egyptians, assessing which of the above 
factors-has been more significant to their migration. This 
helps to identify some of the major social characteristics 
the migants bring with them to Italy and- the degree to which 
these characteristics are- preserved or modified. It is 
hypothesized that the context of arrival will determine some 
changes in the migrants' cultural identity, but that the 
character of their identity prior to migration will have some 
significant- implications for the strength of ethnic 
solidarity and for. the relationship with the "host society". 
After a brief introduction on some general social processes 
in the so-called "Third World" affecting both Eritrea and 
Egypt, this, chapter will contain a section on the 
relationsthip, between Eritrea and Ethiopia in terms of 
centralizing, cultural and historical forces and separatist 
nationalist ones. It concludes by assessing the influence of 
Islam and class differentiation in Egypt and the bearing this 
has on Egyvtian migrants in Milan. 
2.1 Urbanization and nationalism in the Third World 
Eritrea and Egypt fall between the traditional object of 
study of the social anthropologist, i. e., segmentary 
societies, and that of "Oriental ism", which have both 
encoutereä recent criticism (l). However the anthroplogical 
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approach s=ill has some major strengths. Among these is the 
method of fieldwork and participant observation leading to an 
empathetic understanding of the people studied, from the 
actors' pcint of-view. This has been usually acheived through 
ethnography, one of whose main strength was to consider the 
various parts composing the society under study, not in 
isolation, but in relationship to each other. 
From the late 1960s social scientists from other disciplines 
urged ant-nropologists to look at the relationship between 
"developed" and "underdeveloped" societies. Among-them Andre 
Gunder Frank (1967) has argued that development in the 
capitalist "core" is functional to underdevelopment in the 
"dependent"', "periphery". Wallerstein (1979) has attempted to 
characters= e the world economy as an integrated system 
dominated by capitalism in which the capitalist "core" is 
supported by "peripheries" and "semi peripheries". -During the 
20th -century, according to these -authors, colonialism 
(experienced by both Eritrea and Egypt), based on a system of 
servile labour, was replaced by "neocolonialism" through 
multinationals. Even though these, approaches have the major 
faults of seeing everything as functional to the "needs" of 
capital and of portraying the peoples of the "peripheries" as 
passive "puppets", they have the merit of drawing attention 
to some major social processes that the fuller integration of 
"Third World" countries have experienced in the last two 
centuries. Among these, the processes of urbanization and the 
development of nationalism are most significant in this 
context. 
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The process of urbanization greatly increased with the 
penetration of capital in the countryside and the migration 
of small peasants to the cities. This fuelled both urban 
growth and urbanization, that had already begun on a large 
scale in the Third World with colonialism (cf. Roberts 1978, 
Gilbert and bugler 1981). Currently the "Third World" is- 
experiencing a faster rate of urbanization than the 
"developed" world, with Latin America being at present the 
most urbanized area and Africa the fastest growing one. 
Although a small number of migrants were absorbed by the 
"formal" industrial sector and a larger number by the 
"informal" service sector or "petty commodity production", 
many remained unemployed or underemployed. It is mainly from 
this surplus of population in the urban areas of the "Third 
World", rather than straight from the countryside, that most 
of the migrants to urban centres in "developed" countries 
originate, being more socialized to urban life and having 
greater opportunities for long-distance migration. However, 
migration from Mediterranean areas (at least southern 
European ones) to northern European cities seems to have been 
a more direct one from rural areas (Reyneri 1979). -It is 
therefore important to assess the urbanization rate of the 
two areas of origin, to understand the migratory potential 
and its character. While "Ethiopia" (including Eritrea, 
which is not yet an internationally recognized state) is a 
relatively little urbanized country, with 15% of its 
population living in urban areas, the same is not true of 
Egypt, where the figure is 45% (2). Some authors estimate the 
urban population in Eritrea at 20% (3), although recent 
conflicts have caused a constant flux of population from the 
60 
countryside to the towns (mainly Asmara) and from there 
abroad. It can however be concluded that while Eritrea has 
only a moderate rate of urbanization, Egypt has a relatively 
high one. 
A second major issue is that of nationalism. Nationalism is 
closely linked to the emergence of the "nation-state" and in 
particular to those situations in which the two sides of the 
term do not coincide. A "state" can be defined, following 
Weber, as "a system of officials holding the legitimate 
monopoly of the use of force and power, involving political 
centralization, taxation and bureaucratic machinery. A nation 
can be defined along the lines of "ethnic group" in the first 
chapter, but with" the difference that there is also a claim 
to political independence in a territorially defined area, 
involving a degree of cultural homogeneity. Nationalism can 
be seen as the movement of a people to build a "nation", 
within a territorially defined unit ' and with political 
autonomy, that is within 'a "nation-state". There are two main 
kinds of nationalisms a "separatist" one aiming to break 
away from the politically dominant, but culturally different 
"nation-state" with the aim of self-determination, and an 
"irredentist" one, with the aim of unifying a culturally 
homogeneous, but politically fragmented population. In 
general, nationalism is related to the emergence of the 
state, requiring some degree of cultural/linguistic 
homogeneity for the functioning of its bureaucratic machinery 
and to sustain social mobility and a specialized division of 





Latin America has experienced relatively few 
nationalist tensions for various reasons (cf. Smith, A. D. 
1981, pp. 137-138), Asia and Africa have experienced a high 
degree of nationalist tensions in this century. Many authors 
agree that colonialism had a major impact on these areas. In 
many cases, the colonial powers in their "scramble for 
Africa", drew political boundaries around areas irrespective 
of their ethnic composition (cf. ibid. and Mazrui and Tidy 
1984). Before the end of colonialism African nationalism was 
essentially of an irredentist kind in order to get rid of the 
colonial powers. Ethiopian resistance to the Italian invasion 
became a symbol of this. With decolonization, the fear of 
"balkanization" and of establishing economically non-viable 
units at the mercy- of neo-colonialism, led to a tendency to 
preserve the colonial boundaries (cf. Mazrui and Tidy 1984, 
Lewis 1983). This preservation of ethnically plural states, 
but with political and cultural power usually concentrated in 
the hands of one group, - sparked-off a multitude of 
nationalist separatist movements that persist also today. 
However nationalisms, especially of the separatist kind, 
emerge also when certain ethnic groups, under particular 
circumstances, become political forces. As it will be seen 
below, Eritrean nationalism is currently more of a burning 
issue than Egyptian one and has a different character. 
2.2 Ethiopia and Eritrea: culture and nationalism. 
Eritrea is officially part of the Ethiopian state, although 
many political groups within it claim independence. In order 
to understand its contemporary significance, the historical 
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and cultural relationship between Eritrea and Ethiopia must 
be assessed. 
Ethiopia: history and culture 
Ethippia is a multicultural country, with different languages 
and different religions. However the northern highland area, 
hereafter referred to as "Abyssinia" (4), has been 
historically and culturally dominated by groups of 
semitic-speaking peoples that, from the third century 
onwards, adhered to Ethiopic Orthodox Christianity. 
Abyssinia's semitic culture manifests itself not only in the 
presence of the Falashas, the Ethiopian Jews (5), but also in 
the languages and physical appearances of Christian 
Abyssinians (shared by the Falashas) as well as in many 
ritual asoects and social customs of the Ethiopian branch of 
Christianity (Ullendorff 1968,1973). The Falshas practice 
an ancient form of Judaism, performing only festivals and 
rituals codified before the Jewish diaspora (cf. Kessler 
1985). When in the 4th century AD King Ezana adopted 
Christianity as the unifying religion for his kingdom in 
Abyssinia, the Ethiopic Orthodox Church, which established 
itself as the dominant religious institution during the times 
of the kingdom of Axum (third-7th century AD) retained many 
of these practices either through prescription or by 
tolerating them as tradition. Among these, circumcision on 
the eighth day after birth, the distinction between pure and 
imnpure food (e. g. pork, seafood), ritual slaughter, female 
ritual purity and others. In terms of festivities, Saturdays 
were observed as well as Sundays, the religious New Year 
(Hadesh A(roat) was celebrated on the 11th of September and the 
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Feast of the Cross' on the 27th of September, which 
correspond to Jewish Festivities, while Christmas is on the 
6th of January (Ullendorff 1969,1973) (6). In general the 
Old Testament is held in equal esteem as the New Testament, 
and Gee:, a semitic language spoken at the time of the 
kingdom of Axum, is retained 'up to this date as the 
liturgical language. From a theological point of view the 
Ethiopic Orthodox Church adheres to monophysism (i. e. 
believing in only one nature of Christ), thereby causing a 
schism from the Catholic Church. It will be seen that 
Eritreans in Milan, who largely adhere to Ethiopian Orthodox 
Christianity, follow to a large extent these rituals and 
customs, even if they present a different image to the "host 
society". 
Moreover the members of the royal dynasty as well as 
"commoner" Abyssinians (both" Christians and Falashas) 
believed themselves to be of Israelite descent, through King 
Solomon's union with the Queen of Sheba, and had Axum as 
their holy city. All this was retained and consolidated 
during the Solomonic dynasty (from the 14th century to Haile 
Selassie's death in 1975), in spite of external pressures 
from the Muslim world which invaded Abyssinia for a brief 
period in the 15th century and Portuguese missionaries in the 
16th century, who attempted to convert Abyssinians to 
Catholicism, accusing them of practicing a form of 
Christianity "contaminated"" by 'Judaism. The southwards 
expansion from the highlands initiated in the 19th century, 
brought about the incorporation of many peoples'of Cushitic 
languages, adhering to either Islam or local religions and 
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looking physically different from the highland Abyssinians. 
These groups are collectively known as Oromo, or Gal la. 
However Ethiopic Orthodox Christianity remained the most 
profound expression of the identity of the highland 
Abyssinians (Ullendorff 1975, pp. 97, -105), which include about 
half of the present day Eritrean population. While the 
historical resistance to encroazhment by Islam helps to 
explain the Ethiopian suspiciousness towards peripheral 
nationalisms, like the Eritrean one, the resistance of 
Ethiopic Orthodox Christianity to conversion to Catholicism, 
is significant to understand the "cultural strategy" of 
Eritreans in Milan, involving the presentation of a different 
identity. 
In the second millenium AD two related languages developed 
from Geez, Tigrinya in the northern province of Tigray and in 
part of present Eritrea (the sites of the Axumite kingdom), 
and Amharic in the provinces of Gondar, Welo, Gojam and part 
of Shoa (see Fig. 2.1). The Tigrinya-speaking and 
Amharic-speaking groups are the carriers of the ancient 
Abyssinian civilization, speaking semitic languages and 
adhering to Ethiopic Orthodox Christianity, accounting for 
around 40% of the population estimated in 1971 at 28 million 
(ibid., pp. 30-31) and at 31 million in 1981 (Hallyday and 
Molyneux 1981, p. 54). It is important to note that part of 
this "culture area" is in Eritrea, a point which will be 
developed below. However with the rise of the Solomonic 
dynasty the centre of power shifted from the northern 
Tigrinya-speaking area, to the central Amharic-speaking one. 
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inheritable land holding system and feudal dues coincided 
with a system of ethnic stratification with Amharas and 
Tigrinyas at the top, often in a position of lord, and Oromos 
at the bottom, often in a position of serfs (cf. Shack 1974a, 
Lewis 1983, Triulzi 1983). The emergence and strengthening of 
the Ethiopian state under Haile Selassie, did not 
fundamentally change this situation, in spite of attempts at 
modernization (Halliday and Molyne. » 1981). On the contrary 
the process of "Amharization", whereby Amhara became the 
official state language and Amharic people held most of the 
top bureaucratic (and military) positions, reinforced the 
system of ethnic stratification (=f. Shack 1974b, Pjeren 
1985) and gave rise to sentiments of nationalism among the 
non-Amhara peoples (cf. Lewis '1982, Triulzi 1982, Baxter 
1982), including Eritreans. 
The period of Italian occupation (1935-4i) did not alter, this 
general pattern, with the exception of Eritrea, which was 
colonized by the Italians for a much longer period. On the 
contrary, it reinforced sentiments of Amhara pride, since 
they were the people most engages in fighting against the 
Italian invasion waged from the Eritrean colony. On the other 
hand, with the overthrow of Haile Selassie in 1975 by an 
alliance of a students' movement (EPRP) and the radical 
military, and the subsequent regime run by a military council 
(Derg) headed by Colonel Mengistu, transformation of 
productive relations and political system did occur, enabling 
some authors to speak of a "revolution" (Hallyday and 
Molyneux 1981, Hi wet 1984). Some elements of Soviet socialism 
were introduced and Marxism-Leninism became the official 
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state ideology. However this did not solve the nationalities 
issues, as the Derg pursued the same centralist position as 
Haile Selassie's regime, repressing with force the various 
nationalist movements that arose in this period and the 
Amharas retained their cultural and political domination (cf. 
Hallyday and Molyneux 1981, Gilkes 1983). While the specific 
relationship between Ethiopian "centralism" and Eritrean 
nationalism will be examined below, that with other 
non-Eritrean nationalist movements is discussed by Hallyday 
and Molyneux (1981), Selassie (1980), Baxter (1983), Triulzi 
(1983). Here it can be pointed out that the Derg feared that 
any concessions to a particular nationalist (or autonomist) 
movement could have led to the total fragmentation of the 
Ethiopian state. 
Eritrea 
Eritrea is itself a culturally and linguistically diverse 
region. Data from 1952 report a population of just above one 
million inhabitants (Pool 1983, p. 178), while a publication 
of the Eritrean People's Liberation Front puts the figure at 
three and a half million in 1984 (Adulis, vol. 1 no. 3,1984). 
Eight major linguistic groups can be found, but half of the 
population is made up by Tigrinya-speaking agriculturalists 
inhabiting the highland provinces of Akele Guzai, Hamasien 
(where the provincial capital, Asmara, is located) and Serae. 
The vast majority of this population adheres to Ethiopic 
Orthodox Christianity (see Fig. 2.2), constituting also the 
greatest part of Etitrean migrants in Milan. The second main 
linguistic group is that of the Tigre-speakers, which, like 
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Muslims. and semi-nomad pastoral is_s (except for the 
inhabitants of Eritrea's main port, Massawa), inhabiting the 
lowland provinces of Sahel and Barca. The other six 
linguistic groups are roughly equal in numbers, speak 
non-semitic languages and are main. y pastoralists and 
Muslims, except for the Bilen, mainly inhabiting the city of 
Keren who are equally divided between Muslim and Catholics 
(cf. Ullendorff 1973, Pool 1983). A few Tigre and Bilen are 
also to be found in Milan. Eritrea, after the period of 
Italian colonization (1990-1941), a federation with Ethiopia 
(1952-1962) and unilateral annexation t*y Ethiopia in 1962, 
experienced the growth of strong nationalist movements. The 
question of why this should be the case may be posed, given 
that there is almost as much cultural diversity within 
Eritrea itself as between Eritrea and Ethiopia, and that half 
of its population, the Tigrinya-speakers, share the same 
language, religion and other cultural and physical 
characteristsics with the neighbouring Ethiopian region of 
Tigray (cf. Fig. 2.1) and the same religion, but only related 
language with the Ethiopian Amharas. 
While Eritrea experienced fifty years of Italian colonialism, 
Ethiopia experienced only five years (Halliday and Molyneux 
1981, Pool 1983). In this sense while the Eritrean case is 
fairly common among African countries where the attempt to 
create a nation-state usually followed the colonial 
boundaries (Smith, A. D. 1981, Mazrui and Tidy 1984, Lewis 
1983), what is peculiar, as Halliday and Molyneux (1981, 
p. 175) point out, is Ethiopia's secular tradition of 
independence. Italian colonialism in Eritrea, initiated with 
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the annexation of the port of Assab in 1879, but formally 
started only in 1890, created a greater rate of 
industrialization and proletarianization, at least in the 
Tigrinya-speaking highlands, than was to be found in the 
rest of Ethiopia (Halliday and Molyneux 1981, Pool 1983) and 
gave some degree of common identity and sense of common 
historical destiny to Eritreans, besides providing the region 
with the very name "Eritrea" itself. The interlude of British 
administration (1941-1952) brought about the formation of 
Eritrean political parties and newspapers which provided 
media for the expression of the growing nationalist feelings 
among the intelligentsia. In 1952, following a UN resolution 
supported by the USA and the western countries in general 
(which supported Haile Selassie's regime in Ethiopia), 
Eritrea was federated with Ethiopia. But in 1962 Ethiopia 
unilaterally annexed Eritrea. Tigrinya, which was Eritrea's 
most important language, was replaced by Amharic as the only 
official language. It was at this point that Eritrean 
nationalist movements gained in strength. Thus a politicized 
radical and nationalist intelligentsia emerged, to which the 
leaders of the liberation movement in Milan also belong. 
Initially the main movement, the Eritrean Liberation Front 
(ELF) drew support from the coastal Muslim populations (from 
which most of its leadershp came). It was financed by the 
Arab countries and the Soviet Union. The establishment of a 
radical military regime in Addis Ababa, the Derg, did not 
mean a change of attitude towards the Eritrean question, but 
only that the Soviet Union and some radical Arab countries 
swapped sides and supported Ethiopia's "centralism" rather 
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than Er. itrean nationalism. It did mean that the Eritrean 
urban masses and peasants, radicalized by the revolution but 
whose expectations of an improvement in Eritrea's autonomy 
were not met, started supporting more actively the cause of 
Eritrean nationalism. It is in this period that the major 
Eritrean liberation movement, the Eritrean People's 
Liberation Front (EPLF) was formed (7). Although originally 
the EPLF was formed also because of the need to counter 
Muslim supremacy in the ELF and therefore had a majority of 
Christian Tigrinya-speaking members, the main dividing line 
between the two fronts was their different class character, 
the ELF drawing support from the semi-nomad pastoralists and 
the EPLF from the settled peasantry and urban masses (Pool 
1983) (8). This may be a significant factor to understand the 
support the EPLF enjoys in Milan among Eritrean migrants, who 
mostly come from this background. 
Nowadays the most important differences between the two 
fronts are not so much in class and religious composition 
(although the ELF has a slight predominance of Muslims while 
the EPLF of Christian peasants), but in their political 
character. Both support Eritrea's independence from 
Ethiopia's "colonialism" and both have a progressive 
orientation. But the EPLF has a clearer policy and a more 
radical Marxist-Leninist orientation. While this political 
persuasion is typical of many Third World liberation 
movements, it may also be seen as a way to overcome, at the 
ideological level, the religious division between Christians 
and Muslims. In fact the EPLF strongly denies being 
essentially a Christian dominated front. The EPLF is 
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committed to safeguard the interests of every citizen, 
regardless of "nationality" and religion (which often 
coincided). However it is also committed to "punish those who 
try to sow discord ... and undermine the progress of the 
Eritrean people on the basis of religion" and that religion 
should be separated from the state and education (9). This 
means that religion, and in particular the Christian/Muslim 
division, is seen as a potentially disruptive element for 
Eritrean nationalism and that therefore its role is to be 
played down. This is also because the EPLF fears foreign 
interference in internal matters, probably from the Arab 
countries, in spite of the fact that it has enjoyed their 
support, even if to a lesser extent than the ELF, and that 
recent Soviet support for the Derg, caused a few radical 
Arab countries (notably Lybia), to drop their assistance to 
the Eritrean cause. It is important to assess the EPLF's 
attitude to religion in order to understand the compromise it 
had to reach in Milan to establish an agreement with the 
leader of an Eritrean church. 
Eritrean nationalism can thus be characterized at the same 
time as a "secessionist" and an "irredentist" one. It is 
secessionist because it wants full independence from 
Ethiopia, on the basis of the experience of Italian 
colonialism and of two previous periods in which it was 
separated from "Abyssinia" and for political reasons. 
Eritrean nationalism characterizes Ethiopia's control of 
Eritrea as "colonialist" (cf. Selassie 1980). On the other 
hand, the Ethiopians point out that the Tigrinya-speaking 
highlands of Eritrea were part of the Axumite kingdom, the 
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cradle. of Ethiopian civilization (10). As Halliday and 
Molyneux argue (1981, p. 175), "both parties make the 
conventional nationalist assumption that in previous 
centuries entities corresponding to either 'Ethiopia' or 
'Eritrea' existed". From a political-strategic point of view 
it is clear that Eritrea provides Ethiopia with a vital 
outlet to the sea and that the Ethiopian rulers fear that an 
independent Eritrea would provide the launching pad for Arab 
penetration in Ethiopia (which has historically been a 
Christian "island" in a Muslim "sea"), pointing out that all 
foreign invasions came from that area. However, the EPLF's 
attitude towards the religious/ethnic question described 
above, is particularly telling of the "irredentist" side of 
its nationalism, that is of the need of "nation-building" 
through cultural unification. Thus the EPLF sees Eritrea's 
nine "nationalities", as having a common historical and 
political destiny on the basis of colonialism, which sets 
them apart from contiguous populations on the other side of 
the colonial boundary. For example the people of the 
Ethiopian region of Tigray, physically and culturally 
indistinguishable from the Tigrinya-speaking Eritrean 
highlanders, are seen as having only the right to struggle 
for autonomy, which indeed is the major goal of the Tigray 
People's Liberation Front (TPLF), rather than full 
independence. Therefore Eritrea constitutes a "nation" not by 
virtue of its cultural/linguistic homogeneity, but through 
its common history (11). At any rate the Eritrean case for 
self-determination does have some validity from the point of 
view of international law (Healy 1983), even if the term 
itself is rather vague and inprecise (Mayall 1983, Wiberg 
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1987. ). 'This outline helps to understand why not all Eritreans 
in Milan support the nationalist cause. Yet it will be seen 
that they, and even some Ethiopians, (especially from 
Tigray), participate in events supporting the Eritrean cause 
in Milan. 
At a political and ideological level the EPLF carries out 
massive literacy campaigns among its illiterate members 
(mainly peasants and women), is committed to a socialist 
transformation of Eritrean society and seeks international 
relationships with the non-aligned countries. From the late 
1970s up to the present the EPLF has displaced the ELF as 
the major Eritrean military force fighting the Ethiopian 
"colonizers". At the moment the EPLF controls large areas of 
the Sahel and Barca regions and small patches of the central 
highland provinces. On the other hand the Ethiopians control 
the main towns of Asmara, Keren and the port of Massawa 
(where there is a Soviet naval base) and the the main roads 
connecting Eritrea with Ethiopia. Although in 1980 the EPLF 
has issued a peace proposal based on a referendum where 
Eritrean could choose between regional autonomy, federation 
with Ethiopia or full independence, this has been rejected by 
the Ethiopian government and thus the fighting goes on. The 
popular support enjoyed by the EPLF and its guerilla tactics 
against Ethiopian superiority in terms of manpower and 
military equipment, create a situation of stalemate and a 
divided country. In the liberated areas the EPLF is 
attempting to create a prototype of what an independent 
Eritrean society would loot; like, with land redistribution, 
self-sufficient and small-scale industrial plants (often in 
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underground cities), sanitary and literacy campaigns and 
female emancipation. Some of these efforts go on also in 
Milan and help to explain the support the EPLF enjoys. In the 
Ethiopian-controlled towns, Amharic is the official language 
and boys are conscripted into the Ethiopian army often to 
fight against relatives in the liberation fronts. The 
droughts and famine that started in the early 19B0s have 
worsened the situation. The EPLF claims that official aid 
sent to Ethiopian-controlled towns did not reach the 
liberated areas and accuses the Derg of misusing 
international aid. Thus after 1975, with the Derg's take-over 
and the worsening of the Ethiopian-Eritrean conflict, the 
speed of migration greatly increased. Many fled the rural 
areas to escape the conflict and' migrated abroad to avoid 
conscription in the Ethiopian army, even if not all Eritreans 
are political refugees in a strict sense. Thousands of 
people are in refugee camps in Sudan. Among those who managed 
to escape further afield, most of the Muslim Eritrean 
migrants went to the Arab countries, while most of the 
Christian ones went to North America and Europe, including 
Italy which is often preferred as a destination because of 
the historical links. 
2.3 Egypt and Islam: between modernism and fundamentalism 
Islam as world-view 
Islam is, together with Judaism and Christianity, one of the 
three great monotheist religions whose members believe in a 
trascendental God. It is also one of-the world's most 
diffused religions both in terms of space, running from 
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Morocco to Indonesia, and of number of believers, amounting 
to several hundreds of million. Together with Judaism and 
Christianity it members believe in a history of God's 
revelation to mankind through a sequence of prophets, held in 
a body of scriptures. In this respect it considers itself as 
the final ring in a chain of revelations to prophets, 
started with Abraham which, through Moses and Jesus, had its 
last and definitive stage with God's revelation to Muhammed. 
For Islam, God's final revelation was entrusted to Muhammed 
who belonged to a particular people, the Arabs, who had the 
duty to spread his words. In fact the Arabs' mission was to 
convert to Islam the greatest possible number of people, 
except for the two previous "people of the Book", i. e. Jews 
and Christians. Islam's attitude towards conversion is 
important in order to understand the ideology and practice of 
the Milanese Muslim Centre and of the Milanese Egyptians on 
this issue. 
For Christianity salvation was essentially achieved through 
the individual. For Judaism and Islam this was achieved 
through the collectivity and therefore the relevance of 
religion for the social order is great (Verbit 1981). Judaism 
and Islam also have in common the fact that they codify most 
aspects of social and everyday life in a way that 
Christianity does not. In Islam this is achieved through the 
Shari 'a, the code of Islamic law, which derives its authority 
from God's revelation to the Prophet in the Written Law, the 
Quran, and the Oral Law, the Sunna. Among matters which the 
Shari 'a rules upon are those concering food proibition and 
prescriptions (e. g. ban on pork eating, ritual butchery, 
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etc. ), 'marriage, divorce and inheri=ance, trade and commerce. 
Contrary to Christianity, at least in its Catholic variant, 
in Islam (and Judaism) the clergy co not claim a monopoly of 
the relationship between God and the faithful, but is made up 
only of men of greater religious learning and authority. 
There are no separate "Churches" as hierachies of clergy 
(Gilsenan 1983). However Islam, also because of its wide 
geographical distribution, should not be seen as a rigid set 
of bounded structures, but "as a word that identifies varying 
relations of practice, representation, symbols, concept and 
woridview within the same and between different societies ... 
(changing) in important ways over time" (ibid., p. 19). This 
outline helps to assess the degree to which Egyptians in 
Milan follow Islam in an orthodox äs opposed to a "liberal" 
way. 
The most immediate expression of these differences is the 
division between Sunni and Shiite Islam. Sunni Islam can be 
considered the "mainstream" form of Islam, being the most 
diffused in the Muslim world, not only among, virtually all 
Arab people (except for some of Lezanese and for a minority 
of Iraquis), but also among the majority of non-Arab Muslims 
(e. g. Muslim black Africans, Pakistanis and Indonesians). On 
the other hand Shiite Islam is mostly professed by Iranians. 
However because, as mentioned above, in Islam there are no 
"Churches" as corporate bodies with a hierarchy of clergy, 
Sunnis and Shiites, although divided and often fighting each 
other, consider themselves both members of the same religion 
in a way Catholics and most Protestants do not. The main 
difference between the two lies not so much in questions of 
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truth, but of power, concerning who is entitled to be the 
leader of the community (imam) (cf. Pipes 1983). The 
stronger messianic character of Shiism makes it particularly 
suited to its members who feel as a body of persons deprived 
of their rights (Guillaume 1956, p. 121) and a "community of 
the suffering", also because of a historical tradition of 
resistance to political power (Gilserian 1983, p. 55). Although 
this makes Shiites more prone to funcamentalism (which will 
be defined below), this tendency is also present among 
Sunnis, especially among the Muslim Brotherhood which 
controls Milan's Muslim Centre. There are other subdivisions 
in modern Islam besides Sunnis and Shiites. For example 
within Sunni Islam there are also the Sufis, a mystical and 
esoteric group also strong in Egypt (Gilsenan 1983, 
pp. 78-87),. often considered on the verge of heresy by 
orthodox Muslims (cf. Guillaume 195.6, pp. 143-154). A small 
group of Sufis is also present in Milan. 
It has been noted above that Islam has profound implications 
for social and political life. Concerning the relationship 
between Islam and politics, three tendencies can be 
identified, namely fundamentalism, secularism and modernism 
(12). The historical and social change of the Muslim world 
has meant that these three interpretations of the role of 
Islam in relation to politics have changed over time and in 
different countries. Fundamentalism acknowledges social 
changes, - but holds that the normative authority of Shari 'a 
can cope with these changes and rule all-aspects of social 
and political life, therefore advocating' Islamic theocracy. 
The best example of a state ruled in this way is, of course, 
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Iran and, to a lesser extent, Saudi Arabia, within the 
contemporary Muslim world. However fundamentalism had perhaps 
its truest expression in various sects, such as the Muslim 
Brotherhood which will be described below. On the other hand 
secularism, the opposite of fundamentalism, advocates a 
separation between religion and politics. Tunisia and Syria 
are probably the examples more closely approaching this model 
in the Arab world. Finally modernism holds that the Islamic 
sources of authority can still influence political life, but 
within a flexible and "liberal" interpretation of the 
scriptures, rather than a'literal one. This approach has been 
attempted especially in Egypt but, as it will be seen below, 
has been countered by fundamentalist revivals, which also hit 
other Muslim countries (Lakhadar 1981). The distinction 
between fundamentalist and modernist Islam helps to 
appreciate the difference in Islamic practice and ideology 
between Milan's Muslim Centre and the majority of Egyptian 
migrants. 
Capitalism and Islam in Egypt 
While Rodinson's study (1977) has shown that Islam, as an 
ideological system, is not incompatible with capitalism, 
different positions emerge in the literature concerning the 
introduction of capitalism and the nature of its development 
in the Muslim world and in Egypt in particular (cf. Rodinson 
1977, Hussein 1977, Clawson 1981). However there is general 
agreement that after an attempt to industrialize Egypt in the 
first half of the 19th century, during the period of French 
and Ottoman domination and, from 1882, of British domination, 
Egyptian capitalism was heavily conditioned by foreign 
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(particularly European) capital. However in the 19th century 
relations of production in the countryside remained of an 
essentially feudal nature, linked to Egypt's phase of export 
of raw material (mainly cotton) to Europe, shared by many 
other Third World countries. In the 20th century up to the 
1950s Egyptian industrialization, attempting a phase of 
"import-substitution", grew slowly also because of European 
commercial and financial domination and the national 
bourgeoisie was rather weak. In the countryside the 
development of capitalist productive systems brought about 
the creation of masses of landless people who fuelled the 
urbanization process mainly in the Nile delta (see Fig. 2.3) 
where most of the industrialization was taking place (Hussein 
1977). In 1980 45% of the Egyptian population, estimated at 
just under 40 million in 1978, was living in urban areas 
(Gilbert and Bugler 1981, p. 7). 
The continuation of British domination over Egypt brought 
about the development of nationalist feelings also among the 
bourgeoisie. These feelings were channelled through the 
emergence of the moderate and reformist Wafd party, which, 
also because of the weakness of the class supporting it, was 
incapable of getting rid of either the corrupt Farouk 
monarchy or of British occupation. Two parallel movements, 
which both had their rank and file mainly made up by members 
of the Egyptian petty bourgeoisie, emerged: that of the Free 
Officers, a secret nationalist organization of middle-rank 
officials, and the Muslim Brotherhood, which will be examined 
'below. It was the former organization led by Nasser which 
managed to overthrow British domination and the monarchy 
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thereby realizing Egypt's national aspirations (cf. Mazrui 
and Tidy 1984, Hussein 1977), even though Egypt also gained 
the leadership of the pan-Arab nationalist movement 
(Jankowski 1983). 
The period of Nasser's regime (1952-1970) has been 
characterized as one of state capitalism (Hussein 1977, 
Clawson 1981) with a strengthening of the state bourgeoisie 
and an attempt to achieve a self-reliant industrial 
development. However, due to internal and international 
problems, this attempt failed and was brought to an end with 
the 1967 defeat in the Six Days War. The advent of Sadat 
(1970-1983) brought about a return to economic liberalism and 
a greater integration of Egypt's economy in the world market. 
This laid bare the structural imbalances of the Egyptian 
economy and caused a deterioration of living standards and an 
impoverishment of the middle and high level of civil servants 
which joined the impoverished masses (Hussein 1977, pp. 
xvix-xxi). These include the intellectuals who, as it will be 
seen, constitute a large part of the migrants who come to 
Italy. 
One of the main problems facing both Nasser and Sadat's 
regime was the state policy on the role of Islam in the life 
of civil society. From the times of Muhammed Ali up to the 
present day, Egypt's rulers have always tried to impose a 
modernist conception of Islam, i. e. to attempt to conciliate 
the Shari'a with the requirements of a modern society 
(Humphreys 1981, Cantori 1981). This uneasy bridge beween 
traditional theology and modernization with the consequent 
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attempt to control the religious authorities (ulama), brought 
about the development of a dualism between "official" and 
"popular" Islam, the former with a modernist approach and the 
latter with a fundamentalist one. The modernist "official" 
approach was continued by Nasser, himself a secular figure, 
who found Islam a good vehicle for the development of his 
foreign policy and his internal socialist ideology. The 
modernist use of Islam for purposes of legitimation was 
continued by Sadat. For example the Shari'a was to constitute 
only Li. source of legislation in the 1971 constitution, even 
if the state's attempt to control the ulama slowed down. 
Islam was to remain the official religion from which the 
rulers had to be drawn, although freedom of practice was 
always assured to Egypt's influential Coptic Christian 
religious minority. One of the most important attempts to 
carry out a modernist version of Islam in Egypt concerned 
the Law on Personal Status, derived from the Sharia'a and 
affecting issues such as the status of women and marriage. 
These primarily revolved around the right to polygamy (up to 
four wives) and the male unilateral right to divorce. However 
the great fear of the Egyptian rulers of accusations of 
"irreligiosity" have meant that in the late 1970s only minor 
reforms were possible (Al-Nowaihi 1983, Hussein, A. 1983). 
This is important to appreciate the Egyptians' attitude 
towards marriage in Milan and the extent to which it follows 
this pattern. 
This modernist and liberal approach to the role of Islam in 
civil society appealed especially to the state bourgeoisie 
and the intelligentsia, to which most Egyptian migrants in 
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Milan belong. However it met with resistance from the 
fundamentalist movements, especially the Muslim Brotherhood, 
which drew their support from the economically vulnerable and 
ideologically excluded (from "official" Islam) urban petty 
bourgeoisie and rural poor (Gilsenan 1983). The Brotherhood, 
founded in 1929, was a fundamentalist movement that sought 
to overthrow the entire social order, which it considered 
illegitimate, and to replace it with an Islamic state based 
on 7th century Arabia and ruled by an orthodox interpretation 
of the Shari'a. Even though its organizational model was 
based on the esoteric Muslim sects of the Middle Ages and 
nostalgically appealed to Islam's Golden Era, it was 
organized with modern techniques with a paramilitary 
organization, albeit within the framework of a secret society 
(Lakhadar 1981). Although it was banned and repressed by 
Nasser, the 1967 military defeat by Israel (which also meant 
an ideological defeat), the socioeconomic failure of Nasser's 
statist attempt and the return to legality with Sadat brought 
about mass popular support, not only in Egypt, but also in 
other Arab countries, like Syria and Jordan. Despite all this 
the brotherhood is still a minority movement in Egypt. But 
the majority of the Egyptians who migrate to Milan come from 
an educated urban background and subscribe more 
to the 
official modernist version of Islam than to the Brotherhood's 




The two groups under consideration have relatively different 
backgrounds and origins, in spite of a few similarities. Both 
Eritrea and Egypt experienced a growing rate of urbanization 
in the 20th century, albeit greater in the latter case than 
in the former, and most of the migrants to Milan came from an 
urban background. Both regions experienced colonialism and 
the development of nationalism in the 20th century, although 
nationalism is not as much a live issue as far as Egypt is 
concerned (except, at an Arab level, for the Palestinian 
question). By contrast it is still a very "hot" issue in 
Eritrea. After Italian colonisation and largely as a result 
of it, the target of this nationalism became Ethiopia in 
spite of the fact that half of the Eritrean population shared 
the same religion and a similar language (identical to that 
of the Ethiopian region of Tigray) with the "official" 
Ethiopian ones and that much cultural diversity was to be 
found in Eritrea itself. However most of the migrants to 
Milan shared their allegiance to the cause of Eritrea's 
independence (via the radical Eritrean liberation movements, 
particularly the EPLF) and to Ethiopic Orthodox Christianity 
(a form of Christianity with many Judaic elements and rather 
different from Catholicism). They spoke Tigrinya, the semitic 
language of the highlanders (by far the most diffused 
language in Eritrea). The conflict that the national question 
entailed was one of the main causes of emigration. On the 
other hand, the main cause of Egyptian emigration seems to be 
the profound processes of social transformation and 
differentiation it has experienced in this century and the 
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recent -impoverishment of the middle classes and of the 
intelligentsia, who provided most of the migrants. Although 
Egypt has recently experienced an Islamic fundamentalist 
revival, most of the immigrants' background is still that of 
a modernist and liberal interpretation of Islam which, as a 
religion, has profound implications for both social and 
political life. It will be seen in later chapters to what 
extent this applies also to the Milanese situation. 
Having analyzed the background to emigration, the next 
chapter will examine the context of immigration in Italy. 
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NOTES TO CHF'TER 2 
(1) See, for example, Evans-Pritchard and Fortes (1940) 
and Radcliffe-Brown (1950) traditional anthropological 
approaches to segmentary societies. These approaches, 
stemming from a structural -functionalist perspective, have 
been criticized by marxist anthropologists on the grounds 
that they did not recognize the existence of exploitation in 
apparently egalitarian societies (cf. the articles contained 
in Seddon 1978 and Terray 1972). Leach (1961) criticized the 
tautologous implications of the structural -functionalist 
comparative method. Finally, Orientalism has also been 
criticized as an ideological notion conceiving the "Orient" 
as a static entity (cf. Said 1985). 
(2) According to World Bank data cited in Gilbert and 
Gugler (1981). O'Connor, (1983) lowers the figure for 
Ethiopia to 8%. 
(3) Cf. - Pool (1982, p. 176) and Firebrace and Holland (1984) 
who quote the same figure as applying already to the 1940s. 
(4) A term used for many centuries to denote this area. 
(5) Who call themselves beta Israel. Cf. Kessler (1985) on 
this topic. 
(6) The Ethiopic Orthodox calendar, however, is solar rather 
than lunar like the Jewish and Muslim ones and is based on 
the Julian, rather than Gregorian compilation (followed by 
"western" Christians). Cf. Ullendorff (1973) 
(7) This characterization has been recently challenged by 
Gebre-Medhin (1984). 
(B) Besides the EPLF and the ELF there are also other 
Eritrean liberation movements, such as Osman Sale Sabbe's 
Eritrean Liberation Front-Popular Liberation Forces. But 
because of their limited influence, the discussion is 
confined to the ELF and mainly to the EPLF. 
(9) These points are taken from the EPLF's "National 
Democratic Programme" of 1977, contained in Holland and 
Firebrace (1984), who also provide a scheme of the EPLF's 
organizational structure (p. 42). 
(10) As in a pamphlet issued by the Workers' Party of 
Ethiopia (controlled by the Derg) in August 1985 called "The 
Sole Truth and Only Solution". 
(11) These views are expressed in a pamphlet issued by the 
EPLF called: "The EPLF and its Relations with Other 
Democratic Movements within Ethiopia". 
(12) This distinction and most of the following discussion is 
taken from Humphreys (1981). 
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CHAPTER 3: THE "HOST SOCIETY" AND THE CONTEXT OF IMMIGRATION 
This chapter analyzes the "context" of immigration of 
Eritreans and Egyptians at the Italian and Milanese levels. 
The "context" will affect the migrants in two major ways. In 
the first place, from a socio-economic point of view, it will 
be important to assess the relationship between the migrants 
and the class structure of the "host society". This has 
important effects not only on the economic niches available 
to the migrants, but also on whether they can make use of 
class resources (e. g. unionization, strikes, social and job 
security, property) for their social advancement and on the 
pattern of conflict with the "host society". The first two 
sections of the chapter contain an analysis of political 
institutions, social classes, socio-territorial structures 
and patterns of urbanization. The third section provides a 
brief overview of the "new immigration" at the Italian level 
and an analysis of the regulations about foreign immigration 
and the effect on the ethnic division of labour. Finally 
there is a brief section on Milan's political history and 
institutions. The "context" of immigration can also be 
defined in terms of the main cultural discourses of the "host 
society", i. e. hegemonic political discorses which affect 
the patterns of alliance the migrants are able to establish 
with sections of the "host society" and the ideological 
legacy of racist stereotypes, whose effects will be analyzed 
in chapter B. 
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3.1 Italy from Unity to the post World War 11 periods history 
and politics 
Although Italy is nowadays among the most industrialized 
countries of the capitalist world, it has usually been 
considered an "untypical" example of a capitalist country. In 
order to analyze its peculiarity and the context to which 
Eritreans and Egyptians migrated, it is useful to start from 
the period immediately following the unification of the 
country. This history will also show some continuities in 
terms of political features that persist up to the present 
and affect the patterns of alliance and system of resources 
open to the migrants in Milan. 
From Unity to the fall of fascism 
In 1861 the foundation of the unitary Italian state brought 
together the North and the South which had very different 
social characteristics, due, among other things, to the 
different kinds of foreign domination they experienced. The 
North, from the end of the 18th century, had undergone the 
gradual introduction of liberal ideas and of a capitalist 
mode of production, both in agriculture and in industry, 
although it was rather weak due to foreign competition. Also 
the northern industrial bourgeoisie, although politically and 
culturally hegemonic, was still a rather weal; social class. 
The South, on the ether hand, in spite of the existence of 
small liberal groups, remained an essentially feudal society 
and the process of unification met with popular uprisings 
known as "banditism", where not only landlords and peasants, 
but also the clergy and other sections of society reacted to 
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the encroachmert by the northern state, which threatened to 
bring about a collapse of the existing social order 
(Tullio-Altan 1986). Although a comprehensive account is 
impossible in his context, it can be pointed out that the 
modern mafia also has its origins in this context. 
The need to find a market for goods produced by northern 
industries and hence some degree of protectionism (because of 
competition from economically more advanced countries), 
brought about the establishment of a class alliance 
("historical t"loc") between the northern bourgeoisie and the 
southern landea class, which obtained the maintenance of the 
status quo in exchange of protectionism, in Gramsci's 
classical formulation (1974). In Gramsci's view this was also 
achieved through an ideological "hegemony" of this 
"historical bloc" through what he called "organic 
intellectuals" (including teachers, clergy, officials) over 
the subordinate "bloc" made up by the northern proletariat 
and the southern peasants, which did not manage to counter 
this hegemony (cf. Gramsci 1977). Thus capitalism and the 
bourgeoisie dic not acheive a complete hegemony in Italy in 
the period from Unity to the advent of fascism, which was 
reflected at the political level by the elaborate system of 
negotiations known as trasformismo which the liberal state 
had to go through to pass any legislation (Tullio-Altan 
1986). 
The First World War brought this state of affairs to an end. 
The contradiction between an economy strained by the war 
effort, a weak bourgeoisie and liberal state on the one hand 
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and a. radical but not yet very strong proletatriat, 
contributed to the advent of fascism in 1922 (Bassoon 1985). 
The rise of fascism or of fascist-like regimes in Europe in 
the 20th century, has been characterized as a "revolution 
from above" (1), attempting to modernize the economy through 
a strong interventionist policy by the state, in a situation 
of weak capitalism in countries that had not experienced 
earlier bourgeois revolutions like England or France 
(Barrington Moore 1967). From a similar perspective, but 
taking into account also Wallerstein's (1979) framework, it 
has been noted that all the "semi-peripheral" southern 
European countries, experienced some 'form of fascist-like 
dictatorship in this century Winer 1982). The important 
thing is to stress that, at least as far as Italy is 
concerned, although the fall of fascism and the advent of a 
democratic system after 1945 brought about major political 
changes at the political level, there are also some 
continuities at the socioeconomic level. These concern 
especially the role of state intervention in civil society 
which remained great in the democratic period, also through 
institutions for economic control like huge state holdings, 
which had already been created in the fascist period. Among 
the most important effects of this continuity were the growth 
of the state bureaucracy and the great role that the 
political parties assumed in controlling this sector on 
clientelistic bases (Tullio-Altan 1986). This legacy 
continues up to the present and has profound effects on the 
relationship between the migrants groups in consideration and 
the Italian state and society. 
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The post-World War II institutional and political framework 
Because of this role of the state in Italian civil society, a 
brief analysis of the institutional and political framework 
is needed. Italy is a democratic republic (after a referendum 
in 1946 which abolished the monarchy), whose politico-legal 
system works within the limits of the Constitution. The 
Italian Constitution prescribes free democratic elections, 
based on a system of proportional representation, to elect 
the members of parliament who hold the legislative power. It 
also guarantees the equality of every citizen before the law, 
regardless of sex, race, language, religion or political 
opinion and safeguards the right to private property, albeit 
in a limited way. These can be seen as the liberal aspects of 
the Constitution. However, forms of collective property and 
state ownership are also envisaged and the working class is 
given a special recognition as a fundamental social force of 
Italian society. These aspects constitute the socialist 
component of the constitution and although there are certain 
continuities with fascism, as noted above, they also break 
with one of the main fascist socioeconomic practices, that of 
corporatism. Finally, although freedom of religion is 
guaranteed, a special role is granted to the Catholic Church. 
The Constitution thus embodies a political compromise among 
Italy's major political forces: the numerically small, but 
politically and culturally influential liberal section (made 
up by the Liberal and Republican parties), the socialist bloc 
(made up by the Communist and Socialist parties) and the 
Catholic one (made up essentially by the Christian Democratic 
party) Masson 1985). 
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As is widely recognized, in Italy political parties have a 
major role in controlling civil society for a variety of 
reasons, some of which are mentioned above. The Christian 
Democratic party (DC) has been the politically most 
influential party since the Second World War. It has 
participated in every government coalition (with one of its 
men as Prime Minister) (2) since the war and has enjoyed 
between 39% and 33% of the votes in the last ten years. It 
is difficult to characterize the DC both in terms of its 
political line and of its social base. Just as its policies 
are multifaceted so is its social base. On the one hand it is 
committed to private enterprise, on the other hand it has to 
maintain social peace and legitimacy acknowledging some form 
of state intervention (ibid. p. 225). Moreover it realized 
that with involvement in the socioeconomic system it could 
also increase its power in a clientelistic way, especially by 
extending the public sector (ibid. and Tullio-Altan 1986). 
Although its traditional power base was constituted by the 
agrarian classes and petty bourgeoisie, especially in the 
South, and by part of the northern bourgeoisie, it also had 
the support of some sections of the working class, but one of 
Its main strongholds is the public tertiary sector. From an 
ideological point of view, although it is committed to 
liberal capitalism and to safeguarding Catholic values, it 
also includes some progressive labour factions and supports 
one trade union, the Confederazione Italiana dei Sindacati 
dei Lavoratori (CISL). Finally the DC is made up of several 
factions, supporting different clientelistic interests, often 
in conflict with each other (cf. Zuckerman 1977). 
. 94 
The seconc main party is the Communist one (PCI), which in 
the past ten years has enjoyed between 27% and 34% of the 
votes. Altnough it is committed to a socialist transformation 
of society, it has shown that it is willing to accept some 
degree o= private enterprise, although its line is not 
totally clear in terms of policies (Tullio-Altan 1986). 
Politically it has proved to be committed to the principles 
of democrazy and pluralism and has been the Communist Party 
that has shown the highest degree of independence from Moscow 
in the West. In spite of its large following, especially 
among the working class but also among intellectuals, service 
workers and some sections of the bourgeoisie (especially in 
some centre-north regions), it has never formally achieved 
central power because it has not found political partners 
willing to make a coalition. However, its power in the labour 
movement (it supports the largest trade union, the 
Confederazione Generale Italiana del Lavoro, CGIL), in the 
world of culture and education and in many local governments, 
is considerable. 
The Socialist Party (PSI) has averaged around 10% of the vote 
in the last ten years. Formerly an ally of the PCI, the PSI 
soon moved to the centre in an attempt to become a "centrist" 
reformist party, hoping to draw support from the progressive 
bourgeoisie. It had however to compete not only with the two 
powerful adversaries mentioned above, but also with the small 
centre pa. -ties (among which the most prominent is the 
Republican Party, PRI) which all, from different angles, 
claimed to advocate some degree of reformism. The fact that, 
because os prooprtional representation, any coalition needs 
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its votes to form a majority, has ensured it a permanent 
presence in every government in the past twenty years. It 
supports one trade union, the Unione Italiana del Lavoro 
(UIL). The three trade unions, CGIL, CISL and UIL formed a 
confederation in the late 1960s that continues up to the 
present, in spite of some recent divisions. It is a major 
social and political force in Italian society, to a certain 
extent controlled by the political parties, but also with 
some degree of independence, especially the Christian 
Democrat CISL. 
The political parties vary considerably in the strength of 
their support, according to different regions. This makes it 
particularly important to provide a brief analysis of the 
regional system of local government. There are three local 
levels at which power is delegated. The smallest is that of 
the municipality which can range from towns with over a 
million inhabitants to villages of a few thousand. Next is 
the province, which includes the various municipalities 
sorrounding the major urban centres (95 in total). Finally, 
there is"the region (20 in total). These levels of local 
authority have functions concerning planning, the provision 
of social services, local public administration and some 
degree of "legislative power. The extent of these functions, 
especially those concerning planning and services (including 
for example the management of public health and, to a certain 
extent, housing) has meant an involvement of the parties in 
civil society even greater than that of the central state and 
a strengthening of the party-based clientelistic system (cf. 
Sassoon 1985, pp. 210-220). Overall, the municipalities and 
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the regions have carried more power than the provinces. 
However, local authorities in Italy have only a limited 
financial autonomy from the central state with which they are 
often in conflict (cf. Martinotti 1981). The uneven 
distribution of wealth and political support within the 
regional system will be discussed below. This brief analysis 
of the role of the Italian central and local state and of the 
political parties was needed in order to have some background 
on the relationship between the migrant groups under 
consideration and the Italian state (central and local) and 
on the patterns of political alliances with the main 
political groups, like the parties and trade unions. 
3.2 Social classes, socioterritoral structures, urbanization 
and migration 
This section will show how changes in Italy's socioeconomic 
structure explain how Italy changed from being a country of 
net labour out-migration, from the end of the 19th century 
(because of processes outlined in the previous section), to 
being a net importer of foreign labour. 
Social classes 
The development of Italian capitalism has presented Italian 
sociologists, mainly working within a marxist perspective, 
with two related sets of problems. In the first place, Italy 
has experienced a period of economic growth since the war 
(especially in the 1958-63 period, termed "economic miracle") 
that aligned her with the most industrialized countries in 
the world (among the top five in 1986), in spite of a long 
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phase . of stagnation (especially during the 1970s). However, 
Italian ca-zitalism has always looked somehow "distorted" and 
uneven. The problem has been to characterize the specificity 
of Italian capitalism. The second set of problems concerned 
the growtn of the tertiary sector, especially in public 
administra=ion, to some extent common to other western 
societies, but also with some Italian peculiarities, 
especially with regard to its dimension. Starting with the 
second set of problems, analyses conducted in the early 1970s 
(Sylos-Labini 1978, Pizzorno 1978) confirmed the great 
numerical importance of the "middle ranks", especially 
including public employees. The growth of this class was 
linked to the surplus of labour, ` especially in the South 
(even after- an extensive emigration), and characterized as a 
"political exchange" whereby state intervention would have 
provided employment in the public bureaucracy in exchange for 
social consensus. The involvement of the state in creating 
employment and the system of subsidies, known as 
assistenzialismo, often following clientelistic rules, are 
very important points in understanding the Italian class 
structure (3). 
As far as the' proletariat is concerned, this class 
experienced rapid growth especially from the mid 1950s to 
the mid 1960s (the phase of the "economic miracle"), the 
highest in western Europe. But since the 1970s, after the 
phase of economic recession, it shrank considerably partly 
because of the introduction of labour-saving technologies, 
partly replaced by an increase in employment in the service 
sector. The dynamics of employment are usually explained 
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within. a segmented labour market approach (4), with the 
creation of a numerically smaller "central" or "protected" 
working class and a "marginal" or "unprotected" proletariat, 
working in small-scale enterprises with a flexible system of 
labour, an important point that will be expanded below. The 
bourgeoisie has on the whole increased its numbers in the 
past thirty years (5). The combined effects of the growth of 
employment in the public sector, assistenzialismo and the 
rising expectations of Italian youth after the spread of 
compulsory education, have meant that in recent times there 
has been a gap in labour supply in. the "unprotected" and 
least attractive occupations in the tertiary sector which 
could not be reached by technological innovation (e. g. 
cleaning, catering). This applied especially to urban 
centres, which have been filled, at least in part, by the 
Third World immigrants (cf. Mingione 1983a, b). As to the 
first question posed at the beginning of this section 
concerning the specificity of Italian capitalist development, 
it is closely related to the socioterritorial structure which 
will now be examined. 
Socioterritorial and social structures 
The particular character of Italian capitalism has often been 
analyzed in evolutionary terms with notions of "backwardness" 
and "latecoming" and more recently in terms of historical and 
social specificity within the constraints of the 
international-division of labour (cf. Donolo 1978, Triglia 
1978), usually related to the regional question. 
Traditionally the regional question has been analyzed in a 
dualistic way, contrasting the industrialized and "developed" 
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North,. r. ith the rural and "underdeveloped" South. However a 
more recent analysis (Bagnasco 1977) has proposed a new 
sociote-ritorial articulation of Italian society. This is 
based on the significance of small-scale, decentralized 
industrial units and enterprise, termed "diffused", 
"marginal", "peripheral" or "informal" economy. The main 
characteristics of this economy are the following( a) the 
small-scale size of its units; b) the use of cheap and 
flexible labour, often of a family kind and interlinked with 
agriculture; c) the decentralization of semi-autonomous 
productive units, often linked by networks; d) frequent tax 
evasion and therefore statistical invisibility (ibid., Paci 
1982). This sector has provided a great proportion of Italy's 
GNP, exports and employment particularly in times of economic 
recession and usually consists of "traditional" manufactured 
goods such as clothing, shoes, and furniture (Bagnasco 1977). 
This sector is concentrated in the central and northeastern 
regions and has therefore been termed the "third Italy" (or 
"Peripheral" Italy), besides the North-West (or "Central"), 
characterized by large-scale industry, "advanced" tertiary 
sector and relatively strong "central" working class and 
bourgeoisie, and the South (or "Marginal" Italy), 
characterized by unemployment and underemployment, state 
subsidies (assistenzialismo), industrial relocation of state 
monopolies (the so-called "cathedrals in the desert") and 
precarious economic activities (see Fig. 3.1). Another 
peculiarity of the "third Italy" is the fact that it has 
either a very clear Communist majority (in the central 
regions around Bologna and Florence) or a Christian Democrat 
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Figure 3.1: The "Three Italies" (after Bagnasco, 1977) 
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one (in the northeastern regions around Venice). The fact 
that the PCI has the greatest number of votes in regions 
without a large-scale proletariat working in big factories 
also calls for a revision of the classical mar>; ist 
assumptions about the relationship between economic life and 
political consciousness. In the North-West and in the South 
there is a pattern resembling more closely the national 
average, however with a relatively greater strength of the 
PCI in the North-West and DC in the South (cf. Sassoon 1985 
p. 173). The greater strength of the PCI in the Centre and DC 
in the North-East has been analyzed in terms of different 
political traditions and similar social role performed by the 
parties at the level of their grass-root organizations (cf. 
Bagnasco 1977, Kertzer 1979). It has to be said, however, 
that the PCI is also' very strong in the big industrial 
centres such as Milan and Turin. ' 
From an a-spatial point of view, the Italian social structure 
has been characterized with a four-fold typology, taking into 
account the segmented labour market approachi a) a 
"protected" productive sector (large-scale industry, 
especially' in the North-West); b) a "protected" reproductive 
sector (public administration, especially in Rome, 
the 
capital, and -large-scale enterprise white collar workers 
in 
the North-West); c) a "non-protected" productive sector 
(small-scale enterprises in the Centre-North-East); d) a 
"non-protected", but "assisted" reproductive sector 
(assistenzialismo, precarious economic activities). The 
regional locations of these sectors are of course not 
completely clear-cut. Each one of them is present also in 
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other regions, even if to a lesser extent and have been added 
here to the original formulation (Pact 1982). Finally the 
impact of the welfare state and the subsequent "fiscal 
crisis" on the household economy in terms of changing 
time-budgets and sexual division of labour and the different 
"strategies" of families to cope with these new situations 
have also been analyzed (cf. Mingione 1983a, 1983b). Part of 
these strategies involved the employment of foreign comestic 
labour as there was a growth in the employment rate of women 
who, also because of the crisis of the welfare state, needed 
domestic assistance. As will be seen in the next section, 
these socioterritorial structures have some impact on the 
character of foreign migration-to Italy. 
Urbanization and migration 
before the First World War Italy had a relatively low degree 
of urbanization and the largest city was' Naples, the 
ex-capital of the Borbonic kingdom. The rate of urbanization 
increased in the fascist period, 'especially with the growth 
of Rome, the political and bureaucratic capital, and at a 
faster rate after the Second World War. In particular in the 
period from 1951 to 1971, industrial development in the 
North-West largely coincided with a great urbanization 
process especially in the three large centres of the 
so-called "industrial triangle"a Milan, Turin and Genoa, the 
first in 1971 with around 1.7 million, the second with 
around 1.2 million and the third with around 800,000 
inhabitants (Mingione 1981, p. 119). While Turin was mainly 
characterized by the presence of a single huge factory, Fiat, 
and Genoa by state-owned petrochemical plants and the port, 
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Milan had a relatively diversified industrial structure and 
is Italy's leading industrial, financial and commercial 
centre (cf. Bagnasco 1977, p. 232, Dalmasso 1971). The 
Centre-North-East does not have any urban centre with more 
than one million inhabitants and in general the urban 
structure is balanced and integrated with the "diffused 
economy" described above and rural activities. Finally the 
South's main urban centres are Rome, with economic activities 
mainly concentrated in the public bureaucracy, and Naples, 
with some degree of industrial relocation and a large amount 
of casual labour and unemployment. There are no other urban 
centres with more that one million inhabitants in the South. 
In general they are disconnected from the wider socieconomic 
context (cf. Mingione 1981, pp. 81-124). Although the 
North-West has the highest number of large towns, the overall 
level of urbanization is fairly uniform across the country 
(around 527. ), with the exception of two southern regions. 
Industrial development in the North-West brought about, from 
the 1950s to the late 1960s, a massive migratory movement 
from the South, where there was a large surplus of population 
especially in the rural sector. This movement was largely 
directed to the three cities of the "industrial triangle" and 
followed two earlier stages of Italian migration (mainly from 
the South): a) a permanent transoceanic one (largely to the 
Americas) at the beginning of the century; b) a temporary one 
to northern Europe (especially to France and Belgium in the 
1940s and 1950s and Germany in the 1950s and 1960s) (cf. 
Reyneri 1979, Ascoli 1979) (6). Migration to the northern 
Italian cities was essentially a permanent one, even if often 
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in two stages, and while the construction industry often 
proved to be a "beach-head" for these immigrants, it was the 
industrial manufacturing sector, which had a labour shortage, 
that provided the greatest amount of employment for them, 
coinciding with the period of the "economic miracle". To give 
an idea of the dimension of this internal migration, it can 
be mentioned that between 1958 and 1963 as many as 900,000 
people came to the North from the South with a peak of 
240,000 in 1961 (Ascoli 1979). These migrants encountered 
difficulties in finding housing and sometimes even in 
communicating since most of them spoke the southern dialects 
and many were illiterate. Their jobs were sometimes 
precarious since, although they were Italian citizens, they 
were often required to have a residence permit in the city 
where they were living, which in turn was linked to the job 
contract. They were therefore at the mercy of their employer 
who could threaten to send them away. In this respect this 
migration had some structural affinities with the "new" Third 
World one. However, in this case, greater cultural 
similarities and common citizenship meant that the migrants 
largely integrated in the "autocthonous" working class with 
whom they shared the struggles of the late 1960s and early 
1970s which greatly increased their income and their social 
and trade union rights. After this period the southern 
migrants largely became part of the "central" unionized 
working class (Ascoli 1979, Reyneri 1979), in contrast to 
what happened to foreign immigrants. 
The economic recession of the 1970s and the subsequent phase 
of industrial restructuring with the introduction of 
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labour-saving technologies brought this process of migration 
to an end. In this period also the migratory balance of Italy 
as a whole with respect to foreign countries started to 
became positive (i. e. with more immigrants than emigrants). 
The introduction of technological innovation, however, did 
not reach certain sectors of society, especially in the least 
qualified occupations of the service sector in which a labour 
shortage persisted (cf. Reyneri 1979, Mingione 198-Za, 198Zb), 
also because of the raised expectations of the native labour 
force through unionization and compulsory education. This 
shortage, especially concentrated in the large towns, was to 
be filled, at least in part, by the "new" immigration. Thus 
while in the first stage (end of 19th century-1950s) Italian 
capitalist development was constrained by a surplus of 
population (mainly in the South) which was forced to 
emig-ate, and in the second stage (1950s-1960s) by a shortage 
of labour in the North, filled by migrants from the South, in 
the third stage (1970s-present) for the first time it was 
affected by a shortage of labour largely filled by foreign 
migration. Foreign migrants have provided many European 
countries (e. g. France, Germany, Britain, with cheap and 
flexible labour, "filling" those employment sectors abandoned 
by indigenous workers (cf. Fiore 1979, Castles and Kosack 
1973, Miles, 1982). This applies also to Italy since the late 
1970-s. But whereas migration to the above countries was, at 
least at the beginning, predominantly concentrated in the 
industrial sector, in Italy, because of its peculiar 
capitalist development, this occurred in the service sector. 
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3.3% The "new" immigration and ethnic divison of labour 
Dimensions and location of the "new" immigration 
It was only in the late 1970s that the presence of a "new" 
immigration, largely from the "Third World", started to be 
noticed by scholars of migration (Reyneri 1979, Ascoli 1979). 
Estimates of the presence of foreign immigrants in Italy, 
especially from Third World countries, have always been 
difficult beacuse of the high rate of "illegal" and therefore 
undocumented immigrants. Indeed their "illegality" 
constitutes one of the main features of this process. As 
mentioned in the first chapter, "illegality" is a very 
powerful instrument on the part of the "host society" in 
ensuring the presence of a cheap and "flexible" pool of 
labour in those sectors where there is labour shortage. This 
is acheived by the instrument of the sojourn permit which is 
tied to the existence of a job contract, which gives the 
employer the bargaining power of threatening to get the 
migrants deported if thy do not comply with the terms of 
labour (Reyneri 1979, Portes, 1977, Giner and Salcedo 1978). 
In this way migrants fill the "unprotected" sectors of the 
segmented labour market. In Italy the "new" Third World 
immigration, estimated at between 500,000 and 800,000 
individuals (Melotti et al. 1985, p. 14), has 'largely 
followed this pattern, (whether directed to the main urban 
centres of the North-West or Rome, where the greatest number 
is reported to be, or in the small-scale founderies of the 
region around Bologna, in the Centre-North-East, where 
Egyptians are reported to work, or in the South in the 
fishing-boats of Sicily, where Tunisians are reported to work' 
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(Ascoli 1979, p. 7). The "new" immigration has therefore to a 
certain extent been shaped by the "Three Italies" framework 
described above. 
Reoulations concernine foreion immigration 
An analysis of the legislation concerning foreign immigration 
is therefore crucial to understand some of the structural 
features affecting not only Eritreans and Egyptians in Milan, 
but other migrants groups in other parts of Italy as well. 
The regulations concerning foreign immigration, at least up 
to 1986, were not based on an organic law, but on a series of 
government circulars and police regulations (7), some of 
which date from the fascist period, like two police 
regulations of 1926 and 1931, slightly updated by new 
circulars in 1963 and 1979 (8). 
In order to sojourn legally in Italy, a "sojourn permit" is 
needed, as the police might require it at any time. This can 
be granted mainly for three reasons: a) tourism; b) study; c) 
work. It is valid only for the purpose for which it has been 
issued and follows the issue of the visa (for one of three 
purposes) stamped in the migrant's passport at the Italian 
embassy in the visitor's country of origin. Tourism may be 
mentioned only insofar as it is used by migrant workers to 
enter Italy and pursue some unauthorized occupations and 
therefore reside illegally. In this respect it should be 
noted that it is relatively easy to enter Italy with a 
tourist permit: it is more or less sufficient to have a 
valid passport. The permit is valid for three months and it 
is not renewable. On the other hand to get a permit for study 
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reasons is more complicated. In order to do so students are 
required to produce evidence of having adequate income so as 
to have sufficient means of subsistence during the period of 
study and evidence of having attended previous courses with 
proficiency. They must also undergo an examination in the 
Italian language. Students are not allowed to work. Sometimes 
migrants register for a course in order to obtain a sojourn 
permit and thereafter wort; illegally. 
As far as workers are concerned, the analysis will not 
concern workers coming from EEC countries or from the OCED, 
with whom there are bilateral agreements, or workers with 
particular occupations, such as show-business or 
multinational employees for whom there are special 
regulations. For other foreign workers the following 
procedure must be followed. The first step is to get an 
"authorization to work". This is done by the prospective 
employer who presents an application to the Province's Labour 
Office to employ a foreign worker for a specific occupation. 
After a period in which the Labour Office makes sure that no 
Italian or EEC worker is interested in the job, it grants the 
authorization to work (work permit) and the employer sends it 
to the worker. Thereafter the worker can obtain a visa to 
enter Italy for "working purposes" from the Italian embassy. 
On his/her arrival the foreign worker (obviously with a valid 
document) must within three days go to the Questura (local 
police headquarters) with the work permit and is thereafter 
granted a sojourn permit "for working" purposes, which is 
valid for one year. If the working contract is renewed, or 
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the worker finds a new employer, within the same occupation, 
a new work and sojourn permit may be issued. 
On the other hand, if the worker seeks a new contract within 
a new occupation., he/she would have to undergo the same 
procedure again from the, country of origin. - If the work 
contract is broken by either side, this means the automatic 
expiry of the sciourn permit. The worker would then have to 
leave the country. This has profound implications for the 
relationship between the worker and the employer which will 
be discussed below. Domestic workers are also required to be 
able to produce aý return ticket to the country of origin 
which-would have. to be paid by the employer. , On the other 
hand,, domestic workers have the advantage that the employer 
can more easily require a specific worker and that there are 
specialized agencies that can do most of the bureaucratic 
work. for them., On this general pattern there is the exception 
of children of less than eighteen years of age who are 
allowed to join their parents, if legally residing, with a 
special permit "for family reunion". Finally, while Italy has 
signed the Geneva Convention of 1951 on political refugees, 
it added a clause defining refugees as "all those who, as a 
result of events happening before 1/1/1951 ... find 
themselves out of the country of which they are citizens and 
cannot or do not want the benefit from the protection of that 
country... " (9). According to this clause, Italy in practice 
recognizes as political refugees mainly people coming from 
Eastern Europe, except for some Vietnamese and Chileans who 
were granted the status with ad hoc circular letters. 
Therefore Eritrean s, who might have grounds on which to be 
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recognized as political refugees in other countries that have 
signed the Geneva Convention, have to enter Italy according 
to the procedures set out above. 
It is clear from the above outline that the rules concerning 
foreign immigration are complicated, discriminatory and 
difficult to follow. This is worsened by the fact that the 
police authorities from whom the migrants would have to 
receive their sojourn permit are able to exert great 
discretionary power. Adding to this the chronic slowness and 
deficiencies of the Italian bureaucratic machinery, one comes 
to the conclusion that a great deal of the migrants simply do 
not follow these rules and therefore reside and work in Italy 
"illegally" and undocumented. By far the most common way is 
to enter Italy with, a tourism visa and thereafter continue 
the sojourn illegally. It is therefore almost impossible to 
give an accurate estimate of the number of foreign migrants 
in Italy, especially from the Third World., Secondly, as 
hypothesized above, these systems of regulations push the 
migrant workers into the area of "illegality" where, as 
"clandestine" workers, they provide a cheap and "flexible" 
pool of labour. It has been argued that, in the case of 
"illegal" Mexican migrants to the USA, where the state does 
have the technical means to prevent and repress this 
immigration, its persistence can only mean that it is 
permitted (Portes 1977). Although there is a danger of 
functionalism in this formulation, it calls for a brief 
review of the attiude of recent governments on the question. 
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Until 1987 the various Italian governments have, willingly or 
not, neglected the issue of a reform of this outdated system 
of regulations. As late as January 1980 and March 1982, two 
proposals were put forward by varoius Ministers, all 
Christian Democrats, that did not contain any substantial 
reform of the situation, but only stressed the need to 
control the "criminal" aspects of this form of immigration. 
The notion of "criminality" in relation to foreign migrants 
groups will be developed in later chapters. What is striking 
here is the fact that although "illegal" immigrants can 
receive an "injunction to leave" the country, very few 
foreigners have actually had to leave Italy as a result of 
this. For example in 1985, out of 423,004 foreign citizens 
legally resident in Italy, only 14,882 have been "asked to 
leave the country" (but often either ignored the injunction 
or came back from other border points), and as few as 1,304 
have actually been expelled (CENSIS 1986). In 1986 two new 
proposals have been put forward, one of them only very 
slightly amending the existing regulations and the 
other 
substantially improving it, but it seemed unlikely that the 
second one will be approved. The only exception to this 
pattern was that in 1982 a government circular allowed 
workers who could persuade their employers to grant them a 
regular job contract and who entered Italy before the issue 
of this circular, to regularize their position, even if they 
had been working illegally up to then. But since few 
employers could be persuaded to do that and the time to 
regularize was comparatively short, only very few migrants 
were regularized. 
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The ethnic division of labour 
It is possible to conclude that the government and the state 
it represents have maintained the "clandestinity" of most 
foreign migrants and therefore the "flexibility" of their 
labour. To give an idea about the presesnce of "clandestine" 
workers in Italy it can be mentioned that while in 1981 the 
Minister of Interior issued 134,461 sojourn permits to 
citizens from countries outside Europe, North America or 
Australia (which should equal the number of residents given 
the fact that sojourn permits must be renewed every year), 
estimates on the presence of Third World immigrants were 
already at around 400, C)00 (10). The status quo is most 
enthusiastically endorsed by the category of petty bourgeois 
that employs most heavily this kind of labour (e. g. small 
restaurant owners) which is usually represented by the DC. 
The very low number of foreign workers expelled from Italy 
mentioned above, supports the hypothesis that the state 
allows this situation as it is beneficial for these sections 
of the society (cf. Portes 1977 for the case of "illegal" 
Mexicans in the USA). The trade unions, the PCI and a section 
of the DC (which also includes the DC-controlled CISL trade 
union) are afraid that this situation will bring about a 
split in the labour movement and a lowering of the price of 
labour. They therefore advocate a greater regularization of 
the migrants already present in Italy and a restriction on 
further immigration, as will be shown in chapter 6. 
Finally it should be pointed out that, following the 
segmented labour market theory (cf. Mingione 1981, pp. 56-57, 
Paci 1982, pp. 46-53, Foire 1979) this pool of labour does 
113 
not amdunt to the "classical" functions of the "reserve army 
of labour" since, as it is largely concentrated in the lower 
"unprotected" tertiary sector and therefore is not competing 
with the "protected" working class or service workers. 
However in the future it may be competing with the "weal; " 
quota of the labour market (the young, the old, women) in 
case of an increase of unemployment and crisis of the 
assistenzialismo system of state subsidies. This situation 
applies largely to the major urban centres, like Milan, but 
it might be slightly different in the other "two Italies" 
where Third World immigrants are also in the "non-protected" 
segments of the labour market, not just in the service 
sector, but also in the small-scale industrial sector in the 
Centre-North-East and in the primary sector (e. g. fishing, 
but also to some degree, agriculture) in the South. In these 
cases competition and conflict might be greater. 
3.4 The Milanese context 
A brief analysis of the specificity of the Milanese context 
of immigration within the broader Italian one set out above 
is needed. Economic and geographical aspects will be taken 
into account in this section, while sociocultural ones will 
be briefly analyzed in the next section. This is particularly 
appropriate given that the findings of this study apply to 
the Milanese case, but they may not be relevant to understand 
the situation of Eritreans and Egyptians in other cities such 
as Rome, for example. 
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At the time of Unity in 1861 Milan, was a middle-sized town 
with just 257,000 inhabitants and with predominantly 
commercial economic activities and just a few textile 
industries. Between 1861 and the end of the century Milan 
witnessed its first industrial and financial boom followed 
by a great increase in its population reaching 121,000 in 
1881 (Dalmasso 1971), mainly migrating from the surrounding 
countryside. While the middle classes tended to live within 
the old city perimeter delimited by the "Spanish Walls", the 
migrants tended to live in the surrounding areas where the 
factories were located thereby bringing about an expansion of 
Milan's growth beyond its historical perimeter (Boffi et al. 
1975). In the fascist period and at a greater rate in the 
1950s and 1960s further stages of industrialization and urban 
growth took place that altered Milan's urban structure. The 
new expansion occurred primarily outside the ring-road that 
delimited the first stage of growth between 1861 and 1911. 
Three main zones therefore developed. In the first place an 
inner circle delimited by the Spanish Walls with Duomo square 
(the site of the catherdral and Milan's historical core) at 
its centre, where only a few upper class families live and 
where financial activities are concentrated. Secondly a 
middle ring between the Spanish Walls and the new ring-road, 
which used to be the working class area before the First 
World War but that, increasingly in the post-World War II 
period, underwent considerable reconstruction (also because 
of the heavy bombing during the war). The middle ring is 
mainly middle classes and commercial. Finally there is an 
outer ring between the ring-road and the administrative 
boundaries where mainly working class housing and some of the 
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most important industrial complexes are situated (cf. ibid. 
pp. 58-82). 
Figure 1.2 illustrates this" situation with the 20 
administrative zones. It should also be pointed out that 
although the middle ring is now predominantly a middle-class 
area, there are still some patches with, late 19th century 
housing. The area with these houses is the closest 
approaching the Chicago school's "zone in transition" 
(Burgess 1925) or "twilight area" (Rex and Moore'1967). These 
areas were , 
first inhabited by the migrants from southern 
Italy before they moved to the outer periphery and were 
subsequently, to a certain extent, settled by Third World 
immigrants. It has also the highest proportion of run-down 
housing in Milan (Comune di Milano 1984, pp. 18-27). This has 
led some authors to speak of a "diffused ghetto" in his area 
(Caputo 1983). This concept and its applicability to the 
Milanese situation will be discussed in chapter 4. 
Milan reached its peak in terms of population in the early 
197C>s when it had around 1.7 million inhabitants (Mingione 
1981, p. 117). This was, the end of the economic boom of the 
late 1950s and early 1960s with heavy industrialization, 
immigration from th South and urban growth. From 1974 onwards 
Milan's population declined to around 1.5 million in 1983 
(11). This was due partly to a cessation of the migratory 
movement towards Milan from southern Italy, partly to a 
decrease in birth rates and partly to the fact that many 
people, primarily working class, went to live in the small 
municipalities of the hinterland. Therefore the Province of 
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Figure 3.2 Milan: administrative areas and historical zones 
Milan, ' more or less coinciding with "greater Milan", had 
around 4 million inhabitants in 1983 (12). In spite of the 
fact that Milan experienced a decline of the industrial 
manufacturing sector from the 1970s onwards, through 
technological` innovation and growth of the tertiary sector, 
it has retained its place as Italy's leading industrial, 
financial and commercial centre (Mingione 1981, Bagnasco 
1977) that it has enjoyed since the 1960s (Dalmasso 1971). 
Also, because of its relatively greater industrial and 
economic diversification, it has suffered less in the period 
of industrial restructuring during the 1970s than cities like 
Turin or Genoa based on a single industry. But, as noted 
above, technological innovation which had such a great impact 
in Milan has not been able to reach certain sectors, like for 
example the catering one or the cleaning one. These sectors 
are to a large extent filled by the "new" immigration, in 
particular Egyptians in the 'first and Eritreans in the 
second. In these sectors`there is a shortage of local labour 
because they are considered "low status" jobs and because the 
employers prefer to utilize the "flexible" and non-unionized 
foreign labour (13). The labour demand in the cleaning sector 
comes from middle-class families who have traditionally been 
used to utilize a maid to help them with house work and who 
find it convenient to employ foreign workers because of their 
"cheapness" especially in terms of social security. The 
demand for domestic help is also increased by the crisis of 
the welfare state (subsidies for children, creches, etc. ) 
and the greater labour force participation of women who 
therefore "need" domestic help (cf. Mingione 1983a, 1983b). 
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Finally, as far as social classes are concerned, Milan has 
traditionally had a strong bourgeoisie and a strong working 
class as compared to the Italian average. However in the 
last decade there has been a significant growth of workers 
employed in the "advanced", "protected" tertiary sector. 
Politically the Milanese municipality has a strong Communist 
Party (the main party), followed by the DC (which in Milan is 
the second party) and Socialist and Republican parties (the 
latter being a centrist "liberal" party) which are stronger 
than the national average. In general Milan is considered in 
Italy as the country's "moral capital", not only for its 
economic weight, but also because of its seemingly "northern 
European efficiency". It also has a strong "liberal" 
tradition (it was Italy's main Elightenment centre in the 
18th and 19th centuries) and a radical one, not only because 
of the importance of the PCI (among the working class and the 
intelligentsia), but also because it was one of the main 
centres of the social movements (to the left of the PCI) that 
developed in Italy after 1968. At the time of study the 
Milanese municipality was run by a Communist-Socialist 
coalition for the second consecutive term. Since then, one of 
the most important functions the Municipality performs, in 
relation to the topic of study, is the management of part of 
the stock of public housing, amounting in 1982 to nearly 
80,000 housing units, that is over 10% of the total Milanese 
hosing stock (Comune di Milano 1984, p. 20). As will be seen 
in later chapters, part of this housing stock owned by the 
Municipality (but not that owned by the state) can be granted 
to foreigners "in case of grave need". 
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3.4 The cultural context 
As noted at the beginning of the chapter, the cultural 
context is important in two ways. In the first place the 
hegemonic cultural discourses will, following Gramsci (1975, 
p. 59), form the terrain on which human beings gain 
consciousness of their position, struggle, etc. These 
cultural discourses (or "ideologies", in Gramsci's words) 
especially of a political kind, will form the terrain on 
which also the migrants will establish their allegiances and 
negotiations and wage their struggles. They are discourses in 
that they may transform their content over time and contain 
an "ideological" element that may legitimate the aims of 
some social groups under particular historical and political 
circumstances, but also provide a "world view". In the 
second place it will be important to define the ideological 
legacy of the "host society's" perception of "the other", 
which will constitute the reservoir of racist ideologies that 
may be applied also to the migrants (cf. Hall 1980). These 
two issues will be briefly analyzed subsequently. 
Heaemonic cultural discourses 
" 
A comprehensive cultural history of Italy's hegemonic 
cultural discourses is not available. However from the 
discussion in previous sections of the chapter and from a few 
works (Tullio-Altan 1986, Sassoon 1985, Gramsci 1975) a brief 
summary can be reconstructed. The historical weakness of the 
Italian bourgeoisie has already been noted above. For this 
reason also the main cultural discourse that is related to 
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this class, namely that of liberalism has been rather weak in 
Italy, especially in terms of the number of people it 
influenced and of its political weight. For example, the 
parties representing this class and ideology, the PRI and PLI 
(14), have never achieved more than 8'% of the vote in an 
election. However because of the influence they had during 
the Fisorgimento (the movement for the unification of Italy) 
they still carry some cultural weight. Some liberal aspects 
were introduced in the Italian constitution, such as the 
defence of private property and enterprise and the principle 
of equality of every citizen before the law. As far as 
religion is concerned, even though freedom of religious 
practice is guaranteed, Catholic Christianity remains the 
state religion and there is still a great discretionary power 
on the part of the authorities over the foundation of new 
non-Catholic places of worship (Disegni 1983, pp. 60-61). In 
general the impersonality and impartiality of the state and 
the bureaucracy does not seem to apply very much in Italy 
where these two social functions wort: primarily on a 
clientelistic basis (cf. Tullio-Altan 1986). 
Catholicism has been one of the dominant cultural discourses 
in Italy which, from a political point of view, gained 
importance after the Second World War when the Catholic 
masses entered the arena of politics and established Italy's 
largest party, the DC, which is committed, among other 
things, to safeguard the importance of the moral and 
religious values of Catholicism in Italy. The role of the 
Church in Italy as a political institution and of Catholicism 
as an ideology can be related to the fact that they performed 
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social and cultural unifying functions in a country 
historically dominated by foreign powers. The DC has been the 
party more closely approaching the model of clientelistic 
politics, with its various factions representing a 
constellation of interest groups. Yet another two 
distinguishing traits of this cultural discourse are its 
universalism and its solidarism. In spite of the 
particularism of the system of mediations of the Catholic 
world, its system is open to everybody with the "right 
connections" and stems from the "catholic" function of the 
Roman Church, as Gramsci (1979) also noted. The solidaristic 
aspect stems from the fact that instead of promoting 
individual competition, as in the liberal attitude stemming 
from Protestantism (cf. Weber 1976), it promotes cooperation 
among fellow-human beings, an attitude coming from the notion 
of charity. This assumes quasi-socialist connotations in 
those sections of the Italian Catholic world that include 
parts- of the labour, movement. These features have been 
important in terms of the attitude of these sections of the 
Catholic world towards Third World immigrants (see chapters 6 
and 7). 
The final main cultural discourse in Italy is what may be 
termed a "radical" one. It is as varied as the Catholic one, 
ranging from the reformist ideology of the socialist party to 
the revolutionary ones of the various post-1968 movements to 
the left of the PCI. Of course the Communist Party is the 
dominant social and political force within this sector of 
Italian society. It is especially strong among the working 
class and the intellectuals. At the grass-root level its 
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organization resembles that of the Church, with the "social 
circle" taking the social functions of the parish (cf. 
Kertzer 1979). The single most important influence has been 
the work of Antonio Gramsci (e. g. 1975) whose originality has 
also meant a greater political and ideological independence 
of the PCI from Moscow than most other Communist parties. 
For example it has repeatedly criticized Soviet foreign 
policy, a point that has some bearing on the position of 
Eritreans in Milan since part of their claims imply a 
rejection of the role of the Soviet Union in the Horn of 
Africa. In terms of internal class relations, although it has 
always had at the centre of its concerns the interests of the 
working class, it has been open to represesent the interests 
of other social groups as well. However it has been some of 
the various political and social movements to the left of the 
PCI, especially strong in Milan, that have granted some of 
the most significant support to Third World immigrants and 
Eritreans in particular, as will be demonstrated in later 
chapters. This is on the one hand because some of them have 
historically broken away from the PCI on the issue of its too 
mild criticism of the USSR (especially in relation to the 
invasion of Czechoslovakia), on the other hand because of 
their greater concern with struggles in the Third World and 
their greater readiness to support the struggle of the 
marginal masses not clearly part of the working class. 
The racist ideological legacy 
The historical heritage of ideological images of "the other" 
constitutes a reservoir of racist stereotypes directed 
towards people in the present day. These ideological 
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stereotypes may have an origin that is not directly related 
to its practical social functions, but "inform" 
discriminatory practices (Miles 1982) (15). In Italy three 
main sets of stereotype s can be identified, namely those 
against Jews, against blacks (from the colonies in 
particular) and against Islam. In Milan (and other northern 
cities too) there is also the pr ejudice of northern Italians 
against Southerners. 
In many European countries the "Jewish question" in the 19th 
century become one of the main focuses for the development of 
biologically constructed racist ideologies. Here is not the 
place to discuss the origins of the Jewish question (cf. 
Mosse 1980), but it might be speculated that a strong 
tradition of antisemitism could function as a reservoir of 
racist ideologies and feelings about other ethnic groups as 
well. Although in Italy like in the rest of Christian Europe 
Jews were the object of religious antisemitism, as De Felice 
(1972) argues, in Italy from the 18th century a Jewish 
question no longer existed. On the contrary, the main 
tendency was for the Jewish community to assimilate. This can 
be related to the fact that in Italy Jews never had the 
monopoly of commercial capital they enjoyed in other European 
countries, as Poland, for example. Consequently the classical 
stereotypes against the Jews were not widespread in Italy 
(ibid. pp. 16-24). Also the development of biological 
doctrines aiming to "prove" the "racial inferiority" of Jews 
were nearly absent in Italy and the few "theories" lacked the 
positivist approach prevalent in other European countries 
(e. g. France and Germany). The "racial laws" against the Jews 
I24 
passed An 1938 were more a result of the political alliance 
with Germany than of actual antisemitic persuasions of most 
of the fascist regime (ibid., Mosse 1980, Di Nola 197, -, ). The 
absence of an explicit antisemitic racist discourse in Italy 
has also been related to the weakness of its post-unitary 
nationalism, for which various reasons have been put forward 
(cf. De Felice 1972, pp. 31-32, Gramsci 1977 pp. 61-62). 
The absence of a developed biologically-based racist 
discourse has meant that other ethnic groups and 
nationalities that Italians have encountered socially as a 
result of colonialism, for example, were not constructed in 
terms of "biologically inferiore races". Unfortunately the 
material on Italian racism against groups other than the Jews 
is virtually, absent. It can be mentioned however, that the 
colonization of the Horn of Africa from the end of the 19th 
century gave Italians the opportunity to develop a kind of 
racism that, even though lacking biological or theoretical 
bases, was probably stronger than that against the Jews 
(Mosse 1980, p. 215). - For example it has been reported that, 
on the eve of the Adwa battle in 1896 where the Italians had 
been defeated by the Abyssinians, the Italian officers 
thought of blacks as "cowards and inferior human beings" and 
that they were fighting against "dark and barbarian Africa" 
(Del Boca 1985 pp. 654,627). In spite of this it is also 
true that many of the Italian settlers who lived in Eritrea 
and Ethiopia intermarried with indigenous people. ThQ 
historically and geographically limited extent of Italian 
colonialism, the virtual absence of any substantial migration 
to Italy from the colonies, coupled with the lack of an 
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explicit theoretical racist doctrine, all meant that a racist 
discourse towards blacks, including Eritreans, did not really 
develop in Italy. 
It would be interesting to know the Italian attitude towards 
Arabs of the Libyan colony, but it has not been possible to 
find data on this topic. However there is a long-standing 
tradition of diffidence towards Muslims contained in popular 
sayings dating from the middle-ages, when Italian regions and 
ships were often raided by various Muslim groups. "Saracenes" 
has often been a synonym for "barbarians" and the saying 
"mamma li Turchi" ("mother, the Turks") is applied when 
threatening people are encountered. "To speak Arabic" means 
to speak an uncomprehensible language, while from a religious 
point of view, the Muslims are considered "infidels" and the 
Crusades a "civilising mission". It can be noted that these 
sayings lack biological connotations also because they 
emerged before the emergence of biology as a science and were 
maintained through commercial and military rivalry between 
Italy. and the Muslim world, rather than through a substantial 
Muslim presence in Italy up to the present. However Egyptians 
in Milan in the 1980s might be expected to suffer as a result 
of this legacy. 
In more recent times, a new form of racist ideology and set 
of discriminatory practices emerged, at least in northern 
Italy. This. was a result of the massive migration from the 
South to the northern Italian towns of the 1950s and 1960s. 
The people who migrated spoke different dialects (16), often 
not mutually understandable with the Italian that was used 
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=hrouahout the education system and which was more widespread 
:n the North than in the South. As a result of this latter 
aspect, many of the migrants were illiterate (Ascoli 1979). 
'ne main racist stereotype towards southern Italians, is the 
word terroni, related to the word terra, meaning earth or 
and and therefore stigmatizing the rural origins of the 
c, iarants. However in this case also, racist stereotypes were 
more of a cultural than of a biological kind, constructed 
around notions of "disreputable lifestyles" and 
`backwardness". In spite of this, notions of "laziness", 
"dishonesty" and "cowardice" were also applied. Finally the 
saying that "Garibaldi instead of uniting Italy, has divided 
Africa" suggests a comparison between "Southerners" and 
"Africans" a term which, as will be seen in chapter 8, is 
coincident with that of Marocchini (Moroccans), denoting both 
Arab and black Africans. However the sociocultural and 
physical differences between northern and southern Italians 
were not sufficiently great to prevent a gradual assimilation 
after a few years, especially in a town like Milan were 
southern employment was more diversified than in Turin, where 
there was a strong dualism between the southern Fiat workers 
and Turinese bourgeoisie. 
Z. 5 Conclusion 
The host society's immigration background has several 
features that are relevant for the understanding of the "new" 
Third World immigration. From a sociopolitical point of view 
the state plays an important role in civil society 
characterized by the influence of political parties and other 
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social- groups operating on the basis of a clientelistic 
system of mediations which results from the historical 
s=ecificity of the Italian road to capitalism. This is 
i«aortant in understanding the strategies adopted by the 
migrants groups, and the Eritreans in particular, to gain 
access to resources. From a socioeconomic point of view, the 
more recent developments of the Italian economy, labour 
market and system of class relations, have brought about a 
relative shortage of labour in the "unprotected" lower 
tertiary sector, especially in the big towns of the 
inoustrialized North-West and in Rome. This also means that 
the migrants on the whole do not enter the native working 
class. Their class situation is also supported by the system 
of regulations concerning foreign immigration that push the 
immigrants to become "clandestine" workers and therefore a 
"flexible" pool of cheap labour. All these aspects apply 
also to Milan in particular, which has spearheaded many of 
the recent transformations of Italian society. In Milan Third 
World immigrants have substituted southern migrants, but with 
the crucial difference that the latter entered the "central" 
wo-king class while the former did not. From the point of 
view of housing, some areas of Milan's middle ring approach 
the "twilight area" where immigrants have often settled in 
otner cities too. From a cultural point of view Catholicism, 
radicalism and to a lesser extent, liberalism are the 
dominant politico-cultural discourses that migrants have to 
learn in order to be able to "play" Italian politics. As it 
will be seen later, the Eritreans are better able to perform 
this task than the Egyptians. Finally although in Italy there 
is a partial ideological legacy of racist stereotypes towards 
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"the other", this has been more of a cultural than of a 
oiological kind. 
Having analyzed the background to emigration in the previous 
chapter and the context of immigration in the present one, 
the next chapter will examine the main demographic, 
employment and housing characteristics of Eritreans and 







NOTES to CHAPTER 3 
(: ) On the delicate issue of the "revolutionary" character 
c` fascism, cf. De Felice (1970). 
(2) In Italy the Prime Minister, rather than the President, 
leads the government. 
(Z, ) These points and those of the following paragraph can be 
further pursued in a series of articles in Paci (ed. 1978). 
(-: ) See chapter 1 for a definition. 
(5) Cf. Triglia's data (1978), reported also in Sassoon 
(1985, p. 93) 
(o) But migrants to France and Belgium tended to be more 
permanent than those to Germany and Switzerland. Also the 
latest stages of European migration coincided with the 
earlier ones towards northern Italy. 
(7) At the time of writing (1997) the situation might be 
cnanged as there have been rumours that a new law is 
about to be introduced. 
(8) In summary, these norms are contained in a trade union 
publication called Norme per 1'Impiego- in Italia di 
Lavoratori Esteri, edited by CISL, Milan (1980). 
(9) Quoted in Milano Sindacale, March 1983: "Lavoratori 
Immigrati e Rifugiati", p. 16. 
(10) The first figure is calculated from the Ministry of the 
Interior's data cited in Hornziel (1986, p. 29) and the 
second from estimates by an Italian research institute 
(CENSIS, in ibid., 1986, p. 33). 
(11) According to data cited in Comune di Milano (1983). 
(12) According to data cited in Comune di Milano (1985). 
(1 ) Cf. Peach (1968) on Britain's West Indians as a "replacement" population. 
(14) The former is the Republican Party and the latter the 
Liberal Party. In spite of some differences, on the whole 
they share ideologies and policies. 
(15) The specific relation between racist idologies and 
discriminatory practices towards Eritreans and Egyptians will 
be discussed in chapter S. 
(16) The term "dialect" is used only as a descriptive term in 
relation to the "official state language", even if it carries 
soae derogatory connotations. 
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17. 
CkAPTER 4: THE NATURE OF THE TWO IMMIGRANT GROUPS 
This chapter examines some aspects concerning demographic, 
occupational and housing patterns and processes of the two 
g-oups, leaving the more "qualitative" aspects like ethnic 
icentity, ethnic relations, etc. to later chapters. The 
a emographic aspects of the group, like numerical size, 
sex-ratio, age structure, etc., are the result of the network 
a; migration, but also constrain the social lives of the two 
migrant groups in Milan, affecting for instance the 
possibilities of intermarriage, the degree of ethnic 
solidarity, forms of employment and chances of racist 
reaction from the "host society" (1). In this respect it can 
be hypothesized that the smaller size and more balanced sex 
and age-structure of the Eritrean group is one of the factors 
bringing about the greater ethnic solidarity and endogamous 
marriage of Eritreans with respect to the Egyptians. On the 
other hand the different patterns of employment and even more 
so, of housing, between the two groups, can only partly be 
explained by the nature of the network process, but point to 
questions that will be tackled in later chapters dealing with 
the different ethnic politics of the two groups. 
4.1 The problem of data 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, the regulations 
concerning foreign immigration, make it very hard for the 
irrenigrants to be in a regular position vis a vis the Italian 
authorities. In this way they become not only "illegal", but 
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also "undocumented" and therefore do not appear in any 
official statistics. It is therefore impossible to have any 
reliable figures not only on the total population of the 
various immigrant groups, but also on employment, housing, 
etc. The only accurate statistics available concern the 
number of sojourn permits (that have to be renewed every 
year) issued up to 1984 by the police authorities and the 
number of foreign citizens registered as residents in Milan's 
municipality, with a few demographic details, also up to 
1984, (Comune di Milano 1985, Melotti et al. 1985). The 1981 
Census is not of much use, not only because it misses all the 
"illegals", but also because, surveying the year 1980, it 
comes before the major wave of immigration that occurred from 
1980 to 1984. Moreover the lack of reliable figures has been 
instrumentalixed by the media and the state authorities 
(including the police), minimizing or, more usually, 
exaggerating the number of "foreigners" present in Milan and 
in Italy , according to their interests. 
Few Italian works on the topic of Third World immigration 
have been published. A rather unhelpful example is a book by 
Hornziel (1986) who, after having analyzed the official 
statistics and the legislative framework, comes up with a 
survey based on as few as 10 questionnaires for Tunisians and 
10 for "NorthAfricans" in Sicily, 10 for Eritreans and 10 for 
Philippinos in Rome and 10 for Moroccans and 10 for "others" 
in Milan. A more dignified attempt, limited to Milan, but 
referring to 14 different ethnic groups, has been carried out 
by a team of urban planners (Caputo, ed. 1983). It was based 
on 450 questionnaires, but asked the more "traditional" 
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sociological questions about employment, residence, date of 
migration, etc. Finally the most recent and comprehensive 
attempt has been by Melotti, Aimi and Ziglio who not only 
produced a large-scale survey (500 questionnaires for as many 
as 27 different groups), but also supplemented it with some 
participant observation carried out by Dr. Aimi, even if on 
several different groups. Unfortunately only a small summary 
of their research has yet been published (Melotti et al. 
1985). 
The only figures that can be produced are therefore at best 
careful estimates, based on the available data on residents 
as well as on personal observations and interviews, 
especially concerning aspects such as employment, housing, 
family groups, that are not recorded in the above 
publications. Before examining all these aspects concerning 
Eritreans and Egyptians, the figures concerning the size of 
some of the major immigrant groups (leaving aside European 
and North American ones) can be analyzed in Table 4.1. This 
gives an idea of the dimensions of the total immigrant 
population (in the years 1984-B5) by which to contextualize 
the two groups under consideration. The percentages refer to 
the Milanese population of 1,560,000 in 19Bz (Comune di 
Milano 1983). 
If these figures can be accepted as giving at least the 
dimensions of the population of the main immigrant groups 
from non-European and North American countries, the first 
thing that can be noted is that while the Egyptian group is 
definitely the most numerous one accounting for some 30% of 
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Table 4.1s estimate of major immigrant croups in Milan, 
1984-85 
Maghreb (mainly Tunisia 
and Morocco) ............... ca. -+9000 -4,000 - ca. 0.2%-0.47. 
Egypt ..................... ca. 10,000-15,000 - ca. 0.6'%-1.07. 
Asian Arab states.......... ca. 2,000- 31000 - ca. 0.1%-0.2% 
Iran .............................. ca. 1,500 o ca...... 
0.1% 
Turkey ............................ ca. 19000 - ca...... 
0.17. 
Somalia ........................... ca. 1,000 s ca...... 
0.17. 
Eritrea/Ethiopia (mainly Eritrea). ca. 2,500 a ca....... 0.2% 
West Africa (mainly Ivory Coast, 
Nigeria and Zaire) ................ ca. 2,000 = ca...... 0.17. 
Cape Verde, Seychelles, Mauritius. ca. 1,000 - ca...... 0.17. 
El Salvador ....................... ca. 1,500 - ca...... 
0.1% 
rest of Latin America (mainly 
Argentina, Brazil and Chile)...... ca. 4,000 - ca...... 0.:; '/. 
Philippines ....................... ca. 2,000 = ca...... 
0.1% 
India and Sri Lanka ............... ca. 1,000 - ca...... 
0.1% 
China, Taiwan and Hong Kong....... ca. 2,000 a ca...... 0.17. 
Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos........ ca.... 500 - ca...... 0.1% 
Total ...................... ca. 35,000-42,000 - ca. 
2.2'%-2.77 
Source: personal estimates. 
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the total foreign immigrant population (taking 12,000 as the 
size of the former and 40,000 that of the latter), the 
Eritrean/Ethiopian one, although probably still the second 
largest national group, accounts for only 6.25% of the 
population and is not significantly greater in size than most 
other groups. With the execption of Egyptians, no single 
national group remotely approaches 1% of the Milanese 
population, and all Third World immigrants constitute only a 
very small proportion of it. 
4.2 Demographic aspects of the two aroups 
Out of an estimated total population of 2,500, probably at 
least 2,000 are "true" Eritreans, either born there or born 
in Ethiopia from Eritrean families, while a few hundred would 
be either Ethiopians, or half Ethiopian-hall Eritreans. A 
team of researchers (Melotti et al. 1985) estimates the 
immigrant population from the Horn of Africa as being around 
3,000, of whom less than 500 are Somalis (2). The figure for 
the Eritrean/Ethiopian group would thus be similar to the 
above one. On the other hand the leaders of the Eritrean 
community insist that the figure should be put at around 
1,500. This is surely an underestimate, as the number of 
"Ethiopians" (3) registered as resident in Milan's 
municipality was 1,596 in 1984 (Comune di Milano 1985, 
Melotti et al. 1985) and it cannot' be assumed that there were 
no "undocumented" immigrants. In the fact the leaders 
probably want to "play down" the importance of' their 
community vis a vis the Italian authorities from which they 
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fear repression, because they are already in the front-line 
of the immigrants' scene. 
According to the Municipality, 1,596 "Ethiopians" wer e 
registered as residents in 1984 (cf. Comune di Milano 199 , 
Melotti et al. 1985), in the same year the police authorities 
(Questura) issued only 1,276 sojourn permits for Ethiopian 
citizens (4). The difference between the two figures is 
explained by the fact that while in theory foreigners should 
renew their sojourn permit every year in order to be formally 
legal, the Municipality registers them as residents for five 
years upon the presentation of such a permit (5). The former 
figure thus represents what may be termed as "semilegal" 
immigrants and includes the latter which represents "legal" 
ones. The figure of 1,596 obviously cannot give an exact 
dimension of the whole Eritrean/Ethiopian population because 
it does not take into account "illegal" immigants. However, 
if the figure of 2,500 can be accepted as an estimate of the 
total Eritrean population, "semilegal" immigrants would then 
amount to 63%, while "legal" ones (a sub-category of 
"semilegal") to 517. of the estimated Eritrean population. 
Table 4.2 summarizes the available data of the Municipality 
on the two groups under consideration. The figure quoted 
above of 1,596 "Ethiopians" registered as residents (in 
1984), is given by the total number of residents minus the 
number of those "born abroad'. This category is not taken 
into consideration, because it is impossible to distinguisn 
within it between those Italians who were born in Ethiopia 
and "Ethiopians" who have acquired Italian citizenship (very 
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few suer, instances have occurred, according to an official of 
the "ci=izenship department" of Milan's municipality). On the 
other hand, a number of them are probably the children of 
"mixed" marriages, usually between Italian men and Ethiopian 
women, Gating from the colonial or immediate post-colonial 
era. It should also be noted that the figure reported under 
each heading refers to the total amount of persons falling 
under =hat category up to that year and not to the number of 
persons who were registered for the first time under that 
category. -, that year. For example the figure under the heading 
"Foreigners born in Italy" in 1984, referring to 
"Ethiopia", that is 241, does not actually represent the 
number of "Ethiopians" born in 1984, but the total amount of 
"Ethiopians" born in Italy and registered to Milan's 
municipality up to 1984. 
Table 4.2: Ethiopians and Egyptians resident in Milan's 
municipality, by citizenship and place of birth 
Italians born Foreigners Foreigners born Total 
abroad. born abroad in Italy 
1979 
ETHIOPIA 889 481 86 1,456 
EGYPT 1,699 596 110 2,405 
1983 
ETHIOPIA 986 1,234 214 2,434 
EGYPT 3,171 1,847 754 5,372 
1984 
ETHIOPIA 994 1,355 241 2,590 
EGYPT 3,115 2,215 293 5,613 
Sources =omune di Milano (1985) 
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Table 4.2 shows that, from 1979 to 1984, there has been a 
rather dramatic increase of 181% in the number of "semilegal" 
Ethiopians, discounting "Italians born abroad". This increase 
is virtually equally to be ascribed to the increase in 
"foreigners born abroad" (i. e. those "Ethiopians" who 
migrated to Milan) and to that in "foreigners born in Italy" 
(i. e. the offsprings of the migrants). The increase in this 
period reflects both the worsening of the war situation 
between the Ethiopian regime and the Eritrean liberation 
fronts and the labour requirements of the "host society". 
From 1979 to 1984 the yearly average number of births has 
been 31. There are therefore 155 children who in 1985 would 
not have been over 5 years old. Also the 86 born before 1979 
would not be more than 10 years old, given the relatively 
recent character of Eritrean migration. 
The only other information given by the Municipality 
(reported in Melotti et al. '1985), is about the sex-ratio. 
For the "Ethiopians" it is about 60% female and 40% male, 
that is, overall, a quite balanced sex-ratio. Moreover, 
taking into account the fact that as this percentage refers 
only to documented residents, it might slightly underestimate 
the male population which has more problems in being in a 
regular position than the female one, which finds authorized 
jobs more easly in the domestic sector (5). Although there 
are no data on age groups or years of birth except for the 
above, on this basis and from observations, interviews, etc. 
the following main -, age groups, subdivided by sex -, can be 
estimated. Table 4.3 shows that the age structure of the 
Milanese Eritrean population is quite differentiated. 
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Table 4.3: estimate of major Eritrean age groups, divided by 
sex (1984) 
Male and Fea. ale 0-10 years old-ca. 10% (mainly born in Italy) 
Male and FeaEa1e 10-19 " =ca. 10% (mainly born Eritrea) 
Male 20-39 =ca. 20% 
Female 20-39 =ca. 30% 
Male 40-59 " =ca. 10% 
Female 40-59 " =ca. 20% 
Sources personal estimate 
As can be seen in Table 4.1, the estimated total population 
of Egyptian immigrants in Milan is somewhere between 10,000 
and 15,004; as also reported in Melotti et. al. (1985). This 
was confirmed by an authoritative spokesman of the Egyptian 
community. However it is probable, according to the same 
sources, that while in the years 1982-1984 the actual number 
was closer to the latter figure, more recently (1985-1986) 
it has dwincled towards the former one. This is because of 
tougher control on immigration, of expulsions by the Italian 
authorities and spontaneous return to the homeland either 
because of : allure of the migratory strategy (also due to a 
probable saturation of the labour and housing markets) or 
because the strategy itself was conceived as temporary. 
In contrast with the attitude of the Eritrean leaders, the 
Muslim Centre claims that the total Milanese Muslim 
population is between 40,000 and 50,000, probably double the 
whole Muslin population, which amounts to about 20,000-25,000 
plus at most a few thousand Milanese Muslims. The Egyptian 
population, which, according to leaders of the Muslim Centre 
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is about 50% of the total Muslim population, is similarly 
overestimatec. This may be because of an effort to get 
recognition = or their religion in order to get authorization 
for a "prope-" mosque (cf. chapter 8). On the contrary, 
sources from the Egyptian consulate underestimate the number 
of Egyptians at about 6,000 probably because they do not want 
to admit that the percentage of "illegal" immigants is quite 
high. 
Looking again at Table 4.2, the total number of Egyptian 
residents in Milan's municipality each year can be 
calculated. Again, "Italians born abroad" are not included, 
as they are likely to be either people of Italian families 
who temporarily migrated to Egypt or people of Jewish 
Egyptian families who migrated in the late 1950s and managed 
to get Italian, citizenship but are not be classified with 
the other Egyptians because they hardly interact with them. 
Thus in 1984 there were 2,508 Egyptian citizens registered as 
residents in Milan's municipality, while in the same year 
only 1,608 sojourn permit were issued by the police 
authorities. Bearing in mind the distinction made above 
between "semilegal" and "legal" immigrants and that the 
former category includes the latter (i. e. they are not 
discrete ones), "semilegal" immigrants were therefore 2,608, 
while legal ones were 1,608. Taking 12,000 as the estimated 
total population (including "illegals"), the semi-legal group 
amounts to about 20% of the total population, while the legal 
one to only ::; %., both percentages being substantially lower 
than for the Eritrean. The proportion of "illegal" immigrants 
is an important structural feature differentiating the two 
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ethnic groups. and is related in turn to the fact that most 
"legal" Eritreans are women who work as maids. They can get a 
permit more easily for such a job through specialized 
recruitment acencies. Thet can then can call close relatives 
to reside ir Italy for "family cohesion". There is also 
probably a reason linked to the different attitude towards 
immigration, and, as it will be seen in chapter 7, because of 
the links of one of their leaders with the "host society" 
(some bribes have been reported too). 
The total increase in "semilegal" Egyptians from 1979 to 1984 
has been even higher than that of Eritreanss 255% versus 1817 
for the Eritreans. The increase has been as much as 271% for 
those "born abroad" and 157% for those "born in Italy". The 
decline in the number of those "born in Italy" from 354 to 
293 in the years 198.3-1984 (cf. Table 4.2), requires some 
explanation. In April 1983 a national law was approved ruling 
that the child of either parent who had Italian citizenship 
was to be considered Italian, whereas before this applied 
only to the famher. The decrease has therefore to be ascribed 
to those children of "mixed" marriages between an Egyptian 
man and an Italian woman (this instance is quite frequent, as 
it will be seers later) who, before 1983 were classified as 
"foreigners born in Italy", and after, as Italians born in 
Italy. They therefore disappear from these statistics. The 
number of these children should be just under 100 (7). The 
average numbe- of births of both "full" and "half" Egyptians 
from 1979 to 1983 is 61, while that of only "full" ones is 
about 38. The increase of both groups from 1979 to 1983 is 
210%. Table 4.4 provides estimates about the main age groups, 
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subdivided by sex, based on the Municipality's data, on 
personal observations, interviews, etc. The age structure is 
very umbalanced, by far the most important group being men of 
"central" working age. 
Table 4.4: estimate of major Egyptian aoe groups, divided by 
Male and Female 0-10 years old=ca.. 5% (mainly born in Italy) 
Male and Female 1C)-19 "" =ca.. 57. (mainly born in Egypt) 
Male 20-39 " =c a. 65% 
Female 20-39 " =ca. 157. 
Male 40-59. " " =ca. 10% 
Source: personal estimate 
In summary therefore Eritreans have a much higher birth rate 
than Egyptians. Leaving aside the children of "mixed" 
marriages (that is taking into account the 1984 figure) the 
absolute number of average yearly births of Egyptians from 
1979 to 1984 is slightly higher than that of the Eritreans. 
Comparing it with the respective populations of those "born 
abroad", the rate is=about 1% for the Egyptians against about 
2% for the Eritreans. Taking into account also the estimated 
number of "illegal" immigrants, the difference in relative 
number of births is even more striking: 0.3% for the 
Egyptians against 1.2% for the Eritreans. The sex-ratio of 
Egyptians, as reported by the Municipality data (Comune di 
Milano 1985) is 77% male against 23% female, a very 
unbalanced ratio compared with the Eritrean one (40% male 
vs. 60% female). The greatly different percentage of women 
is to be ascribed to the different role that women have in 
Christian Africa as opposed to the Muslim Arab states, that 
makes the latter very unlikely to carry out a migratory 
142 
strategy: Finally, Eritreans are a much smaller group than 
Egyptians (ca. 2,500 vs. 12,000) but have a much higher 
proportion of "semilegal" migrants (ca. 63% vs. ca. 207. ) and 
"legal" ones (ca. 51% vs. ca. 1Z; %). They also have a much 
higher proportion of family groups than Egyptians. Estimates 
on this topic are provided in Table 4.5. The significance of 
these demographic factors for the contrasting styles of 
ethnic politics will be discussed in chapters 5 and 7. 
Table 4.5: estimate of main Eritrean and Egyptian family 
groups (1984) 
Eritreans Egyptians 
Single women=20% Single men=75% 
Single women with children=20%-30% Couples with children=20% 
Couples with children=30%-40% (most "mixed" Eg. -It. ) 
Single men=10%-15% Single women=5% 
Source: personal estimate 
The next section summarizes and compares the housing and 
employment situation of Eritreans and Egyptians, trying to 
identify patterns of segregation. Explanations of these 
trends in terms of ethnic politics will be provided in 
chapter 7. These trends are identified on the bases of life 
histories and interviews with migrant families around these 
topics, the most significant of which will be summarized in 
the next two sections, while the more "qualitative" aspects 




4.3 Residential and occupational seareoation 
In the geographical literature, segregation has been analyzed 
mainly in terms of spatial residential patterns, adopting 
quantitative techniques (cf. Duncan and Duncan 1955, 
Lieberson 1981). However there may also be segregation in 
terms of "type" of housing tenure and occupation. This kind 
of segregation may be called "typological" as opposed to 
"spatial", as it refers to "types" of housing or employment. 
Thus four categories of-segregation can be identifiede 1) 
typological-occupational, (i. e. forms of employment that at 
one level of generalization may correspond to class, at 
anoher to economic ' sector and finally to economic niche); 2) 
spatial-occupational (i. e. the concentration of one group's 
economic activity in a particular area, an aspect not widely 
covered in the literature, but present especially in the case 
of "ethnic entrepreneurs) (8); 3) typological-residential 
(i. e. by type of housing, " tenure and access); 4) 
spatial-residential (the "classic" form of urban 
segregation). The main patterns and trends of Eritrean and 
Egyptian' housing and employment will , now be examined 
according to this four-fold-typology. 
"Typological"-ocupational segreaation. , 
At the level of the economic sector, segregation is very high 
for both groups since the overwhelming majority of the 
migrants seems to be. -employed in the lower tertiary sector 
or, from the point of view of the segmented labour market 
approach, in the non-protected reproductive sector (Paci 
1980). This sector is often occupied, in industrialized 
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countries, by Third world immigrants (cf. Mingione 198äa, 
19B3b). In class terms these immigrants could be 
characterized as belonging to the marginal proletariat or to 
the sub-proletariat. In each instance, the most important 
factors are socioeconomic ones (the labour market and 
economic requirements) and political-juridical ones (the set 
of bureaucratic constraints governing foreign immigration to 
Italy that push the migrants into this economic stratum). 
However, within this economic sector and social class, the 
two immigrant groups are clearly differentiated in terms of 
occupational niches, the cleaning sector being the most 
important one for the Eritreans and the catering one for the 
Egyptians, even if the actual picture is slightly more 
complicated. The main factors that account for this 
differentiation are demographic characteristics 
(particularly the sen-ratio) and the network process. The 
earlier immigration and predominance of females in the 
Eritrean case and the even greater predominance of men in the 
Egyptian one "fit in" with the fact that employment in the 
cleaning sector is culturally defined as "female" while 
employment in the catering sector (especially cooks but also, 
to a lesser extent, waiters and dishwashers) is defined as 
"masculine" (cf. Carby 1982, Parmar 1982). The "chain-like" 
network process of migration running along ethnic lines 
further reinforces this pattern. For example the Eritrean 
priest, Father Yohannes, acts as a mediator between Eritrean 
female labour supply and Italian families with labour demand 
in the domestic sector (cf. chapter 7). The great 
socioeconomic "weight" of Eritrean female employment in the 
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cleaning sector "draws" men too in this sector, even if not 
as domestic workers (in the sense of "maids" that not only 
clean but also wash, cook, etc. ), but often in office 
cleaning enterprises, as butlers, or just as casual cleaners. 
While female employment as cleaners in the domestic sector is 
almost always the case, male employment is slightly more 
differentiated as there are a few entrepreneurs (e. g. one bar 
and two restaurant owners, some traders and market sellers, 
etc. ), some who work as "errand boys", while a few work for 
the Eritrean Popular Liberation Front and some are students 
and casual workers. 
Egyptian employment' is almost exclusively male. Probably 70% 
work in the catering sector, which in Italy is very big 
especially given the very high number of middle-status 
restaurants and pizzerias. Probably another 207. perform 
other kinds of jobs in the "unprotected" service economy 
(e. g. as carpenters, painters, car mechanics, etc. ) or in the 
small scale industrial sector and another 10% in more upper 
class forms of employment (entrepreneurs, etc. ). 
Spatial occupational segregation 
This category is not very useful in the present context since 
moth middle class families who are the employers of Eritrean 
domestic labour, as well as restaurant owners, who are the 
employers of Egyptian labour, are scattered around the town, 
although there is obviously a correlation in the first case 
with predominantly middle class areas, like the historical 
=entre (cf. Fig. 3.1). It may be, however, that some of the 
-estaurants are concentrated in the eastern part of the 
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middle, ring (cf. Fig. 3.1), as is reported by a survey 
(Caputo, ed. 1983). 
"Typological" residential seareaation 
This concept refers to housing quality as well as forms of 
tenure and access. Generally speaking, housing for both 
groups is concentrated in old and degraded types of buildings 
and is characterized by precarious forms of tenure. Also in 
this case there are socioeconomic factors, i. e. the very 
"rigid" housing market that leaves very few empty spaces, as 
well as political-juridical ones, i. e. the lack of access to 
state owned public housing and restrictions of access to 
Municipality-owned housing' (cf. Re>; and Moore 1967) and its 
relative scarcity in the Italian and Milanese cases. For both 
groups the process of finding housing, a resource probably 
scarcer than employment, is facilitated by the existence of 
ethnic networks, stronger for the Eritreans than for the 
Egyptians. But within this general pattern there are marked 
and important differences between the two groups. 
In the Eritrean case four main categories of housing 
dwellers can be distinguished to which, a fifth one has 
recently (1984-1986) been added. Firstly there is a 
substantial, ' even if not major, group of Eritreans, almost 
entirely female, residing with their employers, i. e. the 
"permanent" maids working in middle class families, probably 
amounting to ca. 20% of the whole group. Secondly probably 
between 30% and 40% live in case occupate (squats) as, 
through interviews with members of the community and with the 
Tenants' Union eleven such squats with an average of over 
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than 10 Eritrean families have been recorded, even if there 
probably are more. Thirdly between 20% and 30'% live in rented 
flats, mostly with temporary contracts or no contracts at 
all. Finally around 20%, mainly young children of 
"permanent" maids, live in religious institutions. Probably 
another 10% live with other forms of tenure (pensions, 
-owner-oc=upiers and council housing). 
This reflects the 
situaticn up to 1981 since when there has been a move from 
the first and fourth categories to the second and third ones, 
as "permanent" maids enhanced their social position becoming 
"daily" ones (9). Also, in 1983 a Municipality law was passed 
ruling that foreigners could gain access- to 
; Municipality-owned housing "in case of grave needs". 
Therefore in the -following years there has been a general 
move of Eritreans, especially squatters, to public housing 
that presently accounts for a substantial proportion of the 
total Eritrean population. An official of the the Tenants' 
Union who dealt with these cases and some Eritreans told me 
that there are nowadays between 100 and 150 Eritrean families 
housed in case popolari. Both squatting and public housing 
are however forms of housing tenure that are almost totally 
absent = or all migrant groups other than the Eritreans. 
Again, he dynamics of this pattern will be explained in 
later chapters. 
The pattern for the Egyptian community seems to be far more 
homogeneous. Probably up to 70% live in rented accomodation 
in old a egraded houses,, either with a temporary contract "for 
foreign e-s" or without a contract at all. Then there are 
about 2Cý: living in even more precarious forms of housing, 
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like Milan s dormitorio (destituted people's hostel) (17) or 
in a similar Catholic run one, or in pensioni a ore, i. e. 
pensions recited for 6 hours or so. Finally there is probably 
another 10% living as owner-occupiers, either among those who 
have marries an Italian woman, or among the wealthier group. 
No instances of squatting or public housing have been 
recorded. 
Spatial residential segregation 
Although sot me general trends can be identified, there does 
not seem to ae any clear pattern of geographical residential 
segregation, at least taking the whole town as the unit of 
analysis. At least three factors expalin this pattern, one of 
them specific`' to the Eritrean group and the other common to 
both groups. These are the percentage of Eritreans living 
with their employers or in religious institutes, the great 
scarcity of any kind of rented housing that makes ghetto 
formation quite difficult as the migrants "fill in" any space 
they can find, and finally the fluidity of the housing 
situation. In the previous chapter it has been argued that 
the areas of the middle ring, even if they also contain quite 
a substantial proportion of middle class housing, is closest 
to the "zone in transition" of the Chicago school, or of the 
"twighlight area" (cf. Re). and Moore 1967) as there is quite 
a high props-tion of old and degraded housing once inhabited 
by the Milanese working classes and then by the southern 
Italian ones, before many of them got rehoused in peripheral 
public housing. The fact that there is some degree of 
correlation between this area and concentration of both 
immigrant housing and "ethnic institutions", has led a team 
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of architects to talk about a "diffused ghetto" (Caputo, ed. 
1983) precisely in the middle ring. However the concept is 
too impressionistic and the word "ghetto" seems hardly 
appropriate as the overall degree of segregation seems quite 
low. Members of the Eritrean group point out that we can 
speak of segregation, especially in area : (cf. Fig. 4.1), 
only in 'terms of places of socialization. Moreover the 
pattern changes according to the number of ethnic groups 
taken into account (Caputo considers several of them) and 
the level of segregation usually increases as the unit of 
analysis decreases from the city as a whole, to an area and 
to a street. However the concept of a "diffused ghetto" does 
carry some descriptive value for the Eritreans, excluding 
those who live.. with their employers or in religious 
institutes. 
Most of the 11 case occupate are located inside the middle 
ring, especially in the administrative areas 3 and 4, 
including. 4 big squats with more than 10 Eritrean families 
living in them (on average at least 22 families for a total 
of about 90 families) (cf. Fig. 4.1). At least another 3 
houses, with maybe 4-5 Eritrean families living there are 
located in the middle ring, plus nearly all Eritrean "ethnic 
institutions", that'is'the church, 'three restaurants and one 
bar. Areas .3 and 4 are therefore the closest to what could 
be described as an "ethnically segregted area" or a "diffused 
ghetto", for the Eritreans. However in the years 1984-1986 
with the process of rehousing in council flats, the 
geographical pattern started to change. The inhabitants of 




4 Restaurants and bars 
Figure 4.1 Eritrean: residence and "ethnic institutions" 
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Eritreins in other housing groups, were rehoused in 
Municipality-owned public housing. According to an Eritrean 
informant of the 100-15C) families who nowadays live in public 
housing, 54, are located in a neighbourhood in area 14, that 
is becoming also an "ethnically concentrated" area. Again, 
including all Eritrean housing groups and taking the whole 
city as unit of analysis the degree of segregation would be 
very low, but leaving, aside "permanent" maids and children 
living in religious institutes, it would increase taking an 
area, a neighbourhood or even a street as unit of analysis. 
As far as Egyptians are concerned, the greater concentration 
in rented housing (with or without contract), makes the 
geographical pattern more dispersed, for the reasons stated, 
above. The "mixed" marriages between Egyptian men and Italian 
women are a further factor of dispersal, in a similar way 
that "permanent" domestic employment is for Eritreans. 
Moreover, - besides the 
dormitorio, there is no form of 
"organized housing" like the squats or public housing from 
which it is possible to extract a significant amount of data. 
However through interviews, personal observation, etc., area 
5 could be said to have some degree of Egyptian "ethnic 
concentration" where there are some old case di ringhiera 
(11) with at least a dozen Egyptians in them, an Egyptian 
restaurant and a few bars where they meet in the evening. 
Another area with a perhaps slightly lower Egyptian "ethnic 
concentration" is area 10 where the Muslim Centre and an 
Egyptian restaurant are located, while another is situated 
near the "heartland" of the Eritrean zone, that is in area 
(cf. Fig. 4.2). 
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. =Figure 
4.2: Egyptians: residence and "ethnic institutions 
1 
. Muslim Centre 
© Proposed site for construction of a Mosque 
The next two sections will provide a typology of Eritrean and 
Egyptian migrants, drawn from life-histories and interviews, 
concerning family units, employment and housing, while the 
more "qualitative" aspects (such as identity) will be 
examined in the following chapter. 
4.4 A typology of Eritrean migrants 
Immigration to Milan happened in two phases. In the first one 
dating to the, early 1970s it was made up mainly by single 
women who migrated above all for economic reasons and in 
almost all cases found a job in the domestic sector as maids 
in middle class families. From the late 1970s to the early 
1980s a more substantial quota of immigrants found its way to 
Italy and , 
Milan in particular, because of the worsening of 
the war between the Ethiopian government and the Eritrean 
liberation, fronts. This migration was made up not only by 
single women (who nonetheless remained an important group) 
but also by married women, often followed first by their 
husbands and then by the children for whom one of the main 
reasons to migrate was to avoid the military service in the 
Ethiopian army, that would have meant fighting against the 
liberation movements in which friends or relatives served. A 
high rate of female migration applies also within Ethiopia as 
a whole (O'Connor 1983, p. 71). However the war has also 
encouraged a number of young men around 18-20 years old to 
migrate on their own. Italy is nearly always chosen because 
of the colonial links that make the migrants hope for a 
better treatment than elsewhere. By far the greatest 
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avenue- of employment and source cf income is made up by 
female labour in the domestic sector, that sometimes is the 
only source of income for the f ami . y. 
A typology of Eritrean migrants can now be introduced. The 
main identifying criteria being the kind of family group 
(i. e. single, married couple, e: c. ), since the Eritrean 
group is very differentiated in this respect. 
Sinole women 
Although they are not the most numerous type of family group, 
single women probably make up 207 of the total number of 
family groups. This group accounts for quite a large part of 
those Eritreans who migrated in the early 1970s mainly for 
economic reasons and even though their migration was 
conceived essentially as temporary, the worsening of the war 
situation in their homeland in the following period has 
forced them, in the word of one of them, "to age in Italy 
without helping it". All of them work as maids in middle 
class families but one can distinguish between "full time, 
permanently resident" ones (residing with their employers) 
and "non-resident ones", working part time or full time, but 
having accommodation of their own. 
Trhas is 38 years old and migrated to Italy in 1974, to 
earn some money, because of economic difficulties: "as long 
as I have legs to walk, hands to . work and a head to think, I 
am never going to be poor", she remarked. She came directly 
to Milan where she had a friend who found her a job as a maid 
in a family. She has worked and resideded permanently in 
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that family ever since. This, by tr e way, is also quite a 
common solution to the housing question which is one of the 
first and more difficult problems the immigrants have to 
encounter. Even-though she would have liked to go back to 
Eritrea, the war situation has prevented her from doing so 
(she is 'the one who remarked "I suddenly found myself aging 
in Italy", probably also referring to the fact that, as in 
those times Eritrean men in Italy were very few, she did not 
have an opprtunity to get married within her ethnic group). 
She is tired of doing this job and thought things would have 
been better in Italy. However she does not foresee changing 
job, because "what else could I do? " Her only days off are, 
like for all maids, Thursday afternoon and Sundays and on 
Thursday afternoons she attends a literacy' course run by some 
priests of Caritas (cf. chapter 6), because she is illiterate 
both in Italian and in her mother tongue, Tigrinya, a rather 
common feature for this ' sex-age group. She is quite 
religious and often' attends the '"ethnic" religious services 
and festivals, carried out at Father Yohannes' (an Eritrean 
priest) church, even though she also attends some EPLF 
organized events and socializes almost exclusively with 
"fellow ethnics". '' 
Amleset is Z4-'years old and comes from a little town near 
Asmara, also of Tigrinya mother tongue, but illiterate. 
Although she has been in Italy for 12 years, her knowledge of 
Italian is barely conversational. Sne decided also to come 
to Italy' temporarily to make some money, but decided to 
remain because of the deteriorating war situation in her 
country. She came directly to Milan already with a job 
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contract she found through her sister and is therefore 
residing "legally" in Italy. She worked for various years in 
a family with whom she also resided, but then she found a 
"daily" job. I came to know her because some acquaintances of 
mine asked me if I could help them get them domestic help 
through my links with the Eritreans. I contacted Father 
Yohannes who helps many Eritrean women find these jobs. His 
role will be analyzed further in chapters 5 and 7. In less 
than a week he sent Amleset. However, after eight days, she 
declined the offer because the house was too big and heavy 
for her, a sign that she probably had other employment 
alternatives. In terms of housing, after she finished living 
with the family for which she worked, she went to live in a 
casa occupata where many other Eritrean families live, in 
area 6, where there are quite a few old decaying houses that 
are accessible for squatters. However in July 1985 this house 
was evicted because of safety regulations and the 
inhabitants, including Amleset, were temporarily housed in a 
pension paid for by the Municipality before they could move 
to a public housing flat. This housing pattern 
(squat-public housing) that involves a certain number of 
social actors (a leader of the Front, a Tenants' Union, the 
local authorities) is quite common for the Eritreans, but 
completely absent for other immigrant groups (see chapter 7, 
below). 
E+erkti is 28 years old and although from a Tigrinya-speaking 
Eritrean family, she was born and brought up in Addis Ababa, 
where the family had previously migrated. In Addis she went 
to high school and reached an educational level far above 
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that of-her sex-age peers, also being perfectly bilingual in 
Tigrinya and Amharic. She came to Italy in 1977 partly 
because of economic reasons and partly because the political 
situation was deteriorating and, as she reported, 
discrimination against Eritreans in Ethiopia increased. She 
got the first job, "naturally" as maid, in Palermo through a 
sister and so"she also came to'Italy with a"job contract and 
is therefore ' "legal ". ' After a couple of years she came to 
Milan where she worked for three years as a "permanently 
resident" maid. In this period she attended an Italian 
language course at the Volta school (cf. chapter'6), as well 
as a course in needlework. Three years ago she found a job as 
a "daily" maid and moved to a rented flat that however soon 
proved to be too expensive. So she found a new one in which, 
with a half day a week house cleaning duty, she did not have 
to pay any rent. Thus both in terms of employment and 
housing, there has been some social enhancement, as in 
Amleset's case. -The flat was found through some 'contacts she 
got through ACLI (12), where she attended a course to get 
trained to advise maids on rights on contracts, social 
benefits, pensions, etc. because, she says, if there is not 
an Eritrean there, 'the other Eritrean'women will not come to 
the existing centres for this purpose. 
Sincle women with children. 
This group accounts 'for around 2O-30% of all types of family 
groups. In most cases the mother, usually divorced from her 
husband or a widow, migrated first, followed some years later 
by the children, although there are exceptions to this 
pattern. Also in this case there is an important difference 
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between permanently resident maids and "daily"'ones, that 
this time has also an effect on the lives of the children who 
would then be brought up usually in Catholic religious 
institutes. The effects of this situation will be briefly 
analyzed in chapter S. 
Lete is -, 56 years old, from Asmara and migrated to Italy in 
1972, mainly for economic reasons, but then decided to stay 
because of the war. She has always worked as a "daily" maid, 
with regular sojourn and work permits, and went to live in a 
case occupata in area 3, where up to Z0 Eritrean families 
lived (cf. Fig. 4.1) As in many cases the squat was "bought" 
from an Italian family who lived there previously and gives 
up the "tenure" for sums that go from £200 to £500. In this 
house she had a relationship with a friend from Asmara (who 
works as a waiter in a family), from whom she had a daughter 
who was born in 1979. After a few years the couple split and 
in 1984 the squat was evicted. After a few weeks in a 
pensione, the mother and daughter went to live in together 
in a case popolare in the peripheral area 14. She said that 
in the process of obtaining public housing she was helped by 
the Front and the Tenants' Union (13) and remarked that she 
is much happier to pay a modest amount of money and to have 
security of tenure (and heating) than to have to pay no rent, 
but have no security (and no heating). She came to ACLI to 
ask assistance with some bureaucratic procedures to get state 
allowances for a child (to which she is entitled as a tax 
payer) and to make the father contribute for the support of 
the child. In a way, she is a case in between the previous 
and the present category as she migrated as a childless 
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single. person, but this case is not frequent as Eritreans put 
quite a lot of emphasis on marriage. 
Ruth is 46 years old and comes from Tigray (the region 
sharing the language and religion of highland Eritrea) where 
her eldest'son was born, but then migrated to Asmara, where 
her younger son, Abraham, was born 20 years ago. Having 
divorced from her husband, who is a shopkeeper in Asmara, she 
migrated to Italy in 1973, while her children grew up with 
their maternal grandmother. She worked first as a "permanent" 
maid, but after a few years she became a "daily" one and went 
to live in a casa-t occupata in area 4, where approximately 15 
Eritrean families live. Her "flat", found through Eritrean 
friends, where she still lives, is made up of a single room 
that had no sanitary facilities. In 1984 she was joined by 
Abraham, her younger son, who migrated to avoid the military 
service, which might have meant fighting against his older 
brother, who served in the TPLF (Tigray's People Liberation 
Front). Being over 18, he could not come to Italy with a 
permit for "family cohesion" and was helped by Father 
Yohannes who acted as a guarantor, another quite common 
practice. With the help of other Eritreans in the house, 
Abraham managed to install sanitary facilities, an 
interesting example of "self-help" (14). Ruth told me that 
she also relies on Father Yohannes to get advice when she has 
employment problems as well as on other matters. 
Lemlem was born in Tigray 35 years ago, where she had 4 sons 
from her husband. In the early 1970s, the family migrated to 
Addis Ababa and after a few years she divorced from her 
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husband who went to work in Saudi Arabia. She came to Italy 
in 1979 partly because of the family crisis and partly 
because of the worsening political situation and was joined 
two years later by her four sons, the eldest of whom, Haile, 
was 14. They came with a permit "for family cohesion", as 
their mother was working regularly in Italy. But because she 
had a job as a "permanent" maid and therefore had to reside 
with her employers, the children had to live in a Catholic 
religious institute until 1984 when Lemlem, through the help 
of Father Yohannes, found a job as "daily" maid. Then the 
whole family moved to a casa occupata in area 4, where up to 
20 Eritrean families used to live, in overcrowded conditions. 
In 1985 this squat was evicted and while the majority of the 
residents were rehoused in area 15, Lemlem's family was given 
a casa poolare in area 14 following the pattern outlined in 
Lete's case. 
Married couples (with children) 
This category probably accounts for around 30-40% of all the 
family groups. Also in this case the usual pattern is 
immigration of the parental couple first (but sometimes the 
woman preceeds the husband as she finds a job more easily in 
the domestic sector) followed a few years later by the 
children, who then come "for family cohesion", when family 
immigration is more "consolidated". In more recent years 
Eritrean couples might have increased, as there is quite a 
high rate of in-group marriage (see chapter 5). 
The Ghebreyesus, husband and wife, came to Italy in 1973, 
from Asmara. The husband works as a peddler market seller of 
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Oriental goods at various fairs in Milan and the surrounding 
small towns. Every three or four years he goes back to 
Eritrea to import directly the merchandise. His job therefore 
should not be considered as "street level peddling", but is 
relatively of higher status as he sometimes has the 
authorization to sell in "prestigious" fairs, like the 
Christmas one in piazza Duomo and besides giving good 
revenues, it also shows the existence of a certain degree of 
integration in the Italian bureaucratic system, needed to get 
the authorization (15). This occupation is not uncommon for 
Eritrean men, often helped by the rest of the family and, to 
a lesser extent, by the Somalis. The wife works as ,a maid for 
an old couple and helps out : the husband on Sundays or on 
holidays. They lived in the same casa occupata in area 4, 
where Lemlem lived. In 1981 they were joined by their three- 
children (the oldest of whom, Michael, was aged 13 when he 
arrived) who meanwhile lived with their grandmother in 
Asmara, while another child was born in Milan. With the 
arrival of the three children the flat where the family 
lived, made up of two rooms, had as many as 14 people living 
in it, as another family of relatives was also there. Luckily 
in 1985, after the squat had been evicted because of safety 
regulations, they got rehoused in a-casa popolare in area 14 
(like Amleset), where more than 50 Eritrean families live, in 
a few streets. 
In the case of the Tesfazyons, instead, it was the father, 
who migrated in 1976 followed shortly by his wife. He worked 
as a "factotum" for a famous Milanese fashion house and 
therefore had a rather good income and so he was in the quite 
, 
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excepti. onal position of not needing his wife's income as a 
maid. In the following years they were joined by their two 
daughters (the eldest of whom after three years migrated to 
the USA) and three sons, the eldest of whom, Yonas, was 1.3 
when he arrived in 1980, partly to join their parents and 
partly because of the war situation. The family lives in the 
same casa occupata in area 4 where Ruth and her son Abraham 
also live. The flat, made up of two rooms, had no sanitary 
facilities, but the family, with the help of other Eritreans 
living there, managed to install a toilet. Yonas and Abraham 
managed also to install a lighting system for the staircase 
of the house which lacked one. This "consolidation" of the 
squat was carried out after an agreement between all the 
residents who had to pay something for the equipment. This 
agreement was reached only after a negotiation with the 
Italian residents who feared that this might have hindered 
their chances of getting a council flat, even if this was 
hoped also by the Eritreans. 
Samuel Woldeghiorghis is ZCº years old and migrated to Milan 
in 1978 as a single person, because of the war and political 
situation. He comes from a big village some 30 miles out of 
Asmara, where he migrated in the late 1960s. He worked as a 
part-time cleaner and registered at Milan's University to 
study geology. Samuel told me that when Italians ask him; 
"how come you came to Italy? ", he answers: "by the same road 
on which you came to Eritrea", obviously referring to the 
colonial link. In 1981 he got married to an Eritrean woman he 
knew from Asmara. The couple had a son, Aaron and a 
daughter, Ruth. The wife, who works as a "daily" maid, is 
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the main source of income of the family, but Samuel remarks 
that as "the Italians managed to find jobs in Eritrea, it is 
impossible I won't be able to find them in Italy", a sentence 
similar to that of Trhas', a sign of the confidence many 
Eritreans have in their capacities and determination they 
have to employ them. The family lived for 5 years in a small 
rented flat in area 4, but has been rehoused at the beginning 
of 1986 in a casa popolare in area 14, where also Lete and 
the Ghebreyesus live. Within this typology therefore, Samuel 
has moved from the 
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group of single males, the next to be 
examined, to the present one of married couples. 
Sinale men 
This category is less numerous than the previous ones and 
accounts for probably around 10-15% of the family groups. 
The great majority of the members of this group is made up of 
young men (ca 19-25 years old), who migrate to escape 
military service. They usually come with a study visa and 
indeed many are registered at the unversity or other 
institutes, even if this is not always possible. However most 
of them also do unauthorized part-time work, usually as 
office cleaners, as they cannot get permission for it. There 
are however also cases of older bachelors or men who 
divorced. This group is usually "weaker" economically and 
legally than the previous ones, since it lacks women's 
presence that is not only a more secure source of income, but 
of sojourn permits too. 
Bereket is 24 years old, comes from Asmara and migrated to 
Milan in 1981, to avoid military service. He came with a 
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study visa as he found a place at Milan's university, 
studying medicine, but he also works part time as a cleaner. 
He told me it has been relatively easy for hir to learn 
Italian, as he already knew it in his country. For the first 
three years he lived in a Catholic institute, but in 1984, 
through some Eritrean friends, he managed to find a room in 
an old house with outdoor services, in area 5, which is 
inhabited by quite a few Egyptians. 
Berhane is 22 years old and was born in Addis Abeba from an 
Eritrean family. Although he speaks quite good Tigrinya, his 
mother tongue is Amharic. He left Ethiopia because of 
political and "ethnic" problems (discrimination against 
Eritreans in Ethiopia), even if he is not an ardent Eritrean 
nationalist, and arrived in Italy at the end of 1984 with a 
tourism visa. Through Caritas, a Catholic institution (see 
chapter 6), he found a place in the home of an Italian middle 
aged person separated from his wife. Because he has no permit 
Berhane cannot do any "regular" job nor officially register 
for any course. He does some casual jobs in the cleaning 
sector and has (unofficially) followed an apprenticeship 
course. 
Tolde is 48 years old and comes from Keren, the provincial 
capital of the Eilen speaking people of Eritrea. However he 
speaks very good Tigrinya and Amharic as well as English. In 
Eritrea he used to be the managing director of a bank but he 
was sacked when, after the revolution, the bank had been 
robbed by an Eritrean guerrilla group and he had been accused 
by the Ethiopian authorities to be an accomplice and 
If 165 
therefore jailed. As a result of this his wife divorced and 
came to Italy (in Genoa) with her two sons, working as a 
maid. After he was freed Tolde, who could also speak some 
Italian, came to Milan in 1984 and went to live in a small 
rented flat in the northeastern periphery with a distant 
relative. He has only casual jobs in the cleaning sector and 
has written to an Italian entrepreneur who used to have his 
business in Eritrea and now lives in Padua, to seek a more 
stable employment. 
Eritreans and Ethiopians with Italian citizenship 
Although this category does not fit the criteria of the 
present typology, it is obvious why this group should be 
singled out as a distinct one, as all the regulations 
concerning foreign immigration that push the migrants into 
the lower tertiary sector do not apply. Although the majority 
of the members of this group, who probably make up less than 
a hundred people, are offspring of marriages between Italian 
men and Eritrean or Ethiopia women, they are considered as 
part of the Eritrean/Ethiopian group because (as will be seen 
in the next chapter) they still interact to a very high 
extent with the Eritrean group. Only two cases will be 
briefly mentioned. Piergiorgio was born in Asmara :8 years 
ago from an Italian father and Eritrean mother, is married to 
an Eritrean wife and came to Milan in 1975, where he owns an 
import-export enterprise and is relatively well off. Roberto 
is 32 years old, was born in Addis Ababa from an Italian 
father and Ethiopian mother and has worked in Milan as a 
skilled worker in a small factory for 4 years. He is married 
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to an Ethiopian woman to whom he sends remittances and whom 
he visits every year. 
4.5 A typology of Egyptian immigrants 
The general character of Egyptian immigration is far more 
homogeneous than the Eritrean one from many points of view 
including gender, age, family groups. Probably 60-70% of the 
immigrants have the following characteristics: they are 
single males, between 20 and 39 years old. The main quota of 
immigrants came between the late 1970s and the early 1980s. 
Generally speaking the immigrants come'from the big or medium 
sized towns of the Nile delta and have reached higher 
education including in many cases university. ' The main 
reason to migrate is an -economic ones although most 
immigrants did-have some sort of employment in Egypt and 
often a qualified one, they say-that as their earnings were 
barely above subsistence, - they can still earn more in Italy 
with an unqualified one. However there is often also a social 
reason for migration, as it is conceived as an enhancement of 
life opportunities and a good life experience - and a lot of 
emphasis is- put on the fact that Italy is a "western" 
country. Italy, considered as a "western" country, is chosen 
not out of particular historical-cultural reasons, but 
because of its 'geographical vicinity and relative ease of 
access, even though sometimes it is stressed that it belongs 
to the same "Mediterranean" area. Most immigrants come with a 
tourism visa"and therefore: do not have an authorization to 
get a "legal" Job. 
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In the following typology four major Egyptian sub-groups can 
be identified, taking into account not only the type of 
family groups '(as most Egyptian are single males), but also 
employment (other than in the lower tertiary sector) and 
marriage with an Italian woman, not an uncommon strategy (as 
will be seen in chapters 5 and 7) that clears all the 
problems relative to sojourn, and working permits. 
Single men employed in the lower tertiary sector 
This is by far the most important category among Egyptians, 
working mainly in the catering sector. Probably 60% of all 
Egyptian immigrants fall into this category, while including 
also single Egyptians with "higher" forms of employment or 
conversely those with similar forms of employment, but 
married, it would amount to about 70%. The great majority of 
these workers have reached higher or university education and 
came to Italy with a tourism visa. Their sojourn permits do 
not allow them to seek employment. Therefore nearly all of 
them work "illegally", without a permit. From the point of 
view of marriage, given the relative lack of Egyptian women 
(there are probably around 20 women for 100 men, in marrying 
age) that make this a difficult, even if viable, option, 
there are three main options availablet a) to remain single; 
b) to go temporarily to Egypt to get married; c) to marry an 
Italian woman with all the legal and social benefit that 
deirves from it, by far. the most common option. 
Mohammed is 31 years old and was born in Cairo. There he 
reached university education and worked as a teacher. His 
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father sa shop owner. He migrated to Italy in 1981 because 
of insufficient earnings in Egypt, but also for the life 
experier.: e. A friend found him a job in a restaurant and so 
he migrated "regularly" (and quite exceptionally, from this 
point o= view, taking for granted what he says is true), by 
himself. to Milan. He followed the usual employment pattern 
in the catering sector, that is after a first period as a 
waiter, ne became assistant cook and then cook, in a good 
restaurant/pizzeria. He lamented the fact that he had to work 
60 hours a week, but afterwards he started working only 
half-tim"e as the management of the restaurant employed also 
another Egyptian. He has four Italian workers under his 
supervision. In terms of housing he managed to find a small 
rented studio-flat, in the northeastern periphery, with a 
temporary contract "for foreigners", but he had to move 
between several places beforehand. Although his spoken 
Italian is rather fluent, he attends a course to improve his 
written one 
Gamel is 35 and was born in Alexandria. After finishing high 
school, he got a diploma in accountancy, but left Egypt in 
1980, mainly for economic reasons and went to the Lebanon. 
Having left in early 1982 because of the war, he went back to 
Egypt for another year and then came to Milan in 1983, where 
he already had some friends, to look for a job but also "to 
see wha: things were like". In Milan he first found a job as 
loader in a warehouse and then, through some Egyptian friends 
one as an assistant cook in a restaurant, which he has been 
doing -or the last two years. However two weeks before I 
interviewed him, the restaurant was sold to some Chinese 
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people' "who employ only Chinese labour" and so he is 
unemployed. In terms of housing, he firstly lived in a 
pension and then moved to a rented flat with some Egyptian 
friends in area 5. After two years, through an agency, he 
moved into a single room, in the same area, because the 
previous flat was too expensive. His knowledge of spoken 
Italian is sufficient for everyday life, but`he also attends 
the same course to improve it. 
Ibrahim is 28 and comes from Cairo. There he obtained a 
university 'bachelor's degree in mechanical engineering but, 
like many other Egyptians, in 1982 he decided to migrate 
because of economic reasons "as the salary one gets in Egypt 
allows bare survival and makes it very hard to plan marriage" 
and because of social ones, i. e. the greater life 
opportunities one can find in "a technologically advanced 
country like Italy". He also chose Italy because of the 
geographical vicinity and relative ease of entry, but said he 
would leave if he found a better place. As usual, he firstly 
found a job as a dishwasher (through some Egyptian friends) 
and then enhanced his position by becoming a cook, in a 
restaurant. This allowed him to move from an old casa di 
rinahiera in area 5, that has quite a high proportion of 
Egyptian immigrants, to a more modern and comfortable flat in 
the same area, which he found through an agency, also with a 
temporary contract for foreigners. He said he chose to remain 
in the same area because it was quite near his workplace. 
Hosni is 31 years old and was born in Cairo, although his 
parents come from a small village in the northern province of 
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'Aswan. -At Cairo university he obtained a law degree, but in 
1979 migrated to Milan, mainly for economic reasons, but also 
for "social" ones, like in the cases mentioned above. He 
started working as a dishwasher and then became a waiter, in 
a pizzeria. He also laments the excessive working week that 
leaves him very little spare time, but is quite satisfied 
with his salary, around £404 a month. The first time r 
interviewed him, he lived in a small rented flat in the 
western periphery. However when I met him again a few months 
later, he had moved to a bed and breakfast because his 
temporary rent contract "for foreigners" was expiring, which 
also allowed him to save some money, as it was cheaper than 
the flat. 
Abdel is 35 and was born in Cairo, where he attended 
university to study economics and then worked for some years 
as an accountant in a bank. His father is a civil servant. 
His main reason to migrate was an economic one as his 
earnings were too low, despite his qualified job and migrated 
to Milan in 1984, where he found a job in a bakery, in the 
centre of town, through a friend. In the bakery he has to 
wort: as many as 64 hours a week (10 hours for 5 days and 14 
hours on Saturday) with four other Egyptians, all with no 
regular contract. He said he would like to migrate to Britain 
where he could wort: in a relative's shop, but he has problems 
with his visa. In terms of housing he also found a single 
room flat in area 5. Also, due to his relatively recent 
arrival in Italy, Abdel's Italian is quite poor and so 
despite his extremely limited spare time, he attends an 
Italian literacy course. 
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Four Egyptians not working in the catering sector may be 
briefly mentioned. The first three, Ahmed, Hassan and 
Mahmoud, work respectively as a builder, carpenter and car 
repairer and all live in area 5 in case di rinahiera, where 
also Ibrahim firstly lived. The first two of them came from 
Cairo while the last one from a small town of upper Egypt and 
all of them migrated for the mix of socioeconomic reasons 
mentioned before 4-5 years ago and say they will eventually 
go back to Egypt. The fourth Egyptian of this group, Magdi, 
also comes from upper Egypt, but has studied in university, 
and migrated because of insufficient income, lack of 
perspectives, etc. in 1982. He first found a place in the 
same area, but then moved to the northeastern periphery to a 
small unheated room. After having worked as a decorator and 
having attended Milan's faculty of Politcal Science 
part-time, he is unemployed since the end of 1984, although 
finds some occasional jobs. 
Married Eavotians (not with Italian women) working in the 
lower tertiary sector 
This category is singled out mainly on criteria that are 
social and cultural (which will be discussed in the next 
chapter). This group includes Egyptian men whose family is 
still residing in Egypt, Egyptian men residing with their 
spouse in Milan (a very small group for reasons stated above, 
none of whom I have encountered with this form of 
employment), and Egyptian men who have married non-Egyptian 
and non-Italian women. Including all three sub-groups, this 
category of immigrants accounts for probably 20% of the 
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Egyptian of family groups. It is more likely that those who 
are married with Egyptian women have done so in Egypt rather 
than in Milan, as very few marriages between Egyptians take 
place in Milan, as will be outlined in chapters 5 and 7. 
Mustafa' is 45 years old and comes from Alexandria. There he 
got married and had four children. In 1980 he came by chance 
to Italy at a time when Egyptian migrants were still quite 
few and managed to find a job as a waiter in one of Milan's 
most prestigious restaurants. Since the job was quite 
remunerative he managed not only to send remittances to 
Egypt, supporting his whole family, but even to buy himself a 
flat, albeit small and in an old building, quite near to the 
city centre. As the flat is too small he cannot call all his 
family to live with him but, during the summer holidays, 
either he goes to visit his family in Egypt, or his wife and 
children come to visit him in Milan. In 1984 he was joined by 
his eldest son, Hassan, who was aged 15 and had started the 
first year of high school in Alexandria, and attended for a 
brief period an apprenticeship course, but then went back to 
Alexandria to finish his school. 
Abdel is 28 and was born in a medium-sized town of the Nile 
delta. He came to Italy in 1979 and found a job in a pizzeria 
as a dishwasher and then "moved up" to become first a waiter 
and then a cook. Meanwhile he got married to a woman from El 
Salvador (another quite substantial immigrant group, cf. 
Table 4.1) and had a daughter by her. The family lived in a 
small rented flat near the city centre but, as they had no 
contract they were evicted two weeks before I interviewed 
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them. T, ney went to live temporarily with friends, but not 
together. They have been advised by a judge that if they 
cannot find housing for themselves and their little daughter, 
she will have to be adopted by another family. Normally this 
would nave led to a suspension of the eviction, but nothing 
can be done since they have no contract. Although Abdel has 
some capital, he has not been able to find rented 
accommodation, neither in the private nor in the public 
sector, given the great scarcity of this resource. 
Ecivptians with "higher" forms of occupation 
Probably around 10% of the working i. e. male, Egyptian 
population, works in forms of occupation that are of higher 
status and more remunerative that the usual employments in 
the lower tertiary sector. In this category there are 
businessmen, import-export entrepreneurs, owners of 
Arabic-Italian translation offices, other forms of 
entrepreneurship. Probably also in this group the majority of 
its members are single, even if the higher status and income 
may make the percentage of married men slightly higher than 
for the previous group. 
Ismail is 34 and was born in El Mansura, a medium-sized town 
of the Nile delta. He has a degree in physical education and 
says he came to Italy to get a specialization in 
physiotherapy. When he arrived in Milan in 1979, he went to 
stay in the house of an old lady (Italian), meanwhile 
studying physiotherapy and doing casual jobs, especially as a 
cleaner. After he obtained his diploma he opened a 
physiotherapy studio with two Italian course mates. The 
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studio rooked very modern and was undergoing some 
restoration and enlargement works, sign that there was enough 
capital t=, invest for such improvements. When he felt he had 
enough money and could afford to buy small flat he was 
joined by his wife from Egypt, by whom he had a son. 
Egyptian men married to Italian women 
Probably around 10% of the male population in reproductive 
age is in this situation. In 1985 as many as 28 marriages 
occurred between Egyptian men and Italian women, by far the 
greatest group of intermarriages. Being married to an Italian 
citizen obviously gives great advantages in terms of access 
to employment and housing, even if it does not mean an 
automatic change of class position. 
Zayed is Z3 and also comes from El Mansura, actually being 
Ismail's brother in law. He came to Italy in 1981 with a 
substantial amount of money (around £1,500, he says) and went 
to stay with his brother in law, at the old lady's place, 
also doing casual jobs in the cleaning sector. He justifies 
his choice to migrate more in terms of the quality of life 
("it's easier to find here the things you want than in 
Egypt") and life experience ("I came to see what thing were 
like") than in strictly monetary terms. After two years he 
married an Italian divorced woman, older than him, with a son 
from the first marriage already 18 years old. Zayed went to 
live in her lower-middle class apartment in area 8, with a 
controlled "fair rent" and found a job as a semi-skilled 
worker in a small factory. 
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4.6 Conclusion 
Eritreans and Egyptians present rather different demographic 
patterns. The former is only slightly larger than most other 
migrant groups in Milan, has a relatively balanced sex-ratio 
(with a slight female predominance) and differentiated 
age-structure. This allows for the existence of many family 
units, even if women-headed households are very common. By 
contrast the Egyptian group is the largest migrant group in 
Milan, has a very strong male predominance and a very 
homogeneous age-structure (around the central working age). 
Family units are not common. These patterns affect social 
relations of ethnic solidarity, identity and rates of 
endogamous marriage that will be examined in the next 
chapter. While Eritreans migrated mainy because of a war and 
chose Italy because of historical links, Egyptians migrated 
for a mixture of economic and social reasons and chose Italy 
for opportunistic reasons. 
From the point of view of employment, both groups are 
concentrated in the "unprotected" tertiary sector, but while 
for Eritreans the main avenue of employment is female 
domestic labour, for Egyptians it is the catering sector. 
This difference might help to explain one of the main 
"structural" difference between the two groups, namely the 
much higher percentage of "legal" migrants among the 
Eritreans, but it is also linked to issues of ethnic politics 
analyzed in chapter 7.. Finally another major difference 
between the two groups is the high percentage of Eritreans 
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living in squats or public housing, which will also be 
analyzed in chapter 7. 
The next chapter examines more qualitative issues concerning 
the two groups, such as identity, solidarity, ethnic 
institutions and marriage. 
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NOTES TO CHAPTER 4 
(1) These aspects would be called by Hannerz "role 
discriminatory attributes", in that they constrain the 
repertoire of roles that an individual can carry out in the 
various role domains (cf. Hannerz 1980, pp. 151-156). 
(2) Personal communication from the authors. 
(3, ) As Eritrea is formally part of the Ethiopian state, 
its inhabitants, holding an Ethiopian passport, are 
classified as "Ethiopians" in official statistics even if 
the great majority of them really come from Eritrea. When 
therefore in the text the name "Ethiopia" appears (in 
inverted commas), usually in the context of some official 
classification, it refers to a mainly Eritrean population, 
unless otherwise specified. 
(4) In 1985 the situation changed, as the Municipality 
changed its requirements to conform with those of the 
police. 
(5) Reported in Melotti et al. (1985, pp. 43,89). 
(6) Cf. ibid. pp. 79-80, where Leila Ziglio puts forward 
the same suggestion for the Eritrean group. 
(7) The number is given by the difference between the 1983 
and the 1984 figures, that is 61, plus those born in 
1984. This has been confirmed by an official of the relevant 
department of the Municipality and is reported in ibid., p. 
114. 
(8) Cf. for instance the Hausa traders in Ibadan or the 
City of London businessmen (Cohen, 1969 and 1974) mentioned 
in chapter 1. 
(9) Thus a survey on 57 Eritreans attending a Municipality 
run literacy course in 1983, showed 26% living with their 
employers, 31% in case occupate, 217. in rented flats, 5% in 
religious institutes and 10% with other forms of tenure, 
even if the sample might be a little unbalanced given the 
higher proportion of women (mostly illiterate) and the lower 
proportion of young children than normal. It also records 
that, considering the first accommodation after arrival, 
the percentage of those living with their employers was 
35%. (Favaro 1983, personal elaborations). 
(10) Research carried out in 1983 (Giori 1983) concluded 
that up to 50% of the hostel's 640 guest were Egyptians, 
while in 1984 because of stricter enforcement of the 
regulation requesting the sojourn permit the number 
dropped down to 25%, as an official working there told me. 
(11) Casa di rinahiera literally means "railings house" and 
is used to describe some 19th century low status housing 
in Milan, characterized by a terraced gallery, with railings 
on each floor and a communal toilet at the end of it. Many of 
these houses are to be found in area 5 in which, as it is 
being outlined, quite a few Egyptians live. 
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(12) Association of Italian Christian Workers (cf. chapter 
6). 
(1-,, ) This process is examined in greater detail in chapters 6 
and 7. 
(14) The story of Abraham, like that of other boys mentioned 
in this chapter will be taken up in later chapters. 
(15) As witnessed by the authorizations issued by the 
relevant Municipality department for the Christmas fair in 
piazza Duomo 1984. 
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CHAPTER 5: ETHNIC IDENTITY, INSTITUTIONS AND ORGANIZATION 
This chapter examines how and to what extent the ethnic 
identity of Eritreans and Egyptians is experienced by the 
migrants in Milan and the extent it is realized in "ethnic 
institutions" and social organization. Although the content 
and significance of identity in the Italian context might be 
different, the relatively recent character of migration 
might mean that a radical identity change is not to be 
expected. "Ethnic institutions" can be defined as groups of 
people (smaller than the whole ethnic group), gathering for 
some common purpose (e. g. drinking or religious ceremonies) 
with the intended or unintended consequence of furthering 
socialization and group identity as well as collective 
action, usually taking place in some defined common place. 
These "ethnic institutions" can be formal, i. e. have some 
defined organizational body with some planned activities 
(that may be called "ethnic events") like a church or an holy 
place, or they can be "informal", lacking the above elements 
and usully having an intended purpose further removed from 
the social effects mentioned above, like a bar or a 
restaurant. 
"Ethnic organization" may 
attempting to reach all 
structure of legitimate 
providing the basis for a 
the intended or unintended 
strengthening the group's 
be defined as an organization 
members of the group, with a 
authority and decision making, 
group-wide collective action with 
consequences on the one hand of 
sociocultural cohesion and on the 
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other of articulating the group's struggle for political and 
economic power or "usurpation". The greater the relative 
importance of informal ethnic institutions, formal ethnic 
institutions and ethnic organization, the greater the degree 
of ethnicity, that in turn will also be affected by the 
character of the socioeconomic and sociopolitical relations 
with the wider society and by the internal "structural" 
factors described in the previous chapter. The content and 
form of all this, on the other hand, will be linked to the 
kind of ethnic identity shared by the group, that for recent 
immigrants is likely to be closely related to that prevalent 
in the country of origin, but that can undergo adaptations or 
even transformations in the new context. In summary this 
chapter compares the different content and strength of the 
ethnic identity of the two groups, the activities of and 
attendance at ethnic institutions and the presence of ethnic 
organization, interaction and solidarity. These features will 
in part be affected by the character of identity of the 
countries of origin examined in chapter 2 and in part by the 
demographic features examined in the previous chapter. In 
turn they will affect the possibility of collective action 
and be related to the character of ethnic politics that will 
be analyzed in chapters 6 and 7. It will also be useful to 
assess the character of the identity of the two groups in 
order to compare it with the identity they present vis a vis 
the "host society", analyzed in chapter 7. 
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5.1 Eritrean ethnic institutions and ethnic events 
Chapter 7 has argued that the 
identity revolve around the n 
Ethiopia on the one hand and, at 
inhabitants and for almost all 
Ethiopic Orthodox Christianity. 
will first be analyzed since most 
to them. 
two "poles" of Eritrean 
ationalist struggle with 
least for 50% of Eritrea's 
the migrants in Milan, 
The "formal" institutions" 
"informal" ones are linked 
Father Yohannes' Eritrean church 
Given that Ethiopic Orthodox Christianity represents the 
most profound expression of the identity of the Abyssinians 
(see Ullendorff 1973, pp. 93-105) of which highland 
Tigrinya-speaking Eritreans are also part, it is quite 
surprising that there is not an Ethiopic Orthodox church in 
Milan. There is however an Eritrean priest (1), Father 
Yohannes, who says mass in a Roman Catholic church, although 
according to the Ethiopic Orthodox ritual. This is possible 
since in the 19th century the Roman Catholic Church 
established a "Catholic Church of Ethiopian rite" preserving 
much that is of particular significance or national pride in 
Abyssinian Christianity (ibid., p. 110). In spite of this, 
the vast majority of Abyssinians, including Tigrinya-speaking 
highland Eritreans, remained loyal to the Ethiopic Orthodox 
Church, numbering several millions, while Roman Catholics are 
only about 30,000 among the "Abyssinians" (ibid. p. 110) and 
some among the Eritrean Bilen. 
The overwhelming majority of the 2,500 or so Milanese 
182 
Er: treans, coming from the Tigrinya-speaking region, are 
Etriopic Orthodox and many of their women even have its 
syc. ool tattoed on their flesh (i. e. the coptic cross on their 
forehead). Although Father Yohannes' church follows in part 
the Ethiopic Orthodox ritual and celebrates some of its 
festivals, thereby allowing Eritreans to preserve part of 
their religiuos identity, the fact that they do not have an 
Ethiopic Orthodox church is significant. The reasons for 
this will be examined in chapter 7. Here only a few 
characteristics and events of this ethnic institution will be 
ou lined. Father Yohannes' church offers several facilities, 
pari of which are derived from the fact of being within the 
Catholic Church: mass is said in a spacious church every 
Sunday and on most major religious festivals according to the 
Ethiopic calendar. In the back of the church and in a nearby 
a hall, where festivals with "ethnic" food and music are 
organized after these festivities. In the same premises there 
is also an "Ethiopian-Eritrean Solidarity Centre" where 
Father Yohannes gives advice to the dozens of people, mostly 
Eritrean women, who queue every day to talk to him seeking 
his advice not only on religious and family questions, but 
als. z on qestions relating to employment, housing or sojourn 
permits and visas (Father Yohannes often acts as guarantor 
for the immigration of Eritreans). He also runs religion and 
scmmol revision classes for young boys who also have their 
Youth Centre in the same premises. 
Among the main religious festivities which are celebrated, 
besides the Sunday masses, the main religious holidays are 
Hacesh Amat (Ethiopic New Year), Christmas, and Easter 
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according to he Orthodox calendar. When these festivities 
fall on a wor.; ing day, they are usually postponed to the next 
Sunday, as ha-dly any Eritrean could afford to take a day off 
for them. The functions are mostly in Tigrinya with a few 
formulas recited in 6eez and some of the rituals, like 
carrying the cross around the church in the middle of the 
mass, which are Ethiopic Orthodox. Traditional psalms and 
songs, often accompanied by drums played by the women, are 
sung. Samuel's (cf. chapter 4) remark on the functions and 
rituals was "t isn't the same we have at home (referring to 
the Orthodox rituals), but at least it is something". The 
Youth Centre. that also includes an Italian nun, sister 
Cesira, among its "staff" provides recreational facilities 
for mainly teenage Eritreans (cf. chapter 8), like bar 
football, table tennis set and some electric musical 
equipment anc organizes an Eritrean youth football team 
called Milanafrica. 
Father Yohannes was born in Asmara 35 years ago, from a 
Catholic family, even if from a Tigrinya-speaking area. In 
his early twenties he entered the order of Cappuccini friars 
and was sent =o a church in a village near Asmara, with some 
Italian friars. In 1975, after Haile Selassie's overthrow and 
the worsening of the Ethiopian-Eritrean struggle, many 
wounded people among whom were some guerrilla figthers 
came to seek refuge at the church and Father Yohannes, as an 
Eritrean, sup^ortive of the nationalist struggle even if 
against violence, did not deny them assistance. He was 
denounced _o the Ethiopian military authorities and 
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soldiers came to look for him. Luckily he was advised of this 
beforehand and managed to escape to the Sudan where he 
stayed for two years in a refugee camp. Later he was sent for 
one year to London to learn English. In 1979 the Order 
decided to send nim to Milan, where there was already a small 
Eritrean community and the Capuccini friars of the church, 
where he now serves, had already established a small 
assistance centre for Eritreans on which he then worked hard 
to improve its services also in the face of the growing 
number of Eritrean immigrants arriving. Although Father 
Yohannes recognized that the vast majority of "Abyssinians" 
(which he thought was the most appropriate term defining the 
semitic language-speaking highlanders) follow the Ethiopic 
Orthodox Church, he tried to "play down" the differences with 
Catholicism and said that Eritreans primarily identify as 
Christians. Therefore Father Yohannes is one of the most 
charismatic leaders of the Eritrean community, but also, as 
it will be seen in chapter 7, a powerful "ethnic broker". 
The Front 
The second main "identity pole" of the Eritreans is the 
nationalist liberation struggle against Ethiopia 'which is 
identified as "colonial oppressor". Both in Eritrea and in 
Milan, the main liberation front is the EPLF, with a 
radical-nationalist ideology, also trying to overcome the 
religious, linguistic and cultural differences in Eritrea. 
However the overwhelming majority of Eritreans in Milan are 
from the Tigrinya-speaking Christian highlands. Muslim 
Eritreans are less than 5%, since they are more likely to 
migrate to the Arab states. This was confirmed by Habib, an 
. 185 
EPLF activist, who was the only Tigre Eritrean (usually 
Muslims) I met in Milan. 
In Milan both fronts have their delegations with 
representatives, but the EPLF has by far the most numerous 
and organized delegation, with different sections, and by far 
the greatest authority over the Milanese Eritrean community, 
second only (perhaps) to that of Father Yohannes. The 
organizational structure of the EPLF, which includes a 
Political Committee and the mass organizations (women, 
peasants, workers and students) (3), has some important 
sections in Italy. While there is a political office in Rome 
dealing with political affairs at the Italian level, in 
Arese, a small town some ten miles north-east of Milan, there 
are the headquarters of the mass organizations for the whole 
Eritrean diaspora (excluding peasants). The Rome office 
issues a monthly bulletin called "Eritrean Information" (both 
in English and Italian), while the Arese one issues papers 
an selected topics, e. g. on the question of female 
emancipation in Eritrea. In Milan itself there is an 
office representing the mass o-ganizations at the Italian 
level. The aim of these offices is to give political guidance 
and to coordinate and assist the Eritrean mass movements they 
represent. Several people, including women, work for the 
offices in Arese and Milan, but the representatives who have 
the greatest importance also in the social life of the 
Milanese community are Tedros, secretary of the union of 
Eritrean students in Europe (based in Arese) and Tekle, 
Tesfai and Ghermai, leaders of the mass organizations at the 
Italian level (based in Milan). The ELF and the TPLF (Tigray 
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Feople', s Liberation Front) have als. ) small representations in 
Milan, the leader of the former being a man called Wolde. 
Besides the more strictly political activities, the Front (4) 
carries out some that have an imp mrtant influence on the 
social life of the community in Milan and in Italy. About 
four times a year it organizes festivals with Eritrean bands, 
usually linked to the Front, that p. ay the traditional music, 
while people dance, talk or eat "ethnic" food. Once every 
year, in August, the Front organizes in Bologna a one week 
general congress with a festival, Political speeches by high 
ranking officials, music and food, attended by Eritreans 
from Italy and many other countries. In Milan itself it also 
organizes Tigrinya literacy courses within a Municipality-run 
literacy course for foreign migrants (cf. chapter 6). 
Moreover, it is also involved in the Italian Solidarity 
Committee with the Eritrean people, by which it is openly 
supported, made up by people sonne of whom have links with 
political parties or organizations, especially of 
progressive or progressive-Catholic orientation. (cf. chapter 
7). In conjunction with the So: idarity Committee it also 
organizes events such as demonstrations, concerts or 
theatrical representations with -amous Italian artists, to 
spread "the Eritrean cause" among tree Italian population. 
At the Milanese level, besides their tasks directly related 
to internal Front activities, -edros usually organizes 
politically the events aimed also at the Italian society, 
giving the political speeches within them, while Tekle, with 
the help of Tesfai and Ghermai, organizes the events aimed at 
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the Eritrean community and teaches Tigrinya in the course 
mentioned above. They also give advice on various matters, 
usually relating to employment or housing rights, to the 
members of the community who come to seek it. However, 
although Tekle's status within the EPLF is lower than 
Tedros', his role at the level of the Milanese community is 
perhaps more important since he is more involved in its day 
to day affairs. Tedros has a degree in economics and 
Tekle in engineering, both from Milan's university. Wolde, 
the ELF leader, also has a degree in economics and is 
involved in communal affairs, but his organization hardly 
carries out any activity at all in Milan. As Abraham once put 
it: "the Eritrean people in Milan follow Tekle's advice and 
initiatives only after those of Father Yohannes and certainly 
before those of Wolde". All Front-organized activities are 
nationalist, political or cultural in character and leave 
aside religion. The role of both Father Yohannes and of 
Tedros and Tekle, within their respective "institutions", 
not only as leaders of the Eritrean but also as "brokers" 
between it and the "host" society, will be analyzed in 
chapter 7 and explains to a large extent Abraham's remark 
mentioned above. 
Restaurants and bars 
Besides these "formal ethnic institutions" with their 
leaders, there are also "informal" ones, like restaurants and 
bars. There are three restaurants and one bar that are 
Eritrean-owned, all of them concentrated in area 3. The 
biggest of the restaurants, called Eritrea, is run by people 
close to the EPLF. Another one, called Salomon, mon, is 
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independenly run by an Eritrean and the third one, called 
Keren, is run by a couple in which the husband is an Amhara 
Ethiopian and the wife is Eritrean. All three restaurants 
serve exclusively Eritrean food and are aimed primarily at 
Eritrean customers, although occasionally also Italian people 
go and eat there. In the bar they usually play boccette, a 
kind of boules game, played on a pool table. The main 
highland national dish, with a few variations also common to 
Amhara Ethiopians, is called zioni, consisting of a pancake 
made of millett stew. The important role of such "ethnic" 
bars and restaurants for socialization and interaction has 
been noted for other Ethiopian minority migrant groups in 
Addis Ababa by Shack (1976). In Milan these "informal" 
institutions also reflect some broader subdivisions in the 
community, e. g. one might expect that in the Eritrea 
restaurant the majority of the customers would be people 
directly linked to the Front or in the Keren restaurant 
non-nationalist Eritreans or Ethiopians. The degree to which 
participation by sub-sections of the Eritrean community to 
these informal institutions and a fortiori to the "formal" 
ones is segregated as opposed to fluid, is an important 
indicator of the degree to which a common cultural identity 
that might form the basis for collective cultural and 
political action (i. e. "ethnicity") is shared by the members 
of the group. This will be analyzed in the next section. 
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5.2 Eritrean participation at ethnic events and institutions 
This section will demonstrate that Eritreans have a high 
attendance at their ethnic institutions, unlike the Egyptians 
described later in this chapter. 
Participation at the church and religious identity 
The Sunday mass in Tigrinya, said by Father Yohannes 
following the Ethiopic ritual, attracts on average between 60 
and 80 Eritreans, mainly middle aged women, who tend to be 
the most religious section of the community. This routine 
religious event however, is not perceived as the most 
fundamental one from the point of view of group solidarity 
and many people who live far away go their local church and 
come to Father Yohannes' very rarely. But on the main 
religious festivals when the service lasts for more than two 
hours, around 400 people fill up Father Yohannes' church. 
During the service a group of singers accompanied by drums 
sing the traditional psalms along with the priests. Nearly 
all the women and some men wear the traditional white 
dresses. After the mass everybody gathers in the reception 
hall behind the church where ziani and wine is provided for 
everybody and a small band plays traditional Eritrean tunes. 
Dance is very important too and many people participate in 
the traditional circular dance in which they tie themselves 
one with another stressing even more the "mutual binding" of 
the various individuals of the community . It is a very 
important occasion for socialization too as different members 
of the community are brought together. For new immigrants it 
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is also an occasion in which they sometimes meet friends or 
acquaintances they knew from their hometown. 
Most of the Eritrean individuals and families mentioned in 
the previous chapter attend these events. Both Abraham's 
mother and Yonas' mother and, to a lesser extent, the 
children themselves and the latter's father, are quite 
religious and always attend the major holidays while the 
women often also attend the Sunday mass, as they live in the 
area. I have seen Trahs, Amleset and Berkti, Samuel 
Woldeghiorghis and his family and Bereket all coming to the 
main religious events. Others, like Lete and Lemlem stated 
that they usually go. This also applies to the vast 
majority, again mostly women, of the people I briefly 
interviewed who nearly always report that they go to Father 
Yohannes' church at least once a year for some religious 
event and other times to seek his advice. Everyone makes 
remarks like "he's a great man", or "he's our greatest help". 
These remarks can be explained not only in terms of his 
spiritual role of priest, but also of his role as "ethnic 
broker" that will be analyzed in chapter 7. What is also very 
interesting is the fact that quite often some of the Front 
leaders, also attend the feast after the religious service. 
For instance after the Christmas mass (1985) Tekle and 
Tesfai attended the following party, saying it was as a sign 
of the unity of the community, even if they had not attended 
the religious service itself. Moreover some people primarily 
involved with the Front, attend these religious ceremonies, 
and conversely some people that are more church goers than 
Front activists, attend Front-organized events. The reasons 
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for this will be evident when examining the Eritrean ethnic 
organization. 
However the religious identity pole linked to Ethiopic 
Orthodox Christianity is not only expressed in these "public" 
social events, but also in the private domain. Many of the 
middle aged people do not eat pork which the Ethiopic 
Orthodox Church forbids. For example, Amleset, working as a 
maid for some acquaintances of mine, refused to eat pork, but 
few of the young generations uphold this precept. Nonetheless 
I saw Abraham singing some traditional Ethiopic Orthodox 
psalms and prayers, some of which even in ancient Geez, 
sometimes followed by Yonas and Berhane. The book from which 
he sang was published in Asmara by the Ethiopic Orthodox 
Church and had been given to him as a present by Father 
Yohannes, a sign that also for him the links with Ethiopic 
Orthodox Christianity were still quite strong. Another 
interesting element is the consciousness of the Judaic and 
semitic aspects of their cultural and religious identity. 
Some of the more educated adults are aware of the many 
striking similarities that Tigrinya language shares with 
Hebrew, especially, but not exclusively, in the religious 
domain (5). 
For example Samuel was not only aware of the many linguistic 
similarities, but also saw his cultural identity as being to 
a great extent a Judaico-Semitic one, linking it to the 
common descent Christian and Falashä Abyssinians claim from 
King Solomon and the Queen of Sheba, and to the many other 
practices and rituals they have in common (cf. chapter 3). He 
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stressed the historical, cultural and emotional links between 
Abyssinians and Jews (going so far as to state that in 1967 
and 1973, in their families they prayed for the victory of 
Israel). This may be a result not only of these cultural 
links between Abyssinians and Judaism, but also of the fear 
of the former, especially in highland Eritrea, to be 
encroached by the Muslim world. For example an EF'LF activist 
called Patria, confirmed the importance of Judaic practices 
and rituals in highland Eritrea (his grandmother would not 
cook on Saturday) and of the spiritual links felt with 
Israel, explaining it with the fact that Abyssinia has always 
been an island surrounded by Islamic or animistic countries. 
Other Eritreans have also expressed these views. However, the 
official position of the Front on these matters is different, 
as will be seen below. Samuel also stated that the 
Tigrinya-speaking people are more the "true" bearers of the 
Abyssinian cultural heritage than the Amharas'linguistically 
and historically as it is the area of the old Axumite 
empire). For this reason he sees a problem in the fact the 
border between Eritrea and Tigray cuts across a people with 
the same language, cultural tradition and religion. 
It can be concluded from the above anecdotes that Ethiopic 
Orthodox Christianity, with all its Judaic components, is 
still to a large extent followed and practiced by a large 
part of the Milanese Eritreans, both in the private domain 
and in Father Yohannes' church, albeit in a reduced version 
because of the fact that he is in the Catholic Church. 
However it will be seen below that the Front's position is 
rather different and in chapter 7 that, from a religious 
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point of view, the Eritreans present a different image to the 
"host society". 
Participation in the Front and political identity 
In the "National Democratic Programme" (in Firebrace and 
Holland 1984), the EF'LF refers to zionism as one of the main 
"enemies of the Eritrean Revolution", after Ethiopian 
colonialism and imperialism. Privately, various Front leaders 
in Milan tended to play down the Judaic elements of the 
cultural-relgious identity of highland Eritreans mentioned 
above. There are both internal and international reasons for 
this. Internally, it was noted in chapter 2 that religion is 
perceived as a potentially dangerous division, especially 
between Christian Orthodox and Muslim and that its role is to 
be played down. This is especially because the former have 
historically enjoyed a supremacy over the latter. From an 
international point of view it should be remembered that, 
especially up to 1985, the Eritrean nationalist movements 
were supported by the Arab countries while the United States 
and Israel supported Ethiopia even if with the new Ethiopian 
radical regime some of the more radical Arab countries (e. g. 
Libya) have swapped sides. This is also reinforced by the 
EPLF's identification with Third World revolutionary 
struggles (6). Finally this attitude might also be explained 
by the relationship with some progressive Milanese 
organizations (which often support also the PLO, cf. chapter 
7). 
The main cultural activities and events organized by the 
Front in Milan are the linguistic and political education of 
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the people, and festivals, stressing the Eritreans cultural 
unity (even if composed of different nationalities) and a 
radical" Third Worldist"liberation consciousness. As far as 
the teaching of Tigrinya is concerned (that of Italian will 
be examined in chapter 6), this mainly concerns illiterate 
adults, the vast majority of whom are women, and young 
children mainly Italian-born who tend to lose the usage of 
Tigrinya as their mother tongue. The former group in 1982-83 
was made up of 19 people and in 1985-86 of 34, and the 
latter one of 40 people in 1985-86. Teaching however does 
not include only language, but also elements of history and 
geography stressing the Eritrean national identity and 
countering the formal education taught under Italian and 
Ethiopian rule that has always tended to deny it. Education 
of peasants and women, traditionally the groups among whom 
illiteracy was most widespread, has always been a priority in 
the EPLF's effort to create an Eritrean political 
consciousness also in the liberated areas of Eritrea. This 
applies also to Milan where illiteracy or loss of usage of 
Tigrinya, especially among the Italian born generation, is 
seen as a potential threat to the maintenance of such 
consciousness and a first stage in the process of 
assimilation that would mean a diminishing pool of support 
for the independence cause, given the great number of 
Eritrean refugees living abroad. 
However festivals with music and dance are the main 
Front-organized events where the national unity of the 
Eritrean people and of the Milanese community in particular 
are mostly underlined and dramatized. At least three of such 
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events are organized yearly at the Milanese level and one in 
Bologna, at an international (Eritrean) level. The Milanese 
ones coincide with Italian holidays when foreign workers 
also do not have to work. The Milanese festivals are usually 
organized in a large political centre belonging to a leftist 
Italian political movement (cf. Chapter 7). The centre is 
quite old, but can easily accommodate the more or less 500 
Eritreans that attend the festivals. On New Year's Eve 
(non-Orthodox) however, as there may be more than 1,000, some 
of whom even come from Germany for the occasion, a larger 
place has to be sought. This was a large circus tent in 
1984-85. On all occasions large quantities of zioni are 
prepared and there is always an Eritrean band playing, as 
music and dance, together with the socialization that goes 
with it, are the main activities of the evenings. Sometimes 
Milan based bands play, but by far the most popular band is 
that of a guitarist called Tekle, who used to live in Milan, 
but now is based in Germany. Leaders of the Front told me 
that they favour a shift of Eritrean bands based in different 
towns both at the Italian and European level as it increases 
the sense of unity of the people. 
In all the festivals the music that is played is the 
traditional Eritrean one, from various part of the country, 
again stressing the unity of all "nationalities", sometimes 
with rock or jazz influences. Large circles of up to 100 
dancing people are formed (the type of dance being the same 
as that performed at Father Yohannes' church). The festivals 
usually go on until midnight but on New Year's Eve, when more 
than 1,000 were around at midnight, there were still hundreds 
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of people at 5 a. m., underlining the extent to which these 
occasions are felt, also given the fact that the chances of 
extended recreations are normally few, in the normal working 
weeks. Music and instruments are also used to convey 
"national" political messages and symbols, as in the above 
occasion when Tekle's band was playing with electric guitars 
that had the shape of Eritrea and of a machine gun, or in 
Bologna in 1985 when, shortly after the seizing of a small 
town by the EPLF forces, the lyrics of a traditional tune 
were changed to fit the occasion. Short political speeches, 
briefing on the latest development of the situation in 
Eritrea and calling for unity, are often given by Front 
leaders or by the singers themselves. Participation at 
such events reflects to a large extent the composition of the 
Milanese Eritrean community with women representing the 
largest group, but also with men, teenagers and children. The 
vast majority of women that come are the same who also attend 
Father Yohannes' church, demonstrating that there is no 
cleavage between the "religious" and "political" sections of 
the community. For instance both Yonas' and Abraham's mothers 
often attend them, as well as the children themselves. Also 
Samuel and Bereket come quite often. Many of these people do 
not come for the politico-nationalist character of these 
events, but for the "ethnic" side of it (music, food, 
socialization) and as part of a "cultural strategy" aiming at 
collective rewards, analyzed in chapter 7. Some of the 
people are also lay Front activists. 
At one of these festival, in which Tekle was getting married 
to an Eritrean woman according to the lay Front ritual, I met 
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Patria, whose sons and wife are fighting with the EPLF in 
Eritrea. He explained the significance of his name (which 
means "homeland" in Italian) with the fact that his father 
wanted to give him a name symbolizing Eritrean unity which 
did not exist at the time, but more probably it is the result 
of Italian colonialism. He was brought up in Addis and said 
that he had always felt an Eritrean inside and was perceived 
as such and discriminated against by Amhara Ethiopians (cf. 
Berkti, chapter 4). Now he works for the Front, gathering 
spare machinery from Italian industries, sending them to the 
liberated areas of Eritrea. He also held the common view I 
heard from many different (Eritrean) sources that Eritrean 
hold about themselves vs. Amhara Ethiopians, i. e. that they 
are usually brighter, more productive, practically minded and 
innovative, while the latter are lazier and more bureaucratic 
and authoritarian minded. These stereotypes largely reflect 
the social situation in Ethiopia where Amharas are the 
politically and culturally dominant group controlling the 
bureaucracy, while Eritreans are reported to be in skilled 
manual occupations (cf. Shack 1973, Bjeren 19B5). This is 
because Eritrea is the most industrialized part of the 
country and an important trading centre (which probably had 
many merchants too). The image of an "industrious community" 
is one which is also often presented by Eritreans towards the 
"host society". Another Front activist, Giuseppe, after 
having been a fighter in the EPLF, now does the same work as 
Patria for the Front. His father is an Italian who used to 
live in Eritrea, but abandoned his Eritrean wife long ago. 
Like other nationalist Eritreans, he stressed that the 
Eritrean question is a colonial one that encompasses all 
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"nationalities" within it. In his view (which is the Front's) 
this does not apply to the region of Tigray which does not 
have the legal bases for independence, even if it shares 
cultural and physical characteristics with highland Eritrea. 
But the politico-nationalist ideology and organizational 
strength and support the Front enjoys, is most evident at the 
Bologna festival. In the past few years more than 2,000" 
people , 
from the whole Eritrean "diaspora" have participated 
on each occasion. In August 19B5 , although the majority of 
Eritreans present were either from Italy or from Germany (the 
two largest Eritrean communities in Europe), there were also 
Eritreans from Saudi Arabia, Sweden, Holland, Great Britain 
and the USA. There were single adults, families, young men 
and women and even boys on their own. The camp was large and 
well organized, situated on a lawn which had been temporarily 
loaned from the local communist "circle" which owned it. 
There were at least 60 big tents which could accommodate at 
least 20 people each. A large camp refectory served both 
Eritrean and European food. There were also two stands 
selling "ethnic objects", like books and pamphlets, tapes, 
T-shirts, etc. " All this was organized almost exclusively by 
the Front, which also established contact with the local 
authorities (mostly Communist) needed to have the necessary 
authorizations for the event. The opening speech was given by. 
Sebat, number three of the political bureau of the EPLF, 
outlining the current political and military situation in 
Eritrea. Various Italian and foreign guests were invited 
(cf. chapter 7). Internal political debates and workshops 
continued for the rest of the week. On the stage of the main 
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hall, two Eritrean bands, including Tekle's, performed for a 
couple of hours, but it was at the camp site where the bands 
alternated playing and the people danced for many hours (ca 9 
p. m. -1 a. m. every night) that the feeling of collective 
togetheress and cohesion was mostly enhanced. I had come to 
bologna with Abraham, Yonas (whose family was also there) and 
Berhane. At the event there were also Ethiopians who, 
although obviously not interested in the nationalist side of 
the event, were there not only for the "ethnic" side of it 
(the relatively similar cultural features), but also for 
reasons of "ethnic politics" analyzed in chapter 7. This also 
applies to some non-nationalist Eritreans whom I also met 
there. 
Attendance at restauants and bars 
It has so far been argued that, although the two main 
Eritrean ethnic institutions expound very different 
ideologies, most Eritreans attend both of them. This can be 
seen also by looking at "informal" institutions, i. e. 
restaurants and bars, which only to an extent form more 
"neutral" bases of interaction for the members of the various 
sections of the community. All of them serve only Eritrean 
food and have few Italian customers. The largest and most 
important restaurant, called Eritrea, is linked to the 
Front. However, even if there are many Front activists who 
go and eat there, like Tedros, Tekle and Tesfai, the vast 
majority of Eritreans who go and eat there are "commoners" 
who may also go to Father Yohannes' church. Indeed it is 
difficult to find any Eritrean in Milan who has not been 
there more than once. All the people I interviewed did so 
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more than once and almost every evening there are more than 
20 people (but many more on Saturdays) at the restaurant. 
The other two restaurants are much smaller in size and cater 
for fewer customers. One of them, Salomons, is run by an 
"independent" Eritrean (i. e. not linked to the Front), also 
serves only Eritrean food. Customers are considerbly fewer 
than those of Eritrea. The other "independent" restaurant, 
Keren, is very interesting because the couple that owns it 
is made up by an Amhara Ethiopian husband, Teferi and a 
Tigrinya wife, Haddas. They serve Eritrean food, but also 
with Ethiopian variants. It might therefore be expected that 
the customers of this restaurant would be either the few 
Ethiopians in Milan or Eritreans who identify themselves as 
Ethiopians. Indeed some Amhara Ethiopians went there, 
including two half Italians (by father) - half Amhara 
Ethiopians (by mother), one of them called Roberto, and a 
young woman that was introduced to me as a "pure Amhara". 
However the majority of the clients are still Eritreans, as a 
young man from Asmara, called Simon and one from k: eren, 
called Tolde. Tolde was quite friendly with some of the 
Ethiopians, yet he still favoured Eritrean independence. 
More importantly there was a notice in Tigrinya issued by the 
Front, calling Eritrean workers to attend a Front-organized 
demonstration in Rome and I have seen some of the above 
people, including Roberto, Simon and Tolde, at a 
Front-organized festival in the "usual" centre, in March 
1986. Finally, a few yards away, there was also an 
Eritrean-run bar, attended most evenings by about a dozen 
Eritrean men, playing boccette, some of whom I have also seen 
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at the above festivals. While the Eritrea restaurant's 
profits go, at least partly, to the Front, the other two 
restaurants and the bar besides being "informal ethnic 
institutions" can also be interpreted as examples of "ethnic 
enterprise". All these restaurants and the bars are situated 
in the same area and the vast majority of Eritreans who want 
to go out in the evening to drink or to eat, would go to one 
of these places. 
This section has examined the activities of and participation 
at Eritrean ethnic institutions, arguing that, although there 
is a great ideological difference between Father Yohannes' 
church and the Front, attendance at both of them was not 
segregated from the majority of Milanese Eritreans. Moreover, 
quite a few people not identifying themselves with either of 
them, still participate in their activities. The next section 
will analyze organizations, activities and identity at a 
wider group level. 
5.3 Eritrean "ethnic" solidarity, consciousness and 
oroanization 
This section shows that also in terms of solidarity network, 
ethnic consciousness and organization, the Eritrean group is 
a very cohesive one, unlike the Egyptians analyzed below. 
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Eritrean ethnic solidarity 
Eritreans always say that obligations of mutual help are 
deeply felt by everyone. This happened, for example, when 
Abraham's mother, Ruth, was taken to hospital suffering from 
a kidney disease. At the time she was the only source of 
income of the family as Abraham was studying (cf. chapter B) 
and the savings were running out quickly. However Abraham 
said he did not have any problems because several times a 
week an Eritrean man or woman would do the shopping at the 
supermarket for him. Visiting Ruth in the hospital, I once 
saw at least twenty different (Eritrean) people, mostly 
women, visiting her. As Abraham wished to go on holiday for 
one week, an old woman, who is quite an influential 
character in the community, especially in Father Yohannes' 
centre, said: "You can go with Abraham on holiday: his mother 
is not going to be left alone". It is interesting to note 
that although Ruth has lived for many years in Asmara, she is 
really a Tigrean and therefore an Ethiopian, although sharing 
the same language and religion with the Eritreans in Milan 
(7). Her case thus shows that Eritrean group solidarity can 
work also for Ethiopians, provided they can be perceived as 
Eritreans by their sociocultural behaviour and they identify 
themselves as such. It also helps to explain, why 
non-Eritrean Ethiopians attend Eritrean ethnic events. 
This group solidarity works also at the level of 
socialization. One evening I went for dinner at a friend of 
Yonas', Daniel, with Yonas and four other (Eritrean) friends. 
Even though his parents were expecting only two guests 
instead of six, they welcomed everyone and after ten minutes 
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a huge communal plate of zioni and beer were served. When I 
asked Daniel's mother if she had been shocked by the arrival 
of so many unexpected guests, she replied: "Why? If there is 
enough food for everyone, everyone can eat, if there is 
little food, we share and if there is not enough food we 
laugh, joke and have a good time. " Although this principle 
works all the time, it should also be noted that that day, 
according to the Ethiopian calendar, was St. Michael's day, 
one week before the Orthodox Easter, and a small party was 
taking place anyhow. Ruth, Yonas' mother as well as other 
women and a few men were also there. The family lives in a 
relatively "good" squat, the mother works as a maid and the 
father is presently unemployed after having worked as a 
waiter. Another similar occasion was when I was invited by 
Michael at a party in the honour of the baptism of a young 
first cousin of his. About twenty Eritreans, including adults 
and children were there, with food and drinks in great 
abundance. Although the father works for the Front, he 
still had his son baptized. 
As far as socialization in terms of friendship, "going out", 
etc., is concerned, the primary and by far the most important 
contacts for the overwhelming majority of Eritreans are 
within the group. Virtually all the people I interviewed said 
the friends they mostly go out with are Eritreans. The 
primary places of socialization are "formal ethnic 
institutions" or "informal" ones. The general attitude of 
Eritreans to intergroup relations, can be summed up by a 
statement Amleset made to me on the subject: " I am very glad 
there is a good Eritrean community here in Milan. We are very 
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attached to each other". From the general discussion of this 
and the preceding paragraph, it can be deduced that it is 
sufficient to be identified and to identify oneself as 
Eritrean, to fall within this primary network of 
relationships, without any further discrimination, e. g. in 
terms of class and status, as for instance for the larger 
Egyptian community. 
Rites of passage 
Coming back to the two main "ethnic institutions", their 
importance and the fact that attendance at them is not 
segregated, is confirmed by an analysis of the main rites of 
passage, i. e. births and marriages, performed at Father 
Yohannes' church. This is because the significance of a rite 
of passage is primarily a sociocultural one of entrance or 
achievement of a certain stage within the group, not just a 
strictly religious one. For instance many Jews even if lay or 
atheist, still have their children circumsized. Their 
relative importance among minority ethnic groups is probably 
all the greater since group membership is more challenged. 
The rate of rites of passage performed in "ethnic 
institutions" can therefore be a good indication of the 
degree to which loyalty to the group is felt by its members. 
Father Yohannes told me that from 1979 to the end of 1985 he 
baptized 141 Eritrean children. This represents ca. 76% of 
the estimated number of Eritrean births for the same period, 
amounting to 186 (8). On top of that many people get their 
sons circumcized, as Samuel did and another man who got his 
son circumcized in Eritrea confirmed this, despite the fact 
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that this practice is probably not approved by Father 
Yohannes, who after all is in the Catholic Church (9). 
As far as marriages are concerned, Father Yohannes told me 
that in the same period he celebrated 68 weddings among 
Eritreans. The average of nearly 10 per year is hard to 
compare with the total number of marriages, including civil 
ones. However in 1985 I recorded 7 "civil" marriages 
involving "Ethiopian" citizens celebrated in Milan's 
municipality. These points will be expanded in chapter 7. No 
marriage classified as "religious" and involving 
"Ethiopians", i. e. celebrated by a qualified Catholic priest 
(10) has been found. It should also be noted that the "civil" 
marriages registered in the Municipality may or may not have 
been carried out as well as those celebrated by Father 
Yohannes, depending on whether the couple wanted their 
marriage to be recognized by the Eritrean community, by the 
Italian authorities or both. 
Three conclusions might be drawn from the above account. In 
the first place all religious marriages carried out by 
Eritreans, in 1985 at least, were celebrated by Father 
Yohannes. Secondly and more importantly, adding the albeit 
rather limited number of "lay" marriages celebrated by the 
Front (ca. 20 from 1980 to 1985, as Tekle told me), the 
number of marriages celebrated in Eritrean "ethnic" 
institutions vastly outnumbers that of those in "civil" 
institutions of the "host" society. The attitude towards 
marriage can be summed up by a statement made by Samuel on 
this topic: "I got married by Father Yohannes and I did not 
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bother' marrying also in the Municipality. Why should I when 
my children can be recognized anyhow? It is much more 
important for me to be married'in the traditional way vis a 
vis my community than the Italian society. " Finally, as very 
few of the marriages celebrated by Father Yohannes involved 
"mixed" marriages with Italians (as he told me) and as the 
marriages recorded in the Municipality for the year 1985 such 
"mixed" marriages were negligible, the overwhelming majority 
of the marriages are endogamous ones. In this respect, Tedros 
told me that at the 1984 Bologna festival there was a heated 
debate on whether or not people agreed to such out-marriages, 
with the vast majority of the adult population opposing it. 
It will be seen that. the situation is very different for the 
Egyptians. 
Ethnic consciousness and oroanization 
besides this "ethnic" solidarity and identification there is 
also a high degree of "ethnic" consciousness and pride, that 
also have an impact on how "outsiders", and in particular 
Italian ones, are perceived and accepted. The first time I 
attended an Eritrean festival at the political centre 
mentioned before, someone at the door enquired who had 
invited me to the festival. When I answered "Giulia", an 
important Italian activist of the Solidarity Committee for 
Eritrea (cf. chapter 7), they let me in immediately. He 
added: "Giulia is a member ad honorem of our community. " It 
was only after several months acquaintance that either Tekle 
or Father Yohannes told me "you are always welcome in our 
community. " This shows that the Eritreans perceive themselves 
as a community of which strangers, only after their 
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reliability has been tested, can become members, but only ad 
honorem. It also shows Father Yohannes' and Tekle's roles as 
"gatekeepers" of the Eritrean commuity, a point which will be 
expanded in chapter 7. 
Moreover on one of the first times I attended a festival at 
Father Yohannes' church, someone told me: "we accept 
strangers at our festivals, if they know how to behave. " To 
my question about what he meant by "behave", he replied: "for 
instance you don't have to say things likes I like Negroes 
very much... " showing an awareness of the ethnic paternalism 
that so often conceals racism. On another occasion my moral 
position as researcher vis a vis the "researched" was 
questioned. Once Samuel asked me: "Is your commitment for the 
Eritrean cause going to end with the end of your research? I 
hope you won't behave like a certain journalist who earned 
his reputation writing about us and then let us down. " 
Finally, Eritreans always appreciate if an outsider knows at 
least a little of their culture and/or language, i. e. 
Tigrinya. If I would greet a person I knew in Tigrinya, 
other people around, especially middle age women, would 
smile and nod their head in assent remarking: "what a good 
boy! " 
Given the high degree of attendance of Eritreans at both 
major ethnic institutions and the importance of "ethnic" 
solidarity and consciousness, it is not surprising that the 
Eritreans should have formalized the substantial cohesion of 
their group into a legally recognized (by the Italian 
authorities) institution called "Eritrean Communitys Movement 
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of Solidarity and Culture (among Eritrean residents in 
Lombardy)" (11). The Community was formed in the Autumn of 
1984 and inclL. ded in its representative council Father 
Yohannes, Gherimay (EPLF), Wolde (ELF) and six other 
"commoners", in=luding one woman. The aims of the Community, 
contained in its statute, are to recognize that all 
Eritreans are an integral part of Eritrean society, to 
preserve and develop Eritrean cultural and civic values and 
the affective and solidarity ties with the country of origin, 
to stimulate among the Eritreans the habit of recognizing 
each other anc meeting as many times as possible as well as 
the highest possible degree of solidarity in fields such as 
housing, work and culture as well as sport, folklore and 
music (art. 1,4,5) 
These aims correspond quite closely to those aspects such as 
nationalism, the role of cultural identity and the importance 
of ties of solidarity among the members of the group. It is 
significant that "all Eritreans resident in Lombardy are by 
right full members of the Eritrean community ..., without 
discrimination by race, religious creed or political 
ideology" and that all Eritreans have the right to make use 
of the premises of the Community and to participate in 
activities organized by it (art. 8,9,11). The statue also 
stresses that three of the members of the representative 
council must be "from a social force in Eritrea" (art. 14). 
This is fulfilled by the presence of Father Yohannes, Ghermay 
and Wolde. It is interesting to note that before setting up 
this Community some Eritreans, including Tedros from the 
EPLF, have interviewed the chief rabbi of Milan's Jewish 
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community, to ask him how the Jews are organized to preserve 
their cultura: identity. This again shows the consciousness 
of Eritreans to preserve their ethnic identity and at the 
same time the role of the Front leaders (and of Father 
Yohannes) in this task, the reasons for which will be 
analyzed in chapter 7. 
The combination of religious and ethnonationalist "identity 
poles", realized in the "ethnic institutions" described 
above, give the Milanese Eritreans a strong ethnic identity. 
The degree of ethnic solidarity, consciousness and 
organization are in part due to the specific character of the 
identity they carry from their country of origin analyzed in 
chapter 2, in part to the specific demographic 
characteristics of the group (small size, balanced sex-ratio) 
and in part to their "usurpatory cultural strategy" in which 
Father Yohannes and the Front have a major role as "ethnic 
brokers" that will be examined in the next two chapters. For 
example the situation of Eritreans in Rome may be very 
different, as is that of the Milanese Egyptians that will 
now be analyzes. 
5.4 Egyptian "ethnic" institutions 
Chapter 3 outlined how Egyptian identity fluctuated 
between a fundamentalist view of Islam and a "modernist" or 
"liberal" one, sometimes with secularist tendencies from a 
religious point of view, and between pan-Arabism and 
territorial nationalism, from a nationalist point of view 
(12). However nowadays there is not an "Egyptian question" 
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in the -same way as there is an Eritrean one. As Islam is not 
just a religion confined to the sphere of spiritual beliefs, 
but has great relevance for everyday life behaviour and 
politics, this section examines the degree to which it is 
practiced by Egyptians in Milan and their relationship to 
Milan's only Islamic institution, the Muslim Centre. One of 
the obvious differences with the Eritreans with respect to 
religious identity is that while the Eritrean one, although 
within the larger framework of the "host society's" religious 
system (i. e. Christianity) is specific to the group (the 
Ethiopic Orthodox ritual), on the contrary the one that 
caters for the Egyptians (i. e. Islam) is outside of the "host 
society's" religious system and caters also for the other 
Muslim national groups present in Milan (cf. Table 4.1). 
The Muslim Centre 
Milan's Muslim Centre (1Z) is situated in a basement in area 
10. It has an Imam, who is a -Jordanian doctor, called 
Sherif, about 40 years old, as well as an Italian Muslim 
leader, about 50 years old, whose Islamic name, by which he 
wants to be called, is Abubakr. He has a very good knowledge 
of Arabic and of Islamic religion, is very respected in the 
Centre and has also an important role as link to the Italian 
society as the editor of a monthly bulletin in Italian called 
11 Messani ero dell' Islam, issued by the Centre. Another 
dozen people are involved in running the Centre, with three 
or four of them who are Italians, interestingly enough, 
mostly merchants. Besides its strictly religious functions, 
organising services for the five daily prayers and major 
religious holidays, the Centre has also some cultural and 
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social -ones, like organizing courses on Islam and A abic both 
for Muslim Arabs and non-Muslim Italians, social activities 
like a football team and providing occasional meals and 
sometimes even a temporary shelter. It also has a small 
library containing books about Islam and organizes some 
meetings to present Islam to the Italian public. This Centre 
is not a Mosque, i. e. a purpose built buiIdi fl g with a 
minaret, etc. But as the only Muslim institution in Milan, 
one would expect its role among the Egyptians in Milan to be 
significant. However, as will be seen below, this it not true 
for most Egyptians. 
The leadership of the Centre is linked to the "Muslim 
Brotherhood". The main features of this sect have already 
been described in chapter Z. It will be recalled that the 
Brotherhood professes a very fundamentalist version of Sunni 
Islam, which entails not only a unity of faith and 
politico-social action ultimately aiming at an Islamic 
theocracy, but also a profound role of traditional Islamic 
values and practices in everyday life. It might be suspected 
that this form of Islam should not be too suited for the 
majority Egyptian migrants, for whom the experience of a 
"western way of life" is one of the motives behind migration 
(cf. chapter 4). The fact that Milan does not yet have a 
mosque and the role of the Muslim Centre in trying to get 
one, are interesting questions which will be examined in 
chapters 7 and S. It should be added that in Milar: there is 
also a small Egyptian Coptic community, probably numbering 
less than a hundred people, with a priest who says mass once 
every month. Although they seem to interact to a certain 
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extent with the main body of the Egyptian Muslim Population, 
the small number and consequent difficulty in establishing 
contacts, have made it difficult to find the necessary data. 
Other Eayptian ethnic institutions 
Non other "formal" institution concerning, either not 
specific to the group (but to which Egyptians had an 
entitlement to membership, e. g. the Centre) or specific to 
the Egyptian group, has yet emerged. There was also a radio 
programme in Arabic, broadcast by an independent left wing 
Milanese station to which many Egyptians listen. However the 
organizer, called Issam, is a Palestinian and although the 
programme has mainly a cultural content (Arab music, 
literature, etc. ), its political messages are mainly 
concerned with the Palestinian question and sometimes with 
the situation of Arab workers in Italy, but it does not 
perform the role of organizing them. In terms of "formal 
ethnic institutions", the lack of group specific ones and the 
only partial identification open to Egyptians as far as 
Muslim or Arab ones are concerned, sets a sharp contrast with 
the Eritrean situation. 
In terms of "informal institutions" however, the contrast is 
less sharp. There are three restaurants that are 
Egyptian-owned and serve Egyptian food, even if one of them, 
situated in area 5, an area of relative Egyptian residential 
concentration (cf. chapter 4), serves also Italian food. One 
of the other two, called the Sphynx, is situated in area Z, 
where also Eritrean restaurants and bars are situated, and 
the other, called Ramses, in area 5, quite near the Muslim 
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Centre, although as it will be seen below, it is not directly 
linked to it. Although quite a few Egyptians go and eat in 
these restaurants every evening, there are definitely more 
Italian customers there maybe because Arabic food has a 
"higher" reputation than Eritrean food, but maybe also 
because these reataurants are meant also for Italian clients, 
as opposed to Eritrean ones. It can also be noted that the 
Egyptians have the same number of restaurants as the 
Eritreans but for a population perhaps four times bigger. 
Moreover there are, to my knowledge, no Egyptian-owned bars, 
perhaps because of the Quranic injunction not to drink 
alcohol even if this does not prevent many Egyptians from 
doing so. Therefore there are quite a few Italian-owned 
bars, especially in area 5 where there is some degree of 
Egyptian residential concentration (cf. chapter 4), where 
Egyptians often meet to drink and play pool or boccette. 
The next section looks at the participation by Egyptian 
immigrants at these "ethnic" institutions, relating it to the 
character of Egyptian migration that has been examined in the 
previous chapter. It will show a very different picture from 
the the Eritrean one analyzed before. 
5.5 Eayptian participation at "ethnic" institutions 
Participation at the Muslim Centre and relinious_identity 
Carrying out "participant observation" in the Muslim Centre 
presented some difficulties. rirst of all an outsider is seen 
either as a potential convert or as a dangerous person. After 
I had been there a few times, Abubakr enquired about the 
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reasons'for my presence and when I told them I was doing 
research I was told: "even if you don't look like a spy, your 
results might be used for wrong purposes even without you 
being aware of it. " In spite of my repeated professions of 
discretion, it was only when I told them I was a friend of a 
researcher they trusted, that I was finally accepted. Part of 
the reason was perhaps that besides my academic interests I 
told them that I was genuinely also interested in learning 
about Islam and given the proselytizing ethos of Islam and of 
the Centre in particular, I started to be seen as a potential 
convert. This shows not only the Centre's attitude towards 
outsiders, but also Abubakr's role as its "gatekeeper". 
The main religious function which is on Friday around midday 
lasts for about 40 minutes and consists mainly of recitation 
of a prayer by the worshippers and of a sermon by the leader 
of the ceremony (imam), who is nominated from time to time. 
This function attracts on average between 60 and 80 people 
and bigger festivals, like that for the birth of the Prophet, 
between 100 and 200 people. They are on the whole either 
working class or "radical" Muslim students, rather than 
wealthy businessmen who, I was told, tend more to go and pray 
in the various Saudi, Kuwaitian, etc. consulates, probably 
because of their different status. It might be noted that 
the equivalent main religious function for the Eritreans, 
that is the Sunday mass, attracts nearly the same absolute 
number of people as the Muslim one but for a total population 
that may be about one tenth of the total Muslim population, 
which could amount to 25,000 (cf. Table 4.1). This can be 
partly accounted for by the fact that it is easier in Italy 
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to find some spare time on Sundays that on Fridays 
lunchtimes, also given the fact that the Centre is virtually 
in the periphery of the city. Part of the reason lies also in 
the Centre's excessively fundamentalist version of Islam that 
does not meet the average religious view and practice of the 
majority of Muslim migrants in Milan, and of Egyptians in 
particular, as will be seen below. The most important 
explanation in terms of the scarce resources the Centre is 
able to mobilize for Egyptians, will be analyzed in chapter 
7. In fact, in terms of national composition, I had the 
impression that Egyptians were under-represented at the 
ceremonies organized by the Centre, but it has to be noted 
that both the leadership of the Centre as well as the 
worshippers were extremely reluctant to give any information 
about nationality given the fact that in that context it was 
totally unimportant as compared to (Muslim) religion. 
However, from the little information I was able to get on 
this question, I found two Jordanians, two Maghrebians, two 
Palestinians, one Syrian, one Lebanese, one Somali and only a 
couple of Egyptians, plus three or four Italian-Muslims. 
This social and national composition was to a large extent 
also present in an important two-day festival celebrating the 
Birth of the Prophet (in December), held by the Centre also 
in view of what Abubakr had earlier described as a "cultural 
break" in the presentation of Islam in the face of all the 
misconceptions surrounding it in western societies. The 
festival, besides the religious services, included the 
showing of a film on the life of the Prophet, two lectures on 
Islamic topics and a buffet with Arab food (mostly 
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Jordand-Syriac). About a dozen non-Muslim Italians attended 
the event. During showing of the film about a dozen Muslim 
women sat at the back, but whenever the lights were on, they 
immediately disappeared in a separate room, probably also as 
a show of Islamic faith to the non-Muslim participants. 
After an opening address by Sherif, the Imam of the Centre, 
Abubakr gave a lecture on "Islamic values", while professor 
Suliman gave one on "Islamic art". 
The fundamentalist interpretation of Islam is apparent from 
the Centre's attitude to other religions and in the 
interpretation of the contemporay world and of history, 
besides the obvious strictness in the application of Muslim 
precepts in everyday life. According to Abubakr, there is 
only one truth in the world, which is Islam of course, and 
the corollary is that there are no other truths or even 
half-truths, i. e. other "truthful" religions or ideologies. 
Western "materialist" ideologies, whether capitalist 
"consumerism" or marxism, are condemned. In this respect 
Abubakr is reluctant to talk about his "dark past", when he 
was involved in the Italian left, "fighting the system", 
without realizing that by doing that he was still within it, 
even if the only important thing now is that he is "a servant 
of Allah. " Not only are western or communist societies most 
obviously remote from the Islamic ideal which would entail 
justice for all mankind, but so are also all existing Muslim 
states who are to different degrees "contaminated" by secular 
ideas. In this respect, even- if Israel is considered as 
occupied Palestine, the FtO is also "sold out" in as much as 
it is a nationalist and political movement and not a 
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religiöus one and is therefore "the 
Israel". This typically fundamentalist 
sharp contrast to the radical "Third 
expounded by the EPLF, which appeals to 
groups of the Italian left (some of wl 
PLO). 
lay counterpart of 
ideology, stands in 
Wordist" iceology 
various po. itical 
iom also suppo-t the 
As far as the Muslim brotherhood is concerned, although the 
leadership of the Centre does not conceal some sympathies for 
it, it never admits allegiance to it as the brothe-hood, 
being a secret society and moreover with a long record of 
opposition and oppression, does not allow its members to do 
so. I discovered that the. leadership of the Centre does 
belong to the Brotherhood only through Issam (the PLO 
activist) who does not hold good relationships witn the 
Centre. The only person that partly falls outsied this 
clearly defined world view and set of religious beliefs for 
whom the Centre has some admiration and whose cooperation it 
actively seeks, is professor Suliman. Of Afghani origin, he 
is not only a professor of history of art in an Italian 
university and a psychoanalyst, but also a "Great Master" of 
a Sufi lodge (14). Abubakr holds professor Suliman in great 
esteem also because of the intellectual contribution and 
legitimacy he can bring to his effort to spread Islam in the 
Milanese society, even if Sufis do not hold, as AbubaKr put 
it, "the bell igerant-applicative side of Islam", probably 
also referring to the jihad (holy war), a belief certainly 
upheld by the Brotherhood. Sufficient data on the Sufi 
presence in Milan have not been found, but its strength among 
Egyptian migrants is probably limited. 
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Attitudes towards the Centre and identity of Egyptians 
As far as the Centre is concerned it might already be deduced 
from the above discussion that attendance, at least on a 
regular basis, is very low, but the reasons given for this 
range from "excessive strictness" in the practice of Islam, 
to lack of time and too great distance, although it is not 
always clear what the real motives are. As far as Islam in 
general is concerned, 'there are varying degrees of 
observance. One of the most "extreme" secularists I have met, 
was Mohammed (15), who said he considers himself a Muslim 
"only by birth " and therefore does not follow any religious 
precepts. He knows there is a Muslim Centre in Milan but has 
never bothered even to find out where it is situated. On the 
other hand Ahmed and Hassan said they are proud to be Muslim, 
but that, they are not strict in observing Islamic precepts, 
especially as far as drinking alcohol is concerned. When I 
asked them if they, have ever attended the Muslim Centre, he 
said: "here in Italy? ", as if implying: "this is not what we 
came for". 
Ibrahim is quite religious, prays at home and does not eat 
pork nor drink alcohol, except on rare occasions when doing 
this would mean offending an Italian friend. He has been to 
the Centre only very rarely, but more because of distance and 
lack of time, than for "ideological" reasons. However he 
thinks that religion is more an individual matter and what is 
important is that someone has "a good heart" and believes in 
God, whether a Muslim, a Christian or a Jew. For this reason 
he does not see, any problems in marrying a non-Muslim woman, 
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"as long as we love each other and share the same values that 
Islam, Christianity and Judaism have in common. " Also raising 
children would not constitute a problem as they would grow up 
in these ideals of goodness and justice and would be able to 
chose which religion to follow when grown up. This attitude 
towards children's upbringing was also shared by Abdel who 
married a woman from El Salvador and has a daughter by her. 
This set of beliefs and values seems to be in too sharp a 
contrast with the Islamic fundamentalism expounded by the 
Centre, to allow for any great identification by Ibrahim with 
it. This is also true of Abdel who told me he even observes 
Ramadan (in Italy) but would have no objections to marrying a 
Catholic Italian girl. Gamel on the other hand is the only 
Egyptian I interviewed who told me he wants to marry an 
Egyptian woman, by going back to Egypt, not because of 
differences in religious beliefs (which he holds very similar 
to Ibrahim), but because he thinks he can trust more an 
Egyptian woman whose values he can be more sure of. 
This indifferent or negative attitude towards the Muslim 
Centre and this "liberal" attitude towards Islam, is even 
more shared by Egyptians of "higher" status. Mustafa', who is. 
married to an Egyptian woman (but it is worth remembering 
that the marriage took place in Egypt before migration), said 
his hard work to support his family in Egypt leave him 
little time for religious ceremonies and he has never been to 
the Centre. His general attitude towards Islam seems to be 
the usual "individualistic" one ("religion is a matter of the 
heart, what is important is what you feel inside... ", etc. ). 
Ismail, who is married to an Egyptian woman (but his marriage 
0 
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also took place in Egypt before migration) told oe that 
although he identifies himself as a Muslim and is going to 
raise his child in the Muslim faith, he is not too strict in 
the observance of Islam. On the question of the Centre he 
said that while at the beginning he has been there a few 
times to pray, he then gave up because of the 
"politicization" of the Centre he did not enjoy, probably 
referring to the fact that it was. controlled by the 
Brotherhood. 
It is interesting he should have been the only Egyptian. I 
interviewed, who has phrased his reluctance to attend the 
Centre in this way, because not only does he come from a 
middle class background, but has been able to maintain this 
class position in Italy and it is precisely against this 
class and its supposed secularist "corruption" that much of 
the Brotherhood's. efforts are directed. Moreover the 
challenge to the legitimacy of Egypt's government as a 
national state is also not shared by many Egyptians who on 
the whole do not question the legitimacy of the state 
representing them. As a member of the Egyptian consulate told 
me: "Egyptians migrate for economic and not for political 
reasons, so they have no reason to go to a place where they 
hear bad things about their country". Zayed, Ismail's brother 
in law, said he is quite religious and is very proud of the 
ethical and spiritual values of Islam and Arab culture, but 
told me he does not go to pray in the Muslim Centre because 
he does not want to be identified as a Muslim "commoner", 
especially in the heartland of Christianity: "it would be 
like going to 'church at Mecca". The only Egyptian I 
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interviewed whom I met at the Centre was Magdi, but it is 
interesting to note that while I have seen him there he was 
unemployed and, as Issam told me, this can be one reason why 
some people attend the Centre, as they hope to be able to get 
some support, besides the fact of having the spare time. 
However when I met him again in another context and with a 
part-time occupation, he spoke about the Centre with some 
distance not showing great identification with it. 
Attendance at bars and restaurants 
Thus attendance by Egyptians at the Centre is, for various 
reasons, very limited and the Centre therefore does not 
perform for them the role of an "ethnic institution" as a 
place of group socialization and interaction and basis for 
collective action that, e. g. Father Yohannes' church performs 
for Eritreans. Other reasons in terms of "ethnic politics" 
and "cultural strategies" will be outlined in chapter 7. No 
other "formal ethnic institution" has been found. In terms of 
"informal" institutions however, the situation is to some 
extent more similar to that of the Eritreans. Of the three 
Egyptian-owned restaurants, that which enjoys the largest 
number of Egyptian customers and has the widest choice of 
Egyptian food, is Ramses, situated relatively near the 
Muslim Centre. But as one influential character close to the 
Egyptian consulate told me, not without contempt, that 
strip-teases have been held there, one can hardly imagine 
that it is linked to the Centre. The Sphynx restaurant, 
situated near the area where also all the Eritrean 
restaurants are, although indicated to me with approval by 
the same character, does not have the same number of Egyptian 
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customers as the Ramses one, also because it is slightly more 
expensive, and has a fair number of"Italian customers. Bars 
and cafes are more popular as meeting places by the 
Egyptians. In the couple I attended in area 5, there were on 
average a dozen Egyptians playing boccette or cards, 
sometimes mixing with the Italian clients, and sometimes 
gathering in a different room. The fact that these bars are 
owned by Italians and therefore are not intended primarily 
for "ethnic" customers, make them an interesting setting for 
"ethnic" encounters and relations which will be discussed in 
chapter S. 
This section concludes that the Egyptian group does not have 
any "formal ethnic institution" with a leadership that can 
articulate its socialization and collective action, but still 
has some degree of in-group interaction in "informal" ethnic 
institutions. The next section will examine the general 
pattern of ethnic solidarity, consciousness (including the 
rate of in-group rites of passage) and organization. 
5.6 Egyptian ethnic solidarity, consciousness and 
or aani=ation 
Eavotian ethnic solidarit 
Egyptians in general do not 
preference in interacting with 
Eritreans. When questioned 
socialization, although nearly 
Egypytian friends, they also 
with Italian ones. This might not 
show the same degree of 
"fellow ethnics" as the 
about friendship and 
everyone says they have 
say equally that they go out 
be very accurate, but it is 
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still interesting that it should be perceived in this way. 
Many say that people should be considered friends not because 
they belong to the same group, but on their individual merit, 
even if most people would admit to have at least three or 
four good Egyptian friends. Moreover while for Eritreans 
ties of friendship and solidarity encompass nearly the whole 
group, for Egyptians the network is much more fragmented, 
reaching only three or four other persons. There are however 
even people, like Ismail and Zayed, who told me that on the 
whole they tended to avoid interacting with other Egyptians, 
except among themselves as brothers-in-law. In this respect a 
phrase Mohammed told me was quite illuminating: "among 
ourselves (i. e. Egyptians) we tend to socialize more on the 
basis of social class and even geographical origin than 
anything else. For instance I would never dream to have as a 
friend a peasant from upper Egypt". This again stands in 
sharp contrast with the Eritrean remark that "Eritreans 
always stick together". This relative social segregation 
based on the perception of different social status seems to 
have its origins in the profound class divisions and 
socioeconomic transformation of Egyptian society (cf. chapter 
2). Although the majority of Egyptians in Milan come from the 
educated middle-classes, chapter 4 has shown that new class 
divisions among Egyptians might be created in Milan, 
superimposed, albeit in a pyramidal way, on the old ones. 
This is precisely the case of Ismail and Zayed. In terms of 
assistance network too, even if in many instances jobs and 
housing are found through "ethnic" contacts, I also heard 
complaints about the reliability of the network in cases of 
difficulty, like from Abdel (the one who married a woman from 
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El Salvador) who complained that the (Egyptian) friends he 
had previously helped are now letting him down. 
The only events to my knowledge that have brought together 
quite a few Egyptians as a group, have been a concert and a 
football tournament. The concert (which unfortunately I 
could not attend) was given by an Egyptian folk musician and 
was reported to have attracted nearly one thousand 
Egyptians, although probably a number of them were from other 
Arab states, as Egyptian culture (cinema and music) is the 
most diffused in the Arab world. The football tournament was 
organized in the past three years by an Italian Catholic 
group, among all the various national groups present in 
Milan. The 1985 event had 24 teams from various nations, but 
Egypt was the only national group which had two teams because 
of the sheer number of players. In the final the British team 
won against one of the two Egyptian teams, much to the dismay 
of the nearly one hundred Egyptian. supporters who came to 
watch the match. The Eritrean team was fifth (after having 
won the 1983 event). These events were of some importance to 
the Egyptians as they gave them an opportunity to meet as a 
group, which they normally lack and many of them turned up. 
However the opportunities for socialization they provide are 
only temporary and therefore cannot articulate the group's 
interests nor provide a stable source of identity as a 
"formal" ethnic institution. 
Rites of passage 
The strength of the Egyptian group identity can be measured, 
to a certain extent by the rate of rites of passage, that 
225 
take place in-group and are performed in an "ethnic" 
institution. Since Egyptians are Muslims, these combined 
roles can be performed only by the Muslim Centre which can be 
compared with Father Yohannes' church for the Eritreans, with 
the difference that the former is not specific to the 
Egyptians as the latter is to the Eritreans. In this respect 
it is important to take into account the fact that Egyptians 
have a more unbalanced se>; -ratio than Eritreans. However they 
still have the options of marrying the ca. 207. female 
population of the group, to go temporarily to Egypt to find a 
wife (cf. camel, above) or to make the Italian Catholic bride 
convert to Islam. One could also expect that the 
fundamentalism of the Centre might prevent Egyptians from 
marrying there, but for one of the most important events in 
the life cycle of an individual it could also be possible 
that allegiance to Islam in general would prevail over 
"ideological" differences. The significance of these issues 
will be taken up again in chapter 7. 
Looking at the Muslim Centre, the data regarding births and 
marriages come from the Centre's monthly bulletin. 
Unfortunately the births and marriages reported do not 
specify the country of origin of the people involved. However 
it can be inferred that about half the births and marriages 
reported will be Egyptians, as they represent about half of 
the total Milanese Muslim population. In 1984 the number of 
births amounted to 11 and in 1985 to 17. This is on average 
less than half of the estimated number of Egyptians born each 
year in Milan from 1979 to 1983, that is 38 (cf. chapter 4). 
The proportion falls to about a quater, taking into account 
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also the offspring of marriages with Italian women, estimated 
at around 61. However, accepting that only half of the 
reported births are actually Egyptian as opposed to Muslim 
from other countries, the percentage falls to 25% in the 
first case and to 12.5% in the second one. 
This contrasts quite sharply with the Eritrean situation in 
which up to 76% of the new born babies are baptized by Father 
Yohannes. Even more striking is the situation of marriages. 
While for the Eritreans "ethnic" marriages (i. e. in Father 
Yohannes' church) exceed those celebrated in the 
Municipality, the total number of marriages celebrated in the 
Muslim Centre, i. e. 6, both in 1984 and in 1985, is less than 
20% of the 34 marriages which took place in the Municipality 
in 1985, involving at least one Egyptian partner. Assuming 
that only half of the marriages recorded by the Centre 
actually involve Egyptians, as opposed to other Muslims, the 
percentage falls to 10%. Moreover in none of the 34 marriages 
celebrated in the Municipality were both partners Egyptians. 
So not only is Islamic marriage not very relevant, but also 
out-group marriage is the only existing form, at least for 
the year I have examined. These data can be interepreted as 
a sign of relatively weak group identity, also given the 
"individualistic" view of Islam, prevalent among Egyptians 
(which does not mean they have no identity as it can come 
from sources other than the group) within a context of a 
relative "scarcity" of women. These points will be further 
pursued in chapter 7 and linked to the ethnic politics and 
cultural strategies of the group. 
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Eayptiýtn ethnic consciousness an organization 
No sign comparable to the significance and pride of 
"Eritreanness" has been found among Egyptians. On the 
contrary, social differentiation within the group and the 
wish to marry an Italian woman are the most significant 
characteristics of the Egyptian group. Within this context it 
is not surprising that no organization capable of providing a 
framework for authority and decision making emerging from the 
interaction between "ethnic" institutions and the group, like 
in the Eritrean case, has yet emerged. However in November 
1985 a group of Egyptians, mainly made up of relative "upper 
class" members, some of whom belonging to the Consulate, 
decided to set up an "Egyptian Community". This decision was 
quite of the "top-down" kind and took the few "ordinary" 
Egyptians who found out about it quite by surprise, while the 
majority was not even aware that it was taking place. The 
aims of the "Egyptian Community", as taken from its statute, 
are "to favour the social and cultural development among its 
members" (art. 1), "to favour cultural and scientific 
exchanges between the Arab Republic of Egypt and the Italian 
Republic", "develop the sociocultural relationship among the 
Egyptians resident in Italy" and to "strengthen the ties 
between Egyptians and their mothercountry, to preserve 
Egyptian culture, traditions and customs" (points 1, Z&4, 
art 3). Overall the emphasis is more on culture and less on 
socialization and developing ties of solidarity, as for the 
Eritreans. 
While it is enough to be an Eritrean to qualify for 
membership to the Community, in the statute of the Egyptian 
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Community it is stated that an application for membership 
"must be supported by the signature of two members" and that 
"the representative council decides admission or refusal 
without having to justify its decision which will be 
definitive" (point 1, :, art. 4). It is obvious that the 
people who decided to set up the Community want to retain 
control of it by regulating access to membership. This 
probably is not so much intended for lower class Egyptians, 
but for potential "trouble makers" as members of the Muslim 
Brotherhood could be, also given the fact that the Community 
is linked to the Egyptian Consulate, as well as Egyptians 
involved with criminal activities. A member must have a 
record of "good behaviour and not have been condemned for any 
offence either by the Italian or by the Egyptian authorities" 
(point 1, art. 4). On the whole the Egyptian Community seems 
to have more the functions of a Rotary club for a selected 
membership, than that of an "ethnic organization" like the 
Eritrean one. It is therefore not surprising that when I 
asked Gamel and Abdel what they thought about the birth of 
the Egyptian Community, they should have remarked: "as they 
are mainly rich Egyptians, what guarantee is there that they 
will represent the interests of the 45% of Egyptians working 
in Milan as waiters and cooks? " Thus, also in terms of ethnic 
organization, the Egyptian group is less cohesive than the 
Eritrean one. 
5.7 Conclusion 
Eritreans and Egyptians present very different pictures 
concerning their ethnic identity and institutions. Eritrean 
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identity revolves around two "identity poles", a religious 
one (Ethiopic Orthodox Christianity) and a nationalist one 
(Eritrean liberation). These two "poles" are realized it 
Milan by two "ethnic institutions", Father Yohannes's churcr 
and the Front (whose most isportant leaders are Tekle anc 
Tedros). Eritreans have a high attendance at botr 
institutions (in spite of their ideological differences), 
both in terms of the events they organize and of rites of 
passage, which are overwhelmingly endogamous. Finally they 
have a high degree of ethnic solidarity and consciousness anc 
have managed to establish a group-wide organization 
representing the various sections of the group and reaching 
the vast majority of its members. On the contrary Egyptians, 
mainly holding a "liberal" Muslim identity, have a very low 
rate of attendance at the Muslim Centre which could perform 
the role of an ethnic institution, also given the fact that 
they are the most numerous Muslim group in Milan. Moreover 
although there is some degree of in-group interaction, ties 
of solidarity and ethnic consciousness are weak and an 
attempt to establish an "ethnic organization" has been met 
with scepticism by most "ordinary" Egyptians. On the other 
hand, class differentiation and a preference for marriage 
with Italian women, are among the most significant 
characteristics. 
Following McKay and Lewins' (1978) typology, Eritreans can be 
characterized as an "ethnic group" (in-group interaction is 
prevalent) with "ethnic consciousness" (i. e. "Eritreanness" 
is the most important source of social identification), while 
Egyptians as an "ethnic group", but with "ethnic awareness" 
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(i. e. " Egyptianness is not the primary source a= 
identification). This affects the different possibilities o= 
collective action and mobilization of group interests (cf. 
chapter 7). On the other hand some of the people attending 
the Muslim Centre, might be defined an "ethnic group with 
ethnic consciousness", but any with religion as the basis of 
their "ethnicity". This chapter has put forward some 
explanations for these differences in terms of the different 
strength and character of the identity of the two groups due 
to the different backgrounds of origin analyzed in chapter 2. 
It has also suggested that they should be related to the 
different demographic characteristics analyzed in chapter 4. 
However the most important argument in terms of ethnic 
politics i. e. of the resources the ethnic institutions and 
leaders can mobilize for the group, and of "cultural 
strategies", i. e. of the image the groups present to the 
"host society" as opposed to the internal one analyzed in 
this chapter, will be put forward in the following chapter 
and in particular in chapter 7. 
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NOTES 70 CHAPTER 5 
(1) Although father Yohannes is really a friar of the 
Cappuccini order, he will be referred to as a priest, because 
his social role in relation to the (Eritrean) faithful is 
more akin to that of a priest than that of friar. 
(2) See Hallyday and Molyneu>: (1981, p. 169) and Firebrace and 
Holland (1984 p. 17), who claim that up to one fifth of the 
Eritrean population living in towns already in the 1940s, as 
opposed to only 8:: for Ethiopia as a whole in 1975 (O'Connor 
1982, p. 45). 
(3) See Firebrace and Holland 1984 for a brief account of the 
EPLF's organizational structure. 
(4) "Front" will hereafter refer to the EPLF, unless 
otherwise specified. 
(5) For instance bruch (Tiginya) and baruch (Hebrew), 
meaning "blessed"; shm and sheen, name; k. ahen and cohen, 
priest; hadesh and hadash, new. 
(6) Cf. Firebrace and Holland (1984, pp. 160-161) where it is 
stated that "our (i. e. Eritrean) struggle is an integral part 
of the international revolutionary movement in general and, 
the struggle of the African, Asian and Latin American peoples 
against colonialism, imperialism, zionism and racial 
discrimination in particular". 
(7) But cf. Giuseppe's remark on Tigray in the previous 
section. 
(8) The figure is calculated as follows. By looking at Table 
5.2 (chapter 5) there are 155 'Ethiopians born in Italy" 
between 1979 and 1984. Adding to this figure the 31 average 
yearly births in that period for the missing 1985 year, we 
reach the figure of 186. 
(9) As outlined in chapter 3, circumcision although not 
prescribed by the Ethiopic Orthodox Church, is largely 
tolerated as it is deeply rooted in Abyssinian tradition. 
Moreover it has a distinctly Judaic charcter, as opposed to 
that practiced by many other African peoples, in that it is 
performed on the eigth day. (cf. Ullendorff 1967, 
pp. 105-109). 
(10) Father yohannes is not authorized to perform marriages 
recognized by the state. Therefore his marriages do not 
appear in the "religious" section of the Municipality's 
register. Although there is a "sacramental" form of marriage 
(i. e. in which the priest acts as intermediary between the 
couple and the Divinity who seals the union, that is the 
Catholic form of marriage), most Abyssinian marriages are 
carried out as a contract between two families in the 
presence of some witnesses with the priest acting just as 
"ritual expert", thereby maintaining its semitic character. 
(cf. Ullendorff 1973) 
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(11) The word "Community" (with a capital "C"), will 
hereafter refer to this organization, as opposed to 
"community", usually used as a substitute for "group". 
(12) On this subject, cf. the collection of articles in 
Curtis (ed. 1982, already mentioned in chapter 3, and in 
particular the articles by Curtis, Jankowsky and Humphreys. 
(13") "Centre" will hereafter refer to the Muslim Centre. 
(14) On the Sufi, cf. chapter 3 and Gilsenan (1983) 
(15) A backoround to the characters mentioned here can be 
found in chapter 4. 
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CHAPTER 6: LOCAL VOLUNTARY ORGANIZATIONS, PUBLIC 
INSTITUTIONS AND POLITICS 
This chapter looks at the role of some of the main voluntary 
organizations dealing with Third World immigrants, examining 
attendance at the various organizations on the part of 
Eritreans and Egyptians in terms of the different services 
they provide vis a vis the different requirements of the two 
groups. It will also try to assess the impact that these 
institutions have on the situation of the migrant groups and 
the attitude and role of the Milanese trade unions and local 
authorities. While the two preceeding chapters have 
analyzed the topic of enquiry mainly from inside the two 
"ethnic" groups, this chapter is the first of two analyzing 
the situation at the boundary. In doing so this chapter will 
also examine different styles of ethnic politics of the two 
groups, involving political and personal contacts between the 
leaders of the groups and those of the voluntary 
organizations and local state authorities. These patterns 
will have important effects for the "cultural strategies" and 
informal access to resources analyzed in the next chapter. 
Groups other than Eritreans and Egyptians will also in part 
be taken into account not only because these organizations 
and institutions deal with them too, but also because it will 
throw into relief the peculiarities of the two groups in 
consideration. 
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6.1 General characteristics of local voluntary o'-oanizations 
From chapter 13 it can be inferred that the only relationship 
the migrants have with the Italian state or its 
representatives, is that with the police authorities, or 
Duesti'ra, that is a relationship of control by the latter. 
Many migrants try to avoid this situation by migrating as 
clandestines. In many respects this situation reproduces that 
of the early 1960s when the migrants from the South to the 
northern "industrial triangle" did not receive any social or 
juridical assistance from the state institutions, but only 
from the voluntary sector, or volontariato (cf. Fondazione 
Franco Verga 1985). Any function in terms of help or 
assistance that the "host" society performs, is left to the 
volontariato. This sector, including voluntary cooperatives, 
associations, organizations and institutions, has 
traditionally been a stronghold of the Catholic world, in its 
manifold manifestations, usually stemming from the more 
"solidaristic" and "workerist" parts of this world. These 
organizations, like ACLI and CISL (cf. below) were often 
quite independent from the DC and the Church, expressing 
more radical points of view on matters of civil rights as 
well as on Third World development and disarmament. From the 
1950s onwards, however, also the Communist party and, in the 
1970s, other left-wing groups, started to operate in this 
sector. These left-wing groups were also quite critical of 
the PCI and in particular of its dogmatism and its position 
on the Soviet intervention in foreign countries, like 
Czechoslovakia, Afghanistan, Cambodia and Eritrea. In general 
they shared a "Third Worldist" ideology. Some of the leaders 
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of these movements and organizations originally came from the 
Catholic world and some of them went back to it after the 
crisis of these movements in the late 1970s. 
The decline of southern migration in the 1970s and the 
unexpected rise of a "new" immigration from the Third World, 
confronted the volontariato with a new set of issues, 
especially in the face of the almost total neglect of the 
problem by the state authorities. Some of the already 
existing organizations dealing with southern immigration, had 
to adjust their services to the demands posed by the new 
immigration. In other cases, new sub-sections or 
semi-independent organizations were set up by the larger 
associations, concerned with other issues as well. 
Predictably, it was the Catholic world, traditionally more 
sensitive to these problems, that first took steps in this 
direction. This happened not only with associations most 
directly linked to the Church, like Caritas, or to the 
traditional Catholic and Christian Democrat social world, but 
also with those Catholic-inspired associations involved in 
labour, trade unionist and cooperativist activities. It must 
be noted, however, that the Catholic "ideology" of these 
associations is present in very different digrees. In any 
case, very few associations operating with foreign migrants 
were not directly or indirectly Catholic inspired, like the 
International Social Service, linked to the United Nations, 
and the Valdese (Italian Protestant) Church. Interestingly 
enough, no association linked just to the left and without 
any Catholic links, has yet mobilized in terms of providing 
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services to the migrants, except in relation to the 
Eritrea. ns, which will be discussed in the next chapter. 
The next section will look at the "ideological" 
characteristics of the associations involved and at the kind 
of services they provide, trying to find out if there is some 
pattern in the differential attendance at them by the various 
immigrant groups in relation either to "ideological" 
characteristics, or to the kinds of services provided. In 
terms of services, the main difference will be whether they 
give tecporary assistance (e. g. food, access to dormitories, 
-money subsidies), or help with more long-term integration 
(e. g., legal and political rights, education). From an 
ideological point of view the main difference will be between 
those organizations closer to the more traditional sections 
of the Catholic world, or those with a more progressive 
orientation, whether linked to the Catholic world or not. An 
important point that will also be noted is the presence of 
political or personal links between leaders of the ethnic 
groups and those of the voluntary organizations and local 
authorities. This will not only affect the attendance at the 
various organizations, but also the processes of ethnic 
politics described in the next chapter. 
6.2 Characteristics and services of the oroanzations and 
attendance at them by the miorant croups 
This section will demonstrate that the different Eritrean and 
Egyptian attendance at the the various organizations listed 
below, .s affected for both groups by the types of services 
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they provide (i. e. temporary subsidies vs. long-term 
integration) in relation to the different needs of the groups 
and, for the Eritreans, by the presence of links between 
their leaders and the leaders of the associations. From 
chapter 5 it can be hypothesized that the Eritrean group, 
with a more effective and cohesive solidarity network than 
the Egyptian one, does not need the first kind of services so 
much and can opt for the second one, while for the Egyptians 
the reverse is true. The types of services and these kinds of 
links are also partly accounted for by the ideological nature 
of the organizations, i. e. by whether they are of a more 
"progressive" or of a more "traditional" Catholic nature. Of 
the first kind, CESIL, the Volta school and ACLI will be 
mentioned. All of them help with long-term integration and 
have strong links with the leaders of the Eritrean group, in 
particular the EPLF, and have a high rate of Eritrean 
attendance and a low Egyptian one. Of the two more 
"traditional" Catholic ones, the Franco Verga Foundation 
partly helps with long-term integration and partly gives 
temporary subsidides, but has the "wrong" links with the 
Eritrean community, i. e. with members of the ELF (the 
minority front) and has very low Eritrean and Egyptian 
attendance. Caritas on the other hand, even though it has 
"good" links with the Eritreans, i. e. with Father Yohannes, 
is specialized in temporary subsidies and has a rather low 
Eritrean attendance. On the other hand even though it does 
not have "good" links with the leadership of the Muslim 
Centre which anyhow does not represent the Egyptian group 
(cf, chapter 5), it has a high Egyptian attendnce because of 
the character of its services. 
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Caritas 
Caritas is a big organization directly linked to the 
Catholic Church, with sub-sections for each diocese, involved 
with various kinds of assistance. In the late 1970s with the 
growing Third World immigration in Italy, its leaders decided 
to set up centres for each diocese) dealing specifically 
with this problem. In Milan, Turin and Genoa, among which 
there is some coordination at this level, this was done in 
1977. In Milan there are actually two centres belonging to 
Caritas dealing with Third World migrants, one of them 
especially concerned with students and providing some space 
for educational and recreational activities for the migrant 
communities, if needed, the other providing general 
"assistance" to the migrants. Both centres are run by the 
same staff including two priests, one nun and one 
conscientious objector. The leader of the staff, called Don 
Cesare is what might be described as an "establishment" 
priest, with a good educational background and concerns for 
"social problems". The second priest, called Don Mario, has 
had seven years experience in a mission in Peru, having 
become consequently quite interested in the Latin American 
"liberation theology" and in Paulo Freire's "pedagogy of the 
oppressed" (cf. Freire 1971), is perceived as quite a 
"radical" priest. The nun is a more conventional one, full of 
piety and of a sense of the missionary importance of 
Christanity. Sometimes they hold masses on major Christian 
holidays to which they invite also non Roman-Catholic and 
even non-Christian people to participate, but Don Mario told 
me he is not at all happy when his two other colleagues try 
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to convert non-Christians. They have some relationship with 
Father Yohannes, whom they invited to co-celebrate one of 
those "interconfessional" masses, but Don Mario would like to 
develop also some relationships with the EPLF. Conversely 
with the Muslim Centre they have definitely an uneasy 
relationship beacuse although they do not want to look 
anti-Muslim, they resent the (Muslim fundamentalist) 
accusation of "cannibalism" (i. e. the eating of the flesh of 
Christ into which the Eucharist gets transubstantiated) the 
Centre levels against Catholicism in particular. 
Both Caritas centres are intended specifically for foreign 
migrants and were not in existence in the years of southern 
Italian migration. As very few of the students are either 
Eritrean or Egyptians, the centre helping students 
(especially in the University) with bureaucratic problems 
will not be analyzed. While there are nearly always two or 
three Eritreans at the events organized by this centre 
(masses, Christmas parties, etc. ), their presence is not 
substantial. As far as Muslims are concerned, although a few 
attend these events, they mostly come from the countries 
other than from Egypt. The vast majority of the migrants who 
attend them, however, usually come either from Latin America, 
or from the Philippines, or from West Africa. A small course 
teaching Italian, following Paulo Freire's pedagogy (1), had 
only limited success drawing four Philippinos, two 
Salvadoreans, two Indians, two Eritreans and one Chilean. The 
course was on Thursday afternoons, which are free for maids, 
but not for cooks, etc. Although the staff of Caritas is 
aware of the shortcomings of assisten: ialismo, i. e. temporary 
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remeoids to monetary, housing, etc. problems, without 
tacking the root of the problem, (i. e. to try to change the 
rest-ictions of the host society and "helping the migrants to 
help themselves"), the centre dealing with other categories 
of cigrants (i. e. non-students) does operate in this 
direction. The main services provided are: assistance to find 
temo orary shelter usually in one of the destituted people's 
dormitories, vouchers for meals in Church-run refectories, 
limited monetary assistance for journeys and other purposes, 
limited medical assistance and travel cards for buses and 
unde-around. 
Attendance by the various national groups present in Milan 
can be seen from Table 6.1, based on the results of a survey 
carried out by Caritas. The main requests, for all 
national groups, are provided by Table 6.2. The replies to 
the above requests were positive in 80.16% of the cases and 
negative in 19.84% (ibid. ). The criteria by which a person 
is granted or refused the assistance he/she requests are not 
objective, but seem to be based on the type of request the 
person makes as related to his/her migration history and 
current situation and the availability of the resource 
requested. However it is also possible that decisions are 
made on the discretionary basis of "instictive sympathies" 
between the staff and the migrant, also related to the 
perception by the former of whether the latter falls within 
his/ner own identity boundary (cf. Flett 1979)'. Concerning 
the kinds of requests put forward by the migrants, these 
requests are partly conditioned by the information and 
perception of what services a centre has actually to offer, 
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Table 6.1: Requests for assistance by Caritas (January 1984 - 
September 1984) by nationality 
Egypt: .......................... 18.2% 
Morocco: ........................ 1;. 97 Tunisia: ......................... 8.8% Ivory Coast: .................... 6.2% Eritrea and Ethiopia: ............ 6.4% (2) (Eritrea: ........................ 2.97. ) 
(Ethiopia: ....................... 13.5%) Ghana: ........................... 4.9'% 
Algeria: ......................... 4.8% 
Zaires ........................... 4.7% 
Nigeria: ......................... 4.7% 
Lebanon: ......................... 3. Z1% 
Somalia:. ......... ............ 2.9% Others (42 nationalities):....... 7.2% 
Source: "Terzo mondo in casa nostra: una urgente 
riconciliaxione" (Caritas 1985, unpublished) 
Table 6.2 Requests for assistance by Caritas (January 1984 - 
September 1984) by type of request 
Housing: .................................... 
Subsidy for travelling: ........... o ......... 
Clearance of luggage from deposit:........... 
Cash: ........................................ 
Medical assistance: .......................... 
Employments ................................. . 
Coupon for shower: ........................... 
Telephone call:. ........................... 
Subsidy for studying:............ .......... 
Assistance for bureaucratic procedures:...... 
Tickets or travel cards for public transport: 
Coupon for hairdressers ...................... 
Procedures for obtaining the status 
















as pointed out by the paper mentioned above. The aoove 
requests therefore seem to match quite closely what is "on 
offer" at Caritas, as opposed to other organizations. The 
assistance provided by Caritas is therefore of a short-term 
kind as it can be seen by the kind of services they provide 
also because "housing", refers mainly to the allocation of 
the migrants to dormitories. In this respect, while there 
is a high attendance at Caritas by the Egyptians, who are by 
far the most numerous group attending this organisation, the 
attendance by the Eritreans and Ethiopians combined is not 
very significant, especially taking into account the relative 
size of the group, probably greater than any of the groups 
preceeding them in Table 6.1. It should be concluded that, at 
least as far as Caritas is concerned, "religion" (i. e. the 
fact that Caritas depends directly from the Church and is run 
by ecclesiastical staff) is not a discrimination in the 
attendance at it, as the vast majority of people who do are 
Muslims. 
What seems to be more important is how the services provided 
match the needs of the various migrant communities. In this 
respect the Eritreans who can rely on a more effective 
"ethnic" network reaching more or less all members of the 
community, seem to be less interested than the Egyptians who 
have a more fragmented community and are therefore more 
exposed to immediate needs like getting temporary shelters in 
dormitories, short-term subsidies and so on. This despite the 
fact that Father Yohannes, as a member of the Catholic 
Church, has very good relations with Caritas. In this case 
the kind of services provided in relation to the different 
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needs of the two migrant groups are the most significant 
factors affecting their different attendance, in spite of the 
absence of personal ties with the Egyptian group and their 
presence (with Father Yohannes) in the Eritrean case. This 
link is however important (cf. chapter7). Finally Caritas 
has some links with more or less all the main organisations 
involved with Third World immigrants, most of whom are part 
of the "Migrants' Committee". However the closest links, not 
approved by all its staff, are with the Franco Verga 
Foundation, which is also closely related to the Church, 
through the Christian Democrat party. This also assumes the 
character of a "spiritual fatherhood" that Don Cesare often 
assumes vis a vis the leaders of the Franco Verga. While 
relationships with ACLI, the International Social Service 
and the Volta school tend to be neutral, those with CESIL, 
one of the most important of these associations, tend to be 
tainted by a certain competition, also due to their different 
approach to these problems and rather different aims. 
Franco Veroa Foundation 
This association, also of a "traditional" Catholic character 
and with a very low Eritrean and Egyptian attendance, was 
founded in 1963, during the heyday of the South-North 
migration, by a Christian Democrat member of parliament, 
Franco Verga, together with other people linked to the DC. 
The ideological position of the centre has always been close 
to the Church and especially to the "solidaristic" message of 
pope John XXIII. The centre had the aim of tackling the 
following problemss a) assisting with the first stages of 
arrival and emergencies; b) finding housing; c) finding 
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employment; d) free time and social activities; e) illiteracy 
(Fondaz: one Franco Verga 1985). However the 1964 budget 
reporter that 6: S. 8% of its expenditure was in the form of 
direct monetary subsidies to the migrants, even if for the 
above purposes (ibid., p. 59). In the early 1970s it ventured 
into the construction of houses for the migrants, by forming 
a coope-ative. But after a scandal that arose because of the 
alleged disappearance of part of the public funds for this 
aim, in August 1975 Franco Verga was found dead in a fountain 
in Milan, probably having committed suicide as reported 
recently by a newspaper (il Manifesto 29 August, 1985). After 
a couple of years his collaborators reopened a centre in 
his name, still keeping links with the original concern with 
southern migrants, but starting to deal primarily with 
foreign ones. The main ideological links were still with the 
Church and with the Christian Democratic party, in which 
the president of the Foundation successfully stood for a post 
as Municipality councillor in the 1980 local elections, but 
unsuccessfully in the 1985 ones. The Foundation is made up by 
a president, a secretary and one clerical worker. It is 
partly funded by the Church and partly by the local 
authorities. It is located in central Milan 
The main services of the Foundation are similar to those of 
Caritas, perhaps with a more limited amount of funds 
available. These services include: small monetary subsidies 
for various purposes, advice and assistance on problems 
linked to employment, housing, permits and, for students, to 
registration on various courses. Sometimes students are also 
helped in getting the books they need. From 1984 the 
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Foundation has also set up an Italian literacy course for 
foreiar migrants. Every year it also organizes a congress on 
the toc_c of Third World migration to Italy, with a few DC 
politic: ans, high ecclesiastical authorities and academics. 
Apart f -om a few "analytical" papers, these congresses are 
usually more a presentation of the Foundation to the media 
and to vocal politicians and a claim for the rights of Third 
World immigrants, than a scientific endeavour. 
No data on attendance at the assistance centre have been 
provide--, but officers of the Foundation supplied a list of 
those wno attended the 1985-86 literacy course (cf. Table 
6.3) saving that it also gives a good idea of the general 
attenda-ice at the Foundation. This can also be compared with 
the attendance at the Volta school, which will be discussed 
below. 
It is noticeable that by far the most numerous group, by 
broad area of origin, is from West and Central Africa, 
making up more than 577. of the total. On the other hand 
Northern Africans amount to just over 27%. The percentage of 
Egyptians is, as will be seen below, quite similar to that of 
the Volta school (also providing literacy courses). In terms 
of subsidies (which are of a more short-term kind) the more 
limiter amount of funds available to the Foundation with 
respect to Caritas, probably explains why Egyptians attend 
more the latter. This and the short-term character of the 
Foundation's services also explain the low Eritrean 
attendance (assuming that attendance at the course also 
reflects attendance in general). But what is more striking, 
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Table 6.3: Numbers attending Franco Verna's Italian 
literacy course (1985-1986) 
Upper Volta:..... Z Israel...... 1 
Austria:......... 1 Morocco..... 7 
Ivory Coast:.... 21 Nigeria.... 13 
EgyPts........... 4 Pakistan.... 8 
El Salvador:..... 1 Benin....... 1 
Equadort......... 1 Sierra Leone 7 
Ethiopia/Eritrea; 1 Tunisia..... 1 
Ghanas........... 2 Zaire....... I 
Irans............ 2 
Totals ........... 77 
Sources Fondazione Franco Verga 1986 (unpublished) 
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is the virtual absence of Eritreans form the course, usually 
over-represented in courses providing educational 
opportunities and, on the contrary, the high rate of 
attendance cj West Africans, usually not so much in contact 
with host so=iety institutions, also due to the relatively 
smaller size of the group. There may be several reasons for 
this. One of these is probably that as the Franco Verga 
course was established only in 1984, four years later than 
the Volta one, the Eritreans, whose migration is older than 
the West African one, started to attend the latter after 
having arrived in Milan. Secondly, from interviews with the 
Franco Verga staff, the usual Eritrean attitude of "sticking 
together and therefore not practicing Italian" is less 
appreciated by the officers of the Foundation than the more 
"diligent" one of West Africans. This probably conceals the 
fact that the Eritreans conduct their "usurpatory cultural 
strategies" more through the Eritrean Community and leaders 
(albeit with the support of some "host society" 
organizations) than through Franco Verga, which tends to 
assume the position of "patron" of the migrants. Finally, 
although Father Yohannes was present at the inauguration of 
the Franco Verga's courses and they do include one Eritrean 
teacher, called Selassie, he belongs to what is probably the 
"losing" faction of the Eritrean community, linked to Tolde 
(the ELF leader, cf. chapter 5). These topics will be further 
discussed in the next chapter. 
Apart from the relationship with Caritas and Don Cesare in 
particular mentioned above, relationships with other 
associations are very weak. Although Franco Verga is a member 
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of the "Ili grants' Committee", its involvement in it is not 
very active. This is probably because it would rather earn 
its reputa=ion as a "fighter" for migrants' rights under the 
umbrella c= the Christian Democratic Party, than of that of 
the more heterogeneous Migrants' Committee. Although the 
leader of he Foundation points out that he does not have any 
political _enefits (in terms of his commitment in the local 
elections) from working with the migrants, since they do not 
have the r: aht to vote, in an election leaflet for the 1985 
local ele=tions he was portrayed among "coloured" migrants, 
perhaps hoeing to strike a chord with the more "charitable" 
section of the Christian Democrat electorate. This 
involvement with Dc is perhaps also a reason for which the 
Eritreans refrain from getting too involved with the 
Foundation since, although they do make use of politics, they 
are aware of the danger of becoming "instrumentalized" by 
one party (which is prohibited by the statute of the Eritrean 
Community, cf. chapter 7). 
CESIL (Cer_tro Solidarieta' Internazionale lavoratori) (3) 
This centre has definitely a more "progressive" ideology and 
helps with more long-term integration than the previous two. 
It thus has a high Eritrean attendance and a relatively low 
Egyptian one. It was set up in the 1970s with the help of 
CISL (the catholic section of the trade unions) with the main 
aim of Providing foreign migrants with information 
concerning their legal and political rights when staying in 
Italy. It :s partly still funded by CISL and partly by 
public funds, usually from the Municipality, the Province or 
the Region. It is run by a young Italian professional with 
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the hdlp of a Salvadorean woman and of a conscientious 
objector who is in charge of the clerical work. CESIL is 
quite self-conscious of its professional and 
non-assistenziale task and sometimes puts itself forward or 
is perceived by others, as the spearhead of the associations 
dealing with Third World migrants. It is located in central 
Milan, quite near the area of concentration of Eritrean 
restaurants. The centre is specifically devoted to foreign 
migrants, especially given their legal problems. Its main 
task is to provide the migrants with legal advice on their 
rights to sojourn in Italy, to have the necessary 
authorization to find legal work. This often takes the form 
of a request to regularize an irregualr position, which is 
possible for those who entered Italy before December 31, 
1981, or to renew or to extend the sojourn permit. Other 
advice that is provided is on "family union" (cf. chapter 3), 
on trade union rights and on schools and courses. In addition 
CESIL often lends its premises for meetings of the Solidarity 
Committee with the Eritrean people (cf. the next chapter). 
In an unpublished document, CESIL surveys attendance at its 
centre, but unfortunately the data refer to broad 
geographical areas of origin and not to single nationalities. 
However through an interview with the leader of the centre, 
it has been possible to estimate them, at least for the 
Eritreans and the Egyptians (see Table 6.4. ). 
Besides a fall in Asian attendance and a rise in Latin 
American attendance (due to the fact that a Salvadorean 
officer has been employed in that period), the table shows a 
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Table 6.4 Numbers attending CESIL by broad area of origin 
(January-September 1982 and January-September 1985) 
1983 1985 % change 1983-1982 
Asias................. «%.... 97 .................. -17. North Africa:. ..... 13% ... 17% ................... +4/ (Estimate for Egypt:... 8%... 10% ................... +2/) Rest of Africa:....... 3C%... 25% ................... -5% (Estimate for Eritrea: 25%... 20% ................... -5%) Latin America:........ : %0%... 38% ................... +8% Non-EEC Europe:........ 4%.... 9Y .................... . 5% Others: ................ 1%.... 2%................... +1% 
Source: "L'intervento CESIL: orientamento e consulenza", 
1985, Milan (unpublished) 
Table 6.5 Requests for assistance by CESIL January-Sptember 
1985 
1) Procedures to regularize legal situations 19% 
2) Sojourn permit (extentions and renewals): 25% 
3) Authorization to work: .................... 3% or:. 47. * 
4) Medical assistance: ...................... 267. ors 25% 
5) Advice on schools and courses:............ 5% or: 21% 
6) Legal consultancyt ........................ 0% or: 12% 7) Family union....: ......................... 9% ort 14% 
8) Advice on trade union rights:............ 11% 
Source: ibid., personal elaborations 
Note: the second set of figures refers to instances where 
more than one request was made by the same person. 
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slight 'increase in Northern Africans, mainly Egyptians, and a 
slight decrease of those from "the rest of Africa", mainly 
Eritreans. This is due to the increase of attendance, jr 
percentage, by the other groups, while the absolute number of 
Eritreans probably remained constant, the total number (for 
all groups) having considerably risen from 19B. (4). The most 
significant fact, however, is that by far the greatest 
attendance by an immigrant group, is that of the Eritreans. 
The requests put forward by the migrants, that are partly 
related to what is "on offer" at the centre, helps to 
understand the reasons for this. The same document reports 
the main requests put forward by the migrants, out of 240 
cases (see Table 6.5). 
The leader of CESIL said that overall Egyptians make mainly 
the first two kinds of requests, while the Eritreans mainly 
the last five types, the percentage of which rises taking 
into account situations when more than one kind of request 
was put forward. The first request can be made by those who 
can show evidence of having entered Italy prior to December 
31,1981. Together with the second request it usually denotes 
one of the first stages in trying to get out from 
"clandestinity", while the last five denote a "further" stage 
of penetration in the "host" society which involves starting 
to claim legal rights. It is not surprising in this respect 
that the Eritreans should be making these requests more than 
the Egyptians since their "usurpatory strategy" and 
political discourse are more oriented towards enhancing their 
social situation as a group by claiming their legal rights, 
than the Egyptians. The fact that the services provided by 
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CESIL 'are mainly of this kind, as opposed to those of 
Caritas, and that the Eritreans seem to be the most numerous 
national group attending it, is an evidence of the argument. 
This is reinforced by the location of CESIL near the area of 
Eritrean restaurants and bars and by the links it has with 
the EPLF, through the Solidarity Committee. 
Finally, concerning relationships with other associations. 
CESIL is a little isolated from the other associations since 
it is sometimes charged with excessive "technicism". However 
many other associations send people to CESIL when they have 
precisely a "technical" problem they cannot deal with. 
However it does have a working relationship with ACLI, which 
is another workers' association, and with the Volta school, 
which sends CESIL people with legal problems they cannot 
solve and in turn, through their courses, trains some people 
who got the information from CESIL. 
The Volta school 
The Volta school consists of a series of courses teaching 
Italian to foreign migrants, plus one Tigrinya course for 
illiterate Eritreans. The courses, funded by the Milanese 
municipality are held in the afternoons in a state hign 
school which lends its premises for these purposes. These 
courses were first organized in 1980, especially through the 
commitment of a young woman called Simona, who used to 
collaborate with CESIL. The Volta school, as an institution 
dealing with Third World migrants, is one of the few not 
institutionally or ideologically linked to the Catholic 
world, but rather to the "lay" and "progressive" sections of 
0 253 
the Milanese civil society, although, like in many cases of 
"progressive" associations, linked to the Catholic worlc, 
like CESIL, it is hard to make such a clear-cut distinction. 
Besides Simona, who has some experience as a teacher and had 
a background in pedagogy and linguistics, the Italian staff 
is made up of two graduates in the humanities. In 1982 when 
Tigrinya literacy courses were introduced, a two person 
Eritrean staff was employed, linked to the EPLF and including 
Tekle, starting also to teach Italian to Eritreans from 1984. 
The Volta school provides only Italian and Tigrinya courses 
to the migrants. The school is free, but some kind of sojourn 
permit is needed to attend it. However many migrants use the 
school precisely to get a sojourn permit, even if only for 
"study purposes", by showing a "pre-registration" to the 
school to the Italian authorities. Regarding the Italian 
courses, there are three levels of studys a) "literacy" (for 
illiterate people, which, in the first years, were also 
attended by Italian illiterates); b) "orientation" (for 
literate people with no Italian knowledge); c) 
"consolidation" (for literate people with some Italian 
knowledge). Even if, besides the Eritrean teachers there is 
also a Chinese one teaching Italian to an entirely Chinese 
class, no Chinese courses are provided. Although most classes 
are nationally mixed, there are some which are predominantly 
or entirely Eritrean or Chinese. No other services are 
provided besides teaching, but attending the Volta school 
often proves to be an important source of contacts to gain 
information about other courses, like the ACLI one (see 
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below),. other associations, like CESIL (located very near the 
school) or just to establish relationships of friendship. 
Looking at Table 6.6, it can be seen, leaving aside the 
"Italians" (probably many of whom are of Ethiopian/Eritrean 
origins), that the "Ethiopian" group is by far the most 
numerous, making up more than 50% of all the participants in 
each year and increasing in absolute numbers nearly six times 
from the first to the last years of the courses. Only in the 
last year, after the introduction of a Chinese teacher, has 
there been a group capable of matching the scale of Eritrean 
participation, i. e. the Chinese one. The Egyptian group, 
after the first two years, has shown a more or less constant 
participation around an average of nearly 5 students per year 
and comes a distant third in the total number of 
participants each year. The massive Eritrean attendance at 
the Volta courses, contrasts sharply with their virtual 
absence from the Franco Verga ones. Again, part of the reason 
may be that the former was established nearly four years' 
before the latter and since the Eritreans were one of the 
first groups to have migrated to Milan (with a high 
proportion of illiterate women), they attended the first 
school available to them. This was then reinforced by the 
introduction of EPLF Eritrean teachers and in particular 
Tek1 e. 
On the other hand the Egyptians who migrated on average 
later, attend both schools without any significant difference 
(5). Moreover being generally more literate, they can perhaps 
learn Italian slightly faster. This can be seen from Tables 
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Table 6.6 Numbers attending the Volta Italian literacy course 
by nationality (1980-86, all levels) 
1980-81 1981-82 1982-83 1982- 84 1984-85 1985-86 
Italy 13 9 7 6 0 0 
Ethiopia 11 1.15 27 25 56 60 
Egypt 1 0 6 5 :, 4 
China Cº 0 0 Cº 5 27 
Morocco 0 0 0 2 1 2 
Iran 0 0 0 1 6 6 
Somalia 0 0 0 1 2 1 
Zaire C) 0 0 0 2 2 
Others C> 1 2 5 16 9 
Total 25 35 42 45 91 111 
Source: Favaro, G., 1986 "I1 quadro degli interventi 
formativi " (unpublish ed) 
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6.7 and 6.8, showing the proportion of national groups by 
course level and the sen-ratio and marital status, that are 
enlightening in this respect. Table 6.7 shows that the vast 
majority of Eritrean participants at the Volta courses are 
illiterate women who are ouite numerous among Eritrean 
migrants. Table 6.8 also reinforces a lot of what was 
mentioned in the previous chapter about the different 
marriage patterns between Eritreans and Egyptians (6). What 
is important is that since women are the predominant force in 
the Milanese Eritrean community and Italian literacy is a 
precondition of being able to engage in the local political 
game in which Eritreans are much more active than Egyptians 
(cf. chapter 7), Eritreans attend Italian literacy classes in 
vast numbers. Moreover the Volta school encourages and 
supports the direct participation of the migrant groups 
themselves in local and inter-ethnic politics without the 
more patronizing approach of the Franco Verga school and 
often provides a platform for important debates. One such 
occasion was when the Migrants' Committee discussed with 
members of various migrant groups the possibility of 
involving some representatives of the various communities in 
the Committee itself and about the Municipality's proposal to 
create a consulting body of representatives of the various 
migrant groups and organizations assisting them (7). Finally 
it should also be remembered that the Volta school has chosen 
Eritrean teachers (e. g. Telke) from the "winning" section of 
the community, i. e. the EPLF, rather than someone from the 
ELF's "losing" faction as the Franco Verga did. 
The Volta school, being funded by the Municipality, does not 
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Table 6.7 Eritrean and Egyptian individuals attending the 
Volta courses. by course level (1984-86) 
1984-85 1985-86 
Level a) (illiterates) 
Eritreans -; 1 G äi 
Egyptians 1 
Level b) (orientation) 
Eritreans 18 21 
Egyptians Cº 71 
Level c) (consolidation) 
Eritreans 86 
Egyptians 21 
Source Favaro, G., personal communication 
Table 6.8 Eritrean and Egyptian individ 




Female 47 0 
Married to 
compatriot 26 0 
Married to 
Italian 13 
Single 28 6 
Sources Favaro, G. and Tudor, C. "Considerazioni sull' utenza 
1982-B3" (unpublished) 
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have any formal links with other private associations. 
However it has strong informal links with ACLI where Simona 
has taught in a course for young foreign migrants (cf. below) 
and with CESIL to whom students are often sent for their 
legal problems. Some relationship is maintained with Caritas, 
but none with Franco Verga. The Volta school is not formally 
part of the Migrants Committee but has lately applied for 
membership. 
ACLI-EMASI 
The Association of Italian Christian Workers (ACLI) also 
helps with long-term integration. It has good links with the 
Eritrean leadership and therefore has relatively high 
Eritrean attendance and a low Egyptian one. ACLI is an 
important movement born at the end of the Second World War 
with the aim of being "an educative and social movement of 
Christian workers who'live the life of the Church and their 
experience of the workers' movement". Although at its 
beginnings ACLI was fairly closely linked to the DC, in the 
1960s they started detaching themselves from the DC having 
some leaders belonging to parties or political ideologies 
other than the Christian Democratic one, usually on the left. 
ACLI has also shown some independence from the Church ruling 
on matters such as divorce (8). Nowadays the Association 
numbers more than half a million members and 5,500 local 
sections. They organize services for the workers such as a 
"Patronate" giving advice on legal and bureaucratic matters 
concerning pensions, insurances, etc.; courses of 
professional training for youth and workers (e. g. computers, 
accountancy, etc. ); and courses facilitating workers' 
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cooperatives. They also try to influence public policies on 
issues such as employment, nuclear disarmament, etc. As one 
of its services the Milanese ACLI established in the 1960s a 
parallel institution called EMASI (Milanese Institute for 
Assistance, Solidarity and Integration) to help the southern 
migrar=s. From the late 1970s this institution also started 
to dem: mainly with Third World immigrants. 
Most c; ACLI's services are not directly intended for foreign 
immigrants and many of them are not de facto open to them. 
Besides EMASI, the other main service of which they make use 
is a special office assisting coif (the technical name for 
maids, meaning "family collaborators") with bureaucratic 
practices and advising them on their rights. More generally 
ACLI also tries to put some pressure on the government 
authorities in order to modify the existing chaos in the 
legislation concerning foreign immigration which gives no 
rights to the migrants and all the power to the police 
authorities. Its Catholic-workerist orientation makes it 
politically quite sensitive to Third World "problems" in a 
spirit of "solidarity and cooperation", also funding some 
development projects in Eritrea. It is also understandable 
that tnis solidarity is not entirely divorced from the hope 
that a few of them might join ACLI, but the association is 
very careful not to try to impose too much on those attending 
it, especially in terms of religion. The main services for 
foreign migrants are, however, provided by EMASI 
Up to . 984 EMASI was run along similar lines to those of 
other institutions, giving general advice on various matters, 
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small direct assistance such as meal coupons for the ACLI 
refectory or directing migrants to other organizations. 
Sometimes more specialized services connected to some of 
ACLI's activities could be provided, like courses for 
professional training, and sometimes even employment, given 
the fact that ACLI has quite a few links with the economic 
world through the workers' cooperatives it sponsors. But at 
the end of 1984 when a new director was appointed, there was 
a radical change of approach. The emphasis is now on helping 
the migrants to help themselves through a project, even if 
this means concentrating on a more limited number of 
people. The chosen target group was that of young immigrants 
between the age of 15 and 24 and the idea of the project was 
to train them to become plumbers/ electricians. The course, 
lasting 6 months, included councelling, theoretical training 
(Italian, maths, physics, hydraulics and electricity) and 
practical training in which students worked on building 
sites, often belonging to ACLI cooperatives. Free lunches 
and free tickets or public means of transportation and a 
small grant of around £100 a month were also offered. The 
only requirement to register for the course, besides age, was 
to be "regular" in terms of sojourn permit. The course was 
funded by ACLI and ENAIP (its institute for professional 
training), by the Lombardy region and the EEC. 
In terms of attendance, Table 6.9 shows the number of 
foreign colfs registered at ACLI's office from 1983 to 1985. 
The membership cards (which provided the source of data) did 
not specify nationality, but, cheking with an Eritrean 
student, the number of Eritreans could be fairly accurately 
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deduced from surnames. Table 6.9 shows that the Eritreans 
are by far the most numerous group registering at this 
office. This is in line with their general activism and 
awareness of the need to claim social and political rights. 
In this case, as far as colfs are concerned, this tendency 
cannot be compared with an Egyptian equivalent because there 
are hardly any Egyptian maids. However it can be compared 
with the Philippino or Salvadorean groups which probably have 
only a slightly lower absolute number of women with this kind 
of occupation. The high Eritrean attendance at this office 
performing a role similar to that of a trade union, further 
shows the existence of a collective strategy of social 
enhancement involving the claim of social and political 
rights, as compared to other migrant groups in Milan. 
Table 6.9 Foreign maids revistered at ACLI's coif office and 
the number of Eritreans among them (1983-1985) 
Total Eritreans % Eritreans 
1983 6 4 66 
1984 4 4 100 
1985 21 10 47 
Total 31 18 58 
Source: personal survey from ACLI archives 
Concerning attendance at EMASI, the data for general 
enquiries up to the beginning of 1985 are not very reliable 
because of the uncertain criteria by which some people came 
to be registered in the archive and others did not. The 
data provided by Table 6.10 are therefore to be taken with 
several pinches of salt. The table shows that the only group 
consistently attending the EMASI office has been the Eritrean 
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Table 6.10 Individuals attending EMASI for general enquiries 
by nationality (1983-85) 
Ethiopia/Eritrea.. 17 Zaire....... 1 
Egypt .............. 5 Seychelles.. I 
Tunisia............ 4 Madagascar.. 1 
El Salvador........ 4 Sierra Leone I 
Somalia............ % Senegal..... 1 
Chile .............. . Iraq........ 1 
Philippines........ 2 Ruwanda..... 1 
Ivory Coast ........ 2 Rumenia..... 1 
Kenya .............. 2 Pakistan.... 
1 
Marocco............ 1 Bangladesh.. 1 
Algeria............ 1 
Total .............. 54 
Source: personal survey in EMASI archives. 
Table 6.11 Types of requests by Eritrean and Egyptian 
individuals to EMASI office (1983-85) 
Eritreans Egyptians 
education 4 0 
work 6 1 
public housing 2 Cý 
welfare/bureaucr. practices 4 C' 
housing 1 0 
dormitory C> 1 
subisidy for train ticket 0 1 
drug problems 0 1 
work & housing 0 1 
Sources ibid. 
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one. The kinds of requests made by the migrants (see Table 
6.11) can be understood in relation to the characteristics of 
the Eritrean group in contrast to those of the Egyptian one 
mentioned before. 
Although on a small scale, the EMASI office provides services 
directed towards the integration of the migrants in the 
Italian society. This is done also through its links with the 
world of employment (workers' cooperatives), with the trade 
unions (especially CISL), and housing (through the Tenants' 
Union, SICET, and building cooperatives). Eritrean attendance 
at it shows again their strategy of long-term collective 
social enhancement also because they can more easily rely on 
their own "ethnic" network for their immediate needs 
(housing, money, etc. ). They can thus seek more long-term 
improvements, like welfare, education and public housing. As 
for the last of these tasks, EMASI is well suited since it 
can direct the migrants to SICET (which has an office within 
the ACLI premises) which played a key role in the process of 
Eritrean access to public housing, cooperating with ACLI and 
CISL (cf. chapter 7). On the contrary, Egyptians, belonging 
to a more socially fragmented group, attend the EMASI office 
less (compared e. g. to Caritas) and more for emergency 
subsidies. The Eritreans' long-term strategy of collective 
social enhancement, in which education plays a major part, is 
also shown by Table 6.12, regarding the course for 
plumbers/electricians mentioned before, where they have been 
by far the most numerous group attending the course. 
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Table 8.12 Numbers attendino the EMASI course for 
electricians and plumbers (1985) 
Eritrea/Etriopia.. 7 
El Salvador ....... 
Somalia........... 2 
Argentina......... 
Egypt ............. 1 
Mauritius......... 1 
Total ............ 16 
Source: EMA_I: "Noi Giovani Stranieri a Milano" (Milan, 1985) 
Another reason for the high Eritrean attendance at the course 
is that it allowed them to learn some skills which might be 
useful in the event of an anticipated return to the 
motherland or might enable them to enter what is perceived 
(also by Italians) as an economic niche providing good 
employment" opportunities in Milan Again this quest of 
Eritreans to enhance their social condition is helped by the 
existence of a fairly tight community which provides the 
ideological cement and network described in the previous 
chapter that allows the migrants to carry out a collective 
"usurpatory strategy" which entails not only these kinds of 
occupational enhancements but also sociopolitical ones which 
will be analyzed in the next chapter. Also in this instance, 
the Eritrean leadership network and its links with other 
institutions were crucial. The Eritreans came to the course 
mainly through the Volta school or CESIL (which have 
connections with EMASI and ACLI), but also via Father 
Yohannes. Moreover Tekle and Simona (who also collaborate in 
the Volta school) were coopted to the organization and 
teaching of the course. It is due to the lack of this ethnic 
leadership and links with the "host society", rather than to 
an absence of a young population (which in absolute numbers 
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might match the Eritrean one), that Egyptian attendance at 
this course has been much lower. 
This section has demonstrated that Eritrean and Egyptian 
attendance at the various voluntary organizations dealing 
with them, has differed according to the kind of services 
they provided and to the existence of personal and political 
links between the leadership of the former group and that of 
the organizations. Thus Eritreans attend organizations that 
help with long-term integration and that have links with the 
"winning" sections of their community (i. e. Tekle and the 
Front and Father Yohannes). These organizations include 
CESIL, the Volta school and ACLI-EMASI. The Egyptians, on the 
other hand, do not have a leadership with authority and 
representation, mostly attend the organizations that can 
best help them with temporary needs, i. e. Caritas. Together 
with the next section reviewing the relationship of the 
migrant groups with other political subjects, such as the 
trade unions and the local state, these patterns have a 
profound influence on the process of "usurpatory cultural 
strategies" examined in the next chapter. 
6.. -3 The trade unions, the "Migrants' Committee" and the local 
authorities 
The trade unions 
The trade unions have been among the most important social 
actors in post-war Italy (cf. Sassoon 1986). The 
long-established tradition of workers' solidarity and 
internationalism and the fact that migrants are not 
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perceived as threatening Italian employment as they occupy 
the unprotected lower tertiary sector (cf. chapter .: "), lead 
them have a rather different attitude toward= foreign 
immigration from that of most of its European counterparts. 
That is, for the time being and for the union leadership at 
least, the foreign migrants are not conceived as "alien 
competitors" for a scarce resource, i. e. jobs. This does not 
mean that some sections of the Italian population might not 
feel some competition, but in this case the workers are not 
very likely to be unionized in this kind of economic sector. 
In principle the position of all the three main trade unions 
(Communist CIGL, Socialist UIL and Christian Democrat CISL) 
on this question is united and quite clears they stand for 
full equality of rights between foreign and Italian workers 
and denounce the legislative chaos and arbitrariness of the 
current regulations. They also denounce the blackmailing 
power that is left to the employers (cf. chapter 3). 
However the trade unions do not favour unlimited immigration. 
Indeed, they advocate a careful planning, assessing the 
amount of foreign labour needed and carrying out bilateral 
agreements between the Italian government and the governments 
of the countries of origin of the migrants. On various 
occasions they stress that no discrimination against the 
migrants means equality of rights between migrants in Italy 
and Italian workers, but not indiscriminate immigration. 
These positions might be interpreted in terms of labour 
migration theory (cf. Miles 1982) whereby trade unions are 
subservient to the shortage of labour of national capitalism 
filled by foreign immigration. However the trade unions also 
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have opposing interests with those of the bouregoisie, as 
argued below. As to the actual steps towards a better 
regulation, the trade unions and ACLI repeatedly refer to the 
standards set by the ILO in a conference held in June 1975. 
First, they agree that the sojourn permit must be extended 
indefinitely, at least as long as the migrants have a work 
contract in the same kind of occupation. Freedom to change 
occupation must occur, following the ILO, after two years of 
residence. In case of unemployment the foreign worker must be 
able on the one hand to use the trade union's contractual 
power and on the other hand to apply for another Job wtih 
priority over new migrants. Therefore, for the trade unions, 
a break of job contract should not automatically mean 
expulsion from the country. Also, after a period of no more 
than 10 years of legal residence, a foreign worker should 
have all the legal rights of an Italian citizen, except for 
citizenship. Finally, norms concerning the reunion of close 
relatives (spouse, children and parents) should be made 
easier. But most importantly the trade unions advocate that 
the migrants should have the right to defend themselves and 
put forward their case through some appropriate organisation 
and that a plan to regularize the thousands of illegal cases 
due to the existing legislation should be implemented (9). 
The trade unions are therefore committed to the planning and 
regularization of migrant workers in order to give them equal 
rights and legal status. These aims are more or. less shared 
by the various voluntary associations mentioned above. Part 
of the reason for this, however, is that they fear that the 
present situation of more or less tolerated illegality, 
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implemented by the government authorities, is functional to 
the present labour market and has the "aim of lowering labour 
costs and weakening the national working class bargaining 
power with the grave risk of divisions among the workers", as 
a trade union leader put it (10). By contrast they see their 
proposal as discouraging the arrival of new migrants because, 
by making it less "economical" for the employers to employ 
them (through social benefits, taxes, etc. ), there would be 
less jobs available on the market. In this case the unions 
would also acheive the double aim of avoiding dangerous 
splits and "unfair competitions" within the working class and 
maybe also slightly reinforce their own ranks, given the fact 
that they are undergoing a period of crisis (cf. Sassoon 
1986). 
Although these general purposes are shared by all three union 
federations, in practice the Catholic section (CISL) has 
been the most active in this question. In the first place it 
partly funds CESIL and the Tenants' Union (SICET) that has 
been crucial to the access that some migrants, especially 
Eritreans, have had to public housing (cf. the following 
chapter). In the second place the director of its 
International Section, Stefano, has been by far the most 
active among the Milanese union leaders on the subject of 
migrants' rights (ii), also by participating in the 
"Migrants' Committee" described below. As to the reasons for 
CISL's greater involvement, it can only be speculated that 
besides an "ideological" reason (i. e. Catholic universalism 
solidarism and sense of charity, cf. chapter 3), there might 
also be reasons of political interest. These may be that 
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while the bulk of the CGIL's (the Communist section) ranks 
are made up of engineering workers (cf. Sassoon 1986), CISL, 
which has a slightly more diversified social base, might draw 
more benefit from a possible unionization of migrant workers 
who occupy mainly the (lower) tertiary sector. However all 
three Milanese sections of the trade unions, and in 
particular CISL and COIL, have also supported the Eritrean 
cause in particular (cf. chapter 7). 
b) The Miarants' Committee 
In Autumn 1985 all the above associations, except the Volta 
school plus some others mentioned below, formed a 
"Committee of associations dealing with foreign migrants", 
briefly known as "Migrants' Committee". The aim of the 
Committee was to coordinate the activity of the various 
associations involved, acting jointly in particular cases, to 
put pressure on central government to improve the existing 
legislation and on local government to "ease the social 
integration of migrants" by allowing them access to housing 
and social and recreational facilities and in the future to 
coopt the "ethnic communities" to become part of these 
sociopolitical activities. The other association members of 
the Committee, apart from those mentioned before, are the 
International Social Service (or ISS, a humanitarian 
organization linked to the UN and the Red Cross), the Valdese 
Church (an Italian-born protestant Church with a small but 
influential number of followers), the International League of 
People's Rights, campaigning especially for the 
self-determination of oppressed peoples; and Democratic 
Medicine, an association of left-wing doctors (12). 
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The most active members of the Committee are undoubtedly the 
directors of EMASI, CESIL, Caritas, ISS and CISL. It is 
through their initiative, also because of the links they 
already had, that the Committee was founded. They thought 
that a coordination among the various associations operating 
in this field, would achieve the double aim of improving 
their services through a better division of labour and 
reciprocal check; on their activities, and on the other hand 
of putting greater pressure on the political authorities to 
change the existing legislation. Most of the initiatives are 
promoted by these organizations whose leaders always attend 
the meeting of the Committee. This is partly because these 
associations have been the most engaged in various forms of 
assistance to the migrants. However Franco Verga, even if 
operating in the field of immigration and a member of the 
Committee, is among the least assiduous in participating in 
it, probably because it seeks more its legitimation within 
the Christian Democratic apparatus than in an independent 
forum. Although there are sometimes some tensions, a good 
cooperation and a minimum of division of labour between the 
various members has been achieved. The director of Franco 
Verga, when present, suggests how to deal with the local 
authorities because of his previous experience there. 
While CGIL and UIL are formally members of the Committee, 
they never attend its meetings. During one of them it was 
regretted that CGIL had organized a separate meeting to 
discuss the situation of foreign migrants in the light of new 
law proposals concerning them after the terrorist attacks of 
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winter. 1985 (cf. chapter 8). There CGIL apologized to the 
migrants for not having paid enough attention to their 
problems and announced the creation of a new advisory centre. 
This was perceived by the other associations of the Committee 
as the project of an opportunist latecomer which did not want 
to miss the chance that might be created by the new situation 
(e. g. if the migrants became "an issue" there might be some 
funds for organizations dealing with them and new laws might 
be approved that would be able to, regularize some of them who 
might join the trade unions). In fact the migrants who 
attended the meeting ("those who are always there", i. e. the 
Eritreans, as a member of the Committee reported) were 
encouraged to join the unions although "they looked rather 
diffident", the same source reported. Naturally those who 
were most upset by all this were the directors of CESIL and 
CISL, the first because of the establishment of a rival 
advisory centre and the second because of the competition' 
over possible membership. 
The law proposals concering foreign migrants that were 
rumoured to be about to come out after the terrorist events 
mentioned above, have also been one of the main topics of 
discussion for the Committee. In a document sent to the Prime 
Minister, the Minister of Interior and the Minister of 
Justice, the Committee underlined that such a proposal still 
viewed the migrants purely in terms of social control and not 
of social integration and migrants' rights. On the other hand 
the Committee. viewed with greater favour a law proposal 
issued by the Ministry of Work which, following more closely 
the indications of the ILO, would allow the migrants, after 
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two years residence, to change type of employment and to be 
unemployed without the sojourn permit expiring automatically. 
Moreover, it envisaged the possibility for "clandestines" to 
regularize their position. The member of Parliament who 
presented this proposal was a former ACLI activist. 
Finally the Committee questioned how best to ensure the 
participation of the "migrant communities" thmselves, 
especially because of the lack of representative leaders in 
most communities, with the notable exception of the Eritreans 
(with whom it already has links through the various 
organizations mentioned in the previous section). This was 
discussed in a meeting at the Volta school in which members 
of many groups took part (cf. chapter 7), especially in view 
of a proposal of the Municipality to create a council of 
migrants in which not only Italian associations, but also 
"migrant communities" would be represented. Thus the 
Migrants' Committee, besides being a unitary pressure group 
from some sections of civil society (despite some contrasting 
interests, e. g. between the two trade unions), trying to 
influence central and local government through lobbying and 
some links, also has privileged relationships with the 
Eritrean group. Some members of the Migrants' Committee are 
also active in a Solidarity Committee with the Eritrean 
People, which will be discussed in the nett chapter. On the 
other hand no particular links with Egyptians are 
established, also because of the lack of organization and 
leadership on the part of the latter. 
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The local authorities 
Regarding the attitude of the local state, the Milanese 
Municipality has stressed, in the words of its mayor, Carlo 
Tognoli, Milan's historical tradition of Enlightenment and 
of tolerance, since it was already able to integrate 
different Italian regional cultures (a reference to southern 
immigration), stating that new cultures might even be to the 
city's advantage (13). Although there are clear rhetorical 
implications in these statements, the Municipality does seem 
to line up with the trade unions' proposals, calling for 
equality of rights with Italian workers (14). 
In fact the major limitation that the local authorities have, 
is that they cannot modify the migrants' major problem, i. e. 
the regulations concerning sojourn and work permit. Also in 
terms of housing their power is limited since the majority 
of the Italian public housing stock, which is state-owned, is 
by law inaccessible to the migrants, even to those who, 
working regularly, pay indirect contributions towards the 
migrants. However in July 1982 the municipal coalition ruled 
that it could have granted access to its own housing stock to 
foreigners "in particular case of grave needs". This means 
that there are no objective criteria to rent public housing 
to foreigners, but each case must be considered on its own 
merits. The next chapter will, show how different migrant 
groups have exploited this opportunity in different ways. 
Moreover the Municipality financed the Italian language 
courses at the Volta school. One of the major complaints of 
the migrants however, is that the Municipality does not help 
them enough where it could, i. e. by granting them 
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recreational space. In fact, apart from the circus tent the 
Eritreans rented for the 1984-85 New Year's Eve (cf. chapter 
6), most of the recreational space the various ethnic groups 
have occasionaly found belonged to the voluntary sector or to 
the left-wing movements. 
The Lombardy Region, in a law of December 5,1983, has also 
ruled in the same terms that part of its housing stock can be 
granted to foreign citizens. The allocation of housing in 
Milan, however, is still supervised by a commission 
controlled by the Municipality. The Region has also jointly 
funded the ACLI-EMASI course for young foreign migrants 
mentioned before. The difference of attitude with central 
government can also be explained by the fact that local 
council members can be more directly influenced by local 
pressure groups while lacking the power to implement major 
changes. Another reason for this can be that while a vote for 
the migrants for the general elections is not yet envisaged, 
a vote in the local ones may be granted in the not too 
distant future. 
6.4 Conclusion 
The voluntary sector has been the main organized section of 
the Milanese civil society to deal with the migrants in 
terms of assistance or social integration and not just of 
social control. This sector is mainly part of the multi-faced 
Catholic social universe, with some "workerist" and 
progressive sections linked to the trade unions, and some 
more linked to the traditional Catholic institutions, such 
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as the Church and the DC. The boundary relationship between 
this side of the "host society" and Third World immigrants in 
the organizations mentioned above, has identified the 
Eritreans as the group with the more stable and deeper 
connections with it. 
Attendance at the various associations by the ethnic groups 
has been differentiated. The main reasons pushing the 
migrants of one group more to one association rather than 
another have been less "ideological" in nature (e. g. in terms 
of religion) and more related to the relationship between the 
particular situation and needs of one migrant group and what 
was "on offer" at the various institutions. So the Muslim 
Egyptians were the more numerous group attending the 
organization most closely related to the Church and run by 
priests, i. e. Caritas. This was because the absence of a 
well developed "ethnic" support network and the greater 
precariousness of their migration, make them focus on more 
immediate needs (food, housing, money). The connection 
between these organizations and the "ethnic" networks, 
through some influential leaders, is also crucial in order to 
understand the differential attendance of the migrants. Thus 
Egyptians have a high attendance at Caritas despite the cool 
relationship its leaders have with the leadership of the 
Muslim Centre, as the latter does not have authority over the 
Egyptians. On the contrary, the Eritreans, are more likely to 
attend those associations that can help them with a more 
long-term integration (legal rights, public housing, 
education), like CESIL, the Volta school and ACLI. But it is 
also through their influential leadership that they mostly 
276 
attend these associations in two of which Tekle, the EPLF 
leader, works as a teacher. On the other hand, even though 
they do not attend Caritas so much, they miantain good links 
with it through Father Yohannes, but less so with Franco 
Verga because of the "wrong" political connections (i. e. 
through the ELF). 
Finally the trade unions, the Migrants' Committee and the 
local authorities might have an even greater role for the 
migrants, the former two because of the political pressures 
they are exerting which might bring about a change in the 
legislation, the latter especially in terms of housing as it 
will be seen in the next chapter. Although ideologically, 
Catholic universalism has been one of the main factors making 
these section of Italian society the most concerned with this 
issue, their attention to it has not always been devoid of 
self-interest. This applies also to the few non-Catholic 
related institutions that have operated in this sector as 
well. Interest might go from support in terms of membership 
to legitimation of the very existence of the these 
associations, some of which receive their funds according to 
their interventions and the attendance they have by the 
migrants. Although these associations could not change the 
main structural constraints the migrants had to face (labour 
and housing market, sojourn and work permits), they could 
provide some limited assistance within those constraints. 
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NOTES TO CHAPTER 6 
(1) Paulo Freire is a Latin American pedagogue concerned to 
teach illiterate people not through the traditional 
"top-down" approach, but by helping people to gain 
consciousness of their situation of oppression, and by using 
topics close to their daily lives (cf. Freire 1980) 
(2) Although the two groups were distinct in the publication, 
they have been considered together because of the uncertain 
accuracy of the distinction made by the staff (e. g. there are 
Eritreans born in Ethiopia and vice versa). Also it might be 
that someone presents himself/herself as Ethiopian or 
Eritrean for a particular purpose, e. g. to have a stronger 
claim on assistance because of the famine-striken Ethiopia 
that the world knows more about (cf. Patterson 1975, for 
comparable Caribbean material). However if the distinction 
reflected the real situation, it would indicate that 
Ethiopians are more outside the Eritrean network than may be 
thought, having a degree of attendance at Caritas comparable 
with that of the groups preceeding them in Table 6.1. 
(ä) The English translation ist Centre for Worker's 
International Solidarity. 
(4) This is reported in the document which unfortunately 
does not specify the total number of cases for 1983. 
(5) Compare Tables 6.5 and 6.6 
(6) The total number of "Eritrean" students reported in this 
table, include 7 from Tigray and 21 students attending the 
Tigrinya course. However there are still inconsistencies with 
the figures reported in the document cited in Table 6.6, 
concerning both Eritreans and Egyptians. 
(7) This episode will be discussed in more detail in the next 
chapter. 
(8) Part of the information is drawn from an ACLI publication 
called "Le ACLI" (1986), but cf. also Sassoon (1986, pp. 
148-150) who mentions that the youth branches of ACLI came 
out in favour of divorce in the 1974 referendum and that the 
Association itself refused to take a stand against it, 
obviously causing a very angry reaction from the Church. 
(9) All this information can be found in a variety of trade 
union papers, like those by Chittolina (1982) and Vercellino 
(1983). 
(10) Cf. Chittolina (1982), p. 6 
(11) For example through its monthly publication, Milano 
Sindacale, mentioned above in note (10), which dedicates its 
February 1986 issue to "Immigrants, law and trade union". 
(12) These organizations have not been dealt with 
extensively, because they have been less important in the 
integration of the "new" immigrants. The International Social 
Service deals primarily with political refugees, but because 
278 
of reasons mentioned in chapter Z, this status applies to 
very few Third World immigrants in Italy. No Ethiopian has 
been recognized as political refugee between 1983 and 1985. 
The Chiesa Valdese hardly carries out other activities in 
this respect besides occasional publications and its 
participation in the Committee. The International League's 
main activities is through campaigning, publishing and 
conferences. Because of its aim, it is particularly sensitive 
to the Eritrean question. Finally Democratic Medicine has set 
up a small health centre for migrants which, interestingly 
enough, is for the time being only open to Eritreans (cf. 
charter 7). 
(13) Cf. the Mayor's preface to Caputo (1983). 
(14) Cf. ibid. and the minutes of the session of the 
Municipality council of the January 20,1986. 
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CHAPTER 7: CULTURAL STRATEGIES AND ETHNIC POLITICS 
This chapter has two aims. In the first place it will attempt 
to convey a general picture of the overall strategies the two 
groups pursue to counter the socioeconomic and political 
constraints the "host society" imposes on them. This means 
looking at the interplay between the socioeconomic and 
demographic characteristics outlined in chapter 4 and 
sociocultural identity, group institutions, interaction and 
leadership outlined in. chapter 5. It will be argued that the 
interplay between these two domains as mediated by the 
different political strategies in which powerful individuals 
play a crucial role, will lead to different approaches 
between the two groups in the pursuit of their interests. 
The role of these individuals is also conditioned by the 
access they have to resources and links with the "host 
society", often obtained through the local associations 
mentioned in chapter 6. In this respect, although some of 
the neomar>: ist critique of the reification of race and 
ethnicity can be accepted (cf. Miles 1982), a simple process 
of labour migration-racial categorization, fails to explain 
the different behaviour of different migrant groups. Instead 
it will be argued that a political approach to the study of 
ethnicity, as outlined above, provides a better framework for 
understanding the issues. Also, the particular struggles 
might not revolve only around purely economic issues 
(employment and wages) but also around socioreproductive ones 
(housing, schooling, aggregative spaces), (cf. Castells 1977, 
1978) and politico-legal ones. 
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Secondly this chapter will aim to throw some light on the 
role of the various "ethnic institutions" and organizations 
examined in chapter 5 and at the reasons for attending them. 
It will be argued that besides "cultural" reasons for the 
different attendance by Eritreans vs. Egyptians at their 
respective institutions, there may be other reasons 
concerning the differential access of Eritrean and Egyptian 
leaders to resources and political links with the Milanese 
society. Also in this case the different demographic size of 
the two groups will condition these processes. 
7.1 Eritrean cultural strategies and ethnic politics 
Chapter 4 has shown that Eritreans are a relatively small 
group, with a slight female predominance and a relatively 
differentiated age structure. Women's employment in the 
domestic sector provides the main source of income, although 
there are some cases of entrepreneurship. Secondly, Eritreans 
have a higher degree of "legality" than other groups. In 
terms of housing Eritreans stand out in comparison with other 
groups, as only among them were squatting and public housing 
to be found as solutions to the housing problem. This chapter 
will try to put forward an explanation in terms of ethnic 
politics. Chapter 5 identified two ideologically different, 
but complementary institutions, the Eritrean church and the 
EPLF, as centres of socialization and group interaction. 
Their respective leaders, Father Yohannes and Tekle, had a 
crucial role in organizing activities and drawing support. 
This situation was formalized in the establishment of an 
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"Eritrean Community", representing various sections of the 
Eritrean group. Some aspects of the internal struggles for 
the control of the group and the conditions of emergence of 
the Community will now be examined. This will in part be 
linked to the resources and support the two leaders can draw 
from the Milanese society by stressing certain aspects of 
their identity that best fit its dominant politico-cultural 
discourse. In other words how far do these institutions 
provide "ethnic resources" (cf. Waliman 1979) and how far 
does the formation of the Eritrean Community constitute a 
"cultural strategy" providing a successful articulation of 
power and decision making to further the group's interests 
(cf. Cohen 1974a, 1974b)? Finally chapter 6 showed the 
selective use Eritreans make of the various local voluntary 
associations and organizations, not only because of the 
services they provided, but also because of the kinds of 
connections they established with important sections of the 
"host society". It will be argued below, that the 
relationship between them and the "ethnic brokers" mentioned 
above, provided the mediating channels between the 
"usurpatory" claims and struggles of the Eritreans and the 
"exclusionary" policies of the Italian society protected by 
the state (cf. Parkin 1979). 
Father Yohannes' church 
Religion is one of the bases of Eritrean identity. However, 
despite the fact that the vast majority of Eritreans are 
Ethiopic Orthodox Christians, they do not have a church and a 
priest of their religion, but attend Father Yohannes' 
church, who is a Catholic priest. Yet Eritreans still go to 
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his church rather that to an Italian one because Father 
Yohannes is an Eritrean, says mass in Tigrinya and, to a 
certain extent, follows their ritual. He can be perceived by 
the Eritrean=_" as "one of us". On the other hand, he still is 
not an Ethiopic Orthodox priest ("although it is not like at 
home, it is something", as Samuel put it). Even so on endless 
occasions people would say things like "he's a good man", or 
"he's a great benefactor of our community" and show great 
respect for him. 
This can also be explained by reference to the resources on 
which Father Yohannes is able to draw. In the first place he 
often acts as a guarantor for the immigration of compatriots 
to Milan. He does so also by using his status as Catholic 
priest, which is still widely respected in Italy, to 
establish good relationships with the police officers who 
issue sojourn permits to foreign migrants in the Questura. 
Virtually every time I have been to the Questura"s 
Foreigners' Office for my community work (cf. chapter 8), 1 
saw him there negotiating about the immigration of a 
compatriot with a police officer. This is possible since, as 
shown in chapter 4, the existing regulations leave wide 
discretionary powers to the police authorities, which are 
more likely to help somebody they can perceive as being part 
of their own cultural system (1). 
Secondly, Father Yohannes has an important role in allocating 
many Eritrean women to work as maids in Italian families. 
For example in a few days he provided one to some 
acquaintances of mine (cf. chapter 4). In general Father 
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Yohannes' role as a Catholic priest, as well as an Eritrean, 
is crucial. The latter aspect is evident as far as 
relationships of trust among compatriots is concerned. The 
former can be understood not only in terms of the great 
social, as well as religious, role the Catholic Church has in 
Italy (cf. chapter 4), but also with the fact that Father 
Yohannes' church is attended not only by Eritreans, but also 
by Italians. This enables him to establish relationships of 
trust, through his religious status, not only with the 
Italians who come to his church, but also with many more, 
through the network of parishes of which he is a member. It 
is through this network that he manages to find this sort of 
employment for his female compatriots, for traditionally 
priests and parishes are often consulted by Italian families 
who seek domestic help. This informal arrangement is often 
beneficial for both the family and the worker, since they can 
save charges from specialized agencies (2). It might also be 
noted is that the female predominance in the Eritrean group 
is well suited for this kind of work, which is socially 
constructed as "female" (ä). 
Thirdly in this way Father Yohannes can provide Eritreans 
with other resources from the Church. For example the 
premises where feasts are organized after the main religious 
festivals, with the distribution of free food, and where he 
runs an advice centre (where every day many people queue up 
to see him about religious, family and other matters, 
including wort: ). Also attached to the same premises is a 
Youth Centre, which will be examined in the next chapter. 
The Church also subsidizes the equipment for the Milanafrica 
284 
football team and summer holidays, usually in Church-owned 
hostels, for young Eritreans. 
Finally, being within the Church can provide useful political 
contacts, either within the Church itself, or with members of 
the DC. This is more difficult to assess. To begin with, the 
relationship between the Church and the DC is not totally 
evident as the DC is not the "long arm" of the Church, nor 
vice versa (cf. Sassoon 1986, pp. 142-152). Secondly, it is 
also the case that the DC is composed of many different 
factions, often in conflict with each other and with changes 
in the extent of their power (cf. Zuckerman 11778). But more 
important is the fact that political connections, if not 
mediated by a relatively neutral institution, are not easily 
disclosed. However I have been told by a high ranking 
Municipality officer that the Eritreans do have some 
connections with the DC, probably through Father Yohannes, 
even if the DC was not a member of the municipal coalition 
during the period of study. 
In other words, Father Yohannes has the role of a "patron" 
and of a "broker", vis a vis a large section of the Milanese 
Eritrean population. He has the role of a broker in that he 
mediates between members of his community and the Milanese 
population in allocating jobs and channelling external 
resources (cf. Scott 1977). He has the role of a patron in 
that his position has a legitimacy that can be considered 
"traditional" with respect to the role of the priest in 
Abyssinian Christianity (cf. Ullendorff 1968,1973), as he 
maintains a good deal of the "traditional" Ethiopic Orthodox 
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rituals'. However, the channelling of these resources means 
that, in exchange., he gets followers for his church and 
therefore also for the Roman Catholic Church. For example, 
young Eritrean boys who attend his youth centre, have to 
follow a catechism course run by him. This means that, from a 
religious point of view, the Eritreans have a double 
identity: Catholic (albeit with some Ethiopic Orthodox 
rituals) to the outside world and Ethiopic Orthodox at home 
(e. g. circumcision of children, abstention from eating pork). 
The existence of this "identity gap" is shown by the fact 
that a nun collaborating with Father Yohannes seemed quite 
unaware of the extent of ritual and theological differences 
and looked quite shocked as I was explaining them. Ruth and 
Abraham both expressed complaints about this nun, the former 
because although she has known her for many years, she never 
came to visit her while she was sick (while Father Yohannes 
did) and the latter because he is not allowed anymore to go 
on the holidays organized by the church, because "he's too 
independent". 
Father Yohannes therefore has also the role of an "ethnicity 
builder" through his powers of "benefactor" to the community. 
This involves a "cultural strategy" in which Eritreans 
present themselves as a Catholic community to the "host 
society". This does not mean that any kind of "cultural 
strategy" is available, nor that they would all have the same 
outcome. For example stressing a Muslim identity not only 
would not simply be accepted by the Eritreans in Milan (at 
least 90% of whom are Christian), but would not enable them 
to establish the same kind of links with the "host society" 
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in terms of resources. In other words the "cultural" is 
neither freely constructable, nor is it neutral in its social 
consequences. Much of this discussion can also be applied to 
the Front, which is the second main Eritrean "institution" in 
Milan. 
The Front 
The nationalist-radical "Third Worldist" ideology expounded 
by the Front, is one that is understood by vast sections of 
the Italian society, linked to the left, and particularly 
strong in cities like Milan (cf. chapter 3). This means that 
the Front is also able to establish some links with the 
Italian-Milanese society whose main benefits are a certain 
degree of material resources and, more importantly, of 
political support. 
In the first place also the Front can get access to some 
recreational facilities, through its connections with 
sections of the Italian left. For example most of the 
festivals organized by the Front are held in a "social 
centre" run by one of the groups to the left of the PCI (cf. 
chapter 3). These groups, typically sensitive to issues 
related to "Third World liberation", lend their premises for 
these purposes when possible. Also, the yearly bologna 
festival, although relying heavily on the EPLF's 
organizational strength, would not be possible without the 
support of the Communist-controlled local authorities, which 
lend the necessary premises (the camping site and the palace 
of congress), even if the PCI has an ambivalent attitude to 
the Eritrean question. Moreover, much of the education, both 
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in Italian and Tigrinya, is carried out for the Milanese 
Eritreans in a school that, although not necessitating any 
particular qualifications, gets most of its Eritrean students 
through Tekie and other Front activists who teach there. 
To understand the nature and extent of political support for 
the Eritreans in Milan, one of the most important 
organizations is the "Solidarity Committee with the Eritrean 
people". It was started in Milan three years ago by a young 
school teacher called Giulia (cf. chapter 5). Giulia is a 
member of CISL (the Catholic section of the trade unions, 
although Giulia is not a believer) and in the 1985 local 
elections she was elected as a district councillor as an 
independent candidate within the PCI (of which, however, she 
is not a member). Besides Giulia, other members of the 
Committee include an M. P. of the "Independent Left" (4) and 
secretary of the International League for the Rights and 
Liberation of Peoples", the secretary of the international 
office of the Milanese CISL (cf. chapter 6), another trade 
unionist and another school teacher. The aims of the 
Solidarity Committee are on the one hand to draw public 
attention to the Eritrean question and on the other hand, to 
gather material support to send relief or to finance 
development projects in the liberated areas in Eritrea. On 
the political question, the Solidarity Committee openly sides 
with the EPLF, while on the question of aid it has links 
with ERA (Eritrean Relief Agency). It is formally independent 
but in practice works in close contact with the EPLF. For 
this reason there are always Eritrean Front members at its 
meetings, usually Tekle, sometimes Tedros (cf. chapter 5) 
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and, more rarely, an officer of ERA. Even if the Milanese 
Committee is the most active, there are others elsewhere in 
Italy. The most'important ones are from Busto Arsizio, a 
small but rich town located about O miles north-east of 
Milan, led by another trade unionist; the Verona one, led by 
an ACLI activist who works as a firm clerk and the Florence 
one. Rome too has a Solidarity Committee, but it is not very 
active since its only member is already engaged in a 
solidarity committee with the Palestinians. 
The information and pressure campaign has the common themes 
of trying to explain the legitimacy of the Eritrean question 
and the nature of the current struggle of the Eritrean 
people. This is usually related to the issue of food aid to 
enfamined Ethiopia that has been receiving worldwide 
publicity, especially after the 1985 "Band Aid" concert. 
Various leaflets pointing out the misuse of relief aid by the 
Ethiopian authorities and the fact that none of the aid sent 
through Ethiopian-controlled areas reaches the areas 
liberated by the Eritrean liberation movements, were 
distributed in the streets or sent to politicians. Moreover 
they draw attention to the fact that aid can be used as a 
political weapon by the Dergue, as it can blackmail the local 
population by forcing young men to enroll in the Ethiopian 
army in exchange for food. Finally there is a general call to 
recognize the right of the Eritrean people to 
self-determination. 
Besides leafleting and lobbying, the Committee also 
organizes, together with the Front, events which can be aimed 
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at a wider public. Among them there was a theatre performance 
given by the celebratd left-wing playwriter and actor Dario 
Fc. At the performance (April 1985) there were about 29OOC) 
pe-_ple and Tedros gave a speech on the situation in Eritrea. 
An nut £6,000 was raised. Later, in October, also in Milan, 
the Committee organized a big concert with three top Italian 
performers (mainly folk/rock), also of radical political 
persuasions, and with TeLle's Eritrean band (cf. chapter 5). 
Again, Tedros gave a speech. This time more than 7,000 people 
came and about £5,000 was raised. Even more importantly, 
al:. the main newspapers reported the event. It needed a lot 
of organizational strength to be set up, which came mainly 
from the members of the Committee as far as renting the site 
and the equipment and contacting the artists was concerned, 
while the poster sticking was done by Front militants. 
Finally the Florence Committee and the League of Peoples 
orcanized in December a major congress on the Eritrean 
question. Various papers on the history, self-determination 
and rights of the Eritrean people, were given by academics 
from Florence, Sorbonne and Manchester universities (e. g. 
Da. -id Pool). On the Eritrean side Andemichael Kasai, of the 
central Committee and Secretary of the EPLF's Foreign 
fie. ations office, gave a speech. On the Italian side there 
were local and national politicians (mainly from the left) 
anc magistrates. A similar Italian attendance was there at 
the opening day of the Bologna festival, in the palace of 
cor. gress. 
These events might, at first sight, be seen as having hardly 
an,. - relation to the situation of Eritreans in Milan. However, 
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even if'it is true that the main aim of the Committee is to 
improve the situation in Eritrea, it has some consequences 
also for the Eritreans living in Italy. In the first place 
there is an effort to make Italians sympathize with the 
Eritrean cause on the basis of historical links, famine and 
Etiiopian oppression. This might have more long-term 
cow: sequences for Eritreans in Italy, as argued below. 
Secondly it enables Eritreans to establish certain social and 
po: itical links with the Italian society that can be 
mocilized in various situations. In this respect the Front, 
ma=nly through the Solidarity Committee, has links with 
mesrsbers of various organizations of the Italian left, even if 
not with a single party, that are sensitive to "Third World 
issues" (cf. chapters Zr, and 6). 
The attitude of the PCI and some of its related 
organizations, like the powerful CGIL trade union, is more 
ambiguous. Although in recent times the PCI became more 
independent from Moscow and only a minority within it still 
actively supports the Soviet-backed Dergue regime, the fact 
that it stood with the Ethiopian revolution against Haile 
Selassie, means that it is unlikely that it would all of a 
su=den withdraw its support. This emerged from discussions 
witn members of the Solidarity Committee (some of whom are 
close to the PCI), who also felt that even the Italian 
government is quite insensitive to the Eritrean issue, 
because it hopes to be able to exert some influence on 
Etriopia which it considers more important than supporting 
Eritrean nationalism. 
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In any case the political links identified above do not 
necessarily have an immediate effect on the Milanese 
situation. Some of them, ' however, were activated in the 
context of the Eritrean Community which gives a wider 
legitimation to the Eritrean claims as will be shown in the 
following section. Among the immediate effects can be 
considered Patria's and Giorgio's activities collecting spare 
machinery from'Italian industries, through the support of the 
trage unions, to be sent to the Eritrean liberated areas (cf. 
chapter 5). 
It is more difficult to say to what extent a single "patron" 
or "broker" can be identified within the Front, as there is 
no single leader like Father Yohannes. It can be argued that 
Tekle is the best candidate because, although Tedros has a 
higher rank with the EPLF, his role in the Milanese scene is 
more limited to political speeches. On the other hand Tekle, 
together with other Front collaborators like Tesfai and 
Ghermay, is the main link regarding access to resources like 
education, recreational facilities and political connections. 
It is difficult to say whether people follow the events 
organized by him, just in exchange for these benefits, for 
the EPLF enjoys widespread popular support in Eritrea. But 
motives for following the Front in Milan might not be the 
same for eveyone. Nor is "ideological" persuasion always the 
reason for participating at events organized by the Front. 
For example it was noted in chapter 6 that quite a few non 
Eritrean Ethiopians attend festivals organized by the Front. 
In Milan I was introduced to a girl of an Amhara-Ethiopian 
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father " and an Eritrean mother and a 
half -I=alian/half-Amhara, both participating at an EPLF 
festival in Milan, while at the bologna festival I met a 
"pure" Amhara-Ethiopian girl. In Milan, the owner of the 
Keren -estaurant allowed the EPLF to display a poster in his 
restau: -ant, calling Eritreans to participte at a 
demons=ration it was organizing in Rome. Although his wife is 
Eritrean, whenever I tried to talk with him about the issue 
of Er_trean nationalism, he seemed to avoid the topic. 
Moreover I met quite a few Tigrean Ethiopians at many Front 
festivals, like Ruth and her son Abraham (the latter however 
born in Asmara), or Lemlem and her son Haile, all of whom I 
also met at a TPLF meeting (5). Although most of these people 
say triey participate at these events because of cultural 
affinities (similar food, music and dances), it is not 
improbable that they do so also in order to remain within the 
network of resources the Front provides. 
But ideological transgression is not allowed by the Front, as 
it can threaten its control over the Milanese community. This 
is shown by what happened when a concert was held in a 
municic"al hall, given by an Ethiopian folk group (based in 
Addis and sponsored, by the Dergue), supposedly to raise money 
for the famine-stricken Ethiopian population. As soon as the 
news about it spread, the EPLF, ELF and TPLF issued leaflets 
in Tigrinya inviting people not to attend the concert. It 
soon became obvious that the concert was going to be a test 
of the Ethiopian government's control of the Eritrean group 
in Milan in comparison to that exercised by the EPLF. This 
was reinforced by the fact that this event was not advertised 
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in the 'media, but only in "ethnic" institutions and in local 
voluntary associations. Moreover quite a few Eritreans were 
allowed in without having to pay for a ticket, hardly an 
approo-fate policy on the part of the organizers if the aim 
was tc raise funds. Finally this concert came after a leaflet 
had been circulated in Milan, issued by the Dergue, accusing 
the "candit leaders" (i. e. the leaders of the various fronts) 
of living a cosy and rich life at the expense of the people 
they claim to represent (6). 
At the entrance of the concert hall there were about a dozen 
EPLF activists plus a few TPLF ones, distributing leaflets 
(translated also into Italian) pointing out the misuse of 
relief aid by the Ethiopian authorities. Quite a few 
Eritrean/Ethiopian people went inside. I asked a young Front 
activist who these people were and, after a brief talk with 
Tekle who was standing nearby, he replied that they were 
unknown Ethiopians. There was a lot of tension and many 
policemen around. Later Abraham told me that most people who 
went in were actually Eritreans and that Tekle advised the 
other Front activist to tell me the opposite. He added that 
Tekle and the Front put a lot of psychological pressure on 
people not to attend the concert. He remarked that it was 
wrong on the part of the Front to prevent Eritreans, not to 
mention Ethiopians, form attending a concert which was part 
of their culture, which should be kept separate from politics 
and tnat this behaviour could create dangerous divisions 
within the community. Finally he pointed out that most of 
the Eritreans or Ethiopians who went in also attended events 
organized by the Front (7). The transgression of political 
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divisions for cultural reasons by Eritreans attending 
"Ethiopia- " events, is parallel to that of Ethiopians 
attendinc "Eritrean" events, although in the latter case 
there are also the political benefits outlined above. 
In summar-, ", both Father Yohannes and the Front, have a group 
of followers who give them their support and presence in the 
events they organize, partly in exchange for being able to 
use -their- network of resources and partly because of the 
legitimac'. " their leaders have, through their roles, within 
Eritrean society. However both institutions have a "hard 
core" of -followers who make sure there is no ideological 
trespassing by others, since the cultural identity these 
leaders and institutions project, is not necessarily 
coincident with the persuasion of the followers. For the 
Front this process involves a "cultural strategy" presenting 
the Milanese community as a cohesive Eritrean group 
supporting the nationalist struggle. Chapter 5 has argued, 
however, that the vast majority of Eritreans in Milan attend 
both institutions and that an Eritrean Community has been 
formed. Tne next section will analyze why and how it was 
formed anc what implications it has for the links identified 
with the "host society". 
The Eritrean Community 
Although r. owadays (1985/86) 
itself as the "natural" 
"Eritrean Community", the 
the outcomme of the strugg 
Although the leaders and 
the Eritrean Community presents 
representative of a harmonious 
process of its formation has been 
le among its various factions. 
Eritreans in general are quite 
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reticent on trris topic, some information I was able to get 
and some by=otheses might help throw some light on this 
process. These conflicts can partly be explained by the 
different ideological standpoints. In chapters 2 and 5 the 
Front's positron on religion, attempting to "play down" its 
role, has been analyzed. From Father Yohannes' and the 
Church's point of view, the main obstacle is not Eritrean 
nationalism pe- se, but the armed struggle. But different 
ideologies can be accommodated under changing circumstances 
and there are also devoted Christians who fight within the 
EPLF in Eritrea and who participate in Front organized 
events in Milan, and conversely Front fighters and activists 
who are baptized and circumsized (cf. chapter 5). 
More importantly, setting up a "Community" would pose a 
threat to the respective control over sections of the 
Milanese Eritreans of the two leaders and their institutions. 
For example, wren ,I interviewed Father Ychannes and members 
of the Front about the formation of the Community, they both 
took credit for it themselves. Father Yohannes told me that 
it was his idea and that when he proposed it to the Front, 
they were rather suspicious since it was seen as attempt to 
draw people away from the arena of nationalist politics and 
bring them to the Church. A member of the Front (Tedros), 
told me exactly the opposite. Although the Eritrean Community 
formally represents all sections of "Eritrean society", 
including the ELF, the latter is surely a minority force 
within it. Even if there was a lot of circumspection around 
this topic, from Samuel (8), I could gather that some years 
before there was an alternative faction within the Eritrean 
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group, 'centred around Wolde (the ELF leader), Selassie (the 
teacher at the Franco Verga course) and himself. He remarked 
that things were better when they were running part of the 
Eritrean social life in Milan, until they were displaced by 
the EPLF. Probably one of the reasons for which it was 
displaced, was the extent of the political network the EPLF 
was able to draw on within Milanese society. In spite of 
this, Wolde is a member of the council of the Community, even 
if his role seems to be more limited than that of other 
members. For example he was delegated to give a speech on the 
situation of Eritreans in Italy, at a congress organized by 
the League of Peoples on Third World immigration. 
Although it has not been possible to trace the political 
affiliation of all members of the council, besides Father 
Yohannes and Wolde, it includes Ghermay (member of the EPLF 
and collaborator of Tekle), a student who is also affiliated 
to the EPLF, and a woman called Embaynesh, probably linked to 
Father Yohannes. Tekle is not a member of the council even 
if, like all Eritreans who apply, he is a member of the 
Community. However, having most of the political 
connections, he often acts on behalf of it, also through his 
position as Italian representative of the Eritrean workers 
(9). In any case, as the power of decision making within the 
Community is in the end left to the assembly of members who 
express it by raising their hands, the most important leaders 
can still exert-their influence on their followers in such 
meetings by their very presence. 
Several factors facilitated the establishment of the 
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Community. In the first place the already existing flow of 
people across the two main "ethnic institutions" (cf. chapter 
5). Secondly the fact that virtually all their members were 
known to Father Yohannes and Tekle in face-to-face 
interactions, the former through his advisory centre and 
religious functions and the latter through festivals and 
education. For example Rome, which has a larger Eritrean and 
Ethiopian population which is probably more fractionalized, 
still lacks a "Community". More important a reason was 
probably the realization that setting up a "Community" would 
also have meant having access to each other's resources. For 
example two Community meeting were alternatively held in a 
hall adjacent to Father Yohannes' church and in a 
Municipality hall provided by the Front to the Solidarity 
Committee. Also, the youth centre in the church's premises 
became a premise of the Community, accessible to everybody. 
The meetings discussed, among other thing, how to raise 
funds to buy a lorry to send to the liberated areas of 
Eritrea (proposed by the EPLF) and how to help family union 
from Eritrea to Italy (a question addressed to Father 
Yohannes). 
Among the benefits that could have been drawn from this 
process, which could also have helped it, there was that of 
preserving an Eritrean identity, especially in the younger 
generations, as Wolde pointed out. This is naturally 
considered important especially by the leaders of the two 
nationalist liberation movements (cf. the next chapter). 
Even more important perhaps has been the realization that 
having a "Community" would have also meant a greater 
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legitimation of their claims vis a vis the "host society". 
For example, even in a Church-related institution like 
Caritas, there was someone, i. e. Don Mario (10), who wanted 
to establish contacts with the Front, but was afraid of 
causing a "political accident" with his colleagues who had 
strong links 'with Father Yohannes. The Eritreans were very 
aware of the dangers of presenting the image of a bitterly 
divided "community", like for example the Iranians. 
The importance of the links with the "host society" is 
recognized in the statute of the Community where it is stated 
that the council should "establish and strengthen relations 
with associations and organizations ... whose cooperation 
could be useful in achieving the social goals" (art. 4b). It 
comes-as no surprise that it is precisely the members of the 
council who can best'manage these relations. However there is 
also an awareness of the danger of instrumentalization by 
these organizations, and in particular of the political 
parties that are very powerful in Italian society (cf. 
chapter 3). The statute further says that "the Eritrean 
Community ... must be absolutely detached from the political 
parties". This is also because the parties could provide an 
alternative leadership to the already established one. 
The unitary legitimation of the Eritrean Community is also 
stressed by the presence of various leaders and members, to 
virtually all the meetings organized in Milan on the topic of 
Third World immigration. Eritreans always participate also 
because they see these meetings as opportunities to put 






are rather unique among Third World immigrants in Milan. As 
far as the former is concerned, having access to a Casa 
occupata usually implies having a network of relatives or 
friends already living there who would either be joined in 
overcrowded conditions (like the Ghebreyesus wno, before 
being moved to a Casa popolare, lived with 19 people in two 
rooms), or who would simply give the information about a 
vacancy. In this case it is quite common, especially if the 
previous squatters were Italian, to buy the "tenancy" from 
them for sums that might reach £1,000. However all this 
would not be conceivable without the support of the Front 
leaders who established political relationships with the 
radical associations who usually control the case popolari, 
especially in Milan (12), and who in turn give their backing 
to the squat. 
Even more important has been the relationship with the 
Tenants' Union called SICET (cf. chapter 6). SICET helps 
tenants in disputes with landlords and applications for 
public housing, "giving both legal advice and political 
support. An official working there told me that virtually the 
only non-Italian people that make use of their facilities are 
the Eritreans, either for individual or for collective claims 
and disputes. "As an example of the first situation, I met 
there a young man called F": ydane, whom I had seen before both 
at Father Yohannes' and Front festivals, who was threatened 
with eviction form his rented flat, together with his newly 
married wife, and who was therefore applying for public 
housing. This case, however, had less chance of success than 
the case in which a whole casa occupsta is evicted, usually 
w 
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for unsafe conditions. In such instances, when the eviction 
involves Eritreans, Tekle contacts SICET and wit n its support 
he negotiates with the local authorities to have people 
rehoused in public housing. Although foreigners who are 
entitled to public housing have to be "legal", it was only 
in 1982 that they had such right, but only "in rase of grave 
needs". This clause means that the process is n=t automatic, 
but that each case is judged on its merits. As a result, 
cases that enjoy political support have a better chance of 
being solved. The Eritreans are able to do so tnrough Teile, 
who can claim to represent the "Eritrean Community" (as he is 
acknowledged as an influential member) or "Eritrean Workers" 
(his position in the EPLF) and, with the support of SICET and 
SUNIA (13), negotiate a solution. 
This is what happened in a Casa occupata in area 3 (cf. Fig. 
4.1), in which a floor had collapsed. The newspapers reported 
this and a couple of weeks later that officials from SICET, 
SUNIA and Tekle had met the councillor for public housing who 
assured them that all tenants, including "legal" Eritreans, 
would obtain a casa popolare (14). This occurred a few weeks 
later and Lete (cf. chapter 4) was among the critreans who 
were rehoused. The same thing happened to the Ghebreyesus, 
who lived in another casa occupata and to Lemlem and her 
children. Residents from other case occupate have been 
rehoused in this way as well, and the officer from SICET said 
that between 100 and 150 Eritrean families now live in case 
popolari, accounting for maybe more than one fourth of the 
Milanese Eritrean population (15). To their knowledge other 
groups, including Egyptians, had only a handful of families 
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living *: n public housing, mainly because they lack leaders 
who ca- represent them and provide links with their 
associ a --i ons. 
Thus tns Eritreans have been able to make use of their links 
with the "host society", through their leaders, to further 
their Interests in the economic and legal spheres (Father 
Yohanne=' role as "broker" of maids and as guarantor for the 
immigra=ion of compatriots), but even more so in the sphere 
of "social reproduction", or "collective consumption", like 
housing. education, recreation and health (cf. Castells 1976, 
1977). Regarding the latter aspect it can briefly be added 
that a radical association of doctors (Democratic Medicine, 
cf. cr. apter 6), also collaborating with the Soldarity 
Committee, has opened a primary care centre only for 
Eritreaas not entitled to public health assistance. In all 
these areas, Eritreans were helped by the fact that they had 
"cultural resources" that fit the "host society" and by 
having combined them in a "Community" that provided a 
framework for the articulation of power and decision making 
(cf. Ccanen 1969,1974a, 1974b) and gave a greater 
legitimation vis a vis the "host society". This, in turn, 
enabled them to have the support of certain Milanese 
organizations that was also crucial to the success of some of 
their c: aims (16). This process in part also explains the 
tendenc,., noted in chapter 5, to perform marriages and 
baptisms in their own "ethnic institutions", as a way of 
reinforcing loyalty to the group whose benefits they share 
(cf. Comen 1981). 
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In order to be part of the group, one need not be a "pure" 
Eritrean, as Lemlem's case (born in Tigray and spending most 
of her life in Addis) shows. But the price to pay is that 
people like Lemlem or Ruth (also from Tigray) have to 
support, willy nilly, Eritrean nationalism because of the 
Front's presence in the Community. For example Ruth resented 
very much the fact that part of the membership fee to the 
Community (about £10) was going to the liberated areas of 
Eritrea and nothing to Tigray, were her eldest son was 
fighting with the TPLF. Also, non Tigrinya-speaking Eritreans 
or Ethiopians, had to adjust to the ethnic and linguistic 
dominance of Tigrinya in the community. For example Tolde, a 
Bilen Eritrean (cf. chapter 4), lamented Tigrinya chauvinism 
within the Community, in spite of pan-Eritrean nationalism 
and Berhane, a young Eritrean born in Addis and whose mother 
tongue was Amharic, although he did know some Tigrinya, had 
to improve it much more in order not to be , 
discriminated 
against (cf. chapter 5). 
Thus the Eritreans, using their "ethnic resources", are able 
to adopt a "usurpatory cultural strategy" as a group, 
especially in the field of social reproduction. The next 
section will show that the situation for Egyptians is rather 
different. 
7.2 Egyptian cultural strategies and ethnic politics 
Chapter 4 has shown that the Egyptians are a relatively large 
group (ca. 12,000) with a very strong male predominance and 
an age-structure concentrated in the working age (20-Z9). 
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Irregular employment in the catering sector is maramount. In 
spite of this there also seems to be a sma: i group of 
entrepreneurs, some of whom are linked to : ne Egyptian 
consulate. In terms of housing they tend to fa: 1 within the 
general pattern of other immigrant groups, who usually live 
in precarious tenancies or in dormitories. In _napter 5, a 
lack of attendance at the main institution that could perform 
the role of an "ethnic institution" for the Egyptians (even 
though it is not limited to them), i. e. the Muslim Centre, 
was further noted. An explanation in terms of the 
fundamentalist religious identity of the Centre versus the 
modernist one of most Egyptians in Milan, was put forward. 
Furthermore a general lack of "ethnic" support network and 
organization has been also remarked, in spite of an attemt to 
create a Community. The former point in part also explained 
the tendency of Egyptians to attend local voluntary 
organizations that gave temporary support, rather than 
helping with long-term integration, as shown in chapter 6. 
This section will suggest explanations for this relative 
"lack of ethnicity" less in cultural terms and more in terms 
of the resources that can be drawn from the host society and 
in terms of the power of mobilization that potential leaders 
have on the Milanese Egyptian population. This section also 
analyzes how intermarriage with Italian women may not only be 
due to the relative "scarcity" of Egyptian women in Milan 
(cf. chapter 5), but may also be a strategy to counter the 
above deficiencies. As Egyptians lack "ethnic resources", 
their "cultural strategy", will not involve stressing 
"ethnicity", but rather concealing it (17). 
305 
The Muslim Centre 
Turning to the Muslim Centre, the first major handicap that 
prevents it from drawing resources from the "host society", 
is that it lacks an ideological matrix that fits with the 
dominant cultural discourse of the latter, as opposed to the 
Front or Father Yohannes' church. This is paracoxical in a 
way, as the Centre includes leaders who are Italian. But 
these individuals have become Muslim precisely as a result of 
their dissatisfaction with the "materialist" values of 
western societies like Italy. The alternative identity they 
have turned to, fundamentalist Sunni Islam, is one that is 
foreign to Italian culture (cf. chapter 3). This does not 
mean that Italian society is necessarely hostile to all 
Arabs or Muslims, but there would have to be factors other 
than religion to draw sympathy. For example the nationalist 
Palestinian struggle against "zionism" enjoys some support 
from various left-wing organizations in Italy. But Islamic 
religious fundamentalism, rather than "Third Woridist" 
nationalism, is the ideological cement of the Centre. This 
religious discourse is foreign to the main cultural features 
of Italian society, dominated by Catholicism, marxism and 
liberalism. The fundamentalist view of Sunni Islam that the 
Centre expounds, is negatively perceived by those non-Muslim 
Italians who get in touch with it. For example Don Mario (cf. 
chapter 5) told me that although he was very interested in 
Islam, held no views of Christian superiority, attended some 
events at the Centre and knew Abubakr, he felt that "the 
atmosphere there is' too heavys they stand for a religious 
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sectari'anism that I have always fought against, also within 
the Church". 
The leaders of the Centre therefore lack a common cultural 
terrain that might facilitate the establishment of political 
links with the "host society" in order to further their 
interests. An example of this is the fact that the Centre had 
not yet been able to build a mosque in Milan, which it had 
been struggling to get for the past four years or so. The 
leadership of the Centre and other Milanese Muslims felt that 
it is high time that Milan had a purpose-built mosque, 
instead of the present basement, where the faithful could 
pray. The Centre has managed to secure financing for the 
project from the Kuwaitian consulate (18). But the request to 
get permission for the construction from the planning 
authorities was met with a continuous series of obstacles and 
refusals. However, in April 1984 the local authorities 
finally decided to grant some land upon which to build a 
mosque, as the July issue of the Messagaero dell' Islam (the 
Centre's monthly bulletin) triumphantly announced. But in 
Autumn Abubakr told me that the project had come to another 
stop because the authorities were prepared only to lend the 
land for the mosque, which, according to Islamic law, shuld 
be owned by Muslims. In Spring 1985 the situation evolved 
again and this time the authorities were prepared to sell the 
land at the exorbitant price of around one million pounds, 
while the Centre claimed not to be able to afford this price, 
advocating instead a heavily reduced one or a donation. 
Between Autumn 1985 and Spring 1986 the whole project was 
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again stopped by pressure from the local population and 
ex ernal events which will be discussed in the next chapter. 
Al=nough this is how the situation stands at the moment, the 
ou=come of the controversy is not predetermined, but will be 
the result of the negotiations and struggle between the 
Ce, ntre and various forces of the "host society", like the 
local authorities and the local population. What it does 
mean, however, is that the Centre, because of its weaker 
po: itical links, has less leverage than Father Yohannes or 
the Front. This might also be a reason that makes the Centre 
no= such an "attractive" institution for many Egyptians. 
Also, from the point of view of cultural identity, the fact 
that it is still located in a basement might reinforce the 
feeling of religious sectarian parochialism, that puts off 
many Egyptians from attending it. A purpose-built mosque, 
instead, as an architectural symbol of Islamic universalism, 
a visible sign of their presence and a centre of social life 
(Gilsenan 1983, p. 194), may be more "attractive". However 
sogue Egyptians told me that even with a mosque, they would 
not be interested in coming "as it would be like going to 
church in Mecca", as one put it. 
This might seem to contradict a claim made in chapter 5 that 
it is the universalism of Islam that makes the Centre an 
"ir. terethnic" institution and therefore not an Egyptian one. 
Although the character of a religion in itself is not a 
determinant factor, it is still an important one, depending 
on whether it is universal or ethnically specific (as, to a 
certain extent, Ethiopic Orthodox Christianity is). It may be 
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objected that Islam is not necessarily antithetic to 
"ethnicity", as the case of the Hausa in Ibadan, adhering to 
the Muslim Tijanyva Order, shows. But while in this case 
there is a specific sect with theological and ritual 
differences from orthodox Islam (cf. Cohen 1969), in the case 
of the Muslim Brotherhood to which the Centre's leadership 
belongs, there is only a sectarian organization, but a 
universal and orthodox (even if fundamentalist) theology, 
ritual and membership. But even more important is the fact 
that in the case of the Hausa, the religious sect is 
controlled by powerful members of the group, which exclude 
non-Hausas from membership, while in the case of the Centre, 
the leadership does not belong to any single group, but is 
mainly Italian or Jordanian, but not Egyptian in any case. 
This means that the Centre is not the focus of socialization 
and articulation of interests of a single ethnic group, but 
can still perform this function for those who are members and 
thus be an "interethnic institution". The lack of political 
links with the "host society ", however, suggest that this 
function might not be the same as that of Father Yohannes', 
church or the Front in the relationship with the "host 
society", but more an internal articulation of trade. This 
seems to be supported by some evidence, in that at least 
three of the Italians who I interviewed there, were 
merchants. 
The Eeyotian Community 
The fact that there is no religious institution performing 
the function of an "ethnic institution" and providing 
leadership, does not mean that others could not exist, in 
0 309 
other smheres of their social life. However chapter 5 has 
argued : hat there is no other institution, comparable to the 
Muslim Centre that could perform such functions. However it 
will be remembered from chapter 5 that a group of influential 
Egyptians more or less all linked to the consulate tried to 
set up an "Egyptian Community". The "Community", which was 
finall} constituted in November 1985, includes a couple of 
owners of import-export enterprises; Ismail, who owns a 
physiotherapy gym (cf. chapters 4 and 5); and a teacher of 
Arabic in a state school who is also an officer of the 
consula_e. 
This attempt to constitute a "Community", has also to be 
related to a proposal from the Milanese municipality to 
create a "Council of Migrants" representing the various local 
voluntary associations and "migrant communities" in Milan, to 
be able to discuss with the local authorities ways to improve 
their situation (cf. Taub et al. 1977). This could have been 
an opportunity for groups like the Egyptians to have their 
voice heard by the local authorities, even if they lacked 
links w. th the "host society". But the problem that emerged 
at a meeting on this topic held at the Volta school in March 
1986, in which representatives of the various local 
associa=ions and many foreign migrants were present, was the 
question of who were to be the representatives of those 
migrant groups that did not have a clear organization. This 
was the case of the Egyptians, as opposed to the Eritrean%, 
both of whom were present at the meeting. When it was pointed 
out to he Egyptians present at the meeting by a member of 
CISL, trat a few months earlier an "Egyptian Community" had 
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been "constituted by the people mentioned above, most 
Egyptians there seemed totally unaware of this. They remarked 
"how are we going to be sure that they are going to represent 
the interests of the 90% of Egyptians who work in 
restaurants? " (see chapter 5 above). 
The problem is therefore that these potential "community 
builders", lack the legitimacy for an acknowledgment of their 
leadership, as there is no focus of socialization where it 
could be transacted, like Father Yohannes' church or the 
Front festivals. In this respect the consulate, which might 
be a focus of aggregation of power, cannot be one of 
socialization. Also their role does not have a "traditional" 
legitimacy by reference to the country of origin, like the 
orthodox priest or liberation fighter for the Eritreans, even 
if there is a tradition of urban patrons in Cairo (cf. El 
Messri 1977). On the other hand, the lack of a centre and of 
legitimacy where power vis a vis the community can be 
transacted is related to the lack of links and resources they 
can mobilize from the "host society". Moreover, as noted in 
chapter 5, Egyptians deeply feel the class divisions cutting 
across their society, not only in Egypt, but also in Milan, 
as Mohammed (cf. chapters 4 and 5) noted: "I would never 
socialize with a peasant from upper Egypt". The founders of 
the Egyptian Community therefore lack the legitimation and 
mobilization of power to be "legitimate leaders" besides, to 
a great extent, lacking the political links enjoyed by the 
Eritrean ones. In summary both the Muslim Centre and the 
Egyptian Community, for different reasons, do not articulate 
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and promote the interests of the Egyptians and do not 
therefore constitute "ethnic institutions". 
Intermarriage 
How do Egyptians manage to counter these relative 
disadvantages? The relative lack of "cultural resources" and 
political links and the failure to articulate and mobilize 
the group are disadvantages that occur at the level of the 
group and prevent the promotion of collective interests. But 
the interests of the individuals that make up the group, such 
as access to better employment, housing, etc., may still be 
pursued by trying to conceal "differences" between them as 
individuals and the "host society", rather than by 
underlining group identity. One of the main avenues of this 
strategy is intermarriage. Marrying an Italian citizen 
involves acquiring Italian citizenship after three years (if 
no legal separation has occurred in the meantime), but 
rights of unlimited sojourn and rights to seek any kind of 
job, are acquired immediately. In chapter 5 it has already 
been hinted that this occurrence is rather frequent for the 
Egyptians who, being a predominantly male group, have a high 
rate of males marrying Italian women. It will also be 
remembered that for a marriage to be recognized as valid by 
the Italian state, it has to be performed by an authorized 
minister of a "recognized cult" (Catholic, Protestant, 
Jewish, but not Muslim) or in the Municipality. Therefore for 
a' marriage between a Muslim Egyptian and an Italian citizen 
to be recognized by the Italian state, it has to be performed 
in the Municipality and would be recorded in the "civil" 
section. At any rate, the marriages celebrated at the Muslim 
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Centre, ' are very few compared to those celebrated in the 
Municpality. Very few people who marry in the Municipality 
marry again, religiously, in the Centre. 
As the Municipality does not publish any statistics 
concerning marriages broken down by nationalities and 
therefore every single marriage had to be reviewed in order 
to get some data, I was able to do so only for the year 1985, 
which involved examining over 6,000 marriage certificates. Of 
the 108 civil marriages I recorded involving at least one 
citizen from a non-Western country, 34 (or 31% of the total) 
involved an Egyptian citizen, of which 28 (26% of the total) 
were between an Egyptian male and an Italian female. No other 
single group approached these percentages. Moreover while 
the average year of birth of the Egyptian males was 1955, 
that of the Italian females was 1950. Breaking down the 
figure further, of the 13 cases in which the Egyptian men 
were younger than the Italian women, the respective years of 
birth were 1953 and 1943. Moreover, two marriages were 
recorded between Italian men and Egyptian women and one 
between an Egyptian man and a British woman, both cases 
involving the same acquisition of rights, except for Italian 
nationality in the latter. Not a single case was found where 
both partners were of Egyptian nationality. Assuming that 
similar figures applied also in at least the two preceeding 
years and that the trend will continue to grow, given the 
relatively recent nature of Egyptian immigration, it can be 
concluded that intermarriage for the Egyptians is not just a 
sporadic occurrence, but a significant trend, enhancing their 
social and legal-'position in Italian society. Although the 
313 
benefits resulting from these marriages may not be the only 
reasons for their occurrence, this is in part confirmed by 
the fact that many of these marriages go against the social 
convention in Italy that the wife should be younger than the 
husband. It can be speculated that from the point of view of 
Italian women, these marriages occur after a divorce (as in 
the case of Zayed's wife, cf. chapters 4 and 5) or are a way 
of avoiding celibacy. Moreover this pattern for the 
Egyptians stands in sharp contrast with that of the 
Eritreans, for whom marriages in the "ethnic institution" is 
more common than that in the Municipality and for whom only ä 
out of 7 of those celebrated in the Municipality were 
between Italian males and "Ethiopian" females, the rest 
being among "Ethiopians". 
In chapter 5 it was shown that many single Egyptians 
expressed the desire to marry Italian women and saw no 
religious "obstacles" to this. In terms of identity, does 
this mean that the Egyptians are more "assimilated" than, for 
example, the Eritreans? It should be remembered that Islamic 
law allows polygamy up to four wives and that this is still 
tolerated in Egypt, even if with some amendments that give 
some extra rights to the wives (cf. chapter 2). This could 
mean that a, marriage with an Italian woman could be conceived 
of as a temporary strategy to enhance life chances in Italy 
while at the same time having a Muslim wife in Egypt or 
marrying one subsequently without having to divorce the 
Italian one. But it seems that polygamy is not common among 
the educated urban middle classes from which most of the 
Egyptian migrants in Milan come and would go against 
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Italian law. None of my informants expressed these 
intentions. A more likely pattern would be to ask for a 
divorce after a, few years of marriage and go back to Egypt 
and marry again or acquire Italian nationality and stay in 
Italy (19). 
. 
But most Egyptians I interviewed expressed the 
desire to stay in Italy if they could improve the situation 
and everybody said that marrying an Italian woman would be 
one such instance. Finally even though every Egyptian 
remarked that they had no religious problems in marrying a 
Christian woman and that the children would be brought up in 
a "pluralistic" religious environment and would be able to 
choose between the; two religions when adult, for the Islamic 
law the children of such marriages are Muslim by right. Thus 
marrying a non-Muslim Italian woman does not necessarily mean 
giving up one's "ethnic" identity to acquire a new one, but 
it means that it cannot be stressed and used as a resource 
because there is no evidence that the Italian women who marry 
them want to convert later. It has at least to be "played 
down"_ in the new context, as it is doubtful whether marrying 
a non-Muslim and non-Arab is socially approved in the Arab 
world. 
Crime 
Intermarriage may not be the only strategy carried out by 
Egyptians to ehance their situation in Milan. Various forms 
of criminal activity may also be among them. This has been a 
common pattern among immigrants in the USA to counter the 
structural disadvantages deriving from their position as 
latecomers in American society (cf. Hannerz , 
1974). Moreover 
concepts such as "criminality"9 "cultural pathology" and 
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"social' disorganization" often have racist implications (cf. 
Gilroy 1982, Lawrence 1982b, Jackson 1984). Given these 
warnings, the occurrence of crime among Egyptians in Milan 
can now be examined and compared with that of the E-itreans. 
To begin with, no accurate and reliable data could be 
gathered, given that the topic of "foreign crimina: ity" has 
become a very "hot" issue, especially in connect . son with 
terrorism (cf. chapter 8). 
The only data that could be collected were from the Milanese 
page of a national conservative newspaper (ii Giornale) which 
reported many instances of "ethnic crime" and through a 
Ministerial publication. Even if these sources may not 
provide an impartial picture of the situation, they give a 
general idea. From September 1984 to March 1986 the paper 
reported the arrest of 31 persons from Third World countries, 
of whom 19 were from Egypt, 10 from Tunisia, 1 from Morocco 
and 1 from "Ethiopia". Of the 19 Egyptians, 15 were arrested 
for crimes related to drug dealing. Among the Tunisians the 
most common offence was theft (7 out of 10). It was 
interesting that the only "Ethiopian" arrested was caught 
with some of the above Egyptians and had a Muslim surname. 
These data suggest that the occurrence of crime among the 
Egyptians might not just be sporadic, but a form of "ethnic 
enterprise", mainly related to drugs, although probably 
practiced by a small minority of the group. On the otner hand 
it seems to be virtually absent from the Eritrean group. This 
pattern is confirmed by data from the Ministry of Justice 
(20), although confined to the national level. They reported 
that as of June 15,1985 there were 7%, 945 foreign prisoners 
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in It9ly among whom the main categories of offence were 
"against property" (i. e. theft) = 1,489 (. -7% of the total) 
and "against other laws" (mainly drugs) e 1,129 : =a% of 
total). Table 7.1 reports foreign prisoners in Italy, by 
nationality and offence. 
These data seem to confirm the Milanese ones, identifying 
Egyptians and Tunisians as the main "foreigners" invo: ved in 
illicit activities, apart from the "Yugoslavs". The problem 
is that the national distribution and size of the above 
population may not be consistent with the Milanese one. Thus 
although in Milan Egyptians outnumber Tunisians, it may be 
that at the national level this is not so, at least not in 
such a marked way. Or it may be that the high rate of 
Tunisian crime may come from areas other than Milar. where 
there is a greater concentration, as in Sicily, for example. 
At any rate the percentage of offenders for "Ethiopians" is 
much lower than for either Tunisians or Egyptians, 
respectively one fourteenth and one eighth. Even taking into 
account the fact that the Egyptian population is larger than 
the "Ethiopian" one also at the national level and assuming 
that the Milanese ratio of about four to one applies also at 
the national level, the figure for Egyptians would still be 
more than double. Finally, the presence of some systematic 
forms of "ethnic crime" among the Egyptians, was confirmed by 
interviews with Egyptians, like Zayed (cf. chapters 4 and 5) 
who remarked that many of his compatriots who come with 
little money to Italy "get involved with bad people in the 
drugs business". Also among Eritreans Egyptians have the 
"reputation" of being thieves and drug dealers. (cf. the next 
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Table 7.1 Foreign prisoners in Italy (May 31.1985) 
Yugoslavia (mainly Gypsies). 535 = 14.9: 
Tunisia ..................... 451 = 12.67 
Egypt ....................... 280 = 7.87.. 
Morocco ..................... 187, = 5.1% 
Algeria ..................... 149 = 4.17. 
Nigeria ..................... 176 = Z. 8% 
France.... ............... 130 = . 6% Germany (BRD) ............... 113 _ 3.1% Chile ........................ 92 = 2.57. 
Switzerland .................. 79 = 2.2% 
Lebanon ...................... 67 = 1.87. 
Syria ........................ 63 = 1.7% 
Turkey ....................... 63 = 1.77 
Colombia ..................... 61 = 1.77. 
Austria ...................... 52 = 1.4% 
India ........................ 50 = 1.37. 
Ghana ........................ 49 = 1.37. 
Argentina .................... 47 = 1.37.. 
Iran ......................... 43 - 1.27. 
Belgium ...................... . "8 = 1.0% 
Sri Lanka .................... 37 - 1.07 
Spain ........................ 37 = 1.0% 
Albania ...................... 34 = 0.97. 
Ethiopia... .......... :2=0.87. 
Other 60 nationalities...... 616 - 17.27 
Total ......... ............ 3,572 =100.0% 
Source: Ministry of Grace and Justice (1985) 
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chapter). No moral judgment is implied here, nor any 
suggestion that "crime" among the Egyptians is "abnormally 
high". What is suggested, is that there may be a more 
significant presence of "crime" among the Egyptians than 
among the Eritreans, as another ethnic strategy to counter 
the relative lack of "ethnic resources" and of political 
leadership and organization, enjoyed to a greater extent by 
the latter group. 
7.3 Conclusion 
In spite of the fact that they are both in a similar class 
position with respect to relations of production, i. e. in the 
lower, unprotected tertiary sector - albeit in different 
economic niches - the two groups in consideration employ very 
different strategies to counter their situation of economic 
and legal subordination. Thus although it is important to 
characterize their class situation as migrant labour (cf. 
Miles 1982), it is insufficient to analyze their behaviour in 
the present context. A political perspective based on the 
strategies employed by the groups to exploit the available 
opportunities to enhance their position should also be taken 
into account, even if-within the "exclusionary" constraints 
of the "host society" (cf. chapter 8). This situation can be 
characterized as one of "usurpation", following Parkin's 
(1979) notion of "social closure". In this process "ethnic 
resources" (Wailman 1979) are important factors defining the 
kinds of links with the "host society" that can be utilized 
to their advantage, as well as providing a framework for 
internal organization, mobilization and decision making. 
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Often 'certain aspects of the group's identity that are more 
suitable to pursue collective interests, are emphasized, even 
if "the cultural" is not freely constructable, but is 
constrained by the "identity options" that allow individuals 
to recognize their position as members of the group. When 
there are powerful individuals within the group who can 
articulate these elements at the group level to promote the 
group's interests these become "cultural strategies", usually 
stressing the group's distinctiveness (Cohen 1969,1974a, 
1974b). 
This is, to a certain extent, the case of the Eritreans who, 
through the cultural discourses of Christianity and 
"radicalism" shared with the "host society" and the reproach 
of the colonial links, are able to engage in a collective 
"usurpatory strategy" in the fields of legal rights, housing, 
education, among others. In this the role of powerful 
"patron/brokers" is crucial, manipulating them to some extent 
and presenting a certain version of the group's identity 
through their double role as group leaders and as mediators 
with the "host society". This was done through the 
presentation of the Eritreans towards the "host society" at 
times as a "Catholic" group, and at times as an oppressed 
national minority, part of the Third World's liberation 
struggles. They can thus both mobilize the group's identity 
and utilize their political links with certain sections of 
the Milanese society. The latter were also crucial in 
successfully ending certain struggles and claims, as in the 
field of housing. The main difference with Cohen's model of 
the Hausa lies in the fact that for them a "cultural 
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strategy" involved mainly the internal articulation of 
interaction and power to control a trading network, while in 
the Eritrean case it is to manipulate a political network of 
links with the "host society". But when "cultural resources" 
and "patron/brokers" are not available and class divisions 
override "ethnic solidarity", as in the Egyptian case, a 
"cultural strategy" might be more individualistic, "playing 
down", rather than emphasizing, the group's identity. This 
was achieved through a self-pesentation as "lay" persons 
sharing a common "Mediterraneanness" wih Italians. The 
outcomes of these strategies ranged from intermarriage to 
organized crime. 
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NOTES TO CHAPTER 7 
(1) For a similar argument applied to British bureaucracy, 
cf. Flett (1979). 
(2) For a similar pattern of Asian "ethnic brokers" in 
Britain, cf. Brooks and Singh (1979). 
(3) The argument of the social construction of employment in 
terms of gender is developed, among others, by Carby (1982). 
(4) This group is slightly to the left of the PCI, but is not 
formalized into a party. 
(5) Cf. chapter 2 for a brief outline of the TPLF and 
chapters 4 and 5 for an intoduction to some of the characters 
mentioned here. 
(6) The leaflet, called "The sole truth and only solution", 
was issued by the Workers' Party of Ethiopia (i. e. the Derg) 
in 1985 
(7) The fact that a good deal of them were young people has 
some implications for the concept of "second generation 
identity" which will be discussed in the next chapter. 
(8) One of the informants mentioned in chapters 4 and 5. 
(9) One of the EPLF's "mass organizations". 
(10) The radical priest mentioned in chapter 6. 
(11) Cf. chapter .: " for the legislation and chapter 6 for the 
situation of political refugees in Milan 
(12) On this topic cf. Boffi et al. (1972) 
(13) SUNIA is the Tenants Union linked to the Communist Trade 
Union, CGIL, which also supports the Eritreans, but less 
actively than SICET. 
(14) la Fepubblica, August 22,1985 and September 5,1985. 
(15) Data from the Municipality could not be collected, for 
this is considered a "hot issue" (cf. chapter 8). 
(16) Cf. Susser (1982) for a similar argument regarding the 
struggle of the American urban poor. 
(17) This point therefore partly contradicts Cohen's model. 
(18) The relationship between what Humphreys (1981) would 
define as a "fundamentalist state" and a fundamentalist sect 
like the Muslim Brotherhood, seems to be at times one of 
cooperation and at times one of conflict. 
(19) It is almost impossible to check how many of those 
Egyptians who married in Milan actually went back to Egypt. 
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(20) Mi, nistero di Grazia e Giusti: ia "The Prison in Italy: 
History, Development, Perspectives" 7th U. N. Congress on 
Prevention of Crime and Treatment of Offenders. 
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CHAPTER 8: RACISM, ETHNIC RELATIONS AND TRANSFORMATIONS 
This chapter examines how the "host society" reacts, in terms 
of social relations and ideological stereotypes, to the 
presence of these immigrant groups and if there is a 
different attitute towards the two groups under 
consideration. The particular forms that racist ideology and 
"exclusionary" discrimination take in the Milanese context 
will be assessed. Secondly it briefly examines how the 
discriminatory practices of the "host society" are felt by 
individuals from the two groups and if this entails a change 
of attitude towards Italian society and, more importantly, if 
a transformation of their "ethnic identity" is beginning to 
emerge. In this respect the concept of "second generation 
identity" will be assessed. Finally it looks briefly at the 
attitudes and perceptions members of the two groups have 
towards each other. 
8.1 Racist ideologies and discriminatory practices 
In chapter 1 it was argued that racism, as a negative 
ideology attributed to an out-group, takes different forms in 
different historical and social circumstances, being at times 
constructed in biological terms with notions of racial 
inferiority, and at times in cultural ones with notions of 
"pathological culture", "disreputable lifestyle" and 
"criminality" (cf. C. C. C. S. 1982, Miles 1982). The economic 
context is crucial in all cases. Secondly, one should 
distinguish between racism at the level of ideas and at the 
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level of social practice, as the ideologies that "inform" 
these practices might have arisen in different circumstances 
(cf. Miles 1982). Thirdly, concerning the racist ideological 
legacy in Italy, it was argued that although a biologically 
constructed racist discourse was not prominent, there are 
some, albeit weak, sets of stereotypes against Muslims and 
Islam, Abyssinians and southern Italians, although the latter 
are of a different nature and occur in a different context. 
Finally in chapters 3 and 4 it has been argued that the 
system of regulations concering foreign immigration to Italy 
pushes the migrants to become clandestine workers in the 
lower tertiary sector and that therefore there is little 
competition beteen migrant workers and "native" ones in terms 
of employment. 
In this context foreign migrants are not unionized and have 
not acquired a common class consciousness with the native 
working class, unlike what happened with migrants from 
southern Italy (cf. Ascoli 1979, p. 148). This is because to 
a large extent they did not compete with the Italian working 
class over employment having never entered the industrial 
manufacturing sector and because the jobs they perform are 
to a large extent not sought after by Italians (cf. chapter 
: ). In the Italian and Milanese case in particular there are 
no structural preconditions for the emergence of racism in 
the economic, productive sphere. This- also means, 
paradoxically, that the trade unions, contrary to what 
happens in other countries, do not have a negative attitude 
towards the immigrants, but support in part their claims (cf. 
chapters 3 and 6). 
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While this is the attitude of the unions (their attitude in 
specific situations will be examined below), little data have 
been found concerning the attitude of the rank and file of 
the working class itself. However, perhaps ignorance (in the 
sense of not caring) is the best way of describing their 
attitude, since I never heard any reports of antagonism to 
the unions' position nor, except in sporadic cases (like the 
Committee for the Eritreans), of active support, such as 
mobilization to defend their rights. Their attitude might 
change in the future, either if the immigrants, after having 
acquired some legal rights, gain access to jobs for which 
there is competition from the local population or, in case of 
a deep economic recession and radical change in the nature of 
the Italian welfare state (with its system of 
assistenzialismo). In this case they will start looking for 
employment in those sectors, at present occupied to a certain 
extent by the migrants, for which there is still shortage of 
"native" labour. 
On the other hand certain manifestations of racism in the 
field of employment occur not so much in relation to the 
competition between migrants and "natives" over employment, 
but to the low status of the jobs performed by the migrants. 
In an Eritrean case, Ruth (cf. chapter 4) told me that once, 
as she was taken to a holiday resort by the family for whom 
she was working as a maid and complained about the place she 
was forced to live, she was answered: "shut up, you slave 
bitch". The "imagery" used in this instance seems to be drawn 
from the colonial legacy. Another source of tension is when 
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there are arguments between the migrant-worker and the 
employer over the social security of the job. For instance an 
Egyptian who worked for a porters' cooperative who tried to 
resist his sacking after an illness, was told: "you bastard 
Egyptian I'll get you thrown out of Italy". 
If there are few racist tensions in the area of employment, 
they may be emerging in other areas of social relations. 
These are important to determine since, in popular discourse 
and "common sense" ideology, one often hears thatt "Italians 
are not racist by nature". "There has never been antisemitism 
in Italy". "We were the only 'good' colonial power that 
treated the indigenous well". While the first claim does 
contain at least some elements of truth (cf. chapter 3), the 
last one is certainly wrong (cf. Del Boca 1985, Mazrui and 
Tidy 1984). Five areas of social relations in which racist 
tensions are beginning to emerge can be identified. Coupled 
with the ideological legacy, they define the ideological 
discourse of "racism" (not necessarily couched in the 
biological language of "race"). They aret housing, 
criminality, terrorism, places of socialization and, in 
specific instances, religion. Some of them are interrelated. 
Housina 
The previous chapter *examined how the Eritreans have access 
to public housing. In the past couple of years, pressure on 
access to public housing from "indigenous" Milanese people 
has also risen since quite a few private tenancies, for years 
safeguarded by the Italian equivalent of the "Fair Rent" 
policy, have been threatened with eviction, some of which 
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have been actually carried out. Moreover as the housing 
market, both private and public, is quite frozen and those 
who have access to housing in favourable conditions (owners, 
public or private tenants with "Fair Rent") tend to keep it 
and to "pass it on" to their children, there is pressure from 
people who are not able to buy, to have access to public 
housing. The process of rehousing the Eritreans in 
Municipality-owned public housing, which took place in the 
last couple of years, has not yet come to the attention of 
the general public and the media have not (yet) made an issue 
of it, perhaps also bec ause of its relatively small 
dimensions, compared to the size of the Milanese housing 
problem. But there are a fe w hints of what the reaction might 
be. 
The previous chapter also described an incident concerning 
the squatters of one casa occupata (among whom were many 
Eritreans), who were evicted and subsequently rehoused in 
Municipality-owned public housing and that this incident 
received attention in two small articles of the local page of 
a national newspaper (1). A few days later, the Municipal 
councillors of the MSI party (neofascist), accused a 
councillor of the ruling coalition responsible for public 
housing, of giving Municipality-owned flats to "illegal 
Eritreans" at the expense of Italian families (2). The 
Tenants' Unions, in a leaflet of October 9,1985, condemned 
the MSI's intervention as indicative of its "racist attitude 
... and inhuman attempt to antagonize, on 
the level of 
fundamental needs like housing, Italian workers to ... 
Eritrean workers". The MSI might be considered relatively 
328 
marginal in Italian politics and in terms of popular support, 
but it is probable that its attitude on this question would 
have a larger support than its percentage of votes, should 
this turn into a "hot issue". Another instance of the fear of 
what might happen "if the lid was opened" is that, when I 
asked a Municipality officer, with the backing of a DC 
councillor, if he could give me some data on public housing 
given to foreign migrants, he was most elusive, gave me a 
figure that was less than one third of the estimated real 
one, and concluded that I should not pursue the issue any 
further "since it is not an appropriate moment". It might be 
concluded that, although at the time being there is no overt 
conflict between Milanese and Eritreans over housing which 
may give rise to racist attitudes and practices, this might 
prove to be a fertile ground for future developments. 
Criminality 
"Criminality" is an important area of racist attitudes 
towards "coloured migrants" (cf. chapter 1). Although it is 
true that the migrants' "criminality" is exaggerated, it is 
also true that on the whole their rate may well be higher 
than that of the local population (and even this might not 
alway be the case), but not as a result of "pathological" 
cultures but as a fairly common "strategy" to counter the 
lack of resources available to newly arrived migrant groups, 
with important differences among them (cf. the previous 
chapter). An example of the criminalization of migrants in 
Milan carried out by the media, is an article from the 
Milanese page of il Giornale, September 29,1985. The 
article's headline was "Sprawl of 'coloured' criminality 
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fuelled by clandestine immigrants" and went on to say that 
"In Milan the unsolved question of clandestines ... is 
becoming a serious problem of public order ... ". The article 
(and other similar ones) contains the "classic" features of 
the emergence of a racist discourse centred around the 
criminali: ation of migrants: the alarmist apprehension of 
"floods" or "invasions" of "coloured" immigrants; the 
indiscriminate and unproblematic association between the 
migrants and the rise of criminality and the reference to the 
notion of "public order"(cf. Solomos et al. 1982, Lawrence 
1982a, 1982b, Gilroy 1982) (ä). Although the tradition of 
internal criminality (Mafia and the like) prevents the total 
imputation of the phenomenon of criminality to the migrants 
(who, when involved in it, would often depend on Italian 
"organizations"), in the popular discourse one starts to hear 
remarks like: "things are not the same since they came", or 
"it became more dangerous to walk in the streets". An old 
lady who had her house broken into from a small window in the 
roof remarked: "in order to be so agile to break in from that 
point, it must have been one of those coloured immigrants". 
Terrorism 
Another area of development of racist attitudes towards the 
migrants, is the association between "clandestine" immigrants 
and terrorism. This process was triggered by some events that 
hit the news at the end of 1985. These events includeds the 
hijack of the Achille Lauro cruiser in the Autumn of 1985 by 
a faction of the PLO and the massacre of 13 people at Rome's 
airport, probably carried out by the Abu Nidal group in 
December of the same year (4). Especially after the second 
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event the media started conveying to the public the image of 
an association between terrorist events and the presence of 
"clandestines" in Italy. For example the prestigious il 
Corriere della Sera, in the Milanese page of January 4,1986, 
a few days after the massacre at the airport wrote: "After 
the dramatic event of Fumicino (Rome's airport), also in 
Lombardy the problem of clandestines comes up again". Or il 
Giornale (December 28,1985): "The hypotheses on the massacre 
link together: irregular foreigners in Italy are 800,000, 
people are calling for measures". Although in most articles 
the causal link between "clandestines" and terrorism was not 
made explicit, the association between the two was conveyed 
to public opinion. What was striking about the majority of 
these articles was that they never mentioned the fact that it 
was very unlikely that highly trained terrorists, provided 
with false passports, could come from the common milieu of 
"illegal" dishwashers or maids, and secondly the generalizing 
character of the association with all types of immigrant 
groups, even if very remotely (like the Eritreans) or not 
related at all (like, say the Salvadoreans) to the 
Middle-Eastern politics in question. This is important for 
the change in the attitude towards life in Italy, of the two 
migrant groups under consideration (cf. the following 
sections). 
The above events proved to be a watershed in the relationship 
between the migrants and Italian people in general. 
Subsequent to them, the media, and in particular the 
newspapers which had previously remained virtually silent on 
the question of the "new" foreign immigration, released a 
331 
"flood" of articles on the question, with various degrees of 
analysis and sympathy. For many Italians who had not 
acknowleoged, at least consciously, this "new" presence in 
their country, the realization came in conjunction with these 
events. As a response to this, the Minister of Internal 
Affairs released a statement that "a law proposal" containing 
stricter regulations on the question of foreign immigration, 
had been prepared. The media reported this (e. g. il Corriere 
delle Sera January 4,1986) (5) and it might have satisfied 
public opinion. Upon closer scrutiny, however, this proposal 
did not change the substance of the existing regulations, 
just changing them from administrative norms to law, maybe to 
preserve the benefits to the labour market deriving from the 
presence of the "clandestines", as suggested in previous 
chapters. Only slightly tougher measures for migrants or 
their employers breaking the rules were envisaged. Although 
some expulsions were carried out in the weeks following the 
massacre (cf. la Repubblica, January 5,1986), this might 
have been for the use of the media and public opinion and 
there is no evidence that a systematic policy of forced 
repatriation followed. 
The criminalization of the immigrants in conjunction with 
these terrorist events might be due to the need "to make 
sense", to use Solomos's et al. (1982) expression, of a 
crisis in the field of foreign policy that occurred quite 
independently from the presence of the "clandestine" 
immigrants. At the level of social interaction, many more 
instances of "racist incidents" happened, or at least were 
reported. In buses, or on walls, sentences like: 
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"Palestinians go home", "Arabs out of Italy", or "Marocchini 
out of Rome" (cf. 1a Repubblica January 4,1986 and il 
Manifesto January 18,1986) were more or less directly 
related to the above incidents. It is important to point out, 
however, that while it is more or less clear who is to be 
considered, in popular discourse, a "Palestinian", this is 
less true of "Arabs" and even more of "Marocchini" 
(Moroccans), as will be shown below. On the other hand it is 
more difficult to discern whether the rise in reports of 
sackings of '"clandestine" workers (6) was due to fear of 
employing "potential terrorists" or of the tougher sanctions 
of the new law proposal, whether the above events just 
triggered latent feelings, or if it was just due to the 
greater attention given by the media to these issues. As a 
final example of the great tension surrounding these issues, 
it may be mentioned that when I went to the Questura (Police 
headquarters) to ask for some data about the number and 
nationality of foreign prisoners in Milan, stating that I was 
a student, before I could even finish the sentence I was 
taken to a room where my identity card was requested, my 
criminal record checked on a computer and finally I was tolde 
"we cannot release this delicate information". 
Reliaion 
Religion, and in particular Islam, might be another area for 
the development of racst attitudes and feelings. In chapter 
t it was argued that traditionally Islam has been negatively 
perceived in Italy, but the lach; of a consistent Muslim 
population in modern times in Italy prevented its practical 
expression. In the previous chapter some of the difficulties 
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that the Muslim Centre encountered in carrying out its 
project of building a mosque in Milan have been outlined. 
Here it can be added that at the beginning of 1985, a 
committee of residents in the area where the mosque should 
have been built was formed in opposition to the project. The 
leader of the committee put forward "technical" planning 
reasons for this opposition, stating that it would have 
created traffic problems, given that it would have been 
situated near the football stadium and race course and 
suggested choosing a more peripheral and quiet site. In 
reality the area did not seem to have particular 
disadvantages from the point of view of traffic since, 
although it was true that it was near the stadium and the 
race course, it was also already quite peripheral and with 
rather wide streets. Other areas in Milan would not have been 
more or less suitable. More importantly, it was a very 
residential upper-middle class area, with attractive villas 
with gardens and the residents feared that a mosque would 
have attracted people with "disreputable lifestyles", who 
would moreover be Muslims (cf. Fig 4.2). This was confirmed 
by an interview with the parish priest of a church close to 
the site who was disturbed by the project. He told me that 
he had nothing against the construction of "another temple 
for the worship of God" (meaning that he was not 
anti-Muslim), but that he was afraid of the social life this 
would have brought about, like "drug dealing". He was aware 
of the committee of residents against the mosque and 
acknowledged that he had had pressures from them to join and 
to take a stance against the project, but he hastened to add 
that he never formally joined the committee and did not lend 
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the pr. emises of the church for its meetings. However he 
conceded that he agreed with, its motivations. In the end he 
said that the police authorities stopped the project anyhow 
since, after the terrorist incidents, it "became dangerous 
to build a. mosque in an area with many consular residences". 
This episode shows how the issue of "terrorism" can be used 
by the "natives" as an excuse to avoid the contact with what 
are perceived as "disreputable" lifestyles and an "alien" 
religion. 
Places of socialization 
A final area of development of racist attitudes and practices 
is that of places of socialization, like bars and 
restaurants. This seems to happen where, there is a certain 
degree of "ethnic mix" between the migrants and the "natives" 
as in, certain bars and restaurants which are monopolized by 
specific ethnic groups, the Eritreans in particular, where 
only the "sympathetic" Italians go there. In this case 
however, when there is a concentration of "ethnic" bars and 
restaurants in a specific area, like in area 3 where there 
are three Eritrean restaurants and- two bars (8), the whole 
area acquires a "bad" reputation. In that specific instance 
for example, where some "old Milanese", usually lower-middle 
class, live, I heard statements likes "the area is not like 
it used to be", "it became more dangerous around here", etc. 
In the first case (that of "ethnically mixed" bars, etc. ) I 
witnessed two examples. I used to go very often with a group 
of young immigrants (mainly Eritreans, but also some Somalis 
and Salvadoreans) to play table-football in a bar near the 
community.,. centre where they attended a course (cf. the 
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following section). The bar was in a very central area with 
many offices and had a separate room wnere customers could 
play pool, table-tennis and table-footoall. Once I noticed 
that they stopped going and they told me they did so because 
the owner of the bar told them they should not come anymore. 
When I went to ask her explanation and if she had something 
to complain about, she answered that she did not. But she 
added: "I am a Christian and believe in God and therefore I 
am not racist. But I would like those boys not to come 
anymore, since they are putting off other customers from 
coming". As some of the boys kept on going, rightly arguing 
that they were not committing any offence, she threatened to 
call the police and they stopped going altogether. 
Similarly I had a conversation with the owner of a bar 
attended by many Egyptians, in area 5, inhabited by quite a 
few Egyptians (cf. chapter 4 and Fig. 4.2). After having gone 
to that bar several times, I had the impression that 
"relations" between the mignants and the "natives" were quite 
"good", since I often saw them playing cards or boccette 
together. After a while, I had the impression of a decrease 
in attendance by Egyptians and talked about it to the owner. 
He told me: "I am left-wing and I concerned myself with the 
situation of Third World immigrants for years. At the 
beginning things between Egyptians and Italian were alright, 
" but then they started deteriorating as more and more of them 
came, among them people involved in rackets. It became 
impossible to distinguish between 'good' and 'bad' people and 
after a while I was faced with an ultimatum by my Italian 
customers: 'ether us or them'. So I told them they were not 
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well accepted in my bar anymore and their number drastically 
reduced". In both cases therefore dicriminatrory practices 
emerge against "the other" who is constructed in terms of 
"threatening" and "disreputable" lifestyles by members of the 
"host society", in the context of common places of 
socialization. This is reminiscent, to a certain extent, of 
the 1950s and 1960s with the immigration from the South, with 
the difference that in our'case the greater cultural, social 
and structural distance, will probably lead to an increase in 
the segregation of places of socialization, as in the 
Eritrean case (9), rather than to an eventual integration 
which happened with southern Italians, in Milan at least. 
Stereotypes 
Do the racist practices and negative stereotypes examined 
above identify specific migrant groups or, on the contrary, 
do they apply more or less indiscriminately to each of them? 
This is important because one would expect the first case to 
be true, since the above events identify specific groups 
(e. g. housing-Eritreansp terrorism- Palestinians, Arabs) and 
because experience from other countries teaches that 
different migrant groups are associated with different sets 
of negative stereotypes (10). The process of racial 
categorization, however, does not necessarily obey the logic 
of "rationality", identifying precise causes and "causers", 
but follows the generalizing logic of "common sense", 
changing with the context (cf. Lawrence 1982a, Miles 1982). 
This is even truer in this case, with a substantial 
immigration that occurred only in the last five years or so. 
In the specific case of Eritreans and Egyptians, in spite of 
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rather obvious "phenotypi cal " differences (e. g. colour) (11) 9 
they are both subsumed under the same negative label of 
"Marocchini" (12). 1 have not been able to ascertain the 
origins of the usage of this term as a stereotype, but I was 
told by some old Italians that it dates from the Allied 
liberation of Italy in the Second World War, in which the 
French troops had a Moroccan brigade which, apparently, 
committed all sorts of despicable acts, that remained in the 
collective subconscious. Whatever the origin may be, the 
image this term nowadays conveys, is that of a poor Arab, 
with a wooden box, selling contraband watches, lighters and 
cigarettes and usually trying to cheat. With the recent 
arrival of the "new" immigrants, the term has widened to 
embrace not only all Arabs, but also all sorts of "black" 
Africans, for which it is used interchangeably with "Neoro" 
(13). Many Eritreans told me they were addressed both as 
"Marocchini" and "Neori" and I witnessed a case of a young 
boy asking a young Eritreant "are you a Marocchino? ". This 
derogatory label, conveying many of the above negative images 
of "disreputable" lifestyles, "criminality", "terrorism" and 
possibly religion (i. e. Islam), is therefore applied 
irrespective of "phenotypical" differences and sociocultural 
ones, making the people it identifies (usually Arabs and 
Africans, - but possibly also others) the object of the 
discriminatory attitudes that follow. One must agree with 
Miles (1982) that the process of racial categorization is a 
social contruction that is not based exclusively on colour, 
but that changes ideological content according to the context 
in which it occurs. 
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The sphere of racism and social alliances 
Looking at the socioeconomic context, it has been shown that 
the migrants enter the lower, "unprotected" tertiary sector 
of the Milanese economy. This, coupled with the sociocultural 
difference with the "host society", prevents the development 
of a common class consciousness that might help breaking down 
the perception of "ethnic difference". On the other hand, 
this also prevented, to a large extent, the emergence of 
racist practices and attitudes in the field of employment, 
when structural processes led to a competition for the 
relatively "protected" (in terms of social security) 
industrial jobs, like in France and in Britain in the early 
1970s (14). Instead, in Milan at least, it seems that the 
structural context for the emergence of racist practices and 
attitudes, is the field of "social reproduction", to use a 
neomarxist term (15), including housing, places of 
socialization and religion and, learning from the British 
experience (cf. Rex and Tomlinson 1979), probably education, 
although it is too early to assess it, as it has only been a 
few years since young migrants started entering the Italian 
educational system. 
However, the particular socioeconomic context of racism also 
means that not all the sections of the "host society" reacted 
in the same way. For example, after the above events, the 
Milanese section of the metallurgic trade unions (FLM), one 
of the most powerful, issued a leaflet denouncing "xenophobic 
events ... in our country ... that might become real and true 
racism against the Arabs, coming in the first instance from 
certain sections of the media, after the very serious events 
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of Fiumicino and Wien". The cardinal of Milan, regarded as 
close to the position of some of the "progressive Catholic" 
organizations mentioned before, in a speech delivered a few 
days after these incidents, expressed the fear that terrorist 
acts might lead to discrimination (il Giorno January 7, 
1986). The various organizations dealing with the migrants 
described in the previous chapter held similar positions. 
The next two sections examine whether the reaction of the 
host society to the presence of the "new" immigrants entails 
a change of perception and attitude towards it by the 
Eritreans and the Egyptians. 
8.2 Attitudes towards the "host society" and "ethnic 
transformation" of Eritreans 
Eritrean attitudes towards the "host society" and perceptions 
of racism 
Eritreans choose Italy as a destination of their migration, 
largely because of colonial links and come to it if not as to 
a "second mothercountry", as a place where they would 
integrate more easily, "because Italy has strong cultural 
ties with Eritrea", as an Eritrean put it (cf. chapter 4). In 
this respect their attitude was similar to that of West 
Indians migrating to Great Britain in the 1950s (cf. Cashmore 
1979). Also, one can recall Samuel's statement that "when 
Italians ask me how come you came here in Italy, I replyt by 
the same road on which you came to Eritrea". To the question 
of whether he planned to go back to his country if the 
situation improved, he answered: "we know where we are born, 
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but not where we are going to die", probably meaning that he 
could envisage settling permanently in Italy. If asked what 
they think of Italian people, Eritreans usually say things 
like: "Italians are good people". This might be interpreted 
as a "tactful" answer to an Italian interviewer, reproducing 
the idea Italians have about themselves ("being 
good-hearted", etc. ). However there is some evidence that 
Eritreans, at least in the first stages of their migration, 
are well disposed towards Italians and Italy, towards which 
they feel a "special relationship". For example, in the civil 
New Year festival that the Front organizes (cf. chapter 5), 
people come from Germany to Milan, rather than vice versa. 
Patria told me that "Italy is the most logical place to hold 
such festivals as it is the European country we feel more 
attached to spiritually". 
However they would often adds "but living conditions are 
very hard". Abraham once said that when he arrived at Milan's 
airport from Asmara, he was very glad to be in Italy. But 
when he saw the old casa occupata where he was going to live 
with his mother, he remarked: "My God, is this our home? It 
can't be! Then I haven't arrived in Milan! " This probably 
means that because of the historical links and the fact that, 
at least until the 1975 revolution, Italy was studied at 
school, expectations about the standards of life they would 
find there, were quite high. One of the first painful 
discoveries was the lack of legal rights (sojourn permit, 
work permit, etc. ) and the constant fear that a police check 
could mean repatriation and in certain cases at least, 
imprisonment or even death in Ethiopia. The historical link 
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between' Eritrea and Italy and the situation of famine and war 
in their country, make Eritreans resent the fact that they 
are not recognized as political refugees, thereby not 
enjoying any privileged status vis a vis other migrant 
groups. A member of the EFLF pointed out that the leader of 
MSI (neofascist party) was reported to have said that 
"Eritreans should be granted Italian passports upon their 
arrival at the border because of their contribution to the 
Italian army in the colonial period and Second World War". 
This lack of recognition of their claim to a special status, 
the fact that migration was often more a necessity than a 
choice, the expectations about Italy and the greater 
politicization (therefore awareness of rights), explain why 
Eritreans regard their living conditions in Italy as worse 
than those in their country and denounce episodes of racism 
more than other migrant groups (Melotti et al. 1985, pp. 
58-63). Also, being identified together with other 
"Marocchini", they resent the negative stereotypes that are 
associated with it. For example, they are often at pains to 
point out that'they are "an honest community", as opposed to 
other ones, often referring to the Egyptians. This negative 
perception of their situation was greatly increased when, 
after the terrorist incidents, they were perceived by common 
people as "potential terrorists" just like ' other 
"Marocchini". For example an Eritrean interviwed by a 
journalist remarked: "I work sixteen hours a day. Can I be a 
terrorist? " (1' Unita' Jan 5,1986). This implies that he 
perceived he could be identified as a "potential terrorist" 
as well. Father Yohannes blamed the media for having spread 
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the idea that all Third World immigrants are terrorists and 
that "because of a small group of terrorists, an honest and 
industrious community like the Eritrean one should be 
penalized". He added that the Ministry of the Interior was 
right in enforcing tougher regulations, but that Eritreans 
should be considered as political refugees. This non- 
recognition of the "particularity" of Eritreans, as opposed 
to other migrants, explains why, as Tedros said, citing the 
results of an internal survey, "more than racism we Eritreans 
feel indifference. At times we would even rather have active 
racism, that at least would be a sign of an acknowledgment of 
our presence and the conflict over the acquisition of rights. 
At the moment we are in a pre-racist stage". 
What implications does this perception of exclusion from the 
"host society" have for the patterns of ethnic identity and 
ethnic politics identified in previous chapters? As argued 
before, the Eritrean migrants who arrive, at an adult age at 
least, have strong "identity poles" (Ethiopic Orthodox 
religion and radical, anti-Ethiopian nationalism) and 
"ethnic institutions" (Father Yohannes' church and the EPLF), 
which not only preserve these aspects of their identity, but 
manage to draw some resources from the "host society". If the 
context remains the same, neither "assimilation" in the 
"host society", nor an "ethnic transformation" of identity, 
institutions and politics are likely to emerge. On the other 
hand a greater reliance by Eritreans on these institutions 
is to be expected, as long as they can cater for an identity 
that is alternative to that of the society that excludes them 
and manage these resources. 
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Second generation and identity transformation 
The same might not be true of "second generation" Eritreans, 
with changing attitudes and expectations towards the "host 
society" and 'a less direct experience of their country of 
origin. It will therefore be assessed if it is possible to 
speak of a transformation of the ethnic identity of these 
groups which is correlated with the presence of a "second 
generation" of migrants. For example Cashmore (1979) argues 
that the emergence of a Rastafarian identity among West 
Indians, sharply different from the identity of the first 
West Indian migrants, is to be associated with the changing 
attitudes, experiences and perceptions of British society by 
second generation migrants. While "second generation" 
migrants are usually considered those born in the new 
country, in this case the Milanese-born Eritreans are likely 
to be less than 10 years old and therefore too young to 
display those signs of a transformation of cultural identity 
that is usually associated with "second generation". On the 
other hand Eritrean teenagers, an age-group which would start 
to show these signs, are usually not Italian-born, but have 
lived in Italy on average for 3-5 years. This group may be 
considered as "quasi-second generation" immigrants because 
they have spent at least part of their formative adolescent 
period in Italy and have experienced, at least in part, its 
educational system. The hypothesis to test is whether there 
is indeed such an "identity transformation" that could be 
distinguishable for this group, as opposed to Eritreans who, 
even if only slightly older, or who have lived in Italy for a 
similar number of years, came after the age of 18-20, when 
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such a transformation is less likely to occur. From a 
theoretical point of view, it will be assessed whether this 
transformation- is due to an "identity crisis" and is 
therefore "conservative" (Lanternari 1976) or to changing 
expectation and circumstances and is therefore a "ritual of 
resistance" (cf. Hall and Jefferson, 1976). The extent of the 
presence of the family, crucial to the development of 
identity (cf. Epstein 1978), but not necessarily leading to 
"pathological" behaviour in the case of the absence of the 
father (16), as is often the case with young Eritreans, will 
also be briefly examined. 
The life-histories, behaviour and identity of a group of 
students, mostly Eritreans, in a training course to become 
plumbers/electricians run by EMASI (cf. chapter 6) can now be 
examined. This is also because I worked for this institution 
for about a year as part of my voluntary service instead of 
military service. Table 8.1 lists the students in the course 
with some of the main characteristics of their 
life-histories. Table 8.1 shows that the "Ethiopian" group, 
virtually all of whom are from Eritrea, is the largest one. 
Because of their numbers, social solidarity and the fact of 
having an Eritrean teacher, the Eritreans constituted the 
strongest and culturally dominant group within the course, 
although it was not a socially and culturally homogeneous 
group. Although it would be interesting to discuss 
"interethnic" relations within the course, for reasons of 
space the discussion will be confined to the Eritrean 
students and to the Egyptian one in the next section. 
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Table 8.1 Students attending the DIASI'course 
Dist Nationality d+to of date of f+eil eduotio LS-11t list ienslitt Ntr of date of tollt wut+ttr 
birth irnrrstion in Italy birth issioration in Italy 
Woue a 6roue I 
hass Eqºottm 1970 1985 lather I year 9oues Ethtooii 1967 1980 Bother, 1 year 
high school tether 1 high Kan] 
(Egypt) 3 brothers (Italy) 
Oon, ued Soulit 1947 1983 father, 2 ºers hbr+he+ Ethiopia 1965 1984 Bother 
S Hear 
catner, 11 Rotatory 1316 +we! 
1 brother school IEtateua) 
(Soalie) 
Irhwe Ethiopia 1965 1901 wne 5 ºers 
Omar Souli+ 1968 1982 none 5 years hill so°ol 
eleeentry (Etbeesai 
school 
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The background to some of the Eritrean boys on the course, 
like Abraham, Berhane, Yonas (of the Tesfazyon family), Haile 
(Lemlem's son) and Michael (of the Ghebreyesus family) can be 
found in chapter 4. Suffice it to remember that while Abraham 
and Haile were both born in Asmara, but from 
Tigrean-Ethiopian families, Berhane comes from an Eritrean 
family, but was born and brought up in Addis Abeba. On the 
other hand Yonas is a "pure" Eritrean, born and raised in 
Asmara. The other two Eritrean boys both had similar 
backrounds, born and raised in Asmara, and situations in 
Italy, having dropped "middle school" (17) before completing 
it and living in Italy with only their mothers, brothers and 
sisters. The most important differences between the two 
groups, as far as the Eritreans are concerned, are therefore 
the age at which they arrived in Italy and the related facts 
of having completed secondary education in their own home 
country (Abraham and Berhane) or of having their whole family 
living in Milan (Yonas). The fact that the Eritreans in group 
A (the advanced learning group) who lacked the above 
characteristics (with the exception of Michael) on the whole 
performed worse in the course than those in group B, seems to 
confirm the hypothesis that there is a dividing line between 
those who migrated in their late teens, after having 
completed the full educational and psychological cycle in 
their own country, and those who migrated in the early teens 
("quasi-second generation"), only a couple of years younger 
and with a longer period of stay in Italy. For the latter it 
can be hypothesized that the interruption of their 
educational process at a delicate period, the need to adjust 
to a new system of education (they all attended Italian state 
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school f or some years) and the subsequent school failures 
(also due to linguistic problems) created difficulties for 
their learning skills. The only exception to this pattern was 
Yonas who, even if classifiable in the "quasi-second 
generation" group, on a whole performed quite well in the 
course. It should be pointed out, however, that Yonas lived 
in Milan with his whole family, including his father who, as 
Yonas would often tell me, exercised a strong pressure on him 
to pursue education. Yonas not only attended the EMASI 
course, but also was the only Eritrean to have reached high 
school in Italy. 
Besides educational failures, other sets of "problems" 
usually associated with second generation are "deviant" 
tendencies and tensions with parents. There is limited 
evidence for the first case (taking as "deviant" behaviours 
that are stigmatized by members of the same ethnic group) and 
more extensive evidence for the second one. Haile was in the 
commom situation for members of his group of living in Milan 
with only his mother and brothers. But, besides that, even if 
at the time of the course he lived in a case occupata with 
the rest of his family, he experienced several years in Milan 
living on his own in a Catholic institute, since his mother 
was working as a full-time maid in an Italian family. The 
combination of all these elements, creating a situation and a 
perception of marginalixation, which helps to explain Haile's 
"deviant" tendencies. Haile talked very little to anybody in 
the course and later we discovered that he was responsible 
for many small thefts that occurred from to other students 
(including Eritrean friends) as well as outside the course. 
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His tendency to steal seemed to be more of a psychological 
nature than of an economic one, since he often stole objects 
that were of no use to him and sometimes even gave them back 
or to somebody else as a present. Another Eritrean boy, in a 
similar situation (he enrolled in the course, but soon 
dropped out), made use of drugs. In both cases "criminal" 
behaviour seems to be the result of psychological processes 
due to social marginalization, rather than "ethnic 
enterprise". Second or "quasi-second" generation and 
female-headed households are not enough to create these 
situations, but coupled with an upbringing in institutions 
and not in the family, they might bring them about. 
Concerning the correlation between "second generation" and 
conflict with parents, the evidence is more extensive. These 
conflicts partly related to different expectations from the 
"host society" and consequently different views of the 
relationship to it and in particular over the usage of 
leisure time, which Hall et al. (1976) see as an important 
prerequisite for the development of "youth subcultural 
responses". Michael, for example, was registered for the 
course by his father who told us he hoped he would learn 
something useful in view of a return to Eritrea (something 
sounding like a classical "myth of return", since the parents 
had been in Italy for the past 12 years and have no prospects 
of return as long as the situation there does not improve). 
Michael, like other Eritrean boys in his situation, also 
expressed the desire to go back to Eritrea, but saw it more 
like a vague possibility as opposed to the more concrete 
chance of staying in Italy or in neighbouring countries. 
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Parents. usually encourage their children to attend places 
like the Eritrean Youth Centre (attached to Father Yohannes' 
church), since they hope they will enable their children to 
retain their identity. On the other hand they strongly object 
to their children going out to attend Italian social places 
that would "corrupt" their children. Rather than just a moral 
judgment, this seems a way of expressing the fear of a change 
in cultural identity and "political" allegiances. On the 
other hand the children, who foresee many years in the "host 
society" and feel less strongly the parental identity and 
particularly the nationalist consciousness, do not want to 
miss out on new opportunities. 
When Michael started the course, he identified totally with 
his family. However he gradually started attending the "bad" 
places of socialization in Milan (described below), that 
attracted the condemnation of the adults, even if he still 
attended the Youth Centre or Eritrean "ethnic events". He 
also started to smoke, something that is stigmatized by 
adult Eritreans. Severe tensions with his family started to 
emerge. This pattern applied also to Gideon, Haile, Petros 
and, to a lower extent, Yonas. Three months after the 
beginning of the course, Gideon, Haile and Petros left for 
Germany (which recognizes Eritreans as political refugees) 
and it is probable that Michael joined them in the end. 
Although they could get many benefits in Germany as political 
refugees, none of them had any sojourn problem in Italy and 
they all had a family supporting them. It can be hypothesized 
therefore, that they left mainly in order to escape the 
social control of their families and the "Eritrean network" 
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(I heard some reports to confirm this) because, although they 
did not have their fathers living with them, their mothers 
still carried the weight of authority and the social control 
exercised by the "ethnic institutions" and their leadership 
was quite tight. 
On the other hand Abraham, of a different age-group, did not 
have any major tension with his mother, Ruth, with whom he 
lived. He respected the main Ethiopic Orthodox religious 
traditions, although he did eat pork (which is forbidden), 
but outside home. He never gave any cause of complaint to his 
mother in terms of fear of "bad habits". At the course he got 
a job with the enterprise from whom he did his practical 
training. Had Berhane also had some family in Milan the 
relationship would have probably been the same. As argued 
before, the differences between the two Eritrean youth 
subgroups can be explained in part by their arrival in Italy 
at different stages of the life-cycle, entailing different 
stages of socialization, identity and expectations. School 
failures, living conditions and discrimination would have 
been other causes. The cultural content of the issues that 
divided these boys from their parents can now be analyzed. 
The different conditions of the two age-groups, entailed an 
"ethnic transformation" in the first group that was made up 
of two cultural spheres. The first one consisted of cultural 
items "borrowed" from the "host society" (and Western culture 
in general) while the second one of Eritrean cultural items 
either dropped, or transformed and recontextualized, to 
convey new meanings (cf. Clarke 1976). In the last five 
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years or so, Milan in particular has experienced the growth 
of youth bands based on distinctive "styles", especially 
distinguished by clothing, after the fragmentation of the 
post-1968 political groups. Some of these bands are closely 
modelled on their British counterparts (punks, mods, etc. ), 
while others were distinctivley Italian, like the paninari. 
Although none of these groups has a very clear-cut political 
orientation, some of them are more radical-anarchic (e. g. the 
punk) and some of them more right-wing-conservative (e. g. the 
paninari). The latter often meet in piazza San Babila, which 
was once the meeting place of fascist groups. The fast-food 
restaurants that have been opened in that area in the past 
few years are an essential part of the style of these groups, 
being their favourite meeting places. 
Many of the "quasi-second generation" Eritreans had piazza 
San Babila and the fast-food restaurants as their favourite 
meeting places, even if they did not integrate with the 
other youth bands, but formed a separate one. It is possible 
that drugs are also used and dealt in these places. These 
places are condemned by Eritreans adults and seen as sources 
of "corruption". Besides meeting places, style of clothing 
(of which these young Eritreans were very conscious), body 
building, football (support and play) and music were other 
cultural items "borrowed" from the "host society" (18). While 
football was practiced also by adult Eritreans and these 
other leisure activities were not necessarily condemned, 
they acquired a new meaning as other distinctive 
characteristics of the Eritrean youth "subgroup". As far as 
football is concerned, young Eritreans not only played it in 
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their bwn "Milanafrica" team, but also followed the Italian 
championship very closely (reading the daily sports 
newspaper) and often going to the stadium. Usually Young 
Eritrean in Milan supported A. C. Milan, rather than Inter 
F. C., because the second team has the reputation of having 
many racsit fans. As far as music and dance is concerned, 
apart from Bob Marley, the favourite singer is Michael 
Jackson and the favourite style of dancing is break-dance. 
All these cultural items coexist with the "traditional" 
Eritrean ones, but start to identify "second generation" 
Eritreans as a "youth subcultural group", defined also by 
items borrowed from the "host society" (in terms of Western 
culture). But this also shows the emergence of a kind of 
"black awareness" (football and racism, black music and 
dance). It should also be noted that, unlike in Britain (cf. 
McRobbie and Garber 1976), Eritrean young women to a large 
extent participate in this subculture. 
These young Eritreans did not necessarily refuse 
"traditional" Eritrean culture as they attended the Eritrean 
Youth Centre and festivals organized by Father Yohannes and 
the Front. But while the identification with Orthodox 
Christianity still persisted, in spite of the neglect of 
many religious precepts the nationalist pole of their 
parents' identity began to show some signs of disintegration. 
This was shared also by people like Abraham and Berhane, 
even if the former came from a Tigrean family (but was 
brought up in Asmara and felt, at the beginning at least, 
some sympathy with the Eritrean cause) and the latter, 
although of Eritrean family, felt more "Ethiopian", being 
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born and raised in Addis Abeba. For example, most of the 
Eritreans who went to see the Ethiopian concert where Amhara 
music was also played (cf. chapter 7), in spite of pressures 
from the Front not to attend it, were "second generation" 
ones. Among them there was Yonas who, as a young boy in 
Asmara, used to stick: illegal EPLF posters. When his father, 
an EPLF supporter, came to know this, he got very angry at 
him. Also, after I went to the Bologna festival with Yonas, 
Abraham and Berhane, while they all said they enjoyed the 
music played by Te4:: le, the traditional dances and food, they 
told me they resented the sectarianism of the Front which 
privileged young Eritreans in its youth cadres. This is all 
the more striking from somebody like Yonas who is a "pure" 
Eritrean. 
Rather than a contradiction between Ethiopian-Amharic and 
western-black music, as opposed to Tigrinya-Eritrean music, 
young Eritreans seem to integrate the two. Often in the 
Youth Centre young Eritreans would tell me that they were 
playing (both on a tape recorder and live with some 
instruments) Ethiopian-Amharic music or else Eritrean- 
Tigrinya music, or Michael Jackson and Bob Marley. The 
different expectations of staying in Italy as opposed to 
going back to Eritrea and the fall in nationalist 
consciousness as a live political issue (even if many of 
these young Eritreans remain aware of the issue and maintain 
their support of Eritrean independence), help to understand 
that a transformation from an Eritrean identity to a wider 
Abyssinian one might have started. This would allow them to 
incorporate both some "traditional" cultural items and those 
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borrowed from the "host society" mentioned above, and to 
recontextualize them in a "new" identity containing some 
Rastafarian elements, thereby reflecting their situation as 
an emerging "black diaspora" group. Although a full-fledged 
Rastafari movement, both in terms of "distinctive style" 
(dreadlocks etc. ) and doctrine (Haile Selassie I, etc. ) has 
not yet developed, there are signs that a "drifting", to use 
Cashmore's (1979) term, is emerging. Bob Marley is probably 
the greatest musical hero and although he was already known 
before the migrants came to Italy, "it is only now that I 
understand his message", as a young Eritrean put it. 
Rastafari symbols appeared in Eritrean homes that I visited 
in the rooms of the children. As they include the Ethiopian 
national colours, they are a symbol of rupture in the home 
of nationalist Eritreans. The adoption of Rastafari identity 
is made easier by the fact that these youth already possess 
some of the "cultural traits" utilized by Rastafarianism and 
in particular Ethiopic Orthodox Christianity. This means that 
"we don't have to take on board all the religious aspects of 
Rastafari: we are already Ethiopic Orthodox", as a young 
Eritrean told me. It should be emphasized that this is only 
a trend, as there are still degrees of allegiance to the 
"traditional" values (including nationalist ones). The older 
boys, like Abraham, although they are also Bob Marley fans, 
do not incorporate him as part of a distinctive lifestyle. 
In summary, while adult Eritreans rely on the two 
"traditional identity poles" as a result of the non- 
recognition of their special relationship to the "host 
society", "quasi-second generation" ones, with different 
I 
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expectations and experiences, are beginning to transform 
their identity to that of a "black diaspora" group, in which 
Rastafari is an important element. These processes with 
respect to the Egyptians will be analyzed below. 
E3.3 Attitudes towards the "host society" and "ethnic 
transformation of the Egyptians 
Egyptian attitudes towards the "host society" and perceptions 
of racism 
Egyptians come to Italy for a mix of economic and 
sociocultural reasons (cf. chapter 4). Their choice of Italy 
is determined more by pragmatic considerations than by 
historical and cultural ones, unlike the Eritreans. Therefore 
their expectations about the "host society" are less high and 
ideologically based and more pragmatic. It is a migration 
determined more by choice than by necessity. Provided that 
these preconditions are satisfied, most people enjoy staying 
in Italy. For example Ibrahim (cf. chapter 4) told met "On 
the whole I enjoy life in Italy as I have a relatively good 
salary and can experience things I couldn't in Egypt. I would 
like to go back but only for a brief holiday". Of all the 
Egyptians I interviewed, only Suliman, who works 64 hours a 
week in a bakery, told me he would definitely like to leave 
Italy and go to Great Britain and work with a cousin of his, 
if he can obtain a permit. For most Egyptians, even if their 
average working week is longer than that of Italian workers 
this does not seem to be a major set-back. They seem to be 
relatively content with the possibility of having a job, to 
make some money and to be able to enjoy some of the 
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sociocultural facilities Italy offers. To the question of 
what they thought of Italian people, they always gave the 
same answer: "it is difficult to generalize. There are, like 
in every country, good people and bad people". This 
individualistic attitude towards Italian people again 
contrasts quite sharply with the more generalizing statements 
made by Eritreans and is almost certainly due to the 
different causes of migration, perceptions of links with 
Italy, and expectations from the migratory experience. 
Moreover whereas Eritreans stress the historical links, some 
Egyptians have expressed the perception of a cultural 
affinity with Italy, in terms of a shared "Mediterraneanness" 
(especially in terms of character), although the links are 
not'so strong as those perceived by the Eritreans. 
Naturally Egyptians also resent their hard living conditions, 
but because of the different migratory project and 
expectations (there is no sense of something being 
historically "due" to them, as there is for the Eritreans) 
and the lower degree of (radical) political consciousness, 
they feel the presence of discrimination and racism to a 
lesser extent. Regarding the application of negative 
stereotypes like Marocchino, Magdi told me that it does not 
bother him, but wonders why he is called that way, since he 
comes from Egypt. The xenophobic tensions that followed the 
terrorist events mentioned before were felt as a worsening of 
the situation. ' While I heard reports that a few Egyptians had 
left this may not have been the determining cause, as it 
probably fell on top of other problems related to employment 
and housing. The prospects of a social and cultural 
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integration of Egyptians in Milan are differentiated. As 
argued in the previous chapter, intermarriage is one of the 
main forms of social enhancement pursued by Egyptians and 
although this does not necessarily mean "cultural 
assimilation", it certainly represents a major "structural" 
improvement and it may be assumed that permanent settlement 
in Italy would follow. Of those who, for one reason or 
another, do not intermarry, there are signs that, depending 
on factors like employment and housing, some might go back 
and some might settle more permanently in Italy. On the whole 
Egyptians, even if not completely secularized, have a 
"liberal" or "modernist" conception of Islam and have a very 
low degree of attendance at the Muslim Centre. For those who 
stay in Italy and do not intermarry, if the present-lack of 
economic and social integration persists, it can be assumed 
that a return to a much stricter form of Islam and possibly a 
much higher rate of attendance to the Muslim Centre will 
follow (19). This would provide both an alternative identity 
to the "western" one they did not manage to become part of, 
and a network of links and contacts, if not with the "host 
society" (like for the Eritreans), among themselves and with 
other fellow-Muslims, leading to the development of an 
"informal organization" within the Muslim Brotherhood "secret 
society" (cf. Cohen 1969). 
Second generation identity and transformation 
As intermarriage is one of the most important "strategies" of 
social enhancement pursued by the Egyptians, but has the 
effect of creating a social differentiation within the group, 
it will also affect an "ethnic transformation" of the second 
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generat. ion. Most actual second generation offspring are 
presently the children of these intermarriages. This creates 
problems of research because these children are on average 
too young to be of interest to this study and also because 
they are not likely to be found in the "ethnic institutions" 
and events where a researcher can interview and "observe" 
them. However from a conversation with an official of the 
Egyptian consulate it is possible to speculate about what 
might be going on. He told me that there are many signs that 
the children of these "mixed marriages", are beginning to 
encounter some difficulties in maintaining the 
Egyptian-Muslim side of their identity, especially from a 
linguistic and a religious point of view. This is because 
the language spoken in the family, in the school and the 
"wider society", is Italian and because the level of 
commitment to Islam of the Muslim parent (usually the father) 
does not seem to be strong enough to counter the "lay" 
forces the child is going to be subjected to. Also a 
"reactive ethnicity" in term of a return to Islam as a result 
of discrimination is not likely to occur, because of the 
socioeconomic (legal rights, citizenship, etc. ), linguistic 
and "physical" ("colour") lack of differentiation with the 
"host society". 
However other trends are also possible. For example of those 
Egyptians who decide to stay in Italy but, for one reason or 
another, do not marry an Italian woman, some might go back 
temporarily to Egypt to get married (one Egyptian I 
interviewed, Abdel, had this intention) and then be joined 
by their family, or an increase in migration of Egyptian 
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women to Italy might occurr (e. g. Ismail married an Egyptian 
woman in Italy, but one whom he knew from Egypt). Hassan, the 
only -Egyptian boy who followed the EMASI course, followed the 
first pattern. He was 15 years old when he joined the course 
and had been living in Milan for just over a year with his 
fathe-, Mustafa' (cf. chapter 4). Even though he had 
completed his first year of high school in Egypt and was 
quite an intelligent and educated boy, his poor knowledge of 
the Italian language, the fact of being the only Egyptian boy 
on the course and of having no Egyptian (or Italian) friends, 
made Kim encounter difficulties in the course. He socialized 
very little with the other students, had difficulties in 
understýanding and being understood and, probably as a result, 
he was-very shy. At the end of the first half of the course 
in i. ni ch, in spite of everything, he was relatively 
proficient, he was taken to hospital suffering from an asthma 
attack. After a few weeks he was dismissed, but his father 
decided that it was better for him to go back to Egypt where 
he started high school again. Later on Mustafa' told me that 
his son wished to come back to Italy, provided that he could 
find another suitable course. Hassan's story illustrates the 
social and psychological difficulties other young Egyptians 
in his position might also encounter, feeling strangers in a 
new s". ciety (even if attracted by it) and lacking the 
alternative identity and social support, given by a 
substantial number of "fellow-ethnic" family and age-peer 
groups, like for the Eritreans. If a substantial number of 
"pure" second generation Egyptians does develop, however, it 
can be suggested that, as for their parents, the lack of 
socioeconomic (legal rights, patterns of employment), 
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linguistic and, to a lesser extent, "physical" ("pure" Arabs 
are more recognizable than "half-cast" ones) integration in 
the "host society" will entail a "reactive" return to Islam, 
as suggested above. 
In summary, the Egyptians come to Italy with more pragmatic 
expectations about what they will find in the "host society" 
and hold a more "individualistic" attitude towards their 
relationship with the Italian people. As a result of this, 
they seem to feel the discriminatory practices of the "host 
society"less, both at the socioeconomic and ideological 
level. However, while there may be a relative degree of 
integration and, eventually, even of assimilation for those 
Egyptians who intermarry with Italians, the same might not 
apply for those who do not and yet decide to stay in Italy. 
For them a greater adherence to Islam than the one they 
practiced in the first years of their settlement is more 
likely to happen. 
8.4 Eritrean-Egyptian relations 
As may be expected, the economic, social and cultural 
differences between Eritreans and Egyptians prevent any 
substantial degree of interaction between the two groups. 
This can be seen not only by the absence of members of one 
group from the institutions and events of the other, but also 
by an almost total segregation in situations of proximity. 
For example, in a street where there is an Eritrean 
restaurant and bar, there is also a bar attended by many 
Egyptians (run by Italians), who never attend the Eritrean 
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one. What is more interesting is the awareness of each 
other's presence and the existence of reciprocal stereotypes 
that reveal the emergence of a certain degree of rivalry and 
competition. This rivalry and competition is not a direct 
one, for example in economic terms (as there may be between 
Eritrean and Philippino maids, where the former accuse the 
latter of unfair competition as they accept jobs with lesser 
pay and a lower degree of social security). On the other hand 
it seems that between Eritreans and Egyptians it is more in 
terms of differentiating themselves from the racist 
stereotypes the "host society" holds about them both. 
The greatest amount of evidence was found among the 
Eritreans. For example Samuel told me that when Eritreans go 
to places like the voluntary organizations described in 
chapter 6, they may come just to get a job and if an officer 
asks them: "do you want a free meal? ", they would answer "I 
came here to work, not to get charity", implying that 
Egyptians, on the other hand, do accept charity. In other 
words, he seemed to want to distance his group from the 
perception the "host society" might have of the migrants as 
"parasitic immigrants, living off our backs". Secondly he 
also said that "while Eritreans tend to marry among 
themselves, Egyptians would marry prostitutes in order to get 
Italian citizenship". Again there was the notion of the 
"opportunistic migrant" vs. "ethnic dignity", this time made 
even stronger by the presence of marriage, as a rite of 
passage enabling the defence of "ethnic dignity". Thirdly 
there was among many Eritreans, the perception of Egyptians 
in terms of "criminality". "They are all thieves" was a very 
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common . response to the question of what they thought of 
Egyptiar s. While all these sentences have some bearing on 
reality %cf. chapters. 6 and 7), the terms in which they are 
constructed and the lack of analysis of the reason for this 
situaticn, make them stereotypes that are not racist because 
they lark the power to implement discriminatory practices 
they wc'uld entail. Finally there is also, among young 
Eritrean s, an "ethnic Joke" about Egyptians that draws on the 
even more "classic" racist imagery that the "host society" 
holds - about "Marocchini" in general, referring to the 
(supposed) inability of African people and Arab people in 
particular to pronounce the letter "p". A famous Italian 
singer is called Loredana Berte'. An Egyptian in a 
discotheque asks the disc-jockey if he could play a record by 
"Loredana". The di asks "fierte'? " The Egyptian answers: "Ber 
me, ber =e', ber tutti" (mistaking the surname for the 
question "per te'? ", meaning "for you? " and therefore 
answers n- : "for me, for you, for everybody"). What is 
interesting is that Eritreans share, to a lesser extent, the 
difficulty of pronouncing the letter "p", but transfer this 
perceived "inability" which is considered, by the "host 
society", the linguistic mark of "primitiveness", on to the 
Egyptians. And it is precisely around the notion of 
"primitiveness" that the few remarks I heard from Egyptians 
about Eritreans were constructed (e. g. "Eritreans are more 
primitive and lazier, and make their women work"). 
363 
8.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has examined various interrelated issues. In the 
first place it tried to analyze the pattern of racist 
ideologies and discriminatory practices that are applied by 
the "host society" to the migrant groups. While some 
"structural" discriminations (in terms of lack of legal 
rights that create a "clandestine army of labour") have been 
examined in previous chapters, here it was pointed out that 
the "material bases" for the emergence of discriminatory 
practices and attitudes were to be found not so much in the 
field of employment but in that of "social reproduction" 
(housing, places of socialization and worship, etc. ) and in 
the area of "criminality". This also provided a set of 
ideological imagery around which the migrants were 
constructed (the "criminalization" of migrants), an imagery 
that was less of a "classical" racist type couched in the 
biological language of "race" (also because of the relative 
lack of this "tradition" in Italy) and more in terms of 
"disreputable lifestyles", "alienness", "criminality" and 
"terrrorism". The last notion was stimulated by some dramatic 
current events, while others where linked to the "traditional 
repertoire", related to the perception of Islam and, 
to a 
lesser extent, to the colonial past. Although the two groups 
were to a large extent categorized together and 
the same 
negative label, Marocchino, applied to both of 
them (thereby 
disproving certain theories about the analytical validity of 
the concept of "race", in terms of "phenotypes"), 
they 
perceived the situation and reacted in different ways. 
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The patterns reported depended on the different causes of 
migration, expectations and perceptions of links with the 
"host society" and characteristics of the migrant groups in 
terms of demographic structure and politico-cultural 
characteristics. Thus the Eritreans who migrate more out of 
necessity-than choice, as a group than individuals, expect a 
"special relationship" with Italy because of the colonial 
past and have a higher degree of radical political 
consciousness, perceive their situation as worse than the 
Egyptians who hold a more individualistic and pragmatic 
attitude, . towards the "host society", even if in certain 
respects the situation of the latter is worse than that of 
the . former. - Consequently also patterns of "ethnic 
transformation" differ between the two groups. In the 
Eritrean case while first generation migrants have strong 
identity and network support from the two main "ethnic 
institutions" to rely on, there are signs that in the second 
generation an "ethnic transformation" may be emerging. This 
seems to be due to the different patterns of socialization 
available to youth within Milanese society and to the 
decline of Eritrean national consciousness as a live 
political issue and relevant identity. A Rastafarian identity 
is beginning to emerge that allows young Eritreans to 
incorporate certain cultural items of the "host society" and 
to retain certain "traditional" ones. But it is "Abyssinian" 
rather than Eritrean and, with its ideological content, it 
reflects their situation as a "black diaspora" group. On the 
question of the relationship between the second generation 
and "social deviance" or "social problems", only limited 
evidence was found, provided that a number of negative social 
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situations (single parents, institutionalized upbringing) 
overlapped. but in no way due to the "pathology" of the 
family. 
On the o=ner hand the situation of Egyptians is more 
differentiated, especially on the basis of whether they 
intermarry with Italian women or not. If this is the case, 
one can expect a certain degree of social and cultural 
integration at the level of the first generation and maybe 
even of assimilation at that of second generation. If they do 
not and decide to stay in Italy one can hypothesize a return 
to a greater practice of Islam as an alternative identity and 
a greater reliance on the Muslim Centre also in terms of 
socialization and access to networks, even if internal to the 
Muslim community. This would probably apply also to a second 
generation that might begin to emerge also for this group. 
Finally although interaction between the two groups is very 
low, there is an awareness of each other's presence and there 
exist negative sterotypes about each other, especially in 
order to try to counter the negative views of the "host 
society". 
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NOTES TO CHAPTER 8 
(1) Cf. la Repubblica (August 22,1985 and September 5, 
1985). 
(2) Comune di Milano: "Interpellan: a del 16-9-1985 pervenuta 
il -10-1985 del Consigliere rag. De Corato e altri. 
Oggetto: occupa: ioni abusive di migrati Eritrei". 
(3) As mentioned in chapter 4, there is also a conflict over 
the estimate of foreign immigrants in Milan between the media 
(which usually tends to exaggerate the number) and the 
leaders of the migrant groups (who usually tend to minimize 
it). For example il Giorno (January 9,1986) had an article 
on the local Milanese page with the headline: "they are 
100,000 and one out of three is outlaw". 
(4) Abu Nidal is a group that broke away from the PLO in the 
early 1970s which is suspected to be behind many terrorist 
attacks related to the Middle-Eastern question. 
(5) Cf. also Reporter (January 5,1986) which carried the 
headline "Doors less open to foreigners" 
(6)La Repubblica (February 2,1986) reports an Egyptian 
porter fired while he was ill. A friend of mine told me 
(late January 1986) that an Egyptian waiter who was arguing 
with an Italian client about a pizza was fired on the spot. 
(7) Schools have not been considered because data could not 
be found. 
(8) See chapter 4 and Figure 4.1, where it was argued that 
this was more an "ethnic" area in terms of socialization than 
residence. 
(9) The Eritreans, however, seem to have opted, for internal 
reasons mentioned in chapters 5 and 7 rather than because of 
external racism, to socialize in "ethnically exclusive" bars 
and restaurants. 
(10) E. g. in Britain there is the stereotype of West Indians 
as "lazy and noisy" and Asians as "crafty and sneaky". 
(11) These differences exist even given the "semitic" traits 
of Eritreans. 
(12) The term "Negro" in Italian has less negative 
connotations than in English, being just a slightly archaic 
form of "nero", meaning "black". 
(13) Cf. the label "Pakis" for Asians in Britain. 
(14) Even if this might be coexisting with racism in other 
social spheres, like housing. Cf. Rex and Moore (1967) and 
Rex and Tomlinson (1979). 
(15) Cf. Mingione (1981,1983a, 1983b), to whom I am indebted 
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for an -early suggestion of this point. 
(16) Chant (1984) makes this argument with reference to 
female-headed Mexican households. 
(17) The Italian educational system is divided as follows: 5 
years of "elementary school", 3 years of "middle school" 
(which terminates compulsory education), 5 years of "high 
school", in which the student, when registering, decides the 
type of study to follow (e. g. classical. scientific, 
technical, etc. ). 
(18) Football and music, of course, where also practiced in 
their country of origin. But, as far as football is 
concerned, only the Eritreans' entry into the sociocultural 
context of Italian football support is being emphasized. 
Music refers to non-"traditional" Eritrean or Ethiopic music. 
(19) For the emergence of this pattern in France, even if in 
a different context, see Kutchera (1984) 
368 
CHAPTER 9: CONCLUSIONS 
This concluding chapter examines two issues: the character 
of ethnic politics or "ethnicity" and the theoretical 
implications of this study for the analysis of "urban 
ethnicity". 
9.1 A characterization of the two ethnic groups 
Figure 9.1 summarizes the main differences between the 
Eritreans and Egyptians discussed in this thesis. 
In chapters 3 and 4 it was demonstrated that, because of 
certain regulations concerning foreign immigration and 
because of the requirements of the labour market, Third World 
immigrants largely occupy the unprotected lower tertiary 
sector and are therefore excluded from the unionized 
"protected" working class, being largely confined to 
precarious forms of tenancies. Within these broad sectors, 
however, the two migrant groups occupy different niches. In 
terms of employment, the Eritreans work primarily in the 
domestic/cleaning sector, while the Egyptians work mainly in 
catering. In terms of housing, besides precarious tenancies 
and residence with the employer (in the case of "permanently 
resident" maids), Eritreans have made extensive use of squats 
(case occunate) and increasingly, virtually alone among other 
immigrant groups, of public housing (case popolari), while 
the Egyptians have largely been confined to precarious 
tenancies and dormitories. Finally Eritreans have a higher 
369 
Figure 9.1: . Eritrean. sn Fy# LS in Mil ant co pjsrAti ve f eheR1P 
ERITREANS ESYPTIANS 
SACK6n0UND (Ch. 2) 
The cultural bactround (2.1) 
identification with Ethiopic 'modernist' identification 
Orthodox Christianity; radical with Islas (universalist); 
nationalist consciouseness. pan-irabisa. 
Causes of eieration (2.2) 
first economic, than political All of economic Ina social 
(war with Ethiopia) reasons. reasons. 
Choice of Italy, (2.30) 
because of historical lints as nearest accessible 
(colonialism) 'western' country 
THE ITALIAN CONTEXT lcn. S) 
Segmented labour sarket; gaps in the lower service sector 
Legislation on foreign ieuigration pushing the sigrants into 
'illegality' and into the lower service sector Limited access 
to public housing and services (Milan) (Lii 
'STRUCTURAL' ASPECTS icf. 4) 
Size (estieates) and sew-ratio (4.1) 
ca. 1,500 (ca. 601 Female) ca. 12,000 (ca. 301 Male) 
'111"ality" (estimates) (4.2) 
ca. 50Z 'clanöestines' ca. 85Z 'clandestines' 
Major stx-ace orouos (estimates) (4.3) 
Male and female (0-9)= 102 Male and female (0-9)" 1% 
sale and female (10-19)= 101 Male and female (10-19)8 52 
Male (20-39)= 201 Male (20-39)8651 
Female (20-39)" 301 Female (20-39)"152 
Male (40-59)= 101 Male (40-59)'lOI 
Female (40-59)2 201 Female (40-59). 02 
ivve of family orouos (estimates) (4.41 
Single woven= 201 Single +en"75Z 
Single women with eilarm=20-301 Couoles with children=201 
Couples with children=30-401 (many are 'mixed' Eq-It) 
Single uen=l0-ISI Single women=51 
Alin foes of efoloveent 11.5) 
Cleaning sector: Olles in Italian Catering sector: waiters, 
taoiles; some 'ethnic entreprise' dishwashers, cooks; sou 
'ethnic enterprise' 
Housing (4.6) 
Precarious tenancies; squatting; Dorsitories, precarious 
public housing tenancies 
ERITAEANS EGYPTIANS 
ETHNIC INSTITUTIONS AND OR6. N! ZAi10N Ich. SI 
'Ethnic' instittiti 
Church (Catholic, but Eth: ooic 
ritual, Eritre+n Artest: Father 
Yonannes); Front (nationalist 
politicization, main Milanese 
lt+oer: Takle): 3 restaurants. 
ohs end leaders (1.11 
huslis Centre (funaeente- 
list Sunni Isles; Italian 
leaders Abuoaur, eiordaniee 
leaaert Sherlf). Aale of 
Egyptian Consulate? 
Ethnic events and e+rticioetion (S. 2) 
Church (weekly uis, religious Mullis Centre (daily prey- 
festivals, aar: sory centre: high er, religious festivals: 
attendance, high rate of births low attendance, low rate 
and sarrieges)J Front (festivals, of births and urrieges). 
courses: high attendance). 
. 'Ethnic' oremitetion (3.3) 
Foriation of Eritrean Couuntty Recent 'too-down' proposal 
with elected council (roe the to constitute an Egyptian 
various sections of the group. Coueunity by peoole lint- 
Meetings with the 'base' ad to the Consulate. 
Character of 'ethnicity' (M) 
'ethoic group with ethnic 'ethnic group with ethnic 
consciousness' erueness' 
LOCAL VOLUNTARY ASSOCIATIONS (eh. V 
Attendance at local voluntary associations (6.1) 
High Attendance to associations high ettencance At "sso- 
helpieq with long-tare integret- ciations helping Pith 
ion and political connections. short-term relief. 
E)4NIC POLITICS (ch. 7) 
'Cultural stratroies' 0.11 
Stressing the group's ustincsi- Playing down distinctive- 
venes% and presenting themselves Ness and stressing lay and 
as a Catholic and oppressed 'Iediterranean' side of 
national sanority, their identity. 
Usvroetia' (7.2) 
At i group level througn At the indiviowl level 
leadership's contacts rite througo intermarriage 
the 'host society'in the field nod Math sou degree of 
social reproduction. 'ethnic crtee'. 
RACISM AND ETHNIC TRANSFORMATIONS (cf. 8) 
For both groups occurring is the field of social 
reproduction and culturally constrocted. loth groups subsumed 
subsumed under sae negative stereotype. For Egyptians soot 
Additional negative elements concerning Islas. (8.1) 
Identity tnnsiarsstions (8.2) 
Second generation trend Second generation partial 
toruds Restefarienisn. assimilation, or reversal 
to Islasic fundeuntellse 
proportion of "legal" immigrants (ca. 50%) than the Egyptians 
(ca. 20%). Even if differences in employment niches can be 
explained in terms of the different sex-ratio between the two 
groups (ca. 60% female among Eritreans and 80% male among 
Egyptians) and of the "chain effect" of the network process, 
it cannot be said that one group is qualitatively better-off 
than the other in terms of employment. On the other hand, the 
specific pattern of employment may to a certain extent 
explain the higher percentage of "legal" immigrants for the 
Eritreans, because domestic workers can find a work permit 
more easily. However, this difference and, to a greater 
extent, the major qualitative difference in terms of housing, 
can also be explained in terms of the different pattern of 
leadership, organization and relationship with the "host 
society"_pf the two immigrant groups. 
In analyzing this crucial difference, different patterns of 
ethnic identity and solidarity have been examined. While 
chapter 2 analyzed the social and cultural background of the 
areas of emigration, chapter 5 demonstrated that Eritrean 
identity in Milan revolves around two "identity poles", 
Ethiopic Orthodox Christianity and a radical nationalist 
consciousness. At the level of social practice this is 
expressed by the presence of two main "ethnic institutions"t 
Father Yohannes' church and the "Front" (EPLF). Both organize 
activities and events that have a large attendance on the 
part of the Milanese Eritreans and there is a very high rate 
of "rites of passage" (births and marriages) performed in 
these institutions as opposed to "host society" institutions. 
Also, it seems that the majority of Eritreans attend both 
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institutions, even if there are two small separate groups of 
followers of Father Yohannes and the Front. On the other 
hand Egyptians, who have a "modernist" identification with 
Islam, have also a rather low attendance (also in 'terms of 
"rites of passage") at the only institution that could 
perform the function of an "ethnic institution", i. e. the 
Muslim, Centre, which is controlled by the fundamentalist 
Sunni Muslim Brotherhood and is attended also by non-Egyptian 
Arabs. Bars- and restaurants have important socializing 
functions for both Eritreans and Egyptians. But in general, 
the degree of group-wide interaction and the strength, of 
support network, is much higher for the Eritreans than for 
the Egyptians. 
The fact that Father Yohannes' church is a Catholic one (even 
if-of Ethiopic ritual) and that quite a few non-Eritrean 
Ethiopians attend Front-organized events, suggests that the 
two "ethnic institutions" are not mere carry-overs from the 
iidentity of the countries of origin, analyzed in chapter 2. 
As far as Egyptians are concerned, while the low attendance 
at the Centre is justified with various reasons (distance, 
lack of time, etc. ) and sometimes with "ideological" reasons 
(the fundamentalist character of the Centre), the most 
striking features is a preference for marrying Italian women 
and a greater class differentiation within the group. Using 
McKay and Lewins' (1978) typology, the Eritreans can be 
characterized as an "ethnic group with ethnic 
consciousness", while the Egyptians as an "ethnic group with 
ethnic awareness", the difference being that in the first 
case identity is significant, forming the basis of group 
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collective action, while in the second it is not. On the 
other hand, the followers of the Muslim Centre could be 
characterized as a "group" with "consciousness", even if 
defined in terms of (Islamic) religion and not in "ethnic" 
terms, not coinciding with the Egyptian group. 
Moreover, and crucially, chapters 5 and 7 showed that, while 
the Eritreans have managed to constitute an articulated and 
formalized "Eritrean Community", with a statute, council and 
elections, which has enjoyed widespread support from the 
Eritrean "base", a similar and later attempt by a group of 
Egyptians close to the Consulate, has happened in isolation 
from the Egyptian "base" and has been met with considerable 
scepticism from the (few) Egyptians who found out about it. 
These major differences can be explained in part by the 
different demographic structures of the two groups, namely 
the smaller size of the Eritrean population (ca. 2,500 vs. 
ca. 12,000 Egyptians) and their more differentiated age and 
sex-ratio (while the Egyptians are 80% male and mostly 
between 20 and 49 years of age). This allows for a higher 
degree of 'face-to-face contacts and endogamous marriage for 
the Eritreans than for the Egyptians. The nationalist 
consciousness of the Eritreans and the fact of having a 
group-specific religion (albeit at the Ethiopian level), as 
opposed to the universalist character of Islam, might also 
help to explain the different strength of group identity and 
solidarity. However, these two sets of features (demography 
and character of identity) can only partially account for the 
extent of these differences. Chapters 6 and 7, on the other 
hand, examined what is perhaps the crucial difference between 
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the two groups, namely the different character of ethnic 
politics, both internal to the groups and in relation to the 
"host society". These differences can be further elaborated 
in-terms of "ethnic resources", "cultural strategies" and 
politico-organizational practice. 
The different character of ethnic identities helps to 
explain how the Christian and radical "identity poles" of the 
Eritreans allow them to understand and "play" Italian 
politics, and in particular Milanese ones, which are 
culturally dominated precisely by Catholic Christianity and 
radicalism (even if there are also other important cultural 
discourses), as shown in chapter 3. Chapter 6 analyzed the 
different attendance, on the part of the two groups, at the 
various voluntary organizations helping Third World 
immigrants. While Eritreans attended more organizations that 
helped with long-term integration (legal and political 
rights, education, etc. ), the Egyptians attended those which 
provided temporary support (shelter, food, subsidies. ) This 
can be seen not only in terms of the different character of 
the two migrations, i. e. the existence of a more effective 
solidarity network among the former, but also in the types of 
political contacts it allowed to establish. The Eritreans, 
through Father Yohannes, a member of the Catholic Church, and 
Tekle, the leader of the Front expounding the cause of 
Eritrean liberation, managed to be established good. links 
with various "host society" organizations, mainly of 
"progressive-Catholic" or radical post-1968 persuasions, 
while the attitude of the Communist Party has been more 
ambivalent. These links were given greater legitimacy with 
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the establishment of the "Eritrean Community"9 presenting the 
image of a cohesive and articulated group. 
This has meant that Father Yohannes has been able to*provide 
various facilities to Eritreans, like premises for 
socialization and meetings, holidays and recreational 
activities for young people, through the Church, and 
employment for Eritrean maids and sojourn permits for his 
compatriots, through his status as Catholic priest. On the 
other hand Tekle and the Front, through their contacts with 
trade unions and other organizations, was able not only to 
install many Eritrean families in case occupate but also, as 
a member of the Eritrean Community, to put pressure on the 
local authorities to grant Eritreans public housing, given 
the discretionary rules on its allocation to foreigners. 
Finally both Father Yohannes and the Front, on every public 
occasion, remind the Italian public of their "historical" 
duty towards Eritrea because of the colonial past, aiming at 
the long-term strategy of gaining the status of political 
refugees, and reinforcing the "moral basis" for deserving 
their support. The "cultural strategy" of Eritreans has 
therefore consisted of presenting themselves to the "host 
society" as a Catholic group (even if internally they follow 
Ethiopic Orthodox Christianity) and as a "nation" oppressed 
by "Ethiopian colonialism" (even if not everybody supports. 
Eritrean nationalism). 
On the contrary, Egyptians lack the "ethnic resources" 
enjoyed by the Eritreans and the Muslim Centre has not yet 
been able to implement its proposed plan to construct a 
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mosque in Milan, because of opposition from the local 
population, but also because of lack of political contacts. 
While for the Eritreans ethnic organization and leadership 
with their ability to draw resources from "host society", 
reinforce their allegiance to "ethnic institutions", for the 
Egyptians this relationship is lacking. This helps to 
explain the relative failure (for the time being) of the 
attempt to constitute an Egyptian Community wich functions as 
an "ethnic organization" like the Eritrean one. However 
Egyptians, might have alternative ways to counter this 
relative lack of "ethnic resources". Intermarriage (with 
Italian women), as shown in chapter 7, may be an alternative 
strategy as Egyptians are the "foreign" group with the 
highest rate of intermarriage with the Italian population, at 
least in the year 1985. Some degree of "ethnic" enterprise 
and criminality may be another alternative and there is some 
evidence that their crime rate, especially related to drugs, 
is among the highest among the various migrants groups in 
Milan and definitely much higher than the Eritreans'. On the 
whole the "cultural strategy" of the Egyptians involves 
"playing down" their identity and stressing its "lay" side 
and "Mediterraneanness". 
While the above social processes can be defined as different 
"usurpatory cultural strategies" employed by Eritreans and 
Egyptians to counter their situation of structural 
subordination, it has to be recognized that there are 
"exclusionary" practices employed by the "host society". 
Chapter 8 has shown that, at the level of social practice, 
the "material bases" for discrimination are to be found not 
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so much in competition over employment between the migrants 
and members of the "host society", but in the area of social 
reproduction and services (housing, places of socialization 
and worship, etc. ). The recent character of the migration 
helps to explain why members of the "host society" do not 
distinguish between many of the migrant groups (e. g. between 
Arabs and black Africans). Eritreans and Egyptians (among 
others) are both subsumed under the same negative label of 
Marocchini. This supports an explanation of discrimination 
and racism in terms of the "social construction of race", as 
opposed to the relevance of "race" defined in "phenotypical" 
terms. Other racist stereotypes were constructed more around 
notions of "criminality", "terrorism" and "disreputable 
lifestyles", than in the "classical" biological terms. These 
racist stereotypes and discriminations serve to reproduce the 
structural subordination of the various immigrant groups. 
Finally these processes, the expectations towards migration 
and the presence of a certain degree of generational 
conflict, help to explain an emerging trend towards a 
Rastafarian identity for some younger Eritreans. On the other 
hand, for, those Egyptians who do not intermarry and yet 
decide to say in Italy, one can hypothesize a redefinition of 
their identity in terms of a greater adherence to orthodox 
Islam and a greater reliance on the (fundamentalist) Muslim 
Centre. 
In summary, "ethnicity", which can be defined as the 
relationship between "cultural resources" and "cultural 
strategies" on the one hand and "usurpatory" political 
practice on the other, is crucial for both groups in the 
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absence of class resources and of formal political power. For 
the Eritreans it involves "making use" of cultural 
difference, even if in the articulation of a network of 
political contacts with the "host society" and in the field 
of "social reproduction", rather than for the articulation of 
a trading network (Cohen 1969). For the Egyptians it involves 
"playing-down" such differences. Thus for the Eritreans it 
has gained them access to resources such as public housing, 
education, health, places of socialization and worship (but 
also a greater number of work permits) as a group, while for 
those Egyptians who intermarried, the acquistion of these 
(and other) resources, as individuals, and, for others, a 
certain involvement in organized crime. Eritreans can 
therefore be analyzed as an interest group, while Egyptians 
cannot. While both groups entered the "host society" in a 
common structural context, the different interplay of 
sociodemographic factors, ethnic identity, institutions and 
organizations, mediated by the "political" practice of 
leaders/brokers and "commoners", has led to a very different 
kind of "ethnicity" for the two groups and to very different 
kinds of benefits from the "host society". But while the two 
ethnic groups adopted different "usurpatory cultural 
strategies", the "host society" adopted a unified one, 
involving racist stereotypes at the ideological level and 
"exclusionary" practices at the sociopolitical one. 
The conclusions reached so far are valid only for a specific 
period of time, i. e. in the three year period spanning from 
1984 to 1986, as the situation is changing fast. For example 
in 1987, during the time of writing, many of the "illegal" 
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immigrants residing in Italy have been regularized. Secondly, 
these conclusions are valid only for Milan because, as 
argued before, the "context" is crucial. The situation of 
Eritreans and Egyptians in Rome, for example, might be rather 
different, as seems to be indicated by the few data obtained 
on the matter. 
9.2 A framework for the analysis of "urban ethnicity" 
Having analyzed the specific conclusions of this study, a few 
suggestions about its more general theoretical relevance and 
its contribution to the literarture can be put forward. This 
can be done by proposing a theoretical framework for the 
analysis of "urban ethnicity" of which the present research 
constitutes a "case study". "Urban ethnicity" can be defined 
as the relationship between the culture and politics of a 
(minority) "ethnic" group (in the sense of having a common 
identity, perception of origins and history, maintained 
through "rites of passage") in an urban context. 
These processes can be analysed by looking at the interplay 
of three groups of factorst socioeconomic and 
socioreproductive, "political" (in the sense already 
clarified) and cultural. These factors are within three 
different domains: the ethnic group, the "host society" and 
the relationship between the two (cf. Figure 9.2). It must 
be stressed that this is only a framework for explanation, 
the content of which will vary according to historically and 
socially specific situations. 
I 
379 
Figure 9.2s A framework for the analysis of "urban ethnicity-" 
relatio 


































It is difficult to find a starting point because all the 
various "boxes" are interrelated and changes in one affect 
changes in the others. However, the analysis will 
arbitrarily begin with economic and reproductive factors. 
Starting with the "host society", the nature of productive 
and reproductive systems must be assessed. Within a 
capitalist, society for example, one has to see whether there 
are labour requirements in the manufacturing sector, or in 
the lower service sector, and whether the labour market is 
"segmented" or not. Entering the "protected" and unionized 
industrial sector or the "unprotected" tertiary one will have 
important effects on the migrant group's position in the 
class structure and on whether they can make use of class 
resources or not. Secondly, it is important to analyze the 
"reproductive 'structures", that is the nature of the housing 
market, both private and public, and the bureaucratic 
entitlements for access to the latter, as well as of other 
"urban goods", i. e. the nature of "collective consumption" 
(cf. Castells 1976,1977; Dunleavy 1980). Concerning the 
(migrant) "ethnic group", size, sex-ratio and age structures 
are important. The first affects the possibility of 
face-to-face contacts and interaction, even if only to a 
certain extent, as it is difficult to establish a threshold 
above which these social relations start to decline. The 
second and third affect, more crucially, the possibility of 
endogamous marriage. These three factors will be influenced 
by the nature of the migratory process, which in turn will 
also affect the group's incorporation in economic 
(employment) and reproductive (especially housing) niches due 
to the "chain effect" of the migratory network, within the 
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broad constraints imposed by the context. The relationship 
between the ethnic group and the "host society" can be 
characterized in these terms, as "ethnic division of labour" 
and "ethnic division of reproduction", which will' entail 
specific patterns of conflict, cooperation, or alliance, in 
the two different spheres. However, while it is obvious that 
conflicts in the area of production (class conflict) and 
conflicts in the area of reproduction ("urban social 
movements") (cf. Castells 1983) are frequent also within the 
"host society" itself, they are also possible, albeit to a 
lesser extent, within a particular ethnic group (1). 
Looking at the cultural aspects, one has first to 
distinguish between culture, identity and ideology (cf. also 
chapter 1). Not all of those aspects that make up the 
"culture" of a group also make up its "identity". In other 
words the first category is wider than the second. Moreover 
"culture", as a system of meaning and world-view, should be 
distinguished analytically from "ideology", as a distortion 
of social reality to justify existing inequalities, although 
in practice- it is not always easy to do so. Finally, while 
it is possible to have various competing cultural discourses 
in the "host society", some hegemonic and some subordinate, 
but all "legitimate", making it difficult to employ the 
notion of identity in this case, also in the "ethnic group" 
there may be competing ideologies, but the identity tends to 
be more homogeneous. It has already been seen that, 
concerning the "ethnic group", the strength of identity is 
affected by the demographic structure, among other things. 
However it is important to analyze the content of its culture 
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and the degree to which it overlaps with identity. For 
example, a live nationalist cause and an ethnically specific 
religion, might help to cause a greater ethnic solidarity, 
than, for example, common origin per se and a universalist 
religion, as argued in this thesis. On the other hand, 
aspects of what can be recognized as part of a group's 
culture, but not of its identity, might be important in case 
of a redefinition of the latter. Secondly it is important to 
characterize the content of the culture and identity of the 
ethnic group as well as that of the "host society", because 
it will affect the extent to which the group will be able to 
understand and "play" the politics of the latter and the kind 
of "ethnic resources" it will be able to use. This means 
that the character of a group's culture is not neutral in its 
social effects. For example, the Christianity and radicalism 
of Eritreans fits the Milanese context much better than 
Islam or the common origin of the Egyptians. 
Concerning the relationship between the two collectivities 
in terms of culture, one must distinguish between situations 
in which the direction of the relationship is from the ethnic 
group to the "host society" and vice versa. The first 
situation can be characterized employing Cohen's (1969, 
1974a, 1974b) notion of "cultural strategy", not in his sense 
of a process always involving the stressing of a group's 
cultural distinctiveness, but in the sense of a particular 
presentation of the group's cultural formation vis a vis the 
"host society". This presentation may involve a certain 
degree of manipulation of the group's identity, stressing the 
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group's distinctiveness or concealing it, as it has been 
shown with respect to Eritreans and Egyptians. 
As Cohen (1974a) stresses, it is very difficult to separate 
"cultural strategies" from the political aspects of the 
group. According to the above framework, they must be related 
to the presence or absence and to the character of "ethnic 
institutions, leadership and organization", that is to the 
political characteristics of the "ethnic group. These allow 
not only for the maintenance and reproduction of identity, 
but also for the articulation of informal political power. In 
this respect they correspond to the political parties and 
organizations of the "host society" but with a lack of formal 
power and a greater reliance on informal organization. Thus 
one can hypothesize that those groups whose "ethnic 
institutions" and leadership can either articulate internal 
trading networks (e. g. the Ibadan Hausa) or a network of 
political links with the "host society" (e. g. the Milanese 
Eritreans) will adopt "cultural strategies" stressing 
distinctiveness. On the other hand, ethnic groups without 
ethnic institutions (enjoying resources), will down-play 
their distinctiveness and seek social enhancement at an 
individual level. The different relationship this entails 
with the "host society" can be characterized as "usurpatory 
practices", following Parkin's (1979) notion of "social 
closure". For example, Eritreans aim to obtain the status of 
political refugees as a group, while Egyptians aim to acquire 
Italian nationality as individuals. 
This also has important effects at the economic level 
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countering the lack of class resources in order to overcome a 
subordinate position within the ethnic division of labour and 
reproduction. Thus Eritreans managed to overcome, to some 
extent, disadvantages mainly in the field of -social 
reproduction (housing, health, education, socialization) as a 
group, making use of the network of contacts between their 
leaders and some organizations of the "host society". On the 
other hand the Egyptians managed to obtain these and other 
resources mainly through intermarriage, but this has so far 
applied only to a minority of its population. Finally, the 
Madan Hausa (Cohen 1969) were able to make use of cultural 
and political strategies as a group in order to manage an 
essentially internal trading network, but not to obtain the 
resources the Eritreans did through their contacts with the 
host society. This relationship between "cultural strategies" 
and "usurpatory" political practices can be defined as 
"ethnicity". It has important effects not only in the 
socioeconomic field, as argued above, but in reproducing 
loyalties to leaders (thus allowing one to speak of "ethnic 
brokerage") and the legitimacy such leaders derive from the 
kind of identity they represent (e. g. religious or 
political). 
Finally, the relationship between the ethnic group and the 
"host society" can be examined from the point of view of the 
latter. The interplay between "cultural strategies" and 
"usurpatory practices" can be defined as "ethnicity" from the 
point of view of the ethnic group. Similarly, the interplay 
beween the "host society's" ideological stereotypes and 
discriminatory practices (domination and exclusion) towards 
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the ethnic group(s) can be defined as "racism", even though 
some authors (cf. Miles 1982) prefer to confine this term to 
the ideological sphere. The ideological stereotypification by 
certain sections of the "host society" may distinguish 
between various (minority) ethnic groups or not, also 
depending on the length of immigration. It may be constructed 
in' biological terms, as in the "classical" racist ideology, 
or more in cultural ones. This in turn will depend on the 
ideological legacy of the attitude towards "the other" and 
on the degree of conflict at the socioeconomic level. This 
conflict may be determined, for instance, by competition over 
employment, or over items of social reproduction, as in the 
Milanese case. At the political level this entails examining 
the degree to which the system of legal and bureaucratic 
rules that regulate immigration relegates migrants (or 
ex-migrants) to subordinate categories of employment, 
housing, etc., and excludes them (formally or informally) 
from the political system. Whereas ethnic groups attempt to 
alter their subordinate status through cultural strategies 
and usurpatory practices, the "host society" attempts to keep 
its dominant position through ideological stereotypes and 
exclusionary practices. The experience of domination, 
generational conflict and different attitudes and 
expectations from the "host society" may lead to an "identity 
transformation" in the second generation, as with young 
Eritreans in Milan tending towards a Rastafarian/Abyssinian 
identity, some elements of which were already part of their 
culture. 
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To conclude two points must be reiterated. First the "boxes" 
of Figure 9.2 should not be seen as fixed categories, but, 
in the language of "structuration" theory (cf. Giddens 1976, 
1985), as systems of reproduced practices constraining human 
agency. This means that practices can be analyzed only in 
specific situations that will determine the specific content 
of each "box". Secondly, the adjective "ethnic" is used only 
to denote a group conceiving itself as sharing a common 
origin and sense of history, that is culturally different (in 
linguistic, religious, or other terms) from the population 
with which it is interacting. 
In summary, the comparative approach adopted in this thesis 
has indicated several points for the study of urban ethnic 
politics, by means of a case study of Eritreans and Egyptians 
in Milan. In a situation of exclusion from the Italian class 
structure and from formal political power, culture becomes an 
integral part of a migrant ethnic minority's struggle to 
enhance its social position. At times, this "usurpatory 
cultural strategy" involves making use of cultural 
distinctiveness and articulating the group's interests in 
order to obtain resources not only in the economic field but 
also in that of social reproduction. At other times, it 
involves concealment and social enhancement pursued at an 
individual level, e. g. through intermarriage. While different 
demographic characteristics and the character of identity 
help to explain these processes, the crucial factor is the 
presence of ethnic leadership and political institutions that 
can make use of "ethnic resources" within the exclusionary 
constraints of the "host society". 
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NOTES TO CHAPTER 9 
(1) Cf. Katznelson (1982) for a good analysis of the 
separation of conflict in the productive sphere from that in 
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